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In the eyes  of the chroniclers,  the  Jacquerie of 1358  was  the most important 
peasant  revolt in late  medieval  France.  Yet  despite  this,  the  uprising has  not 
generated  the  quality  of scholarship that other revolts  from  the late  medieval 
period have encouraged, such as the Ciompi of 1378 in Florence or the English 
Peasants' Revolt of 1381.  In popular perception, the Jacquerie remains a violent 
spasmodic  riot  typical  of the  so-called  'pre-industlial  revolt',  itself a  model 
forwarded  thirty  years  ago  and  never  rigourously  examined.  Rather  than 
focussing on the complexity within the uprising, recent work has concentrated on 
whether  the  rebellion  was  co-opted  by  elites  (a  theory  that  this  thesis  will 
debunk);  indeed,  the  last  substantial  monograph  on  the  subject  was  Simeon 
Luce's Histoire  de  fa  Jacquerie in  1896.  Luce's work made use of letters of 
remission,  paid  pardons  issued  by  the  French  crown,  to  forward  a  more 
sympathetic view of the rebels.  However, Luce never exploited the documents 
fully  and  quoted  only  occasionally  from  their  nalTatives.  By  surveying  the 
remissions  systematically,  and  retuming  to  the  full  population  of documents 
available, this thesis offers 'a wholly new view of the revolt  its leadership, its 
geographical  dimensions,  duration,  organisation  and  ideology.  Moreover,  it 
challenges many old theories about the medieval 'crowd' as mindless, doomed to 
failure and dominated by the clergy and other elites.  In their place, it constructs 
a  new  model  around  cOlllil1Unal  ties  in  the  medieval  village,  sophisticated 
organisation within the revolt itself and participants'  identities  as  the  defining 
factor of the crowd's ideology. CONTENTS 
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7 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is barbarian -
that is,  a creature acting by instinct.  He possesses the spontaneity, the 
violence,  the ferocity and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive 
beings whom he further tends to  resemble by the facility with which he 
allows himself to be impressed by words and images ... An individual in 
a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs 
up at will.! 
So wrote Gustave Le Bon in his classic study Tlze  CrOYFd,  A Study of  the Popular 
Mind of 1896.  This image of the crowd held sway over the fields of both history 
and  psychology  for  a  considerable  time:  a  revolt  represents  spontaneous, 
barbaric, plimitive violence.  Worse, the individuals within the movement were 
powerless  to  resist  - the  'contagion'  of the  barbarism  within  the  crowd  was 
unstoppable.  Those caught up in the riot lack control over their destiny - actions 
are instinctive rather than planned.  The crowd gives in to its plimal instincts and 
with it  loses  their capacity for  reason:  '[t]he laws  of logic have no  action  on 
crowds'.2  Within the group, all  individualism is  lost and  'impressed by words 
and images' rebels possessed the same mindset. 
Le  Bon's theOlies  were attacked by social  psychologists who  followed 
on.  Early  challenges  came from  Floyd Allport and Sigmund Freud,  amongst 
others,  who  sought  to  re-establish the importance of the individual  within the 
movement.  To them, crowd action was the product of separate individuals acting 
in  a  similar fashion:  "the individual  in the  crowd behaves just as  he would 
behave alone only more SO".3  However, crowds are no  more the product of a 
I  G.  Le Bon, The Cr01l'd.  A Study of  the Popular Mind (London: Benn, 1896), p.  13. 
:' ibid., p.  113. 
3  See F.  Allport, Social Psychology (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1924). 
8 group  of heroic  individuals  than  they are .an expression of a primitive  'group 
mind'.  Rather, a combination of the identities of the participants come together 
to  form  the crowd's ideology.  Later psychologists forwarded Emergent Nonn 
Theory - the crowd  is  governed by rules  that  emerge  during the movement.
4 
CUlTent trends have developed this theory into what is known as a 'social identity 
model', whereby the identities of the participants govern the nOlms that emerge.
5 
Social psychologists now stress that crowds are melting pots of ideology from 
which sophisticated social agendas are forn1ed and identities expressed.
6 
Historians  such as  George Rude and  E.P.  Thompson have echoed that 
sentiment.  7  Revolts  are  complex  organisms,  propelled  by the  ideologies  and 
identities of the participants who  shape the agenda.  In any conception of the 
cro'vvd,  the insurgents themselves require the focus.  Rather than acting with the 
spontaneity of primal instincts, the identity and ideas of the mob are the crucial 
factors in creating the dynamics that propel the movement. 
Successful challenges to  assumptions that the crowd was a mindless mob have 
led  historians  to  theorise  that  the  'complex  crowd'  must  only be  a  modern 
im10vation.  Charles Tilly argued that developments in European culture, most 
notably  urbanisation,  industrialisation  and  the  growth  of the  state,  led  to  an 
4 See R.  Tumer &  L. Killian, Collective Behaviour (London; Prentice-Hall, 1987). 
) See S. Reicher, 'The St Paul's 'riot', European Journal of  Social Psychology.  14 (1984), pp.  1-
21. 
6 For an excellent discussion of various psychologists' views on the crowd and a summary of  the 
CUITent thinking on  the subject, see S. Reicher, The Psychology of  Crowd Dynamics (in press). 
7  See G.  Rude,  The  Crmrd in History: a Study of  Papillar Disturbances in  France and England, 
1730-1848 (New  York:  Wiley,  1964);  and  "The  London  Mob  of the eighteenth  century',  The 
Historical Journal, 2 (1959), pp.  1-18; E.P. Thompson "The moral economy of the English crowd 
in the eighteenth century', in Past and Present 50, (1971), pp.  76-136.  However, while arguing 
against a simple characterisation of  the crowd, they still champion the food riot  the prototypical 
'pre-industlial' revolt - as the major form of protest, although they do not demonstrate that this 
was the case. 
9 evolution in the nature of  revolts.  S  These 'industrial-era' revolts are described as 
more complex,  distant from  the  spasmodic riot of the  so-called  'pre-industrial 
revolt'.
9  For Tilly, it was a given that popular movements prior to the birth of 
nation state were less sophisticated than their modem counterpart.  For protest 
before the  Industrial  Revolution,  Le  Bon's vision of mindless mobs  remained 
largely intact. 
Of course, this model has been challenged.  The work ofN.Z. Davis, and 
before her Yves-Marie Berct\ have stressed that in their respective periods the 
riot was in fact a far more textured and complex organism than Tilly's typology 
suggests. 10  Each historian in turn has demonstrated that their chosen rebellion 
was  as  sophisticated  as  any  that  followed.  However,  instead  of dismissing 
Tilly's generalisation about the pre-industrial revolt from  the vocabulary of the 
historian, each new work has served only to  push the moment these  'complex' 
popular movements devolved backwards in time in the public perception.  For 
example, Davis's work, which stressed the impOliance of 'leaders' and ideology, 
have  been  taken as  indicative  of developments  new  to  the  sixteenth  century. 
The image of  the medieval revolt as spasmodic and destructive remains prevalent 
in the textbooks and surveys that cover the late middle ages. 
The only syntheses, until recently, came to conclusions similar to Tilly - Michel 
MoHat and Philippe Wolffs Ongles, Bleues and Jacques (translated into English 
S C. Tilly, Coercion,  Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1992) and C. Tilly, 'How Protest Modernized in France, 1845-55', The Dimension ofQllalitative 
Research, ed.  B. Aydelotte et al.  (Princeton, 1972),  pp.  192-256. 
9 This ternl has found favour in many works - Rude devotes a whole chapter to 'The Pre-
Industrial Revolt' in The Crowd in Histol)'.  The teTIn itself implies a sharp shift from before 
industrialisation to afterwards, of which there is no evidence. 
10  Sce N.Z Davis, 'The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth Century France' and 
'Strikes and Salvation in Lyon', Society and Culture in  Ear~y Modem France (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press,  1975); Y.-M. Berce, HistolY of  Peasant Revolts, t1'.  A. Whitmore 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1990). 
10 as Popular Revolutions o/the Late Middle Ages) described the medieval revolt as 
a  violent,  conservative  backlash  caused  by  poverty  and  misery.  I I  Guy 
Fourquin's  Anatomy  0/ Popular  Rebellion  followed  suit  - conflicts  were 
conservative,  harking back towards  a supposed golden age.
12  These historical 
works  also  stressed  other  old  ideas  tied  to  this  paradigm,  for  instance,  that 
crowds contained a substantial proportion of "elites':  Fourquin devotes a whole 
chapter to this theme. 
Individually, however, there has been excellent work, particularly on the 
Ciompi of Florence in l378 and the English Peasant's Revolt of l381, that serves 
to  give us  a more textured survey of medieval violence, and challenged these 
images of the barbaric pre-industrial riot.  Richard Trexler's studies, for example, 
have placed an emphasis on the establishment of  identity within the crowd, while 
Sam Cohn has shown that the leaders came exclusively from within the rebellion, 
not outside.
13  The English Peasants'  Revolt of l381  has been studied from 
every  angle,  with  interpretations  ranging  from  high  politics  to  localised 
microstudies:  for  example,  Rodney  Hilton  and  Chris  Dyer  stressed  the 
organisation and sophistication of the peasantry.14  This work has helped recreate 
the Great Rising as a subject wOlihy of  further study. 
11  M.  MoJlat and P.  Wolt1~ Popillar Revolutions ofrhe Late Middle Ages, tr. A.  LyttonseJle 
(London: AJlcn &  Unwin, 1975). 
12  G.  Fourquin, The Anatomy of  Popillar Rebellion il1 the lvfiddle Ages, tr. A Chesters (Oxford: 
North-HoJland Publishing Co.,  1978). 
13  For example, R.  Trexler. "Neighbours and Comrades: The Revolutionaries of Florence, 1378', 
Social Analysis, 14 (December 1983), pp. 53-105 and "Follow the Flag: The Ciompi Revolt Seen 
from the Streets', Bibliotlu':que  d 'Hwnanisme et Renaissance, 46  (1984), pp.  357-92;  S.  Cohn, 
The Labollring Classes in Renaissance Florence, (London: Academic Press, 1980). 
14  See R.H.  Hilton, 'Popular Movements at the end of the fourteenth century', in R.  H.  Hilton, 
Class COI!flicrs and the Crisis 0/  Felldalism (London: Temple Press,  1985) and also R.H.  Hilton, 
Bond Men Made Free (London: Temple Press, 1973); C. Dyer, "Thc Social and Economic 
Background to the Rural Revolt of 1381', in The English Rising of  1381, ed. T.H. Aston and R.H. 
Hilton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  For an example of  the range of 
scholarship encouraged by the Peasants' Revolt, sce collected other articles in The  English Rising 
of  1381.  For related scholarship on the relation between lords and peasants in England, see E.B. 
11 With the attention lavished upon the two most memorable revolts in late 
medieval  Italy  and  England,  the  same  emphasis  could  be  expected  for  late 
medieval  France's most important revolt.  Taking its  name from  the Jacques 
Bonhommes (the slang tenn for the peasantry), the Jacquerie began on 28  May 
1358, when the ganison at Saint-Leu d'Esserent was attacked by peasants from 
the  sun'ounding  area,  and  from  there  spread  quickly  across  the  north  of the 
country, stretching as  far west as  Rouen and as far east as the borders of Bar. IS 
Yet within two weeks, this great revolt had collapsed: on 9 June, Parisian troops 
(who themselves had rebelled under the leadership of  Etienne Marcel) J 6 and men 
from Meaux were crushed by the crown's forces when attempting to  destroy the 
fOliress  known as  the Marche on the other bank of the  Seine.
17  The victorious 
men-at-am1s  laid  waste  to  the  town  that  had  harboured  the  force,  before 
beginning  on  a  campaign  of destruction  throughout  the  countryside.  This 
counter-offensive effectively destroyed many villages involved in the Jacquerie. 
The next day,  10 June, a large force of Jacques, led by one Guillaume Cale, was 
defeated outside Clem10nt by the anny of Charles of Navarre, whose men then 
also tumed their attention to  the peasants in the surrounding area.  These great 
noble counter-offensives (and several on a smaller scale) swept up the remaining 
pockets of resistance over the next two weeks.  While the Jacquerie may have 
been brie±~ its impact was undoubted: the chronicler Jean Ie Bel posited that the 
Fryde, Peasants and Landlords in Medieval England. c.  1380-1525 (New York: St. Mar1in's 
Press, 1996). 
15  The size of  the Jacquerie has been underestimated by many historians. The revolt will be 
mapped extensively in Chapter 4, in the section 'Mapping the Revolt'. 
16 The Parisian revolt of 1358 will be discussed in  'Marcel' in Chapter 3.  This thesis will argue 
that the two rcbellions were entirely distinct. 
17 Most historians have accepted that Jacques were involved in the Parisian otTensive against the 
fortress.  This argument will be refuted in Chapter 3, specifically the section on 'The Attack on 
the MarcJ£. 
12 Jacques  'would have killed and destroyed everything had God by his  grace not 
sent help, for which each good man must give thanks' .18 
Yet unlike the Ciampi or the Peasants' Revolt, the Jacquerie remains an 
unreconstructed example of the  pre-industrial revolt in the historiography.  For 
Mollat  and  Wolff the  'movement  as  a  whole  was  as  incoherent  as  it  was 
spontaneous'.  19  By describing  the  movement  as  mindless  and  irrational,  the 
Jacquerie has been dismissed as unimportant.  Andre Leguai states that 'it is not 
even  the  most  serious  movement  of the  time  which  interests  us,.20  Having 
already  been  convinced  that  the  Jacque1-ie  is  nothing  but  a  messy  1-iOt,  he 
wondered how  'a blazing fire  of fifteen  days'  can  be  compared  with  longer 
struggles  like  the  Tuchinerie  in  the  Languedoc,  which  may  have  lasted  over 
twenty  years.21  It is  in  this  manner  that  the  movement  has  been  ignored: 
textbooks like R.H.C. Davis's A History of  Medieval Europe and Martin Scott's 
Medieval  Europe  ignore  it  all  together,  and  Georges  Duby's  France  in  the 
Middle  Ages  devotes  only  a  couple  of  lines  to  the  rebellion.
22  Yet 
unquestionably the Jacquerie was the most impOliant revolt in medieval France, 
at least in the eyes of the contemporaries.  There are over twenty accounts of the 
Jacque1-ie, by chroniclers in France, Flanders, England and Italy; no  other single 
revolt  can  claim  such  coverage.  Only  eight  chroniclers  record  the  Pm-isian 
'Revolt  of the  Hammermen'  in  1382,  and  only  fOUlieen  English  chroniclers 
reported the great English Peasants' Revolt of 1381.  For the Tuchinerie, we only 
IS  Bel, C!l/·Oll., v. 2, p. 257, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  152. 
19 Mollat and  Wolft~ Papillar ReJlollifions, p.  123. 
20  A.  Leguai, 'Les n::voltes rurales dans Ie royaume de France, du milieu du XIVe siecle Ii la fin 
du XVe', Le Moyen Age, 88  (1982) p. 58. 
21  Leguai, 'Les revoltes rurales', pp. 58-59.  References to the rebel bands known as Tuchins stali 
as early as  1363 and continue until their supposed destruction in  1384. 
22  R.H.C. Davis, A His/Oly of  Medieval Europe (Harlow: Longman, 1970): M. Scott, Medieval 
Europe (London: Longmans, 1964); G.  Duby, France in/fie Middle Ages 980-1460, trans. 1. Vale 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 279. 
13 have a short paragraph or two by the king's chronicler at St. Denis, Jar removed 
from the events and long after the revolt had been suspended. 
Of course,  the  word jacquerie itself has  survived to  us  as  synonymous 
with a bloody rising of the peasantry, which offers a good indicator of how the 
revolt is preserved in historical memory.  Napoleon was said to have responded 
to  the request to  arm the people by stating that he 'did not wish to be the leader 
of  a jacquerie,.23  Emile Zola cOlmnented that: 
Always, from century to century, the same exasperation bursts forth, and 
a 'jacquerie' arms the labourers with their pitchforks and their scythes, in 
which state they remain until they die.
24 
This depiction of a typical 'jacquerie' is indicative of how the original rising was 
perceived:  violent, manic and spontaneous.  It is  a madness that overtakes the 
peasantry rather than an expression of social grievances. 
This is because of the chroniclers' pOlirayal of the Jacquelie, particularly 
the lingeling image of the Jacques is provided to  us by Jean Ie  Bel,25  and later 
repeated and made famous by Froissart,26 which reinforces the modem prejudice: 
23  Quoted in E.  Littre, Dictionnaire de fa  Langue Franc;aise (Paris, 1863), reference for 
'Jacquerie', pp.  155-6. 
24  Zola, La Terre ( 1877), Premier Parie, Chapitre V, trans. D.  Pannee, The Earth (London: 
Penguin,  1980), p. 91. 
25  The Chronique de Jean  fe  Bef was written contemporary to the revolt.  Jean Ie Bel himself was 
a canon of Saint-Lambert in Liege, although he still had strong connections to secular society: in 
1327, Ie BcI became involved in military action against the Scots, and Auguste Molinier reports 
that he 'was always in the entourage of nobles'.  A.  Molinier, Le sources de I'hisloire de France 
des origincs aw: guerres d 'ltalie (1494), vol.  4, Les Valois.  1328-1461 (Paris, 1904), pp. 4-5. 
The best discussion of chronicle accounts of  the Jacquerie is M.-.T. de Mcdieros, Jacques et 
Chrolliqueurs,  fllle elude comparee de recits contemporains relalan/ la Jacquerie de  1358 (Paris: 
Honore Champion, 1979).  While an excellent discussion of the relevant accounts, its analysis of 
the Jacquerie, which uses the chronicles as its base, is necessarily limited and differs little from 
traditional views of the rebellion: it is intended as a study of the reportage of  the revolt, rather 
than the revolt itself. 
26 Jean Froissarfs account of the Jacquerie comes from his first book which, as Moliner notes, 
'was copied, which Froissart honestly admits at the beginning, from Jean Ie Bel's clzronique, with 
some additions and rehandlings'.  There is only one significant difference between Froissart's 
account and Jean Ie Bel's, and that will be discussed in Chapter 3, specifically 'The Marche of 
Meaux'. Molinier, Les sources de I'his/oire, vol IV, pp. 5-14. 
14 Soon afterwards,  around Pentecost, a mysterious  affliction broke out in 
many parts of the realm of France, in the regions of Beauvais, Amiens, 
Brie,  Perthois,  the  lIe de  France and Valois  as  far as  Soissons.  Some 
rural people had assembled in their villages but nowhere with a leader. ... 
Thus  these  leaderless  people  gathered  together,  burnt,  and  robbed 
everything and murdered gentlemen, noble ladies and their children; they 
raped  ladies  and  virgins  without  any  mercy  whatsoever....  Certainly 
among Christians, even Saracens, there has never been such uncontrolled, 
diabolical madness.  27 
Jean Ie Bel and Froissmi also include stories of the atrocities to  lend gravitas to 
their accounts: for example, a knight was roasted on a spit, before the Jacques 
'wished to  force  feed  [the noble ladies and their children]  the roasted flesh of 
their father  and husband'.  Other chroniclers  add  to  this  gtizzly image.  The 
Chronique de regnes des Jean II et Charles  V claims that the Jacques 'killed all 
the gentlemen they could find and did the same to  gentle ladies and many of the 
children with madness beyond measure'.28  The continuator of Richard Lescot's 
chronicle  (the  royal  chronicler of Saint-Denis)  is  similarly scathing:  '[a]s this 
pack of rabid dogs went about, coming and going, they single-mindedly devoted 
themselves  to  destroying  Senlis,  Ermenonville,  Thien)' and razing the  castles 
nearby to  the  ground and attacking the castle of Beaumont-sur-Oize'.  Lescot 
also  places  emphasis  on  their  murder  of children,  even  those  still  'sweetly 
kl'  , 79  suc'mg .-
Yet this is not the only impression the clu'oniclers give of the Jacquerie; 
even Richard Lescot attributes reason to the rebellion: 
27  Bel, Chroll., v.2, p.257, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  151. 
2, Chron. des reglles.  v.1, p.  180-1, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  167. 
29  Lescot, Chrol1., p.  126-7, trans.  S.  Cohn, PP, p.  170.  The continuator of Richard Lescot's 
chronicle was, like Lescot before him, a monk at S1.  Denis.  Molinier suggests the continuation 
was written around 1390.  Molinier, Les SOllrces de f'histoire, vol IV, pp.19-20. 
15 since the plundering was happening everywhere and.no one was around 
to oppose the brigands and enemy troops, the fields now lay barren.  As a 
result, on 27 May 1358 the peasants rose up ...  30 
Jean de Venette extends more sympathy towards the Jacques: 
the peasants living near Saint-Leu-d'Esserent and Clermont in the diocese 
of  Beauvais, seeing the wrongs and oppression inflicted on them on every 
side  and  seeing  that  the  nobles  gave  them  no  protection  but  rather 
oppressed them as heavily as  the enemy, rose and took arms against the 
nobles of France.  31 
In addition, chroniclers saw complexity within the revolt.  According to  Jean de 
Venette, the revolt began with a certain lighteousness, a 'zeal for justice',  but 
'since their lords  were not defending them but oppressing them,  [they]  turned 
themselves  to  base  and  execrable  deeds'.  32  The  Chronique  de  Quatres 
Premiers  Valois  describes  how  the  leadership  of the  Jacques  convinced  the 
followers to take a more reasoned path and introduced order into what began as 
chaos.
33  These  tempered  views  condemned the  rebels  for  their  brutality but 
simultaneously accredited them with a degree of organisation and saw their cause 
as justifiable. 
Recently,  the  value  of chronicles  to  the histOlian has  been questioned. 
Fourquin,  for  example,  described them as  useful plimarily as  a  guide  to  class 
prejudices (by focussing on 'what they gloss over or alter'), and urged turning to 
30 ibid. 
31  Venette. Chron., v. 2, p.  263, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p.  76. The chronicle was written 
sometime before 1365, and was probably the closest to the Jacquelie in tenns of geography and 
perhaps ideology - Jean shows sympathy with the peasants, although he celtainly does not 
approve of  their actions. There is some debate over the exact identity of the author, but he 
celiainly was a Carmelite fi'iar from Venette, near Compiegne, in the supposed 'heartland' of  the 
revolt.  See Cohn, PP, p.171  for a sholi discussion. 
32  Venette, Chron., v.  2, p.  263, trans. Birdsall, Vellerte, p.  77. 
)3 Chroll. premiers Valois, p. 72, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  159.  The chronicler was an anonymous 
NOIl11an cleric, at one pointfamilier of Philippe d' Alenyon, Archbishop of Rouen (1359-71), but 
composed the chronicle sometime between 1397-9.  Based primarily on the Chroniques des 
regnes Jean Jl et Charles V,  it was 'detailed and original for the wars ofNollnandy and also for 
the Parisian incidents', including the JacqueJie.  Molinier, Les sources de l'histoire, vol. 4, p. 25. 
16 'more reliable'  data for  discussion of revolts themselves.
34  As  is  evident in the 
passages quoted above, chroniclers did not remain objective about a movement 
like  the  Jacquerie.  There  can  be serious  contradictions  between  accounts  on 
crucial  information  that  one might expect historical  accounts  to  be consistent 
,-
upon.-)  Outside  problems  with  the  accuracy  of their  reportage,  there  are 
problems  of intertextuality  (as  evidenced  by  Froissart's  update  of Ie  Bel's 
original  account):  can we  speak of chronicles as  distinct n31Tatives  when they 
bOlTOW  heavily  from  each  other?  The  picture  is  further  complicated by the 
existence of 'un veritable laboratoire historique', the monastery of Saint-Denis, 
which produced not only the crown-sanctioned Grandes  Chroniques de  France 
but numerous other histories (like the work of Richard Lescot), and influenced 
many  of the  works  that  have  survived  to  US.
36  Yet  we  should  not  discount 
chronicles simply because they are problematic. In the case of the Jacquerie, the 
chroniclers"  personal and subjective accounts give us a sense of how the revolt 
was experienced by its contemporaries, and offer the only interpretations of the 
p31iicipants'  motivations  within  the  source  material.  Inconsistency  between 
chroniclers  can  raise  questions  about  the  revolt,  with  one  set  of chroniclers 
fervently cli tical of the movement, and another more sympathetic to the rebels.
37 
However,  most  modems  histOlians  have  simply  concurred  with  the 
fonner  group  (particularly  Ie  Bel  and  Froissali),  ignoring  the  more  balanced 
accounts  of the  likes  of Jean  de  Venette.  As  mentioned,  Mollat  and Wolff's 
34  Fourquin, Anatomy of  Popular Rebellion, p.  162. 
35  Probably the best example is the attack on the Marche of Meaux, which FroissaJi claims 
Jacques took part in, but no other chronicler does the same.  This will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
36 Molinier, Les s01lrees de I 'histoire, vol. 4, p. 25.  Also quoted in D.  Hay, Annalists and 
Historians.  Western HiSTOriography ji-OI11  rhe Eig/zrh to rhe Eigl7reenth Centuries (London: 
Methuen, 1977), which provides a good summary of  the late medieval chronicle tradition and the 
influence ofSt. Denis. pp. 63-87. 
37  For a discussion of  the usage of chronicles in the study of  popular revolt, see S. Cohn, Llistfor 
Liberty (London: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 14-20. 
17 synthesis emphasises the incoherence and violence of the Jacquerie, contrasting 
it  with sophistication of the so-called 'cluster' between 1378-82, including the 
Ciompi and the English Peasants' Revolt.  38  These latter revolts are identified as 
complex reactions to  the change in social conditions following the Black Death; 
the  Jacquerie  instead  was  likened  to  the  hysterical  knee-jerk  reactions  of the 
Flagellants and the persecution of the Jews that immediately followed  the first 
strike of the plague.  This acceptance of the revolt as a violent, spasmodic mess 
was most stridently expressed by Jean Flammemlont's inf1uential article written 
in  1879.
39  Flammennonfs model was  generally in agreement with Ie  Bel and 
others whose 'rabid dogs' and 'execrable deeds' paved the way for the popular 
meaning of the teml Jacquerie, even if  he gave some credence to the views ofthe 
sympathetic chroniclers.  For example, he based his picture of Guillaume Cale on 
the  account  from  the  Clzronique  des  Quatres  Premiers  Valois. 4o  Otherwise, 
according to FlanU11ennont, Jacques were essentially mindless.  In distinguishing 
between the uprising in Paris and the Jacquerie, Flmml1ennont suggests that the 
peasantry were too crude to have been part of such a complex political struggle: 
That supposes a plot and by consequence that the men were capable of 
reason, directed by intelligent leaders.  We find nothing like this within 
the .Tacquerie;  the insurgents were the gross peasants, without education, 
without instruction.
41 
33  Mollat and Wolff entitled their chapter on 1378-82 as 'The Years of Revolution', pp.  138-211, 
with a conscious glance forward to the 1848, the Oliginal Year of  Revolutions.  For a discussion 
of the misleading nature of  this claim, and the lack ,of evidence suggesting these years to be a 
distinct 'cluster', see Cohn, Lustlor Liberty (London: Harvard University Press, 2006). pp. 225-
7. 
39 J.  Flammennont, 'La Jacquerie en  Beauvaisis', Re1'lle Historique, 9 (1879), pp.  123-144. 
40  Flammel1110nt details that 'Gui11ame Karle ... was a man of great stature, remarkable for his 
beauty and intelligence ... he recognised immediately that the Jacques were indisciplined brutes 
and rcfused to command them, but they threatened him with death and he had to accept', 
Flammel1110nt,  'La Jacquelie en Beauvaisis', p.  140.  The Chronique des Qllalre Premiers Valois 
describes the same.  Flammermont also records that Cale was aided by a Hospitaller, a detail only 
mentioned in that chronicle. 
41  Flammermont, 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis', p.  127. 
18 FlanU11ennont's  article  responded. to  an  earlier  attempt  to  present  a  more 
humanised view of the revolt, in line with these other chronicle reports.  Some 
twenty years earlier,  Simeon Luce's Histoire de  fa  Jacquerie forwarded a new 
view of the violence, one more sympathetic to  the peasants.42 Concentrating on 
the causes of revolt,  Luce portrayed the Jacques  as  motivated by a  series  of 
failures by the nobility to preserve order and to protect its communities.  Instead 
of wild animals, Luce gave the peasants reason. 
Although  Luce  provided  the  last  thorough  analysis  of the  Jacques,  a 
couple of  modifications to his argument have been proposed since.  Building on 
Luce's work, Raymond Cazelles suggested that the Jacquerie was not, in fact,  a 
peasant revolt at all.43  Rather, he argued that the Jacquerie was made up of a 
combination of rural artisans, townsmen and the clergy.  The presence of minor 
functionmies meant this  could not be a rebellion against royal power.  He also 
believed that the organisation and planning of some of the Jacques' assaults was 
such that it would require outside intervention - Cazelles drew on Luce's thesis, 
and  suggested  that  the  provost  of  merchants,  Etienne  Marcel,  may  have 
instigated the whole revolt.  He then theorised that the revolt was set into motion 
before 28  May, and that the rising of the Jacques was a premeditated attack on 
the nobles' fortifications as part of a larger campaign for power by Marcel. 
David Bessen's 'The Jacquerie:  class war or co-opted rebellion?,44 used 
Cazelles' assumptions to further another theory.  Assuming Cazelles to  be light 
about  the  socio-economic  makeup of the  Jacques,  and  that the  revolt,  to  use 
42  S.  Luce, Histoire de fa Jacquerie d'apres des docllments inMits, first published 1859, 2
nd 
edition (Pmis, 1894). 
43  See R.  Cazelles, 'The Jacqueric', in  The English RiSing [if J  381, ed.  Aston and Hilton  'thc rich 
found thcmselvcs side-by side with thc poor, the royal official with thc lord's subjcct', p.  77. 
44  D. Bessen, 'The Jacqueric: Class War or Co-Optcd Rebcllion?', Journal of  Medieval HislolJJ, 
II (1985), pp. 43-59. 
19 Bessen's own tenn, was a co-opted rebellion,he argued that Charles of NavarTe 
was  more likely to  have  directed it  than  Etielme  Marcel.  The Jacquelie  was 
instigated in an attempt to  destabilise the crown's faltering control of the region, 
creating  conditions  in  which  Navarre  could  make  substantial  gains.  The 
Navarrese forces  crushed the Jacques only when it is  clear to  Charles that they 
could no longer be controlled. 
Neither of these arguments have proved convincing, but both are at least 
attempts  to  desclibe  complexity  within  the  violence.  However,  they  place 
emphasis  on  outside  forces  providing  organisation  and  direction  to  the 
movement, rather than from within the rebellion itself.  Their beliefs stem from a 
prejudicial assumption: that such organisation was beyond the peasants' abilities. 
Luce used chronicles but went beyond them, building his study upon analysis of 
letters of remission, and on his groundwork (and his printed examples) Cazelles 
and Bessen built their studies.  Letters of remission, paid pardons issued by the 
crown,  detail  the crimes and pleas of innocence of several hundred rebels and 
rebel communities from the SUlmner of 1358, including Jacques and followers of 
Etienne Marcel.  There are almost two  hundred remissions issued for Jacques 
alone,  containing  the  names,  locations  and  actions  of insurgents;  when  we 
include remissions  for  nobles involved in the repression and urban rebels,  that 
number swells to well over two hundred. 
Yet Luce, Cazelles and Bessen barely scratched the surface of a source 
that offers another layer of meaning, as well as specific evidence, concerning the 
revolt.  Rather than use this mass of documents to find insight into the insurgents 
of the revolt, the narratives of scattered remissions have been used sparingly to 
20 fill in background details of grand political conspiracies.  The unsystematic use 
of  these  remissions  has  produced  images  of  the  Jacquerie  that  a  more 
comprehensive use of them could dispel.  Undoubtedly, the anecdotal evidence 
they provide is useful, but Luce provided full transcliptions for a small sample of 
these documents  a fact which subsequent historians of the Jacquelie either did 
not  recognise  or  failed  to  point  out.  Without  going  back  to  the  Oliginal 
documents, Cazelles and Bessen continued in this manner, apparently assuming 
that the remissions published by  Luce were the  entire set of such documents. 
The  potential  now  remains  for  a  wide-ranging  survey  of these  remissions, 
complemented by the new emphasis upon the complexity of the crowd.  After 
introducing the letters of remission, this thesis will undertake that task:  first by 
deconstructing the recent arguments that the Jacquelie was a co-opted rebellion; 
second, we will establish the basics of the revolt and the retaliation; third,  the 
composition of the rebels will be examined; finally, we will create a new model 
of how the revolt worked.  The Jacquerie deserves the same level of in-depth 
analysis  that  has  been  conferred  on  other  revolts  like  the  Ciompi  and  the 
Peasants' Revolt of 1381. 
21 2 - REMISSIONS: FORM AND FUNCTION 
The  senes  of the  registres  du  Tresor  des  charles  conserved  in  the  Archives 
Nationale runs from  1302, during Philippe Ie  Bel's reign (IT  35), until 1568  (IT 
226).  Written  in  either  French  or  Latin,  these  registers  represent  a  broad 
spectrum  of the  documents  issued  by  French  royal  chancery  from  the  later 
Middle  Ages.  They  include  the  highest  political  action,  like  the  granting of 
privileges  to  the  bonnes  villes,  alongside  pardons  issued  to  common  thieves. 
Michel Fran<;:ois,  in his brief 'Notes sur lettres de remission trans  Clites dans les 
registres  du  Tresor  des  charles',  identified  eight  categories  of  document 
contained within the registers:  ordonnances,  letters of anoblissemenl, letters  of 
naturalite, amortissements, concessions or confirmations of  priveleges, letters of 
abolition and letters of remission. 45  It is the last of these categOlies that contains 
the most infonnation for the histolian interested in the .Tacquerie. 
Of the ninety-five thousand documents contained within the registre du 
Tresor des chartes, over fifty-three thousand are letters of remission.
46  When we 
consider  that  there  are  virtually  no  remissions  issued  until  1350,  then  the 
percentage of documents that were remissions in the  later registers  was  much 
higher.  In  the  early  registers,  IT  36  to  49,  which  cover  1302  to  1314,  for 
example,  only seventeen  of the  2,850  documents  are  remissions  (0.6%).  By 
45  M.  Franyois, 'Note sur lcs lcttres de remission trans crites dans lcs registres du Tresor des 
cIJalies', Bibliotheqlle de l'ecole des chartes, 102 (1942), pp. 317-24.  For a blief discussion of 
fourteenth century remissions, see P. Texier, 'La remission au XIVe siecle : significations et 
fonctions', in La Fallte, la d:pressioll et le pardon, v.  I of  Actes du 107e COllgres national 
societes sal'al1tes, Brest 1982 (Paris: CT.H.S., 1984), pp.  193-202, although it is only a basic 
typology of the types of document issued. 
46 Remissions can be further subdivided into three categories: 'pardons', issued when the 
supplicant witnessed the crime but did not participate; 'abolitions', where the legal proceedings 
have yct to stmi against the individual who obtains grace, and true 'remissions'.  The distinction 
is not made clear by the documents themselves, and will not be used here.  N.Z. Davis, Fiction ill 
[he Archives. Pardon Tales and their Tellers (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), p.  153. 
22 JJ236,  however,  which covers  the years  1523-24,  614  of 640  documents  are 
remissions (96%). 
A letter of remission is  a pardon granted by the crown to  an appellant. 
The crown either quashed or reduced the punishment Oliginally inflicted (which 
may either be implisomllent or a collective punishment issued to  a community, 
like  a  fine).  On  most  occasions,  the  pardon  contained an explanation of the 
events leading up to  its issue: sometimes a plea for clemency on account of the 
age  or  hardship  of an  individual,  but  most  often  a  description  of how  the 
individual was innocent (or less  culpable) of the crime he had been originally 
punished for.  A royal notary and clerk prepared a draft of the document with the 
supplicant  or  people  on  behalf of them.  The  letter  was  then  recorded  on 
parchment, and then transClibed into the royal chancery records (the JJ series).47 
Remissions had to  be paid for.  Chancery letters were categOlised, and the co.st 
was dependent on which particular category they fell  into; a letter of remission 
was  recorded as  a  charte.  The  cost  of remissions  was  theoretically constant 
between the fourteenth  century and the early seventeenth century:  3 livres (60 
SOUS),  split between the crown and the notary and wax-melter involved in the 
document's creation.4~  In reality, however, the price would be higher: references 
to  additional  taxes  upon  remissions  suggest  that  there  were  hefty  surcharges 
payable to  the crown.49  By the  l550s, the average remission would cost two 
months wages of an unskilled labourer, although in certain cases the fees  were 
47 ibid., p.  10. 
4, ibid, p.  153. 
49 B. Geremek, The Margins of  Society in Late Medieval Paris, trans 1.  BinTll (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 240.  Geremek makes reference to a document issued in 1400 
where the king complains he has not been receiving the six SOilS tax on remissions, because it had 
been withheld by local officials. 
23 waived  for  those  who  could .not  afford  it.
50  Luce's  sample  of remissions 
represents  a paIiicularly expensive brand of remission:  to  have  the  remission 
recorded in the royal chancery - the JJ series - incurred an additional charge.
51 
All letters of remission within the registres du  Tn?sor  des chartes were 
issued in the name of the crown.  52  The invocation of the king or regent's name 
was fonnalised and appears the same in all the documents; in the majority of the 
examples used  in thesis  they begin 'Charles, eldest son of the King of France, 
regent of the realm, duke of Nonnandy and dauphin of Vienne'.  53  Often this was 
shortened to just 'Charles aisne etc.'.  From here, the documents had a standard 
opening clause, 'Let it be known to all present and future ...  ',54 before giving the 
name of the supplicant or supplicants and detailing the actual pardon itself.  The 
end of the  remissions  were  also  formalised,  giving the place of issue and the 
date;  for  example:  'Issued  in  Paris,  the  year  of grace  l358  in  the  month  of 
September'.  55  The document was then finished with 'par Ie monsieur Ie regent' 
(and  often  'et son conseil'),  and the  signature  of the  notary who  created  the 
document. 
50 Davis, Fiction ill  [ize  Archives, p.  154. 
51  ibid, p.  145. 
52  Remissions were not solely the prcserve of  the Valois monarchs in this period.  We do see 
examples issued by the dukes of Brittany and the vicomtes of  Turenne, amongst others, over the 
course of  the late middle ages.  See M. Naisset, 'Brittany and the French Monarchy in the 
Sixteenth Century: The E,idence of the Letters of Remission', French HistOlY,  17, n.4, p. 425-
439 (2004) and P. Flandin-Blety, 'Lettres de remission des vicomtes de Turenne aux XIVeme et 
XVeme siec1es',  IvJemoires de fa societe pOllr l'lzistoire du droit et des institutions des anciens 
pays bOllrgllignolls, comtois et rom{lnds (1988), pp.  J 24-143. 
53  In the French remissions, this is 'Charles, aisne filz du roy de France, regent Ie royaume, duc 
de Nonnandie et da1phin de Vienn·ois',  In the infrequent Latin remissions, this is written 
'Karolus, regis FraneoTUm primogenitus, regnum regens, dux Normannie ct dalphinus Viennois' 
54  Again, in the Latin texts 'notum facimus universis, presentibus et futuris .... ', 
55  In French,  the clause is worded 'Donne it Paris, ran grace de mil CCCL  VIII, ou moys de 
septcmbre',  In  Latin documents, the equivalent is . Datum Parisius, anno domino MCCCLVII, 
mense marcii'. 
24 These  notaries  held  responsibility  over  the  final  fODnof  these 
documents.  56  Both the supplicant's story and the crown's offer of grace needed 
transcription  in  a  fonn  acceptable  to  the  courts.  That  meant  changing  the 
dictated  version  from  dialect  to  standardised  French  or  Latin,  but  more 
importantly,  selecting appropriate formulas  and phrases to  describe  the crime, 
and the grace the supplicant received.  These fonnulas identified the whole range 
of 'climinal behaviour' from murder or theft to grand political conspiracies and 
treason.
57  With variations dependent on the individual notary, we would expect 
remissions  of the  same  period that refelTed  to  a  patiicular type  of offense  to 
appear  broadly  similar  in  the  final  documents.  58  In  applying  the  crown's 
vocabulary onto these narratives, the notaries exercised considerable power on 
the fonn which the pardon took. 
Rather than simply rubber-stamping succesful pardons, the crown often 
set the agenda for the production of  these documents.  Remissions were regularly 
issued as part of a royal entry into a town, publically demonstrating the crown's 
mercy;59 in the case of the J acquerie and Marcel's revolt, a general amnesty was 
proclaimed in the first instance, and remissions issued to those who felt excluded 
:;6 For a discussion of the role of the notary in the production of these documents, see Davis, 
Fictioll in the Archil'es. pp.  18-23. 'vVhile Davis does find the notary to be imp0!1ant, she argues 
than'emissions have 'a variety about them that seems impossible to attribute merely to the talents 
of a limited number of notarial hands'; instead, Davis argues that the supplicant is a major factor 
in shaping the wording of  the pardon. 
57  For a discussion of the importance of stereotypes, see C. Gauvard, 'De grace especial': crime. 
erat el societe en France (I  lafin du Moyen Age (Paris, : Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), pg. 
198-209.  Gauvard's conclusion is that these stereotypes of  grand crill1inalite were far removed 
from the reality of  crime; this thesis will argue that the stereotypes themselves can actually help 
us get closer to the reality of  how revolts were viewed. 
53  There were many different notaries whose signatures appeared at the bottom of these 
documents, but for the Jacquerie, all use the same vocabularly that will be described later in this 
chapter.  There are only minor differences in style between notaries, and the tenninology remains 
consistent: for example, G.  de Montagu prefen'ecl variations on 'les effroiz, commocions, 
assemblees estoient des genz du plat pais contre les nobles' (for example, AN, JJS6, f.  147, nos. 
421,422), whereas J.  Douhen used 'les genz du plat pais se esmeurent et firent plusiers effroiz et 
commocions contre les nobles' (for examples, AN, JJ90, f.  151  ,no. 294). 
59 For discussion, see L. Bryant, The King and the City in the Parisian Royal Entry Ceremony: 
Politics. Art and Ritual in Ihe Renaissance (Geneva: Libraire Droz  S.A., 1986), pp. 24-6. 
25 from it.  Indeed, the very process of issuing a pardon was an active intrusion on 
the  part  of  the  crown  into  the  administration  of justice.  Through  these 
documents,  loyal  subjects  could  be  rewarded  and  elTant  subjects  punished 
(through  fines  and  confiscations  of property).  Remissions  could  be  granted 
provisionally on payment of a  charge  or completion of a  pilgrimage.  While 
granting a remission, the crown could set policy - it was in a remission that the 
town of  Meaux was banned from having communal government. 
If the pardoning agenda was set by the crown, and the wording was set by 
the  notary based on the  crown's  distinctions,  then  it  was  the  supplicant who 
provided the nalTative on which the pardon would be based.
60  Natalie Davis's 
work on remissions in the sixteenth century emphasises the creative aspect of the 
pardon.
61  Rather  than  the  final  contract  between  crown  and  defendant,  the 
remission was pati of the pardoning process itself  These remissions, if they 
were to  be accepted, would either explain the participant's activities or at least 
place  them  in  a  context  that  makes  them  pardonable.  They  also  offered 
testimony  to  the  individual's  previous  reputation,  and  his  good  name  and 
renown.  Often,  it  was  the  only  input  that  a  'defendant'  might  have  in the 
criminal procedure - the  remission natTative  would be read at  the start of the 
judicial  process,  like  an  opening  statement.  62  Thus,  the  onus  was  on  the 
supplicant to create a narrative that convinced the crown of their innocence and 
informed them of  any mitigating circumstances. 
60  Davis describes the supplicant as the 'first author'. Davis, Ficlion in the Archives, p.  18. 
61  Although Davis' book is rather sensationally titled, it does not claim remissions to be entirely 
fictitious, rather that the storytelling represents a distinct literary style in which numerous voices 
can be heard.  However, others have questioned the validity of these documents,describing them 
as 'a tissue of counter-truths', Pierre Braun, 'La valeur documentaire des Jettres de remission', in 
La/allte. fa  repression et le pardon. v.  I ofActes dL!  ID7e Congres national societes savantes. 
Brest 1982 (Paris: C.T.H.S., 1984), quoted in Davis, Fiction in the Archives, p.  10. 
62  ibid., p.  10. 
26 Those involved in the rebellions of 1358 were as concerned to prove their 
suitability for a pardon as the petty criminals who form the backbone of Davis' 
studies.  This remission for a  Jacque,  Gillebart Colas, indicates the  fon11  that 
these pleas could take: 
Let it be known to all  present and future  that Gilleba11  Colas,  living at 
Acy in Meucien (Oise)63,  poor small trader of chicken, cheese, eggs and 
other small merchandise to  make a  living and  to  supp0l1  his  wife and 
children,  who had previously under constraint and against his  will  and 
wishes with other Jacques of the said village and men of the land from 
Mucien, La Fe11e and other places nearby ... [was] taken and imprisoned 
in the castle of Dammartin ... he is a man of good life and honest.  64 
In  this  case,  it  is  clear why  Gillebart  sought  forgiveness:  at  the  time  of his 
supplication he was implisoned.  Gillebart based his plea for clemency on his 
social status: he was a poor merchant and must provide for his wife and children. 
The remission also features two popular excuses that appellants used to argue for 
their  personal  w011hiness  to  be granted  a  remission.  One  we have  already 
mentioned:  he claimed to  have led  a  good life up to  this  point  (although this 
remission does not claim that the subject was of good renown).  The other was a 
defence repeated in many of the Jacques' remissions: that they had been forced 
into action by others.  Davis' caricature of these remissions as  'fiction' helps us 
remain  vigilant  regarding  the  nature  of  the  document.  Claims  of  non-
involvement, for example, should be treated with caution.  Perhaps Gillebart was 
better  off financially  than  his  plea  suggests.  For  the  histOlian,  however,  the 
document provides more than just story-telling.  Any sense of fiction is kept brief 
6.'  Where a location is not commonly known, and there is no map or table nearby for reference, [ 
have included the modern department in parentheses. 
64  'Sa  voir faisons a  taus presenz et a  venir comme Gillebart Colas demourans ;i Acy en Meucien 
petit et pouvre marchant de pouillaie, de fourmage et oeux et autres petites marchandises pour 
gaegner sa vie et de sa femme et enfans, ait este n' a gaires par contrainte autre son gre et sa 
\·olente avec plusiers des Jacques de la dicte ville et les gens du pais de moncien, de la Fel1e et 
d'ailleures environs ... prendre et emplisones au chastel de Dammartin ... il est un hOll1l11e de 
bonne vie et honeste',  AN, JJ86, f.  151, no. 430. 
27 - there  was  no  great nanative to  prove Gillebarfs innocence.  They offer new 
information concerning the  rebellion - Gillebart did not deny that  the men of 
Acy did rise up.  Although Gillebart may have been exaggerating his financial 
difficulties, his occupation as  a sometime merchant of dairy goods is  useful to 
surmise exactly who  the Jacques were.  Though the language of the remission 
was intended to portray the appellant's reduced culpability, the basic facts of the 
case - the defendant's status and location, the crime itself and the punishment -
are undisputed. 
The useful data that these documents provide about individuals and their 
transgressions against the crown have been the basis for several excellent studies 
of criminality and social status.  Bronislaw Geremek's study of the marginallx of 
Paris was  based on  a variety of documents,  including remission letters for  the 
inhabitants.  Although he culls numerous stories fi:om these remissions, Geremek 
admits  'it is  clear that  the  costs  necessarily incUlTed  in  obtaining  a  letter of 
remission were such that marginal people rarely appear in the documents'.  65  The 
most comprehensive study of the remission is  Claude Gauvard' s two volume De 
Grace Especial.  Built upon remissions, criminal and judicial records and other 
documents,  she  concentrates  on the  reign  of Charles VI  and seeks  to  build a 
typology of crime between 1380 and  1420.
66  Although remissions were not her 
only source, they undoubtedly make up the vast mqjority of the documents she 
covers.  Yet even  in  this  exhaustive work,  Gauvard avoids  discussing popular 
protest:  group  violence  appears,  characterised by  the  term  rixe,  but this  was 
65  Geremek, The kIm'gins o[Sociefy, p. 310. 
66 Gauvard, De grace especial.  Also see C.  Gauvard, 'L'image du roi justicier en France it 1a fin 
du Moyen Age d'apres les lettres de remission', in Lafallle, v.  I of  Acles du  I07e COl1gres, pp. 
165-192. 
28 mainly bar fights  or small  scuffles,  not  collective  action.
67  The exclusion  of 
remissions concerning rebellion or revolt (notably the lzarelle in Rouen and the 
tax revolts in Paris of the  1380s) in such an exhaustive study tells us something 
about the position that popular violence occupies: it was connected to  the world 
of criminality and justice, but somehow set apart from it. 
As  mentioned, Luce used remissions to  give a more human side to  the 
J  acquerie,  more in line with the  sympathetic  chroniclers  like Jean  de  Venette 
than the scalding fury of Jean Ie Bel, whom Flammennont would champion.  Yet 
he did not exploit the  source to its fullest.  His Pieces Just?fzcatives  contained 
sixty-t\VO  documents, of which fifty-four are remissions, and fonned the core of 
h·  I' 68  IS  ana YSIS.  This  sample  is  skewed:  for  instance,  Luce  reprinted  every 
document  that  mentions  the  attack  on  Meaux  (of which  there  are  nineteen, 
representing almost a third of his Pieces Justificatives).  These incidents had only 
weak connections to  the Jacquerie,  (as we will discuss  in  "The  Attack on the 
Marche'  in  Chapter Ill).  Further  considering that  these  remissions  were  for 
scattered individuals rather than for settlements and groups, in real numbers there 
were very few individuals from Meaux pardoned compared with the Jacques in 
the countryside.  Because the attack on Meaux was spearheaded by Parisi ens, not 
Jacques,  Luce's  analysis  heavily  weighted  Etienne  Marcel's  percieved 
involvement, yet Luce did  not supplement this  with analysis of the remissions 
issued for his followers. 
67  Gauvard states that over 51 % of  group crimes within the remissions can be classified as 'rixe-
homicide' (which Gauvard uses to refer to bar-fights and similar attacks), and another 23% is 
thefts or burglaries (p.  275).  Collective crimes makes up only 1.6% of Gauvard's remissions (p. 
242).  Even in a two-volume study like Gauvard's, there is little attention played to popular 
revolts, which Gam'ard suggests there is no evidence of in the remissions.  Gauvard, De grace 
especial. 
6S  Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 217-350.  Luce's selection includes some other royal documents and all 
the revclant chronicle descriptions of the events of 1358.  Only tifty-two of  these documents are 
actml transcriptions - two of  these documents are just short descriptions of  what the remission 
contains. 
29 Raymond Cazelles and David Bessen both turned to  Luce's summary to 
wlite miicles about the Jacquelie but neither returned to  the  oliginal registers. 
These  later  studies  feature  the  same  shortcomings  seen in Luce's book:  they 
sample from Luce's already skewed Pieces Justificatives as though they were the 
full  collection of documents.  FUliher,  the data available on the majolity of the 
Jacques was marginalized in favour of a focus on those with the most interesting 
nanatives  surrounding  their  participation.  With  these  in  hand,  Cazelles  and 
Bessen  constructed  histories  of the  rebellion  that  place  an  emphasis  on  the 
Parisian-led  attack  on  Meaux  rather  than  the  greater group  of remissions,  as 
though those from  Meaux were typical Jacques.  The misunderstanding of the 
sources led both to  deeply flawed arguments, as  will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
'The Theory of Co-opted Rebellion'. 
A thorough analysis of the Jacquelie requires equal focus to be placed on 
all the documents.  Broadly speaking, there are four types of remission issued for 
subjects  involved in the  rebellions  of 1358  clearly  defined  within the  source 
matelial: (1) those individuals and settlements that rose up in the countryside, (2) 
remissions for those nobles involved in the vengeance upon the peasantry in the 
wake of the Jacques,  (3)  remissions for those involved in the Pmisian uplising 
and (4) for those involved with the King of  Navarre. 
The  remissions  that  exist  make  up  an  unusual  sample.  They  do  not 
represent all those the crown forgave for their pali in the uplisings.  The masses 
of rebels had received grace for their climes in general amnesties issued directly 
after the revolt, supposedly pardoned as  a group on the  10 August in a general 
remission issued in Palis.  On that same day, the Pmisian rebels were pardoned: 
A great number of the good people and loyal commoners of this city of 
Palis  conceived  and  intended  to  act  against  our  lord,  and  the  royal 
30 majesty  '"  our  loyal  friends  Gentian  Tristan,  presently  provost,  the 
aldermen, bourgeois and inhabitants of this city have humbly beseeched 
us  to  show  pity  and  mercy  and  to  find  a  gracious  remedy.  Thus 
considering the good love and loyalty which the provost, bourgeois, and 
inhabitants of this city have always had towards our lord and to  us and 
which has  been demonstrated by the  capture  and  destruction  of these 
traitors, rebels and  enemies of the  crown of France, we are inclined to 
grant this supplication.  69 
Yet  this  document  did  not represent the  end of the pardons  for  the Parisians: 
rather,  it  triggered  the  start  of numerous  remissions  for  people  connected  to 
Marcel's revolt.  Other remissions were issued on the very day that the general 
pardon was sent out.  Our sample consists of individuals who required specific 
pardons not covered by the general pardon.  The remissions for individuals and 
distinct communities thus represent the  exceptions, not the main contingent of 
those forgiven. 
Luce's  centrepiece,  the  attack  on  the  Marche  of Meaux,  represents a 
microcosm of the bigger picture.  A general remission was issued to those of the 
town, stating that the residents are given grace for their pariicipation, updated to 
include a clause that does not allow the city to have a communal government.  In 
effect, the remission itself confirmed this punislunent and stripped Meaux of its 
communal privileges: 
Let  it  be  known  to  all  present  and  future  that  we  have  heard  the 
supplication made by our loyal friend 1ehan Maillari, bourgeois of Paris 
containing matters  concerning the  misdeeds  in the  town  of Meaux the 
Saturday past,  the eve of the feast  of Saint Barnabas  (1 0 June)  '"  [the 
enemies]  entered  the  town  of Meaux  by  the  gate  of Saint-Remi  for 
attacking the MarcM of the said town of Meaux and damaging the houses 
of the  nobles  and  non-nobles  ...  we  have  acquitted,  remitted  and 
pardoned  and  re-established  the  peace,  and  their  good  reputation  and 
name and also  their goods,  excepting that the  said town cannot have a 
69 AN, ]]86, f. 80, no. 240, reprinted in OrdolZlwl1ces des Rovs de France de la troisieme race, 
ed. D.-F. Secousse, vol. 4 (Paris, 1734), trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  179-81. 
31 cOl1Ul1Unal  government. (17 'aura  cmps ne commune)  '"  Issued in Paris, 
the year of grace 1358 in the month of AUgust,70 
However, this remission did not include all the inhabitants, as further remissions, 
like this one for Guillaume de Chavenoil, indicated: 
recently we have forgiven and pardoned generally all the inhabitants of 
the  town,  city  and  Marche  of Meaux  ,"  except  a  number of certain 
persons, including the said Guillaume de Chavenoil, priest and canon of 
Meaux,71 
So  when we consider individuals like Guillaume de Chavenoil,  and how they 
relate to the group that attacked the Marche, we must bear in mind that crown 
consciously rejected them from the initial grace, 
The  JJ  senes  contains  214  remissions  that  were  linked  to  members  of the 
Jacquerie.  Of these,  188  of them are issued between JJ  86 and JJ  90 inclusive, 
with  139 alone in JJ  86,  the main register for the Jacquerie, running from July 
1358 until early January 1359.  I will tum to statistical analysis later, but below is 
an example of a remission issued to a rebel in the wake of  the rebellion: 
Charles, eldest son of the King of France (etc,), Let us make known to all 
those now and in the future  that Jean des  Hayes,  of Rhuis in Verberie 
(Oise),  at  the time of the ten'Of  (elfi'ois)  and uprising (commocion)  that 
reigned and was recently caused by the men of the countryside (genz du 
plat pais) against the nobles of the realm, was made, against his will and 
wishes and by constraint of the people, captain of  the said village (ville 72) 
70  'Savoir faisons Ii tous presenz et Ii venir, comme oye ]a supplication a nous faite par nostre ame 
et feal 1ehan Maillali, bourgeois de Pmis, contenant que, comme pour cause du meffait qui advint 
en la ville de Meaulx le samedi veille de teste saint Barnabe apostre dernier passe ... enh'erent en 
]a dicte ville de Meulx par la porte Saint Remi, pour assaillir le Marchie de Meaulx, dommagier 
en ville ct villener nobles et non-nobles qui dedans estoit '"  nous avons quicte, remis et pardonne 
et restabliz au pais, it leur bonne fame, renommee et it leur biens, excepte que la dicte ville n 'aura 
corps de commune', AN, 1186, f  75, no. 288.  This document is included in Luce's Pieces 
Justicalires, but rather than transcribing a section of  it there is only a short description of  the 
content. 
71  AN, 1186, f  91, no. 274, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 228-9, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  183. 
72  The term ville is used in almost every remission to reter to settlements of any size, from 
villages like Rhuis here to even the city of Paris.  While the word may have originally meant 'a 
group of rural houses',  it also came to be applied to any important settlements,  rural or urban. 
32 of Rhuis, who otherwise feared they might kill him, bum down his house 
and destroy or distribute his goods, and because of that he was present at 
the said revolt against the nobles, but the said Jean did not bum or knock 
down houses of the said nobles; nor did he take or hand out their goods; 
nor did he make a profit or pillage more than the sum of three escus  .... 
on the Sunday after the feast day of  the Holy Sacrament (3  June) that had 
past, the said Jehan and a esquire, with many others, had come to the said 
town (ville) of Verb  erie ... [.Tehan cried out]  'For God's sake, good lords, 
watch what you are doing for your actions are very bad', and despite this 
and against his will, wishes and consent, the said esquire was killed, and 
for this reason the said nobles would hate him and have hostility towards 
the said Jehan ... Issued in Paris, the year of grace 1358, in the month of 
October. 73 
This document stresses that Jehan des Hayes was less involved with the rebellion 
than he had been accused of.  Although he was a capitaine, he had not taken part 
in the most terrible of the outrages, neither had he made a profit above 3 escu7,. 
Not  only  does  Jehan  excuse  himself from  the  worst  of the  violence,  he  also 
claimed he wamed the other Jacques not to kill the squire in Verbelie.  Yet Jehan 
felt  forced  to  seek a remission because of the nobility's hatred of him and the 
grudge they bore were likely to have held towards him. 
The vocabulary of these remissions from the Jacques remained constant 
from document to document.  First, the Jacques were referred to the gel17, dll plat-
pays: men of the countryside.  This was the language the crown used to describe 
On each occasion that vilfe is used, I have given my best approximation to the type of settlement 
(for example, I have translated it as village in the case ofRhuis, town in the case of Senlis and 
city in the case of Paris). 
73  'Charles ainsne fils du roy de France .... Savoir faisons a  to us presenz et il venir, que, com me 
lehan des Hayes, de Ruys, lez Verberie, ou temps des efTroiz et commocions qui derrainement et 
n'a gaires ont este faiz par les genz du plat pais contre les nobles du royaume, eust este contre son 
gre et volente et par contrainte du peuple, esleu capitaine de la dicte ville de Ruys, ou autrement 
il eust este en doubte d'avoir este mis il mort, sa maison arse, et gastez et dessipes ses biens, et 
avec ce ait este aus dictes commocions faites contre les diz nobles, sanz ce que Ie dit lehan ait 
este a  ardoir ou abatre aucuns maisons des diz nobles, ne en ycelles prendre ou disspier leurs 
biens, ne en aucun prouftlt de pillage qui monte a  plus de la somme de trois escuz ... Ie 
dymanche apres Ie Saint Sacrement delTainement passe, Ie dit lehan et un escuier, avec plusiers 
autres, s'en venoient en la dictc ville de Verberie ... 'Pour Dicu, beaux seigneurs, gardes que 
vous faites, car c'est trop mal fait', ct tout ce non obstant, ils mistrent, contre son gTe, sa volente 
et consentement, Ie dit escuier it mort, et pour ce aucuns des diz nobles pourroient avoir 
malivolence et hayne au dit .Tehan  ... Donne it Paris, ran de grace mil CCCLVIII, ou mois 
d' octobre', AN, JJ86, f.  156, no. 444,  reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 280-1. 
33 these insurgents,  directly opposed to  the  'nobles of the  realm'.  74  The greater. 
violence was described as a 'terror' (efFois) or a 'movement' (commocioll).  The 
Jacques were specifically accused of having 'sent [nobles]  to  death, burnt their 
homes, and destroyed and distributed their goods'  .75  Unlike the inhabitants of 
the  town,  the  Jacques  were  described  spatingly:  we  are  often  given  little 
infomation about the appellant's occupation or status within a community. 
The  remission  above  was  for  an  individual,  but  remissions  were  also 
issued for village communities or collections of local peasants who were accused 
of  patiicipation in the Jacquerie: 
Let it be known to  all present and future that the inhabitants resident in 
the  villages  of Bettancourt  and  Vroil  in  Perthois  (Marne),  along  with 
many other men of the countryside have been involved in the terror that 
the men of the countryside recently int1icted with  great speed upon the 
nobles of the realm.  They conspired and assembled with other men of the 
countryside  many  times  without  burning  or  knocking  down  houses, 
killing people or mistreating anyone .,. Our friend, loyal counsellor and 
lieutenant in these parts, the count of Vaudemont, SUlllill0ned them before 
him at a certain time and place ... without knowing anything about them, 
he condemned them to pay a fine of  two-thousand ecus.
76 
As with the vocabulary of remissions for individuals, the Jacquelie was desclibed 
as 'the terror', the Jacques were the 'men of the countryside' engaged in 'burning 
or knocking down houses, killing people' (although the men of Bettancourt and 
Vroil claim not to have been involved).  This remission does not list any of the 
individuals  who  appealed;  they  were  described  only  as  'inhabitants'.  This 
remission also gives a clear indication of what could be gained from recieving a 
pardon.  The  reduction  of a  fine  imposed  earlier  upon  the  villagers  raises 
74  The phrase 'non-nobles' or 'gens du plat pays contre nobles' or 'nobles de royaume' is fairly 
ubiquitous in the remissions, but has been the subject of some debate.  BeSSell, who does not 
show familiarity with remissions outwith Luce, claims that they are infrequently referred to as 
'non-nobles', but it is very rare to find a document that does not make reference to the non-noble 
status of  the supplicant(s) some\vhere in the document. 
75  This phrase, with variations, appears in almost all the remissions concerning the Jacquerie. 
76  AN, JJ86, f.  117, no. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 266-8,  trans. Cohn, PP, p.  187. 
34 important questions about the nature of the punishment, which we will retum to 
in the 'Retaliation' section of Chapter 6, but also reminds us of the failings of our 
sources:  we  have  only  records  of  those  who  successfully  quashed  their 
conviction, and no record of the nature of any original punishments.  References 
to  any fine  or punislm1ents issued to  other settlements indicate this was a fairly 
typical treatment of  rebellious villages involved in the Jacquerie . 
These collective remissions for the Jacquerie were different from  those 
considered typical in the studies of Davis and Gauvard.  As the document above 
demonstrates,  these  were  issued  to  communities,  villages,  parishes  and 
collections  of peasants  who  acted  m  concert  against  the  crown  during  the 
upnsmg.  There is  less of an emphasis  on paid remuneration:  Bettancourt and 
Vroil had their fines  alleviated, but some of these supplicants make their pleas 
based on their extreme poverty.  While pardons could be issued to those without 
the finances to hire an advocate on their behalf, usually through the generosity of 
the court, this was unusual.  77  Pardons could be issued by the crown as pari of a 
celebration, such as the king's entry to  a city.  However, neither of these events 
could  account for the number of individuals who had no  occupation recorded. 
The traditional crux of the remission seen in criminal cases - the impOliance of 
an individual's good name and renown - is often missing.  Most supplicants were 
unknown to the court, nor could they have afforded the advocacy or suppOli that 
the traditional supplicant would have had. 
The majority of these remissions were issued seemingly in bulk, a short 
time after the end of the Jacquerie.  By contrast, in Gauvard's study of the reign 
77  Geremek desclibes such an event as 'exceptionar, Gercmek, The Margins a/Society, p. 63. 
35 of Charles VI, the majority of remissions were issued a long time after the crime 
was committed, with the greatest proportion coming after one year.
78 
Table I. Time taken to issue a remission. 
Time after crime  Proportion 
'peu de temps'  3.5% 
Less than 15 days  5% 
Less than 1 month  8.5% 
A month  18% 
Between 1 and six months  20% 
Six months to a year  8% 
Over a year  28% 
'il y a longtemps'  9% 
Gauvard's sample shows  that  obtaining a remission was a  drawn-out process; 
over 45% of Gauvard's remissions are issued after at least six months.  For some 
Jacques, the process also took 'a long time', but the vast majority received grace 
promptly  after  the  rebellion.  The  majority  of the  Jacques'  remissions  were 
issued within 'between one and  six months': 78% compared with only 20% in 
Gauvard's sample.  Rather than the time-consuming criminal cases that compose 
the majority of cases in Gauvard's study, remissions for the Jacquerie are issued 
quickly to a mass of appellants.  Remissions, at least as regards their widespread 
use,  were  relatively  new,  but  the  nature  of the  Jacquerie  itself created  an 
unprecedented administrative bu~den. 
7S  The following table is taken from Gauvard, De grace especial, p.  71. 
36 The first  remissions issued in the direct aftennath of the rebellion connected to 
the  Jacques  are not for  the  'gem du  plat-pays'.  Rather,  in July 1358,  only a 
month after  the  revolt's  conclusion,  the  crown  started dispensing justice and, 
more accurately, grace to its own loyal followers.  The first individuals to receive 
remissions were members of the nobility pardoned for the excess they cOlmnitted 
in  their  counter-offensive  against  the  peasants.  These  remissions  give  us 
information sUlTounding the movements of  the Jacques.  The lord ofSaint-Dizier 
first  attacked  against  rebels  closest  to  him  in  Saint-Liviere.
79  Two  later 
remissions confinn that the men of Saint-Liviere were involved with the Jacques, 
speci fically on their lord's lands.
8o 
Other remissions for  individuals and  settlements were  granted  to  those 
who defended themselves against the attacks of  the nobles: 
We  have  heard  the  supplication  of the  said  ville  of Saint  Lumier  in 
Champagne (Marne) ... [they] assembled, armed and made plans together 
there to  guard and defend against certain nobles ... especially against our 
loyal  friend  the Lord of Saint-Dizier. ...  Issued in  Paris  in  the  year of 
grace 1358 in the month ofNovember.
81 
The remission above refers us to an attack on rebels in a village where we have 
no  record  of activity  in  the  Jacquerie.  Not  only  do  we  get  a  sense  of the 
geography  of the  repression,  but  we  gain  some  insight  into  its  scale.  For 
example, we have a remission for a group of brigands hired by the crown to help 
bring an end to the violence in the region.
82  This obviously indicates the lengths 
79  AN, JJ86, f.  210, no. 578. 
so  AN, JJ86, 1'.  129, no. 377 and AN, JJ86, f.  210, no. 578. 
31  'oye la supplication habitants des dictes ville de Saint-Lumier en Champagne ... [the 
supplicants] assemblcz anlles et fait conspiracies ensemble it garder et deffendre contres aucuns 
nobles ... especialcment contre nostre 3me fealle Seigneur de Saint Dizier ... Donne a Paris l'an 
de grace mil CCCL  VIII ou mois de Novembre', AN, JJ86, f.  210, no. 578. 
S2  AN, JJ90, f. 225, no. 444, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 303-4. 
37 the crown was willing to  go  to  put down the rebellion.  The remission dates the 
brigands'  violent  repression  of the  villagers  to  10  September,  almost  three 
months  after  the  initial  revolt.  Perhaps  this  I?ives  a  new  depth  to  Jean  de 
Venette's depiction of the repression as the equivalent of a scorched earth policy: 
'Verberie,  La  Croix-Saint-Ouen  near  Compiegne,  Ressons  (Oise),  and  many 
other country towns lying in  the open fields  which I have not seen and do  not 
note here, mourned their destruction by fire,.B3  If  this repressive violence was 
continuing  so  long  after  the  event,  while  the  crown  was  simultaneously 
dispensing  its  grace  to  hundreds  of individuals  and  communities  across  the 
regIOn,  then  it  creates  a  new  context  m  which  to  place  the  whole  body  of 
remissions: the crown's definition of its role in the remissions as  're-establishing 
the peace' was not simply a rhetorical flourish, but rather confirmation that these 
remissions  were  intended to  end the continuing violence  between  nobles  and 
peasants in the countryside.
84 
Of course, the rebellion in the countryside was just one uprising that the crown 
faced  in  1358.  The rebellion  in Paris,  spearheaded by an aggressive Estates-
General and Etienne Marcel,  was  also  documented by thirty-three  documents 
(not  including duplicates)  within the registres des  Tresor  des  chartes.  Again, 
like the Jacques, many individuals involved in the dissent received pardons from 
the crown for their participation.  These remissions, while shating much of the 
basic  fonn  of those  issued  for  the  Jacques,  used  a  different  vocabulary  to 
describe events: 
83  Venette, Chrol1  .. v. 2, p. 263. trans. Birdsall,  Vel1erre, p.  77. 
S4  This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, during the section on 'Retaliation'. 
38 Charles eldest son of the King of France, regent of the realm and duke of 
Nonnandy and  dauphin of Viem10is,  let it be known to  all present and 
future .... Nicolas Ie Flamenc, draper and bourgeois of Paris, by the false 
encouragement and  evil  inducement of the late Etienne Marcel, provost 
of merchants of the said city (ville)  of Paris,  and of Charles Toussac,85 
Gilles Marcel,86  Jehan de Lille and any other of the traitors of the  said 
city who were false traitors and rebels to  the crown of France who had 
executed justices in our said city (ville), at several times had taken anns 
with  those  against  us ...  we  pardon  and  graciously  remit  ...  the  said 
Nicolas  who  to  this  day  has  a  good  life  and  renown  and  an  honest 
standing  and  also  good  relations  with  our good  and  loyal  subjects 
issued in Paris in the year of grace 1358 in the month of August.s7 
The f01111  of these documents was similar to those issued for the Jacques.  They 
started with the king's name, described the individual's reduced culpability for 
the crime originally accused of,  and pardoned the appellant of all  the criminal 
charges but did not exclude the possibility of future  civil  charges.  Excepting 
pardons  for  Paris,  Meaux  and  Amiens,  these  documents  were  issued  for 
individuals.  The crown handled Marcel's pariisans promptly after the rebellion. 
All of these remissions were issued directly after the trouble in  August of 1358, 
most in  August  but  a  couple  as  late  as  December.  If the  Jacques'  pleas  of 
clemency were dealt with quickly in comparison to the average criminal, then the 
partisans of Marcel were dealt with even quicker - all were issued within four 
months of the rebellion.  Unlike the Jacques,  1358  represented the end of the 
matter  within  the  courts;  no  documents  were  issued  after  December  for 
,5 Charles Toussac was a Parisian money-changer, one of  the 'Council of Eighty' organised by 
the Estates-Genera/ to draw up a list of  concessions the Estates wished to extract from the 
Dauphin.  1.  Sumption, The Hundred Years  War,  v.  2,  Trial by Fire (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 254. 
S6 Gilles Marcel was Eticnne's cousin, and also part ofthc 'Council of Eighty', ibid, p. 254. 
07  'Charles aisnc fils du Roy de France regent le royaume ct duc de nonnande et dauphin de 
viennois, savoir faisons it tous presenz et it venir comme Nicolas Ie Flamenc drappier et 
bourgeois de paris par les faux ennortement et malaises inducien de feu Estienne Marcel provost 
des marchans de nostre ville de Paris de Charles Toussac, Gilles Marcel, lehan de Lille et 
aucunes autres de nostre ville noz traitres qui comme faux traitres et rebeIJes de mons de nous de 
la couronne de France aus este mis a  mOli justices en nostre dicte ville se soit par plusiers fois 
annes avec eulx contre nous ... nous pardonnons et remettons gracieux  ... qui Ie dit Nicolas a 
tous jours este de bonne vie et renomee et de honeste vie oy aussi la bonne relation de nos bon et 
loyal subjet de mons',  AN, JJ86, f.  68, n. 209. 
39 individuals involved in the Parisian uprising.  On the other hand, documents for 
the Jacques continued to tlickle from the chancery until the end'ofthe 1370s.
88 
Several  other notable  differences  seperate  the  Parisians'  pardons  from 
those  of the  Jacques.  The  Parisian supplicants  cited  Etienne  Marcel  and his 
deputies  like  Gilles  Marcel  and  Jehan  de  Lille  as  responsible  for  the  revolt. 
While  the  individuals  pardoned  for  involvement  in  the  Jacquerie  were  acting 
'under constraint and against their will and wishes', the supplicants involved in 
the Parisian uprising were 'persuaded' by the heads of the movement into action. 
The 'commotion' or 'terror' in which the men of  the countryside 'knocked down, 
destroyed and burned' the property of the nobles and 'sent them to  death' was 
replaced  for  the  city  with  a  different  Clime:  being  'a false  traitor  and  rebel 
towards the King of  France'.  These insurgents were the 'men of Paris', not 'men 
of  the countryside'. 
The  rebellion  of  Charles  of NavarTe,  and  his  followers,  also  produced  a 
substantial number of remissions on the troubles of 1358.  Although the rebellion 
was as much a dynastic conflict as a true uplising, the remissions indicate that a 
variety of 'nonnal' people were caught up in it.  Fish merchants, moneychangers 
and fUlners all were forced to seek the crown's grace in the wake of the events.
89 
The remissions themselves followed the same basic principles as  those we have 
seen already: they were wlitten in the name of the regent, detailed the crimes of 
the burghers involved and the grounds for reduced culpability: 
88  The latest remission we have connected to the Jacquerie is .11145, n. 498, which is in carly 
1394.  This remission, however, is for the murder of a brigand who was active during the 
coml17ociol1.  The latest remission issued specifically for mcmbers ofthc Jacqueric (and not, for 
example, noblcs who had killed Jacques) is J1107,  n.186 where thc inhabitants of Hangest 
receive thcir remission aftcr a long process, in July 1375. 
89  For example, in AN, .1190. f.  12-15, nos. 26 and 29 are issued to fish merchants, nos. 21, 22 and 
27 are issued to money-changers, and no.  30 was issued to a furrier. 
40 Let it be known to  all present and future ... for many rebellions, treason 
and  unpleasantness  committed  and  perpetrated  against  the  crown  of 
France ... Jean de Maours, Collart de Lille and Jacques de Rue bourgeois 
and habitants of Amiens who offended and cOlmnitted the crime of lese-
majeste and treason  ... in the company of the ICing  of NavalTe  and the 
English enemies of the said realm ... issued at Paris in the year of grace 
1358 on 20 August.9o 
There are sixty remissions  for  suppOliers  of NaValTe,  all  of which come from 
JJ86, 87 or 90.  The earliest fully dated remission was issued on 20 August 1358, 
ten days after the general amnesty.  This first batch of remissions was issued for 
the  Jacques  and  Marcel's  followers.  There  is  another  batch  released  in 
November and December after a  second wave of stIikes  by  the  forces  of the 
crown on suspected Navan'ese paliisans, this  time brought on by rumours of a 
second  conspiracy.  Communities  like  Amiens  were  issued  remissions,  but 
pardons  were  intended  mainly  for  individuals.  These  remissions,  like  those 
before,  were  issued swiftly,  certainly in  comparison to  Gauvard's analysis  of 
criminal remissions. 
These remissions also used a distinct vocabulary to describe allegiance to 
the  NavalTese  cause.  It  was  a  'rebellion'  against  the  lightful  king.  More 
importantly, the rebels were 'traitors' who committed the crimes of 'treason' and 
'lese-majeste'.  Much has been made of the crimes that could not be pardoned 
which, according to  Gauvard, included lese-l71ajeste, yet here were men indicted 
for that very ofIence,  and gained reduced sentences.  Mentions of lese-majeste 
90  • Savoir faisons a  tous presenz et a  venir  ... pour p1usiers rebellions prodicions et malnaistres 
commcttant ct perpetrant contre la couronne de France ... Jean de Maours, Collart et Lille et 
Jacques de Rue bourgeois et habitants d'amiens qui en offendant et commettant crime de 1cse-
majcste royal et traison ...  de 1a compangie du roy de navane et des eng10is ennemis du dit 
royaume'  AN, JJ86, f.  72, no. 219. 
41 were only found in  remissions to  the followers  of  NavalTe  and a scattering of 
references among Parisiens who aided the'  enemies of the crown'.  91 
Another type of document within the registre du Tn?sor des clzartes that can help 
shed further light on the events of 1358 are donations of property.  Several are 
made to  those who served the  crown against the uprisings,  and  several of the 
donations themselves consist of property confiscated from rebels, who suppOlied 
NavalTe or Marcel.  In this famous example, the Marshal Boucicaut recieved the 
property of Robeli, Bishop of  Laon: 
Since Robert Ie Coq, bishop of Laon has been and is a rebel, disobedient 
to  our lord, to  us and the realm '"  we confiscate all the temporalities of 
his  bishopric  ...  Lord  Jean  Ie  Meingre,  called  Boucicaut,  marshal  of 
France,  has  performed  for  us  during  the  present  wars  and  which  he 
continues to  offer day after day ... [and]  we have given, authorised and 
delivered the house which the said bishop had in  Paris ..• Issued at the 
Louvre in Paris, the year of grace l358 on 11  August.
92 
These  documents  help  us  discover  yet  more  'rebels'  within  the  registres  du 
Tn?sor des chartes.
93  It is not only the highest political movers like Ie Coq who 
have their property confiscated; nor is it only royal marshals that receive them: a 
Norman knight Jehan De Muisenit and his sister Blanche were rewarded for loyal 
service with land taken from some of the lesser NavalTese soliders. We can also 
estimate their wealth and their holdings, perhaps including their political power. 
It informs us about the geography of the rebellions, as well as  an indication of 
91  Phillip IV's reign sees the beginning of widespread usage of  the concept of  treason, but it is 
Charles the Dauphin's reign that encourages the concept of the 'crown' as the offended pmiy, 
see S.H. Curtler, The Laws o(Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France (CUP: 
CambJidge, 1981).  For general discussion of  the uses of treason during Charles's regency and 
reign see also pp. 4-20, 28-54, 163-180. 
92  AN, .IJ89, f.280, no. 525, ed. D.-F. Secousse, Recl/eil, trans. Cohn, PP.  pp.  194-5. 
93  Donations of  property will be used sparingly in this thesis; they will not be included in any 
tables concerning the Jacquerie, although examples of  them will be used to illustrate general 
points. 
42 where the crown's loyal  servants. were found.  They also give us  some idea of 
how the crown administered punishment. 
They  also  confirmed  the  fixed  vocabulary  used  to  describe  different 
rebellions.  In the document that grants Boucicaut ownership of Robert Ie Coq's 
house, the bishop is desclibed as a 'rebel' and aiding the 'enemies of the crown'. 
In the document issued to  Sir Jehan de Musenit, the rebels have committed the 
crime  of 'treason  and  rebellion',  and  Charles  of Navane is  desClibed  as  the 
mortal  enemy of the  crown.
94  Again,  this  parallels  the  language  used  in  the 
remissions for the Parisian rebels.  Political rebellion was treated differently in 
the sources from the rural popular movement. 
Donations were issued for paIiisans of both Navane and Marcel, but no 
documents show propeliy being taken from an individual or group involved with 
the Jacquerie, although two remissions were issued in which property is granted 
specifically  for  good  service  against  the  Jacques.  In all,  thiliy  donations  of 
property were either made to  those who served the crown against the rebellions, 
or confiscated property owned by rebels.  As one would expect, considering that 
these were issued plimarily for those who were connected to the Navane or the 
Parisian rebellion, they are all issued in the wake of  August 1358. 
As stated, there were several distinct types of remission concerning the rebels of 
1358.  In the rush to produce several hundred of these documents within a couple 
of months,  a  distinct  vocabulary  for  each  type  of remission  emerged.  This 
vocabulary even transfened to  other documents, like donations and confiscations 
9"  'confisques a  nostre dit seigneur a  nous pour la trahison ct rebellion des des sus dictes maticres 
qui se sont renduz ennemis et rebelles de nostre dit seigneur ... avec Ie roy de navarre nostre 
ennemi mortel.  Donne au Louvre des Paris ran de grace 1358 ou moys de mais ... .', AN, 1190, f. 
30. no. 65. 
43 of property.  When Bessen attempted to  explain why no  remissions  suggested 
NavalTese forces  worked with the Jacques, he claimed  'the occasionally vague 
descriptions  of disloyal  deeds  ,95  made  these  hard  to  find.  Yet,  of the  307 
remissions for men involved in the three rebellions combined, only five suggest 
any doubt whatsoever as  to  which of the three distinct challenges to  the crown 
they belonged.  These are issued late in 1358, and refer to settlements to  the far 
south of the Dauphin's lands.  These are the exceptions and, as I will argue later, 
were probably distinct revolts other than those of the Jacques, the Parisian revolt 
and the mistoricatic disobedience of NavalTe.
96  Instead, what characterises the 
selies  is  the clmity with  which the  different rebels  can be identified,  be they 
'conspiring with the men of Pmis' and Etienne Marcel, 'rebels and traitors with 
the  King  of NavalTe'  who  had  committed  "  lese-majeste' ,  or  'men  of the 
countryside' who were caught up in the revolt against the 'nobles'. 
The tumult of 1358  also represented a change in the administration of justice. 
Not only did the Jacques and others speed up the normal channels of chancery 
remissions,  the  sheer mass  of remissions  is  even more  in  the  context  of the 
number nonnally issued in the year.  This  is  especially true when considering 
that  although the  remission is  not  a  new document,  by  1358  it had only just 
begun to  be issued regularly.  Previously, no  more than two hundred had been 
issued mlliually with any regularity. 
95  Bessen, 'The Jaequerie', p. 53. 
96 These remissions will be discussed in Chapter 6, 'Peasant Resistance'. 
44 Table II. Comparison of remissions issued. 
Average remissions issued per year, 1350-7 (JJ80-84)  174 
Remissions  issued  within 6  months  between late  1358  and  271 
early  1359  for  the  Jacques,  Marcel's  partisans  and  the 
Navarrese 
Remissions issued per year, 1361-3 (JJ91-2)  123 
The number of remissions that had to  be issued by the French crown, and the 
volume  of individuals  who  needed  pardons,  was  of an  unprecedented  scale. 
Gauvard  claims  that  remission production was  at  its  height between 1380  and 
1400,  but the  output for  1358  was greater than any year in her period.  There 
were more than twice as  many documents issued in six months than would be 
expected  in  an  entire  year  dming  the  early  1360s.  What  differences  to  the 
normal  practice  of  the  granting  remissions  did  such  a  huge  turnover  of 
documents cause?  What role did the rebellions have in stimulating new turnover 
in terms of  remissions? 
Below is a table showing the remissions issued in the JJ selies.  I have included 
only volumes that contain over 400 documents within them.
97  Note that volumes 
are not issued strictly chronologically:  one does not necessmily start where the 
previous  volume ends.  Several  volumes  consist of a collection of documents 
brought together that were missed out in other collections, spanning as  much as 
two  decades.  There can be no  guarantee that a remission from JJ58 was issued 
earlier than ]]59, for example: 
97  Data taken from Franyois, 'Note sur Ies Iettres de remission'. 
45 Table III. Remissions issued per series. 
Series (JJ)  Years  Number of  documents  Number of  remissions  D;(,age of  remissions 
35-49  1302-14  2850  17  0.6 
54  1317  701  2  0.3 
56  1317-19  620  6  1.0 
58  1317-20  487  0  0.0 
59  1318-21  611  1  0.2 
61  1322-3  493  2  0.4 
62  1323-5  531  5  0.9 
64  1342-8  756  8  1.1 
66  1329-34  1502  9  0.6 
68  1322-49  429  80  18.6 
71  1337-40  427  6  1.4 
72  1329-45  568  II  1.9 
74  1340-6  756  18  2.4 
75  1342-6  609  38  6.2 
76  1340-8  406  110  27.1 
77  1345-9  443  113  25.5 
80  1350-1  780  290  37.2 
81  1351-3  959  348  36.3 
82  1352-5  695  300  43.2 
84  1352-7  823  427  51.9 
86  1357-9  620  437  70.5 
87  1357-60  758  440  58.0 
90  1356-61  638  363  56.9 
91  1361-3  510  243  47.6 
92  1361-3  523  127  24.3 
96  1364-5  434  166  38.2 
46 The importance of the  rebellions  of 1358  within the  production of pardons  is 
stressed by this table. Remission remained a small minority within the registres 
du  Tresor des chm'tes until  1358.  There is  one exception in JJ68, a series that 
has  18%  of remissions,  however this  series  is  a  conglomerate  of documents 
issued between 1322  and  1348  and is  not necessarily a good representation of 
early-fourteenth century administration.  The general trend is clear:  remissions 
were present in the registers from the beginning of the fourteenth century, but it 
is the late 1340s that see a massive growth in the production of  remissions, which 
continues into the 1350s,  The increase in remissions was not a product solely of 
the  rebellions  of 1358.  Yet  1358  gives  the production of remissions  another 
massive boost, so that almost 75% of JJ86 (1357-9) consists of remissions.  If we 
are  to  understand these documents  as  indicative of the  French crown's focus, 
then  its  primary  concern  was  the  punislunent  and  pardon  of  the  rebels. 
Following  1358,  the  number of remissions  retumed back to  the  levels of the 
earlier 1350s, before growing again in the 1370s.  The level of remissions issued 
in the wake of rebellion is a substantial, even if momentary, change in previous 
practice for the French crown. 
Another change is  the language of these documents: they shift from entirely in 
Latin at the beginning of the fourteenth century to almost universally French by 
the end. Thus, during Gauvard"s time period, the reign of Charles VI, remissions 
were nearly always written in the vemacular.  By JJl38, for example, only three 
of the two hundred and fifteen remissions in the collection are in Latin.  In the 
context of the 1350s however, this is exceptional: remissions were still primarily 
written in Latin.  Fran90is collated the numbers of remissions recorded in French 
47 and Latin.
9S  These figures place particular focus upon the years around 1358 as a 
watershed: 
Table IV. The language of remissions in the registers. 
JJ  Series  Number  of  Number  111  Percentage  Percentage 
Remissions  Latin  Latin  French 
80 (1350-1)  290  280  97%  3% 
81  (1351-3)  348  340  98%  2% 
84 (1352-7)  417  400  96%  4% 
85 (1357)  138  50  36%  64% 
86 (1357-59)  437  120  27%  73% 
92 (1361-3)  127  0  0%  100% 
Franyois attributes this switch from Latin to French as  a product of the switch in 
administrations from Jean II to the dauphin Charles.
99  This change can be seen 
in all forms of administration.lOo  For example, of the sixty-four documents that 
were issued for Saint-Quentin in Jean II's reign, fifty-one were issued in Latin 
and thirteen in French;  of the  thirteen issued by Charles in his  regency to  the 
same bonne ville,  only three were in  Latin and ten were in French.
lol  The 
return of Jean II  to  pO\ver sees a shift back towards Latin, used in 79% of royal 
administrative  documents,  indicating  the  exceptional  nature  of Charles  V's 
9S  Franyois, 'Note sur les lettres de remission', pp. 321-4.  Franyois only offers figures for a 
scattered collection of  series.  After ]]92, almost all remissions are written in French. 
99  For Fran<;:ois, 'the registers correspond to particular moments in the history of our language and 
royal chancel1erie',  This is no doubt true, but he does not suggest any reason why this change 
occurs. p.  322. 
100  Sec S.  Lusignan, La langue des rois au Moyen,.{ge,  leji-anr,:ois ell France et en Anglelerre 
(Pmis: Presses universitaires de France, 2004), pp.  116-126, for details oflanguage used in 
Charles's reign as both Dauphin and Charles V. 
101  Lusignan, La langue des rois, p.  91. 
48 selection of the vernacular as  his  language of choice. 102  In this  context,  JJ86, 
with the remissions for the Jacques, NavalTese and  followers  of Marcel,  looks 
like just an extension of the Dauphin's new policy.  However, if  we take a look at 
the remissions issued for the rebels, there is something new in JJ86: 
Table V. The language of remissions in JJ86. 
JJ86  Number  of  Number  111  Percentage  Percentage 
Remissions  Latin  Latin  French 
Jacques  136  7  5%  95% 
Marcel  ""  .).)  0  0%  100% 
NavalTe  26  4  15%  85% 
Total  195  11  5%  95% 
Unrelated  242  109  45%  55% 
Remissions 
Remissions for crimes not related to rebellion were almost as likely to be written 
in  Latin  as  they  were  in  French  throughout  JJ86,  the  register  consisting  of 
documents issued in the wake of the summer of 1358.  Documents relating to the 
rebellion however, are almost exclusively in the vernacular.  If we exclude the 
NavalTese documents, then only 4% of the remissions for the Jacquerie and the 
followers  of Marcel were written in Latin.  Meanwhile, 45% of remissions for 
standard climinals were written in Latin.  The continuing shift towards French is 
supported entirely by remissions issued for  the rebellions  of 1358, particularly 
the Jacquerie. 
102  ibid., p.  125. 
49 It would be useful for our purposes to  presume this  is connected to  the 
lower economic class of the Jacques; after all, Lusignan argues that the selection 
of French  was  'intended  to  bring  the  King's  word  closer  to  that  of  his 
subj ects' .  1  03  When  we  consider  how  an  individual  might  seek  to  use  his 
remission - to  present to  his  local  lord,  to  give him immunity from  criminal 
prosecution,  to  obtain  release  from  imprisonment  - we  could  see  how  the 
peasantry would favour a document in the vemacular easily understood by local 
officials.  Operating  outside the  world of advocates,  paid counsels  and  long-
established reputations that remissions were nom1ally issued,  these individuals 
required pardons that could be used within their society.  This would explain why 
we see more Latin pardons for  the followers of NavalTe,  who  tended to  be of 
higher status. 
The complete  absence  of Latin  from  any  of the  remissions  issued  for 
those of Marcel suggests this might not be the only reason.  These Parisians were 
often men with professional occupations and were granted their pardons based on 
their'  good name and renown'.  What links them is that they were granted their 
remissions  during the same administrative frenzy.  The rebellions of 1358 not 
only represented the first crisis in the rule of the regent, they represented the first 
administrative challenge: how does the crown adminster grace and re-establish 
the peace in the countryside, where private violence between nobles and peasants 
had raged from May to  August?  With the courts having begun the process of 
switching from Latin to  French for the remission letters, the massive number of 
pardons - more issued in a couple of months than were normally issued in two 
years - issued in the wake of these events were processed quickly.  Hence we see 
103  Lusignan, La langlle des rois, p.  121. 
50 the  same  vocabulary  repeating .itself from  document  to  document,  the  same 
phrases  to  describe  action  and  the  same  claims  of non-involvement  or being 
forced  into  action  repeated  in  the  vast  majOlity  of the  remissions.  It is  not 
surprising that they should also  be produced in the same language.  This was 
mass justice, issued quickly and efficiently to hundreds of  appellants. 
The remissions issued in the wake of the Jacquerie did not represent a revolution 
in the French administration of  pardons.  Remissions had became common in the 
preceding years, and within the previous twelve months there seems to have been 
a shift from  Latin to  French.  Most likely,  this was  an  innovation of the new 
regime of the  dauphin Charles.  Yet the J  acquerie represented a watershed in 
these new fonns of administration.  Suddenly, not only were the vast majority of 
documents being issued in the vernacular, but the  administrative centre issued 
more remissions than ever before, at  almost four times  the monthly rate.  The 
fonnation  of a  distinct  vocabularly  to  desclibe  each  revolt,  the  issuing  to 
cOlmnunities as well as  individuals, even the fonn that these letters took:  all  of 
these are  indicative of an  embryonic document finding rigidity through usage. 
Letters  of remission  were  not  historic  documents  with  a  long history  of re-
establishing peace after violence: rather, their fonn and function were suddenly 
forged tln-ough being processed for hundreds of  rebels in the lIe de France. 
51 3 - THE THEORY OF CO-"OPTED REBELLION 
A People's War in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth 
century.  It has its advocates and opponents ... In the generality of cases, 
the  people  who  make  judicious  use  of  this  means  will  gain  a 
proportionate superiority over those who despise its use ...  we ask 'what 
is  the  effect  which  such  a  resistance  can  produce?  What  are  its 
conditions, and how is it to be used?'  104 
In  011  War,  Carl von  Clausewitz wondered whether nineteenth-century am1ies 
could take advantage of the phenomenon of revolution, and suggested that public 
fervour would be an excellent weapon for generals to marshal against opposing 
forces.  This idea of a political group using popular movements to  fmiher their 
own aims has proved attractive to histOlians, even though the concept of  an army 
influencing the  mob has  long been rejected by social  psychologists:  ideology 
cannot be  'simply imposed on mindless subj ects', indeed, historically'  [c ]rowd 
members certainly neither needed,  nor had,  leaders  standing over them telling 
them what to  do'  .105  The image of a workers' revolt manipulated by powerful 
elites  has  affected the entire conception of the medieval revolt in the  eyes  of 
modem historians  1  06. 
As an example, when David Bessen examined whether the Jacquerie was 
a 'Class-War or Co-Opted rebellion?'  107  in his 1988 3liic1e, he strongly favoured 
the latter - the 'Jacquerie' was simply Charles of NavalTe's attempt to  employ a 
peasant anny against the  French crown.  By either usurping the leadership of the 
104  Gen. C.  von Clausewitz, 011  War,  tr. Col. 1.J. Graham (London: Truber, 1940), v.  ll, pp. 341-
2. 
105 S. Reieher, The Challenge ortlze Crowd (forthcoming). 
106 The is demonstrable in case ofthe revolt of  the Ciompi, wllere Mollat and Wolff focussed 
upon 'cliques around men like Salvestr·o de Medici, Giorgio Scali and Alberto Strozzi' rather 
than the numerous leaders fi'om the artisan class, Mollat and Wolff, Poplllar Revolutions, p.  154. 
For a discussion ofleadership within the Ciompi, see Cohn, Lllstjor Liberty, pp.  120-9, and for a 
short discussion of the historiography on that revolt, see Cohn, PP, pp. 201-5. 
107  Bessen, 'The Jacquerie'. 
52 Jacques, or by instigating the entire rebellion, Charles the Bad had simply anived 
at Von Clausewitz's conclusions several centUlies  earlier:  that elites can utilise 
peasants to destabilise opposing forces. 
Bessen was not the first to  emphasise the importance elite groups played 
111  organising  rebellion.  Guy  Fourquin  devoted  a  whole  chapter  to  '[t]he 
preponderance of elites in rebellion'  .108  Neither was Bessen even the first  to 
suggest that  elites  had  led  the Jacquerie.  Raymond  Cazelles  made the  same 
argument  for  the  Jacquelie ten years  earlier,  but claimed that  it  was  Etienne 
Marcel who had marshalled the rural forces to  aid his rebellion in the capital;I09 
Simeon Luce himself made a similar argument in 1897.
110  For both Cazelles and 
Luce,  the attack on the Marche of Meaux represented the centrepiece of their 
theories, w'hen  the Parisians and the rural rebels joined together to  destroy the 
fortress.  The idea  of the  Jacquerie  as  a  'co-opted'  rebellion  has,  in  several 
works, become accepted. III 
Letters of remissions tell a very different story.  There is no evidence to 
suggest that Marcel or Navan'e were behind the Jacquerie; indeed, the remissions 
suggest  that  the  peasants  were  often  openly  hostile  to  both  townsmen  and 
Navarrese forces.  Surprisingly, given the importance that the attack on Meaux 
has  been  granted  in  the  historiography,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that 
Jacques were involved in any meaningful way in the assault.  To begin rebuilding 
the  image of the  Jacques  as  an  important historical  movement,  we must first 
lOS  Fourquin, Anatomy of  Popular Rebellion, pp. 63-80. 
109  Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', in  The English Rising of  1381, pp. 74-84. 
110 Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 99-104. 
III For example, see F.  Autrand, Charles  V,  le Sage (Paris: Fayard,  1994), and the chapter on 'La 
Jacqueric' pp. 318-330, which includes a section on the role of'Les COl71mandos Parisiens' in the 
rebellion.  In the article on the Jacquerie in the Dictionmy of  the Middle Ages, cd. J. Strayer 
(Scribner: New York, 1986), J.B. Henneman descibes Cazel1es's article as 'the authoritative 
work', and states that 'only in the Beauvaisis, where the worst atrocities occurred, does the 
Jacqueric seem to have pursued an independent course', vol. 6, pp. 35-6. 
53 dismantle accusations that  it  was  simply an extension of elite groups' political 
ambitions.  The following  chapter seeks  to  challenge theOlies  that NavalTe  or 
Marcel co-opted the Jacquerie for their own purposes, or that Meaux represented 
the great unification of urban and rural rebels; the Jacquerie was undoubtedly a 
distinct rural movement which was not controlled from outside. 
NAVARRE 
The peasants were quite happy to  recognise their lords as  leader both in 
revolts  and  ..  in  nationalistic  movements  .. .It  is  precisely  in  real 
Jacqueries that the presence of  noble leaders is conspicuous.
1ll 
Guy  Fourquin's  Anatom:v  of a  Popular  Rebellion  confidently  declared  that 
medieval popular revolt was  dominated  by aristocratic leaders,  subveliing the 
will of the rebels  to  f'rniher  their own ends.  Peasant rebels were  "manipulated 
tactical force[ s r:  'the leading roles remain, directly or indirectly, with the elites 
in many types of  disturbances'. 113  F  oUl'quin' s model has been relentlessly applied 
to  almost every popular movement of the Middle Ages.  The search for nobles 
within  a  rebellion  has  become  so  common  that  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to 
identify th.em within the crowd; rather, it  can be assumed they are there, even if 
chronicles or documentary sources offer no or little evidence of this. I 14 
Fourquin's views on the Jacquelie have been echoed by other historians, 
the  best  example  being  Raymond  Cazelles'  two-pronged  attack  on  previous 
scholarship;  first,  he  maintained  that  the  insurgents  were  rural  aliisans;  and 
112  Fourquin, Anatomy of  Popular Rebellion, pp. 76-7. 
J 1.1  ibid., p. 70. 
114  Mol1at and Woltl, for example, while accepting the importance of  non-elite leaders, talk of  the 
'sacred union' between the upper bourgeoisie and the people' in this period. Mol1at and Woltr~ 
Popular Revolllfiol1s, p. 299. 
54 second,  that  the  Jacquerie  was  organised by Etienne  Marcel.  Following. that 
came  another  theory  from  David  Bessen  115  that  the  mastermind  behind  the 
Jacquerie was none other than its eventual vanquisher, Charles ofNavane, Count 
of Evreux  and son-in-law of King Jean II  (or Charles the  Bad,  as  history has 
remembered him): 
The Navanese were sympathetic or tolerant
116  of the Jacques, as long as 
their actions were directed against Navane's enemies.  Once the violence 
of the Jacques could not be controlled and threatened the position of the 
Navanese  and  the  Parisians,  the  rebellion was  quickly  crushed.  The 
opportunity  to  use  the  initial  rural  revolt  as  a  means  of expressing 
political  dissent  and  forcing  concrete  refonn  within  the  govennnent 
brought disparate  groups together,  not in a social  war but in  an act  of 
political expediency 
Charles of Navane was a significant thorn in the crown's side over the period. 
He represented a real dynastic rival to the regent Charles, being the grandson of 
Louis X, and conmlanded large numbers of followers in the north of France and 
had a history of dealings with the English crown. During the years before and 
after the Jacquerie, his forces took control of  many of  the key fortifications of  the 
lIe de  France,  and later that  summer he would be welcomed into Paris  as  the 
city's captain.  Remissions for Navanese supporters refer to  Charles the Bad as 
.  .  l' 117  Y  1  ..  d .  dIN  an  . enneml morte  .  et now lere IS  It  suggeste  111  any recor  s t lat  avane 
may  have  controlled  the  rural  revolt  or  that  the  two  rebellions  were  linked 
together  to  further  distinctly  Navanese aims.  Rather,  Bessen  constructed  a 
nanative grounded solely on the presumption that peasant rebellions need nobles 
11:;  'Class War or Co-Opted Rebellion?' is a bold title, but one that Bessen shies away from in his 
actual argument (at least until the conclusion).  Bessen's argues '[iJt seems quite likely that nobles 
who call be classed as supporters of Charles of Navarre were sympathelic to alld lolcrall! ()fthe 
non-noble rioters' (my emphasis).  Bessen, 'The Jaequerie', pp. 43-59. 
116 This phrase, "sympathetic and tolerant', appears several times in the article. We are asked to 
make the logical leap from some Navarrese being "sympathetic and tolerant' of the Jacques to 
them having been in charge of it.  Bessen, "The Jacquerie' pp. 46, 48, 51, 56. 
117  For example, see AN, JJ90, f.  98, no.  178. 
55 at  the  helm,  and  those  nobles  could  have  supported  Navane.  There  is  no 
evidence of any peasant activity that was  'co-opted', but given the  prevailing 
scholarship, this was an acceptable thesis. 
When Fourquin originally argued that the nobility had a role in the Jacquerie, he 
encouraged historians to  disregard the majority of the chronicle evidence: 'Must 
we  follow  Froiss31i  blindly  in  his  repeated  insistence  on  the  hostility  of the 
Jacques  to  the  nobles  in  1358?,118  To propose that  the  Navanese controlled 
these  revolts  requires  the  same approach:  the  chronicles  display  contempt for 
both the Jacques and the King of Navane, but never once suggest that the two 
rebellions  were  interlinked.  Bessen' turned  to  the  documents  that  show  quite 
clearly  that the  Jacques  were hostile to  the  nobles,  at least  in  the  eye  of the 
crown: the remissions. 
Yet within this  supposedly supportive dataset  of remissions,  as  Bessen 
admits, 'there is no single document' within remissions issued to both Navanese 
individuals and Jacques that indicates a link between the twO. 119  He describes a 
'sparseness of source materials describing the event',  120 which is simply wrong-
the vast databank of remissions provide ample evidence of the character of the 
violence.  Many remissions give us clear descriptions of many of the rebels on 
either side. 
We  have  already  discussed  the  distinctive  language  that  is  used  to 
describe the Jacques.  They are refened to  the gcnz du  plat-pays:  men of the 
countryside, described primarily as being 'against the nobles'.  There are several 
variations on this theme;  they can also be described as  'non-nobles against the 
118  Fourquin, Anatomy of  Popular Rebellion, p. 76. 
119 Bessen, 'The Jacquerie' p. 49. 
120  ibid,  p. 53. 
56 nobles of the realm'.l21  Occasionally, we see them described as  "communs' or 
'peuple',  but  even  Bessen  concedes  that  this  group  is  'almost  always 
counterpoised  with  les  nobles'.  122  The  revolt  itself was  referred  to  as  the 
commocioll  or the effi'oi,  giving a sense of the chaos  that ensued in its wake. 
This language remains constant throughout all  the remissions, making it simple 
to spot a remission for the Jacques even when surrounded by the mass of general 
remissions that make up the rest of the registers. 
As mentioned, particular tenns were used in conjunction with Navarrese 
pardons that  we do  not find  in the remissions for  the  Jacques.  The lacquerie 
itself was  identified  as  the  "time  of the  commotion  between  the  men of the 
countryside  and  the  nobles',  and  the  Navarrese  rebellion  was  identified  as  a 
separate temporal  entity ('at the time that the Navan'ese and other enemies of 
ours  ...  [came  together]  for  wounding  and  damaging  our  subjects  and  the 
realm  '),123  For example, Navan'ese partisan Jehan Bugdenet and his aides were 
described as  'rebels against us and the crown of France';  124 a change of emphasis 
to the sole target being the regent, not the 'nobility' and'  good men' of  France,l25 
There is  even a clearer example of this distinctive text in a document donating 
land confiscated from a Navarrese partisan: 
121  Bessen argues that only a portion of the thirty-four remissions in the Pieces Justificatives that 
refer to the Jacqucs (again, making reference only to those fully reprinted in Luce) specifically 
say 'non-nobles': 'Any explanation of the usage must first note that the phrase was not always 
used in the precise fonn of les nobles con/re les nOllnobles.  More frequently, the tenns used 
instead of nOl1llOhles were les gen7. dll plat pavs, les habilal1= or les peuple of a specific region, or 
les cOll1munes of an area'.  However, while it is true that some do not, they do all describe it as 
someone against the nobles, be that the 'peuple', the 'rustics' or the'  gens du play pays'  ibid., p. 
58. 
121 ibid. 
123  'Que comme ou temps que le navaITois et autres ennemies de mons ... pour grever et domagier 
noz subgies et le royaume cest assavoir au 1110is d'aoust dernier passe', AN, JJ90, f.  98, no.  178. 
124, rebelle de mons de nous et de la COUTOnne de France', AN, JJ90, f.  30, no. 65. 
125 It should be noted, of course, that the Jacques are accused (if  not as frequently) of  having 
acted against the crown of  France, but they are always indicted of actions against the nobles, 
whereas the Navaresse are never accused of  this but only in their opposition to the crown. 
57 for the treason and rebellion of these said matters that they had given to 
enemies  ....  and  rebels  against  our  said lord and  to  us  with  our mOlial 
h  .  f  ]')6  enemy t  e Kmg 0  Navarre. -
Treason (trahisoll)  is  a term not used in any of the remissions for the Jacques, 
and  has  its  own implications:  this  was  an  assault  upon  the  monarch.  This 
distinction defines  the  differences  between these two  outbreaks of unrest:  the 
Navarrese  uprising  was  a  treasonous  attack  aimed  at  the  regent,  while  the 
Jacquerie  was  targeted  only  against  the  nobility  as  a  whole.  Perhaps  more 
impOliant  was  the  description  of the  Navarrese  interest  as  a  'rebellion'.  The 
whole nature of what constitutes a 'rebellion', and how a rebellion is defined, has 
coloured  many  debates  on  what  constitutes  popular  action.  Fourquin,  for 
example, prefers rebellion to  revolt in cases were the 'movements were stmied 
either by a new social group which wishes to belong to  the elites, or by elites 
who  are  not  satisfied with  their 10t'.127  This  distinction  is  not simply one for 
modern historians  either.  Cohn makes  clear that  this  is  also  a  distinction  of 
contemporaries: 
Statutes, criminal records, town council proceedings, and chronicles often 
restlicted the use of the word rebellion for aristocratic challenges to  the 
dominant power, be it a king, count or city-state,  or the 'rebellion' of a 
b·  '11  ·]18  su  .lect VI  age or CIty.  -
Cohn contrasts this use of 'rebellion' with the commocions of the lower classes 
in France and Flanders, and indeed the Jacquerie is referred to in almost all the 
remIssIOns  as  a  commociol1. 129  The French crown made a  deliberate  contrast 
126  'pour la lraison et rebellion des dessus diz matieres qui se sont renduz ennemis .... et rebelles 
de nostre dit seigneur et de nous avec Ie roy de navuITe nostre ennemi martel' AN, J]90. f.  198. 
no.  178. 
127 Fourquill, Anatomy ofa Papillar Rebellion, p.  116. 
128 Cohn, Lustfor Liberty, pp.  3-13. 
129  ibid. 
58 between  the  organised  lese-l71ajeste  of the  'rebellion'  and. the  commocion  or 
effi'ois of the 1acquerie. 
The whole sample of remissions tied to Navarre's rebellion is substantial, 
and it is hard to make any generalisations on the exact makeup of the Navarrese 
force.  I have found sixty remissions that specifically refer to Navarre's rebellion 
using the phrases above, but there are many more documents (like confiscations 
of property)  within  the  chancery  series.  They  include  actual  lieutenants  of 
Navarre,  like Adam de  Prusieux,  a  knight who  had spent a  'long time in  the 
company and audience of the King of Navarre, our enemy'  .130  Also, towns that 
had  sided  with  Navarre,  like  Paris,  were  pardoned,  along  with  individual 
townsmen accused in complicity in the treason, like 1ehan de Maours, Colmi de 
Lille and 1  acques de Rue of Amiens.  All of these groups of remissions used the 
same vocabulary,  described above.  The most interesting sub-bracket of these 
remissions are local villagers who, in August, either took up arms and cOlllillitted 
crimes against the allied troops of the Navarrese and English, or in fear for their 
lives acceeded to whatever these enemies of the crown demanded.  This sample 
includes priests like 1ehan Bugnedit
131  and 1ehan de Pris (who was also the cure 
of his village),132  carpenters like 1ehan Magneut
133  and even butchers
134
.  The 
remissions for these individuals, rural men who were involved in fighting in the 
summer of 1358,  make  no  mention  of the  Jacquel-ie  whatsoever - peasants 
resisting or joining the Navarrese rebellion were considered distinct from their 
neighbours who had rampaged against the nobility two months earlier. 
130 AN, ]]86, f.  129,110.376. 
131  AN, JJ90, f. 71, no.  133, 'Jehan Bugnedet, prestre esperanf. 
1-'2  AN, .1190, 1'.  98, no.  177 . lehan de Pris, prestre cure de 1a ville de Foilloy'. 
133  AN, JJ90, f.  100, no.  187. 
13~ AN, JJ90, f.  82, no.  149. 
59 Faced with remissions that clearly show the two revolts to  be distinct,  Bessen 
based his argument on scant threads within individual remissions:  in this  case, 
the remissions for urban centres, and two documents issued to individuals within 
the centre of the rural revolt.  However, neither of these groups suggest anything 
conclusive.  Bessen first argued that the involvement of towns loyal to Navane 
within the revolt proved that Navanese partisans controlled the revolt.  Although 
these towns may have risen up,  there is  nothing to  suggest they were directly 
linked to  the Jacquerie.  For example, Bessen lists Paris as one of the towns that 
had  Navanese  support,  and  that  took  part  in  the  Jacquerie.  Yet,  against 
Cazelles's argument that the 1:\'10 were the same,135  every clu'onicle and remission 
states that the Parisian revolt and the Jacquel-ie were entirely separate, as we will 
discuss presently.  There is absolutely no evidence that towns like Rouen or Laon 
were involved in the J acquel-ie from either the chronicles or the remissions, and 
as will be argued later, neither is there much evidence of involvement at Meaux. 
Only three  of Bessen's pro-Navanese towns  are  linked by remissions  to  the 
Jacquel-ie:  Amiens,  Montdidier  and  Senlis.  In  the  case  of  Amiens,  it  is 
problematic to descl-ibe the town as having supported the Jacques: 
Charles, etc., Let it be known to all present and future that in times past 
the aldennen [esqllevins]  and commune of the city of Amiens have been 
and,  (we continue to  hope) always will be good, loyal, and true in their 
obedience as subjects to my lord, to us, and to the crown of France.  And 
they have realised that they have incUlTed  our indignation for what has 
happened at several assemblies of the people of the three estates, which 
we found offensive, even if they were encouraged and advised by some 
who claimed at the time to  be members of our council.  ... In addition, 
during  this  present  year,  when  we  left  Compiegne  for  Corbie, 
accompanied  by  many  armed  guards,  we  wrote  to  the  mayor,  many 
leaders  of the  guild  and  others  of the  city,  ordering them  to  come to 
Corbie to talk with us.  They did not obey or heed our command but sent 
us  envoys, suggesting that we should go  to  the city of Amiens and that 
our men should go there unanned.  They said they feared the noblemen in 
135  See Cazel1es, 'The Jacquerie', pp. 74·84. 
60 our troops, because they heard some of these persons make certain threats 
... At the request of the common people of the Beauvaisis and without 
our permission, the mayor, aldennen and the commune [of Amiens] sent 
their own people out [to join] the common people of the Beauvaisis, who 
had just begun to  assemble.  In  addition,  many individuals of Amiens 
went by their own will,  although it was said that those who  were sent 
only went four,  five or six leagues outside the city and its environs and 
then immediately returned...  Moreover,  in all  the assemblies with  the 
other bOl1l1es villes of the realm, they requested the King of NavalTe to be 
freed, hoping, it is said, that he would be good and loyal to my lord, to us, 
and to the crown of France ... Also, they put on the hoods, part blue and 
red,  as  a  sign  of their  unity  and  alliance  with  the  city  of Paris ... 
Moreover, after the treaty made between us and the said King of  Navarre, 
when we were with our troops at the bridge of Charenton, they agreed 
that this King should be the leader, because the city of Paris had written 
to  them  that  it  had  been  among  the  things  agreed  to  and  negotiated 
between us and this King. ·136 
Whatever rebellion the Amienois may have been involved in, they were part of a 
general  backdrop  of sedition  and  confusion against  the  crown,  rather  than  as 
some orchestrated master-plan to  unite townsmen and peasants in the NavalTese 
cause.  All  the  allegations  of rebellion  were  treated  distinctly;  refusing  the 
crown's demands,  sending men to  the Jacques, pledging allegiance to  NavalTe 
and showing unity with the Parisians were all different crimes.  Clearly, there is 
confusion about the  involvement with  the  Jacques:  men were  sent  out to  the 
countryside, then called back, and others joined of their own accord.  Colm links 
this account to  that of the Chroniqlle Nonnande, which records that 'the mayor 
of Amiens also sent forth a hundred men of the commune, but the town council 
disapproved and recalled them.  They returned without more or less doing any 
hann to  the nobles·
J37
.  Amiens cannot be used as  an example of a NavalTese 
136  AN, JJ86, f. 79, no. 239, reprinted in Secousse, pp. 97-9,  trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  197-8. 
137  La Chrollique Ilormande dll XIVe sicc!e, ed A. and E.  Molinier SHF (Paris, 1882), p.181, and, 
for discussion, Cohn, Lusl for Liberly, p. 169. This chronicle, wTitten by a  Norman noble, was 
composcd sometime aftcr 1372, although whether the work is Oliginal or a compliation of  other 
chronicles is still disputcd.  In the case of the Jacqucrie, the account is almost exactly the same as 
Jean de NoyaJ's Flemish chronicle, the so-called 'Version non normande', ed. J. Kervyn de 
Lettenhove, Lvlore el croniqlles de Flandres (Brussels, 1896) vol. 2, pp.85-6.  See Molinier, Les 
sources de l'hisloire, vol. 4, pp. 23-5. 
61 town's control  of the Jacquerie;  the  municipal elite could not agree whether a 
relatively minor force of 100 men should go or not, and the general uproar only 
led to instability within the town.  This small force, that did not reach six leagues 
from their home city before being recalled, could not have dictated the Jacques' 
agenda.  Perhaps Amiens was indicative of how confusing politics was in the 
rebellions  in  northern  France,  with  the  city  attempting  to  increase  its  power 
through involvement in all three great rebellions; it was certainly not indicative 
of strong links between the peasants and the municipal elites. 
The same can be seen in Montdidier.  Despite the inhabitants receiving a 
remission for participation, their mayor simultaneously sought grace for having 
hung a thieving cleric during the rebellion.
138  He was not involved in the rest of 
the revolt.  Others of the urban elite seemed to  be at odds with the rebels; the 
inhabitants  attacked  the  nobles  of Montdidier,  and long past the  revolt  these 
knights held a grudge against the townsmen.139  In Senlis, townsmen evicted the 
nobles  from  their houses.
140  If the  top-ranks  of the  urban  society were pro-
NavalTese, but those involved with the Jacques were fighting against those top 
ranks, then surely the insurgents were anti-NavalTese? 
None of these remissions mentioned NavalTe,  and more importantly, the 
agency is granted not to  townsmen, but rather to the 'men of the countryside'.  A 
ragtag collection of burghers joined the mass of peasantry in their uprising; they 
did not orchestrate a revolt that the peasantry then joined.  All the chronicle and 
I1S  AN, J1106, f  121, no. 393. 
139 The remission for the habitants recorded that 'aucuns des diz nobles pourroient avoir 
malivo1ence ou hayne aux dessus diz [habitants]"  AN, JJ86, f  154, no. 437. 
140 See AN, J.l86, f  127, no. 421. 
62 remission evidence indicates that urban suppOli was, at most, ancillary to the real 
insugents, the men of the countryside. 141 
Apart from these towns, Bessen alleges that two remissions show a link between 
Navarre and the Jacquerie, but neither shows any definitive connection.  The first 
was  issued to  a  Jacque,  Jehan Bernier.  After the  defeat at  Clennont, he  was 
offered 'letters of  commission' from the King of  Navane: 
'this [Jehan] Bernier of  Villers Saint Pol (Oise), acting in fear and on pain 
of death, was with those [men of the countryside] through the said tenor 
and  was  for  many  days  in  their  company,  until  this  Guillaume  Cale, 
calling  himself  captain  of the  Beauvoisis,  and  many  others  of his 
adherents and accomplices were executed at Clennont thus putting an end 
to  their mad  enterprise,  and  so  it  happened that.  because these  certain 
nobles  of our  realm,  enemies  of the  said  countryside,  for  the  stated 
causes,  were running amock and causing destruction for  a time  to  tllis 
said land and the goods of the fields, some people from the said land,  of 
Senlis and of Villiers, and of the neigbouring sunoundings  of Clern10nt 
and  Beauvoisin,  came  before  to  the King  of Navane  (then  captain, 
rebellious and hostile to  the said realm,  to  our Lord the King142  and to 
us 143)  and obtained from him certain letters of commission by which the 
said J ehan Bernier,  of Villers,  was made captain there and guard of the 
countryside in [N avane'  s]  absence so that the people and commons could 
work there and cultivate the lands and reap and secure the goods of the 
fields.  The said Bernier refused this  said cOlm11ission  for the space of 
around a week, and finally, against his will and wishes and by constraint, 
he accepted it and went to stay in the said town (ville) of Senlis, without 
leaving it  and without making use of the said commission, saving that he 
wrote to many villages (villes) of the countryside asking that they would 
come to him in the said town (ville) to see and plan how they could begin 
resisting the said [nobles'] rampage ... ,144 
141  This will be expanded upon in the Chapter  IV, 'Mapping the Revolt'. 
142  This refers to King Jean II. 
143  This refers to the Dauphin Charles. 
144  'Ie qucl Bemier dc Villers Saint Pol, aient hOlTeur,  doubte et paour de mOli, demoura avec 
eulx aus diz effrois et fu par plusiers jours en leur compaignie, jusque a  ce que Guillaume Ca1e, 
soi portant capitaine du dit pais de Beauvoisin et plusicrs autres ses adherens et complices furent 
mis a  mOli iJ  Clem10nt et descheirent de Jeur fole emprise, et il soit ainsi que, pour cc aucuns 
nobles elu elit royaume, malveillans et ennemis du  dit plat pais, pour les causes dessus dictes, 
coulToient et gastoeint pour Ie temps de Iors icelui pais, et Ies biens des champs, plusiers 
personnes du dit pais, tant de Senlis comme de Villiers, voisins d'environs Clennont en 
Beauvoisin, venissent a present par dcvers Ie Roy de Navarre, a donc capitaine d'icellui et nostre 
rebelle et malveillant du dit royaume, de monseigneur et de nous, et obtenissent de Ii celiaines 
Jettres de commission par lesqulles Ie dit Jehan Bemier, ele Villers, fu commis de par lui capitaine 
et garelc elu dit pais, lui absent, afin que Ie peuple et common el'icelui peust labourrer et cultiver 
Ies terres et ouster ct metlre iJ  sauvcte Ies biens des champs, Iaquelle commission Ie elit Bemier 
63 First, it is important to  note that Bernier was not a Navan"ese agent;  rather, he 
was  a Jacque who refused a commission to  protect the  countryside against the 
nobles'  rampage.  The key example  of Bessen's argument never accepted  the 
commission from Navarre,  even under duress.  It was,  of course,  in Bernier's 
best interests to  downplay the relationship with NavaITe;  perhaps he had been 
eager to help at the time but there is no  evidence in the remission to suggest this 
was  the case.  Moreover,  Bessen argued that Navarre was  instrumental in the 
organisation  of the  Jacques,  selecting  targets  and  driving  the  programme  of 
destruction from the very start.  Yet the only example Bessen has,  even if we 
believe  that  Bernier  accepted  the  commission  willingly,  happened  after 
Clermont, once the Jacques had been defeated and the emphasis had shifted to 
the nobJes' chevaucJuze of the countryside.  Far from being involved in turning 
the Jacques to  a Navarrese agenda, Bernier abandoned the  Navarrese only once 
the Jacques had been defeated.  Navarre was approached by the peasantry who 
wanted calm restored to the countryside in the wake of  his retaliatory attack; this 
was an attempted truce between peasants and their enemy, not an indication of a 
long-agreed pact. 
Bessen refers to just one other remission, and this one makes no reference 
to  collusion with Navarre.  Rather, Bessen believes the man to have been linked 
previously to the Navarrese cause: 
refusa par l'espace de huit jours ou environ,  et finablement, contre son gre et volente et par 
contrainte, la receut et s'en ala demourer en la dicte ville de Senlis, sens soi partir ne sens 
cxecutier ou user en aucune maniere de la dicte commission, tors tant seulement qu'il escript it 
plusiers villes du dit plat pais que il venissent a  lui en la dicte ville pour veoir et orderener 
commcnt on pOUIToit mectre remede et resister aus diz COUITCUX  ... ' AN, JJ86, 1'.  133, no.  387, 
reprintcd in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 276-8. 
64 Charles, .. .let it be known to  all that Gennain de Reveillon, inhabitant of 
Sachy-Ie-Grant in the Beauvoisin (Oise), waged retainer
145  of the Count 
of  Montfort, during the commotion or terror of  the men of  the countryside 
of the Beauvais against the nobles of the land and by constraint of the 
said people and their captain, rode out with them for three days  or so in 
their company to Mello, Pont-Saint Maxence and Montataire, and that on 
the last of these three days,  when the said people were in anns and fired 
up, on the hill of Montataire,  they requested of that said Gennain that he 
be their captain in the absence of their general captain, who was then in 
Ennenonville.  The said Germain excused himself several times for many 
causes and reasons.  Finally, because he did not wish to obey their request 
and  to  their wishes.  they  seized his  hood injuriously,  and said that he 
must be their captain for half-a-day and one night, whether he like it or 
not,  and they intended to pull him off his horse,  and with that pulled out 
several swords with the intention of  cutting off his head ifhe did not obey 
them.  In fear and to avoid the threat of death, he became their captain for 
half-a-day  and  a  night  only,  at  the  said place of Mello
146
,  where they 
encountered  the  men  of the  King  of Navarre,  who  at  the  time  were 
forcing themselves upon the said land of the Beauvaisis to  destroy and 
pillage there.  There, at the said Mello, Germain left and returned to  his 
house as  quickly as  he could, and he did so  without having caused any 
damage, nor in any other manner setting tIres, robbing nor killing anyone, 
nor doing anything else  that was wrong.  However,  what is  worse,  the 
said  nobles  went  on  to  bum,  steal,  ravage  and  assaulted  all  the  said 
supplicant and all his movable and inherited goods, and he suffered losses 
to the value of three thousand moutons. or thereabouts. and he has nothing 
left but his  wife  and  his  children  ...  he  was  a  homme  de  labour who 
cultivated and sent his goods to safety. 147 
140  I have translated familia as a waged retainer of  the Count.  Gennain was listed as a homme 
de labour, and he had 3,000 mOIlfOI1S worth ofpropcrty, so this would suggest hc was a 
landowner of some standing.  Yet afclIl1i!ier would not be a courtier or a high-ranking associate 
of the Count of Montfort; there is no reason to believe he was part of the Count's inner circle, or 
shared the Count's political views. 
146  Mello was the hometown of Guillaume Cale, the alleged 'leader' of  the Jacquerie. 
147 'Charles, ainsne fils du roy de France, regent le royaume, due de N0l111andie et dalphin de 
Yiennois, savoir faisons a  to US, presenz et a  venir, a  nous avoir este expose par Gel111ain de 
Reveillon, demourant a  Sachy-le-Grant en Beauvoisin, familier du conte de MontfOli, que, 
comme, en la  commocion ou esmeute du peuple du plait pais de Beauvoisins n'a gaires tilite 
contre les nobles dudit pais, ledit Gennain, par contrainte dudit peuple et de leur capitaine, lors 
eust chevauchi6 par trois jours ou environ en leur compagnie Ii Mello, Ii Pont-Saint Maxence, et Ii 
Montataire, a  la deneine des quelx trois jOUl11eeS, 1edit peuple estant en a1l11eS et esmeu, sur la 
montainge de Montatiare, eust requis audit Gennain qu'il vousist pour lors estre leur capitaine en 
rabsence de leur capitaine general, qui lars cstoit devant EI111eJ1onville, lequel Germain s'en 
excusa par plusiers fois et pour plusieurs causes et raisons.  Et finablement, pour ce qu'il ne 
vouloit obeir a  leur requcste et a  leur voulente, Ie pristrent par son chaperon injurieuscment, en 
disant qu'il seroit leur capitaine pour demi jour et une nuit, vousist au non, ct le vouldrent sachier 
jus dessus son cheval, et avec ce sacherent plusieurs espees sur lui pour Ii  caper la teste s'il n'eust 
obey a  eulx.  Lequel, pour doubte et pour eschever au peril de la mort, fu  leur capito"1ine  cle111i jour 
et une nuit tant seulle111cnt, au dit lieu Mello, encontre les gens du roy de Navarre, qui lors 
s'efforcoient d'entre au dit pais de Beauvoisins pour icellui grever et gaster, duquelliey de 
Mellou le dit Gennain se departi et s'en reppaira en sa maison si tost comme il post eschaper, 
senz ce qu'il ait autrement chevauchi'e, ne en aucune 111aniere boute fcu, pille ne occis personne, 
ne metJait en aucune maniere autre111ent; mais, qui pis est, depuis, les dis nobles ont ars, pille, 
65 Obviously,  this  was  a  complex  remlSSlOn  with  many  sections  worthy  of 
comment,  from  Gennain  de  Reveillon  claiming  around  3,000  moutons  of 
damage, to his appointment as  captain (if only for half a day and night!) in the 
absence of the general capitaine. 148  Gennain was linked to nobility, but was also 
a h0711me de labour with substantial holdings.  Yet most interestingly for us is the 
reference to Navane: the encounter with the Navanese who were pillaging the 
land seems to be the turning point for Gennain.  Presumably after his force was 
defeated, he escaped home. 
This remission suggests  antagonism between Navarre and the peasants, 
but Bessen does not mention this.  Rather, Bessen only remarks that Germain de 
Reveillon  was  a familiar  of the  count  of Montfort,  Jean  de  Boulogne,  who 
Bessen  claims  had  supported  the  Navanese  cause  in  1355.  He  supplies' no 
evidence that Jean of Boulogne was still allied to the NaVaITeSe cause, or that he 
showed anything but loyalty to  the crown in this period after receiving grace. 
To  make the logical leap that it was  'very likely' that Gennain 'adhered to  the 
rebel's cause' is stretched.
149  Bessen argued that had he not suppOlied Navane, 
he would have left Boulogne's service, yet if anything the fact he stayed in his 
service  once  Boulogne  had  re-pledged  himself  to  the  crown  indicates  the 
gaste et essille audit suppliant tous ses biens meubles et heritages, et Ii ont fait dommage jusques 
a  la value de trois mille moutons, ou environ, et ne Ii est rienz demoure fors sa femme et sa 
enfanz '"  commc il soit homme de labour qui a it cueillir et mettre a  sauvete ses biens', AN, 
.IJ86, f.  102, no. 308,  reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie,  pp.261-3. 
148 This will be discussed in more depth later, but there is reason to believe that this general 
capilaine might be Guillaume Cale, the captain made famous by the chroniclers.  The three 
villages mentioned here that Gennain takes control of-Mello, Pont-Saint-Maxence and 
Montataire - are all  contained within the very small region in which we find other evidence of 
Cale (Mello is in fact Calc's home village, and one other remission mentions Cale being in 
Montataire).  Others have taken the reference to mean that Gennain took control of the whole 
force of  the Jacques; but there is no evidence to suggest he led any other than the three villages. 
149  Bessen, 'The Jacquerie', p. 52. 
66 opposite. 150  Even then, one wonders what his master's loyalty mattered anyway, 
considering that Germain was involved in  a bloody battle against the  nobility. 
Yet most importantly,  the remission details  exactly how  the peasants  and the 
NavalTese met - as enemies, not as  friends.  At the end of Gem1ain's time as a 
Jacque,  he,  along  with  his  comrades,  faced  vengeance  at  the  hands  of their 
supposed organiser, Charles ofNavalTe. 
These two remissions offer scant evidence of a link between NavalTe and 
the Jacques: the remissions combined indicate one individual who was offered a 
commission by NavalTe once the Jacquerie had ended, the other for an individual 
related to  a  Count who  had  once showed loyalty to  Charles the Bad,  three or 
more years before the Jacquerie.  Neither suggests any link during the rebellion 
itself, and neither indicates that the crown considered these individuals NaValTeSe 
suppOliers.  The  only  time  either  individual  came  into  contact  with  Navan'e 
during their stay with the Jacques  was  on the  fields  at  Clennont, where they 
faced first-hand a crushing defeat at the hands of NavalTe and his companions, or 
afterwards, when NavalTe's men where ravaging the countryside in retaliation. 
No other document for either the Jacques or the Navarrese pardoned in the wake 
of 1358  mentions  any  link  between  the  two  rebellions.  Bessen  only  used 
remissions for the Jacques taken from Luce's Pieces Just(ficatives,151  but there is 
a large sample available especially as regards NavalTese partisans.  For example, 
150  After initially stating that Gennain 'was at least uncommitted to the Navanese cause', Bessen 
then transmutes this into 'the evidence strongly suggests that a Navanese supporter participated 
in the Jacquerie', ibid. , p. 53. 
151  Bessen does not reference Luce's Pieces JlIstijicatives as the source of  his data.  This in itself 
might not be a problem, but not recognising this in turn does not recognise the slightly 
idiosyncratic nature ofLuce's collection, obviously in its skewed sample, as mentioned earlier, 
but also in its tendency to only extract certain sections of the remission, and occasionally to 
change from straight transcription to a summary by Luce himself. 
67 rather than give a sense of the scale of the documentation, Bessen misrepresents 
the sample: 
Other cases of Pro-Navarrese individuals who took an active role in the 
Jacquerie have not yet been identified ... This paucity of evidence can be 
attributed to  the fact  that most NavalTese were pardoned by means of a 
blanket pardon,  issued either by a  treaty or by a  letter,  coveting all  of 
their unspecified crimes and rebellion.
ls2 
Of course, not  only were  the NavalTese pardoned by a blanket pardon, but so 
were the followers of Etienne Marcel and the Jacques themselves.
IS3  Moreover, 
NavalTe's men also  received  individual pardons, exactly the same  as  with the 
Parisians  and  Jacques.  Bessen  cannot  find  any  individuals  with  links  to  the 
Jacques in the remissions referring to the NavalTese, and his only examples, the 
two  quoted  above,  come  from  the  Jacques  themselves,  wrong-headed  as  they 
may be.  Yet  chroniclers  and remissions  do  testify  to  animosity between the 
peasants and NavalTe. 
First,  the  viciousness  of the  NavalTese  retaliation  111  itself indicates 
substantial  animosity  between  the  two  groups.  Good  examples  are  the 
remissions that Bessen uses, both of which desctibe the execution of Cale and 
many of the rebels at  Clem10nt by NavalTe and his troops.  It was undoubtedly 
bloody - many  were  executed  at  Clermont,  where  the  Chronique  Normande 
estimates 800 were beheaded.  Bessen argued that the Navarrese had stepped in 
only  because  of 'the  bourgeois-NavalTese  abhorrence  at  the  use  of vicious 
brutality,154 by the peasants, yet the remissions and chronicles both testify that 
152  Bessen, 'The Jacquerie', p. 53. 
153  For the Parisians, see AN, .JJ86, f. 80, n.  240, reprinted in Cohn, PP, p.  179-81.  There is no 
specific general pardon for the Jacques, but many remissions make reference to a general 
amnesty: for example, 'we [the crown] desired and decreed that all the nobles give remission to 
and pardon the men of the countryside as well as to those of the nobility', JJ98, f. 84, n. 252, 
reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, p.  224, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 191-2. 
154  ibid., p. 56. 
68 the viciousness of  Navarrese retaliation was even more brutal than the Jacquerie 
that came before it.
155 
Second,  there  IS  evidence  that  even before  the  battle  at  Clermont  the 
Jacques  would  have  considered  conspIracy  with  Navarre  an  offence.  The 
remISSIOn  to  Mathieu  de  Leure1,  issued  for  his  part  111  the  execution of Jean 
Bernier (a  different Bernier than Bessen's example who refused the Navarrese 
cOll11nission
I56
), has been discussed already, but it does again provide insight into 
the animosity held towards Navarre: 
Around the time of this feast day [of Corpus Christi], Jean Bernier, a non-
noble,  was  allegedly  accused  of treason,  for  letters  from  the  I(jng  of 
Navarre were found on him, and he was c0l11111only known for such deeds 
in  the  region.  For this,  he was  led  to  Guillaume  Cale  ...  Guillaume 
handed  him  over  to  EtieI111e  du  Wes,  the  captain  of the  village  of 
Montataire,  to  be put  to  death,  if he and  the  villagers judged that he 
deserved  it.  Informed about  [Bernier's]  life and  reputation  and  in the 
presence  of  two  or  three  hundred  people  of  this  village  and  the 
surrounding countryside, this Etienne had him led barefoot in his shirt to 
the  cross  in front  of the  palace of these  monks  of Montataire  (Oise), 
where he conunanded Jehan Ie Charon to execute and put him to death; 
the command was obeyed.
157 
Thus, the Jacques meted out punishment for collusion with Navarre, and their 
sentence was death.  The description of the execution - which is  as  detailed an 
image of an execution that we find in the sources  indicates that it was a brutal 
and public spectacle.  There was dramatic capital to be gained in the ceremonial 
murder of  a Navarrese agent. 
I:'" See the Chapter 4, section on 'Retaliation'. 
1,,6 Notably, the previous remission that Bessen relies upon also concerned a Jehan Bernier of 
Montataire who was suspected of  being a Navarrese partisan.  However, the Bernier referred to 
here was executed before Cale's death at Clennont, while the f0ll11er clearly lived long past 
Clcnnont (which even mentions Cale's death) and only had relationship with Navarre after the 
Jaequerie.  Although it seems like an unlikely coincidence, lehan Bernier was a common enough 
name within the remission sample for us to assume that these two individuals were different. 
157 AN, J.J98, f. 84, no.  252, repIinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 333-5, tr. Cohn in PP, pp.  191-2. 
69 Secondly,  the  premIse  of the  trial  may  have  centred. around  Jehan's 
possession  of the  letters,  but  emphasis  was  also  placed  on  Jehan's  prevIOUS 
character.  Much like  the remissions,  which took  into  account  a  supplicant's 
previous  good name and renown when passing judgement, Bernier's execution 
was  because  he  was  commonly  known  for  associating  with  Navane in  this 
region.  In the trial itself, it was  '[Bernier's] life and reputation' that convinced 
the villagers of his guilt.  The importance placed on the fact that Bernier was a 
known Navanese sympathiser strongly suggests that the Jacques were well aware 
of those within their midst who had ties to the King of  Navarre. 
It was the people of Montataire who passed judgement on Bernier.  Two 
to three hundred came out for the execution, and Cale placed Bernier's fate in the 
hands of the villagers, not just their captain.  There was  great public antipathy 
towards those who sympathised with Navan'e - collusion with Navarre was not 
just considered a crime by Etienne du Wes, but also by the villagers in the fIe  de 
France. 
Considering that Bessen believed that Navanese followers had infiltrated 
the higher echelons  of Jacques  high-command,  and pressured the  leaders  into 
following  a  Navanese  agenda,  it  is  telling  that  Guillaume  Cale  himself,  the 
fabled  'leader' of the movement,  clearly considered Bernier's crime wOlihy of 
execution.  This antipathy towards the Navanese within the movement gainsays 
Bessen's suggestion that the 'heads' of the Jacquerie favoured Navane.  At every 
level of the Jacquerie - Guillame Cale, the local village leader and the villagers 
themselves - conspiracy with Navane was considered a capital crime. 
One remission is not representative of an entire sample, nor do we know 
if the reaction of the villagers of Montataire to  this Navanese agent would have 
70 been replicated  across  the  north of France ..  Yet  one remission that  explicitly 
mentions Navane (and that read wrongly) is all that Bessen has suggested to link 
the two groups.  This remission indicates a strong anti-Navane feeling before the 
attack  in  Clermont,  and  demonstrates  that  opinion  within  the  Jacques'  high-
command and the countryside was largely hostile. 
While  negative  evidence  is  usually  not  the  best  way  to  proceed,  the  almost 
complete absence of evidence within over 250 remissions issued to  either the 
Jacques or the Navanese paliisans that suggests complicity between the two, is 
impressive.  All evidence indicates the two movements were considered entirely 
distinct:  different  language  is  used  to  describe  the  'rebellion'  and  the 
'commotion'  respectively,  different  clusters  of  remissions,  and  different 
descriptions of the individuals involved.  The only remission that mentions a 
link  between  NaValTe  and  the  Jacques  prior  to  Navane's  slaughter  of the 
peasantry at Clermont indicates that conspiracy with Navan'e was punishable by 
death! 
So, if there is no evidence, where does this asseliion come from'?  First, 
Bessen's studies focussed on Navane, who was undoubtedly aided by the chaos 
of 1358.  Navane's eagerness  to  end  the  rebellion shows  he celiainly did  not 
approve of the actions ofthe Jacques.  Idle specula tion apart, the theory is born 
from  the  same  roots  that  all  such  theories  of the  nobility  manipulating  the 
peasantry:  that  peasants  in  the  Middle  Ages  were  incapable  of organising 
themselves  and  achieving  the  successes  they  did  in  the  initial  stages  of the 
uprising.  As I will show in Chapter 6,  the remissions shows in great depth that 
the peasants did organise themselves, appointed their own leaders and selecting 
71 their  own  objectives.  The  evidence  from  the  letters  of  remISSIOn  IS 
incontroveliable,  and their silence is  weighty:  the Navarrese rebellion and  the 
peasantry's  commotion  were  distinct  phenomena  in  the  eyes  of the  French 
crown. 
MARCEL 
It can still called be doubtful, in spite of the arguments and the evidence 
produced here  for  the first  time,  that  Marcel  was  the  instigator of the 
Jacquerie;  it  is  certain however that,  once the  first  impulse began,  the 
provost of  merchants assisted the movement in the most active manner.  15~ 
The idea that Etienne Marcel was the behind the rising of the Jacques is not new. 
Simeon Luce first put it forward at the end of  the nineteenth century, and made it 
central to his thesis on the Jacqucrie.  Yet Luce admitted that the evidence was 
sketchy.  He had only snippets of chronicle evidence for support:  for example, 
one chronicle's statement that Guillaume Cale 'sent some of his wisest and most 
notable men to  see the provost of merchants in Paris and wrote to  him that he 
was at his  service ... this filled the leader of the three estates with joy ... and 
they were  all  ready to  give him help,.159  Yet  this  report  certainly does  not 
suggest that Etienne Marcel instigated the Jacquerie, and rather suggests that any 
contact  came  after  the  start  of the  Jacquerie  and  just before  the  Navarrese 
attack. 160  Luce's argument  did  not  hold well:  two  years  later,  Flammennont 
lOS  Luce, Jacqllcrie, pp. 105. 
159  Chrol1.  premiers Valois, p.  72, tr. Cohn, PP (2005), p.  160. 
160  Luce's other example is equally inconclusive: it is a quote from an anonymous fragment of 
chronicle reprinted by Secousse, which states 'the Parisians, as said, in the absence of the Regent, 
beaan an incursion against the fortified castle the Louvre; they then pillaged and stole all that 
th:y found in the Hotel de Ville de Paris, and they invited, by letter and order, all the villcs, all 
the burghs and villages of  the realm, to revolt and to take anns against the nobles: this is what 
made the men of the people, in the Beauvaisis and in many other places in France, rise up where 
72 launched a  stinging rebuke.  Luce's. interest  in  the  attack  on  Meaux  clearly 
affected the rest of his analysis, from the argument itself, to the composition of 
his Pieces JlIst(ficatives: nineteen of the documents are not issued to Jacques at 
all,  but instead to  Parisians  and men of Meaux involved in the  attack  on  the 
MarcM. 
One  notable  historian,  Raymond  Cazelles,  took  up  Luce's  emphasis 
although he fails to  credit Luce's work.  Nonetheless, all  Cazelles's references 
come from  documents that Luce published in his Pieces Just!ficatives,  and his 
general thesis follows Luce's: 
Coming immediately after the affair at Saint-Leu, this coalition of towns 
against their neighboUling castles must have required some planning and 
it is impossible to believe they happened by chance.  In his famous lettter 
to  the people of Ypres, written two months after the Jacquerie, Etienne 
Marcel only disassociated himself from the excesses of these actions in 
the  Beauvaisis.  He  did  not  deny  a  previous  understanding  with  the 
echevinages to weaken the nobility by destroying their castles.  I am even 
inclined to  think that the planning by towns must have been some time 
before 28 May and the fighting at Saint-Leu.161 
Not only does this passage indicate that Cazelles believed the revolt to have been 
led by Marcel and planned in advance, but it also grants prime agency in the 
Jacquerie to the 'towns'.16:?  It is a 'coalition' of  urban centres that forms the core 
of the revolt.  In this new reading of events, townsmen of Senlis 'accepted the 
help of the Jacques' in attacking castles, rather than townsmen of Senlis joining 
a great number of nobles were executed'.  This may well be suggestive, if taken in isolation from 
the many chronicles that suggest no link, but similarly, it is celtainly not 'incontroveliible fact', 
as Luce calls it.  There is no other evidence to support this fragment.  More importantly than 
disagreeing with other chroniclers, it disagrees with the mass of  remissions that indicate that the 
Parisian revolt and the Jacquerie were distinct. Luce, Jacquerie, p.  103. 
161  Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', pp.  79-80. 
162  In Sociere polilique, noblesse el COllronlle, Cazelles' section on the Jacquerie is almost exactly 
the same as his article in the English Rising, but he includes a map with an-ows spreading 
outwards from towns to show the revolt 'spreading' from urban centres, yet there is no evidence 
at all to support these assertions; rather, it is simply a visualisation of Cazelles' theories on the 
revolt.  R.  Cazelles, Societe polifique, l10blesse el courOl1ne SOliS les regnes de Jeall !I Ie  Bon el 
Charles V (Paris: Geneve-Paris, 1982). 
73 the Jacques in their offensive.
163  As ilU10vative as this reading might be, it is also 
unfounded, and contradicts the entire body of remissions that Cazelles claimed to 
have  studied.  Cazelles  must  even admit  that  other  'coalition'  members  like 
Amiens and Montdidier only  'helped' the Jacques in destroying the targets.
IM 
Cazelles argues that these towns led the assaults, yet must concede that they only 
offered occasional support - as mentioned earlier, the Amienois's paltry force of 
one hundred men were recalled before they got four leagues from the city due to 
an  internal  dispute.  Moreover,  the  odd instances  where  the  townsmen  were 
involved  are  outnumbered  by  the  numerous  remissions  where  village 
communities committed attacks. 165 
The idea that the Jacquerie was composed of townsmen will be disproved 
later  in  this  thesis,166  where  it  will  be  shown  that  instead  the  rebels  were 
predominantly  men  of the  countryside  and  the insurgent  unit  was  the  local 
village.  It will also been shown that rather than being manipulated by elites, it 
was  led by peasant leaders  who  had  clear ideas  of objectives.
167  Rather,  this 
chapter will deal with the one specific allegation that Cazelles made which has 
gained some credence - that the Jacquerie was organised and manipulated by the 
Parisian provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel. 
When we look at the remissions issued to  Parisian rebels who had taken part in 
the revolt of 1358, we see with c1ality that this uplising and the Jacquerie were 
163  ibid., p. 79. 
164 ibid. 
165  Urban involvement in the revolt will be discussed in more detail in  Chapter 4, 'Mapping the 
Revolt'. 
166 Antagonism towards towns will be dealt with in Chapter 4 ('Mapping the Revolt'), and the 
mral makeup of the rebels will be dealt with in Chapter 5 ('The Composition of the Jacquerie'). 
The village as the focal point of  the insurgency will be discussed in Chapter 6 (,Peasant 
Communities'). 
167  See 'Leadership', in Chapter 6. 
74 168  not  linked.  The  remISSIons  for  those  involved  in  Marcel's  revolt  can be 
separated into  tvvo  distinct groups.  First,  general remissions  were issued (and 
reissued) to the Parisians for their part in the rebellion.  A second set were then 
issued for those who were excluded from the general pardon.  These individuals 
seem to  have missed the opportunity, generally by not having reported to  court 
within three days of the original amnesty.  In many of  these cases, the individuals 
had fled.  These men therefore represent an exception to the vast majority who 
were forgiven in the general amnesty.  That said, there is nothing to  suggest that 
these individuals' stories are not representative, and they serve to  give a flavour 
of the Parisian revolt. 
Apart from  the general remission to  the  Parisians,  and  several  pardons 
issued multiple times  to  the same individual,169  there are twenty-two  Parisiens 
granted pardons by the crown in the wake of the revolt.
l7O  Eighteen of these 
were issued in August 1358, in the wake of the rebellion and directly after the 
original general pardons were transcribed.  Three more were issued in October of 
the same year, and one more in November.  Despite the vast literature on Etienne 
Marcel, no-one has ever attempted to  catalogue these documents. 171  They do, 
however, point to a new understanding of the Parisian revolt. 
16S  For the purposes of this table I have seperated those Parisians pardoned for involvement in the 
revolt of 1358 with those pardoned for being part of Parisian-Navarrese alliance between June 
and July.  These are pardoned in November 1358 at the start of the register ]]90, specifically 
between no. 1 and no. 32.  Other historians, notably S.H. Cuttler, combined these two groups for 
analysing Parisian treason; however, my intcntion here is to discuss the initial revolt, not the 
political machinations that followed it.  See S.H. Cuttler, The Law o.fTreasol1 and Treason  Trials 
in Later Medieval France (CUP: Cambridge, 1981), p.  166. 
1C,0  For example. AN. JJ86. no.  196 and no. 209 are both pardons issued to Nicholas Ie Flament. 
There is also examples when substantially different pardons are issued, one for rebelling against 
the crown in  1358, and secondly for treason with Navarre in the months that followed, as for 
Nicolas de la Court Nemie, AN, JJ86, [  72, no. 220 and J.l90, [  38, no.  78. 
170 Not included in this sample is Jean Marcel, Etienne's brother, who was accepted by the crown 
as having no part in the rebellion.  AN, ]]86, [  65, no.  194.  , 
171  Cuttler includes a list of ·thosc pardoned individually' for being . adherents' to Etienne 
Marcel, including those who were pardoned for the later conspiracy between Marcel and Navarre. 
However, this list seems confused: there are several individuals missing (specifically Etienne de 
75 Table VI. Names and occupations of Parisian rebels 
REMISSION  INDIVIDUAL  OCCUPATION 
86,206  PielTe de Lagny 
86,209  Nicolas Ie Flament  Draper 
86,214  Guillaume Ie Fevre  Fish-seller 
86,216  Jacques du Chatel 
86,220  Nicolas  de  la  COUli  garde de  fa  mannaies de 
Nemie  Rauen 
86,230  Jean Hersent 
86,233  Laurens de Veullettes  Lingier 
86,238  .Tehan de Monteux  Knight 
86,248  Henry de Chastillon  Knight 
86,252  Guillot BOill1achet  Man at am1S 
86,253  .Tehan Fagnet  Merchant 
86,271  Gieftl-on Ie Flament 
86, 272  Thomas Gascogne 
86,278  Etienne de la Fontaine  Argentier  du  roy  (Royal 
Master of  the Robes) 
86,282  Etienne de Resnie  Captain  of  many 
soldiers  172 
86,285  Phillipe de JeUlTe  Especier 
86,289  J ehan Pisdoe 
86,292  Maron Pisdoe 
86,371  J  ehan de Lyon  Sergeant of Arnis 
86,390  Guillaume d'Augeuil 
86,519  Salemon de la Tour  poor  archer  and 
miserable person 
86, 527  Jehan de Saint-Leu  cure of Ste Genevieve 
As  with NavalTese  sympathisers,  each of these remissions  issued to  Marcel's 
suppOliers  used  distinctive  language  to  identify  the  Parisian  rebellion.  For 
example, this is the remission issued to Guillame Ie Fevre: 173 
Charles ... let it be known to  all present and future that at the instigation, 
prompting and encouragement of the late Etienne Marcel fonner provost 
Resnie, 1ehan de Monteux, Salemon de la Tour and khan Hersent).  It could be that Cuttler was 
using a different definition of 'adherents' rather than just anyone involved in the revolt, but he 
does not make this clear.  The  Law of  Treason, p.  166. 
m The following remission (AN, JJ86, f.  93, no.  283) is for 3 number of men who 'venuz en 
all11eS'  to the M;rche of Meaux: it is possible that these were the soldiers who Etienne du  Resnie 
\V3S  captain of  However, as these men were not involved in the Parisian revolt, they are not 
included in this table. 
m  Interestingly, this remission is issued twice in the S3me month.  Exactly why is unclear, 
although the second remission does start off by making reference to the previous remission 
before repeating it word for word.  Secousse references this second version (AN, 1J86, f  85, no. 
255) but the text he uses is in fact identical to the first version (AN, JJ86, f.  69, no. 214). 
76 of  merchants  of  the  city  of  Paris,  many  of  his  allies,  followers,. 
collaborators and accomplices said and maintained that during the whole 
time they governed the good city of Paris and its surrounding countryside, 
all that they did was for a good end - the ransom and deliverance of our 
above mentioned lord (King Jean II)  - for the public good,  and for the 
great number of good people and faithful commoners of this city of  Paris. 
Without the authority of our lord or of us and unaware of  the great acts of 
treason and plotting,  conspiracies, and other crimes which this  provost 
and his accomplices did in secret, they resolved and strove to go against 
our lord, ourselves and his royal  majesty,  agreeing to  rebel and take as 
their leader the  King of Navarre,  to  make alliances  with him and the 
English and other enemies of the crown of France.  They wore a silver 
buckle enamelled half in vennillion, half in blue, with  'to a good end' 
written underneath it.  And they wore paIii-coloured hoods as  a sign to 
live or die with this provost, against all others, and took up anus against 
us to take away our royal prerogatives, that is,  [they decided] to be rebels 
[rebelles]  against our lord and us,  and to  say abusive words  against us 
personally and cOlmnit many other crimes, misdemeanours and felonies 
against the royal majesty.  By these means,  they wished  the people to 
believe that we would order our soldiers to destroy and rob them, that we 
would abandon the city along with other cities and surrounding districts 
within the realm of France to  these soldiers, and that we had absolutely 
no intention of delivering and paying the ransom for our lord,  although 
these  things  are  self-evidently false.  For these crimes  and felonies  or 
some of them, Guillaume Ie F6vre, fIshmonger at Les Halles in Paris and 
bourgeois of the city, who, it is said, recently fled and is now absent [had 
1-4  been charged].  / 
This example indicates the precise language that the remissions used to  describe 
Marcel's revolt.  One distinguishing characteristic of this rebellion was the paIii-
coloured hoods (recorded in another remission as half red, half blue)  175  worn by 
the  rebels,  which  was  repeated  in  several  remissions  and  represented  an 
important symbol of what was understood as the Parisian revolt.  It even appears 
in  remissions  for  other  bOl1l7es  vi1les,  like  Meaux  and  Amiens.
176  Crucially, 
however, it does not appear in any remissions for the Jacques. 
174  AN, JJ86, f.  85, no.  255, reprinted in Secousse, Ordol1l1G1zces, pp. 83-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 
192-4. 
175  See AN, ]]86, [  78, no. 239. 
176 ibid 
77 These same stock phrases that are in this remission are repeated, with a 
few variations, for every Parisian rebeL 177  First, every remission made reference 
to  the  instigation  of the  rebellion  by  Etienne  Marcel,  and  sometimes  other 
individuals,  normally at  the beginning of the remission.  A  typical example is 
'that  this  Nicolas  Ie  Flamenc,  draper  and  bourgeois  of Pmis,  by  the  false 
promises  and wickedly induced by  the late Etienne Marcel  fonner provost of 
merchants of our city (l'ille) of Paris, by Charles Toussac, Gilles Marcel, Jehan 
de Lille and also others of our said (ville),.178  These references to being misled 
by wicked demagogues are important - they provide the context for which the 
crown could offer amnesty to the Parisians, as these traitorous leaders had misled 
them.  They also marked a sharp contrast with the remissions for the Jacquerie, 
where individuals most often are desclibed as  having acted out of fear for their 
own safety.  Whether this distinction is valid or not is unimportant; the basis for 
justifying participation in each rebellion is different. 
Secondly, like the Navarrese example, there is  a specific vocabulary to 
the Parisian rebellion.  Unlike the 'temps du cOlllillotion "  the Parisian rebellion 
is desclibed as  'des grans traisons, rebellions, conspiracions annees chevauchees 
invasions  et  desobessiances·.179  The Parisian rebellion  is  not the  'men of the 
countryside against the nobles', rather it is the  'Clime of lese-majeste ..  against 
our said lord,  us  and  the  crown of France'.  180  Again,  the  substance of these 
remarks are important, but they are not the tum of phrase of a single chronicler; 
177 This template has several minor variations, but the clauses listed below appear in each 
document tabulated above. 
178  'Que comme Nicolas Ie Flamenc drappier et bourgeois de Paix par les faux enhortements et 
mauvaises inducion de feu Etienne Marcel, jadis provost des marchans de nostre ville de Paris, de 
Charles Toussac, Gilles Marcel, 1ehan de Lille et aucuns autres de nostre dicte ville'.  AN, JJ86, 
f  68, no. 209. 
179 AN, JJ86, f  70, no.  216. 
ISO  For example, AN, 1186, f  99, no. 298. 
78 these tenns were used in every pardon the crown issues to  the Parisian rebels, 
and was the crown's judicial definition of  the violence. lSI 
Moreover, no remissions for the Jacquerie mentioned any links between 
the  two  revolts,  and  only  one  mentions  Marcel,  but  it  does  not  suggest 
cooperation.  Hue de Sailleville initially was forced to join the Jacquerie, before 
having second thoughts: 
because of the great fear that he had of the excesses and outrages which 
the men of the countryside connnited against his will, and which he was 
powerless to prevent, he went to the Provost of Merchants, who was then 
in Paris. ..  to reveal these matters to him and to seek advice so that the 
aforesaid things should stopl82 
Etienne  Marcel  was  not  part  of  the  Jacquerie;  to  Hue  de  Sailleville,  he 
represented an opportunity to  stop it.  This concurs with Etienne Marcel's letter 
to  the conm1Unes of Picardy and Flanders, which stated that the Parisians 'would 
rather have died than have approved these deeds and the manner in which they 
were  COlllillitted  by some  of those  people',  and  that they  'sent three  hundred 
troops from our people and confidential letters to stop the great evil'  .183  Marcel 
considered himself an enemy to the Jacques, and Hue de SailleviIIe concuned. 
Even  uprisings  that  occured  within  the  sunoundings  of Paris,  like 
Montmorency, make  no  reference  to  Etienne Marcel's insurgency.  The  same 
goes  for  those  remissions  for the  Parisians:  they  do  occasionally refer to  the 
'countryside of Paris'  but not further - indeed,  this  could be seen  as  an  area 
defined to contrast with the rest of  the countryside that the Jacquerie represented. 
lSI  This distinction was also made by pamphleteers some four centuries later, by those from 
Champagne in  1790, who in the wake of  the Revolution made the case that they had shown 
loyalty to the crown in 1358 when its deputies left Paris for Provins in the wake of Marcel's 
coup.  The Parisian rebellion was essentially treasonous; the Champenois felt no reason to 
mention the Jacquerie. which their neighbours certainly \vere involved in.  Les Champenois all 
mi. au pal'allele des evenemens de 1358 et 1789, 24th Feb 1790. 
132  AN, JJ90, f.  96, n.  288; reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 253-4. 
183  Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of  Pi cardy and Flanders, in Oeuvres de Froissart 
ed. de Lettenhove (Bruxelles, 1868), vol. 6, pp. 470-1, reprinted and trans. in Cohn, PP.  p.  177. 
79 If uprisings in Montmorency, Montdidier, Senlis and others were engineered by 
Parisian infiltrators of the Jacquerie, then the crown was unaware of this.  If the 
Jacques aided the Parisians in their rebellion, then there is  no word in either set 
of  remissions to indicate this. 
Moreover,  even  when  Cazelles  implied  unity,  for  example  Etienne 
Marcel's  attempt  to  stir  up  the  countryside  around  Paris  to  his  cause,  the 
documents provided clear distinctions.  Marcel sent Jean Hersent to the village of 
Chatres  (Essonne)  to  organise  resistance  against  the  crown  ('by virtue  of the 
command given him to  the late Etienne Marcel, then provost of merchants').  184 
However, this remission detailed events outside during the traditional timeframe 
of the Jacquerie, it concerned 'a certain Sunday' after 24 June, two weeks after 
Clermont and the end of the peasants' rising.  It could be an exception, a late 
outbreak  of peasant  violence,  but  far  more  likely  Marcel  was  preparing  the 
countryside for the Dauphin's attempts to regain Paris, and the inevitable siege. 
By 29 June, the Dauphin and 12,000 troops would be encamped on the other side 
of the Seine.
185  The crown is unequivocal: this action was part of the Parisian 
uprising, not the Jacquerie, and the remission makes no mention of the 'time of 
commotion and telTor', the 'men of the countryside' or the conflict of the 'non-
nobles against the nobles'.  Just as with the remissions of  Navarre, the crown had 
a very clear sense of  which rebellion each individual belongs to. 
If the Parisian remissions do  not mention any links between the Jacques 
and Marcel, what do they say about the Parisian revolt itself?  First, there are far 
1,4 AN, .1.186,  f  75, no. 230, reprinted in Luee, Jacqllerie, pp. 263-4.  The inclusion of  this 
remission in Luce's Pieces Justificatives has led some to see a link with the .Iaequerie that was 
not there; although this document sheds light on the Parisian attempts to secure the outlying 
countryside prior to the Dauphin's seige, it makes no mention of the 'men of the countryside', the 
'tenor and commotion' or anything else connected to the rural revolt. 
1,5 Sumption, Fire, p.  338. 
80 fewer  remissions  issued  for  the  Parisian  rebellion  than  the  Jacquerie.  All 
nineteen were issued quickly - ban-ing a few,  almost all these remissions were 
issued within a month of the end of the Parisian rebellion.  By contrast, for the 
Jacques,  some  individuals  still  received  pardons  seven  years  after  the  revolt. 
Virtually all of Paris  was granted grace by August  1358,  yet the  nobles were 
simultaneously  still  pillaging  the  countryside.  Of course,  all  remissions  are 
exceptions issued to those who missed the initial general pardon.  Nonetheless, it 
hints at the logistical differences between pardoning those of a city and trying to 
administer grace,  and  upholding the  peace,  to  the  countryside of the  north  of 
France.  Long after the Parisians had all received pardons, the repression in the 
countryside was still continuing, and remissions attest to nobles holding grudges 
against  their  peasants  into  the  1370s.  While  the  exceptions  to  the  general 
pardons  of Paris  could be  dealt  with  in  a  couple  of weeks,  the  process  of 
restoring the peace to  the countryside took years.  For the crown, Paris could be 
dealt with quickly; the Jacquerie required more effort. 
Excepting  the  general  pardon,  the  Par-isian  remissions  are  granted  to 
individuals, not communities of rebels, as they were in the case of the Jacquerie. 
All  but  one  individual
1g6  hailed  from  Paris,  and  most  were  introduced  as 
'bourgeois  of Paris'.  This  strong sense of local  identity - all  these men are 
Parisian at least in residence - can be contrasted with the pan-regional Jacquerie, 
spread out across the whole of the lIe de France and beyond to the borders of Bar 
and into N0l111andy.  These individuals were for the mostly part of a str-ikingly 
different social class than the Jacques, for example, the King's 'argentier' and a 
186 lehan de Monteux of Courtenay stayed in Sens but was in Paris during the revolt. AN, JJ86, f. 
78. no. 238. 
81 knight.187  Every remission made reference to  the individual's good name and 
reputation.  Only Salemon de Tour's remission made reference to  poveliy, yet 
even he was employed: he was 'a poor archer and a miserable person', and he 
was also listed as a 'soldoier'  .188 
There are others who had military roles as  well.  For example, .Tehan  de 
Lyon was a 'Sergent d'annes' and Etienne de Resnie was the captain of a party 
of foot  soldiers based within the city.  The remissions for Marcel's supporters 
emphasise the military aspects of the revolt in Paris,  which contrasts with the 
remissions for the .Tacquelie.  The narratives express a military sophistication to 
the Palisian revolt, and one testifies to the level of annament of  these rebels: one 
individual "took a great quantity of siege engines, war-cannons, crossbows with 
windlasses and other artillery' from the Louvre. I 89 
The Parisians were well organised, had access to  the King's arsenal, and 
were anned with siege equipment.  While the peasants of the lIe de France may 
also  have been well  organised,  there is  no  sense that they possessed the same 
level of  military armament.  This was a CO lip d'eratby the burghers and the city's 
militia:  as  one  remission  desclibed  it,  the  insurgents  were  'many  knights, 
counsellors and others'.  190  Within the remissions, it was the wrong-doing of the 
gens  d 'armes,  not just of the  habitants  of the city,  that caught the eye of the 
authorities.  The  taking  of the  Castle  of the  Palaisel,  where  one  Guillaume 
Bonachet drank wine and stole a little piece of metalwork, was clearly achieved 
by  skilled  military  men,  not  enraged  10cals.
191  This  emphasis  on  skilled 
1~7 AN, JJ86, f. 78. no. 238 and AN, JJ86,  t~ 93, no. 279. 
ISS  AN, JJ86, f.  187,110.519. 
1,9 AN, JJ86, f.  126,110. 371. 
190 AN, JJ86, f.  92, no. 275. 
191  AN, JJ86, f. 83, 110.  252. 
82 soldiering implies  that  the  Parisian  revolt  was  centred  on  specific  attacks  by 
groups of soldiers on key military targets. 
The Parisian revolt was not necessarily tied to the walls of Paris, and most of the 
confusion on this issue has come from a willingness to describe all rural violence 
as  part  of the  Jacquerie,  and  all  the  urban  violence  coming  from  Paris  and 
Marcel.  A  medieval  city  could  not  be  independent  of its  countryside.  The 
Parisian  revolt  did  extend  beyond  its  walls,  as  one  might  expect,  into  the 
dependent  countryside  that  surrounded  the  main  city  (like  Tremblay  and 
197  .  Chartres),  - and most famously nOlih to Meaux, where the Kmg's palace stood. 
However, the crown distinguished these events as directly connected to Paris, not 
the  'men of the countryside'.  The confusion was only created when Luce and 
Cazelles attempted to  create their own definitions of what made a Jacque and 
what made a Parisian rebel. 
The cornerstone of Cazelles's argument has  already been summarised; 
when we think of the  attacks  of the Jacques,  'it is  impossible to  believe they 
happened  by  chance'.  They did  not  happen by chance - local  conul1unities 
selected  their  own  objectives.  What  Cazelles  meant  is  that  he,  like 
Flammermont,  considered  it  impossible  to  believe  that  these  attacks  were 
organised by peasants.  Perhaps the  lack of historical  data  left to  us  by rural 
conU11Unities,  or even prc:iudice against the peasantry that can be seen in Marxist 
literature going back to Marx himself, has convinced historians that they cannot 
be considered sophisticated enough to plan anything, and certainly not be serious 
historical  actors,  unlike  their  urban  counterparts.  Even  when  the  remission 
192  See AN, JJ86, 1'.  93, no. 278 and 1J86, 1'.  75, no. 230 respectively. 
83 record offered numerous nanatives indicating exactly how villagers could stand 
up  against  the  local  nobility,  organise  themselves,  elect  leaders  and  hold 
assemblies, it was easier to  grant agency to  the bonnes villes.  That Marcel and 
his Parisian rebels were behind the Jacquerie is  a notion completely unsupported 
by the remissions and the chroniclers.  The image painted by the two selections 
of documents, and thus the crown, is entirely different - the Parisian remissions 
conjure an image of a technically advanced, well-armed military take-over of the 
centre of  Paris, at the heari of which were soldiers and members of the army who 
quickly mobilised an organised resistance to the crown.  Paris's armed resistance 
and  the  peasants'  uprising in the  countryside were distinct phenomena,  in the 
eyes of  contemporaries. 
THE ATTACK ON THE MARC  HE 
When the Jacques and Parisians an"ived [at Meaux] the mayor of Meaux, 
who had never made any  secret of his  hostility to  the  Dauphin,  threw 
open the gates of the city [to them] and laid out food and ch"ink  for them 
on  tables  in  the  streets.  The  people  of the  town  overwhelmingly 
supported  him  ...  When  they  had  eaten  their  fill,  the  Jacques,  the 
Parisians and a crowd of  men of Meaux fonned themselves up in units on 
the north side of the Marne bl"idge  opposite the fortress, and prepared to 
storm it. 193 
In  the  second volume  of Sumption's  17ze  Hundred  Years  War,  the  attack  on 
Meaux represents the apogee of the great rebellions of 1358, where the Par"isians 
and the Jacques came together for a final doomed assault upon the great fortress 
across the Marne.  This is no surpl"ise;  Meaux represented this same centrepiece 
for  Luce's study of the  Jacquerie.  Almost every work on  this pel"iod  makes 
19] Sumptioll, Fire, pp. 333-4. 
84 some reference to  the combination of the two rebellions at Meaux.  It has been. 
assumed that the attack on Meaux was pmi of the Jacquerie, and yet, barring one 
passage in Jean Froissmi's chronicle,  there is  no  evidence whatsoever for  this 
asseliion. 
This topic requires some clarity.  First, I am not claiming that there was 
no  link between  Meaux  and  the  peasantry;  rather,  evidence  suggests  that  the 
some of the repression afterwards was initiated at the Marche.  Jean de Venette is 
clear  that  the  plat-pays  took  the  brunt"  of the  nobles'  vengeance,  stating 
:[a]fterwards they went ravaging over the  adjacent countryside,  killing  all  the 
men  they  have  found  and  setting  fire  to  various  villages'  .194  Neither  am  I 
suggesting that no peasants took part in the assault; rather, I think it is very likely 
that  some  did,  especially  in  the  case  of the  village  of Tremblay,  and  the 
'countryside'  around  Pmis  and  Meaux.  However,  no  evidence,  barring  the 
second-hand  story  of Froissmi  and  received wisdom  of the  last  150  years  of 
historiography, suggests that the Jacques as  a separate force attacked Meaux.  In 
fact,  contemporary  chroniclers,  and  the  crown  through  letters  of remission, 
desclibe the  attack  on Meaux as  a  Parisian offensive,  and whatever 'Jacques' 
who  were  involved  were  not  recorded  in  these  documents.  They  make  no 
suggestion that the two joined together to mount an attack on the fortress. 
Simeon Luce devoted a whole chapter - over a tenth of his  book - to 
Meaux,  entitled  'The  Pmis  expedition  reunites  with  the  Jacques  against  the 
Marche of Meaux, and the nobles of Senlis,:195 
The  attack  on  the  Marche  of Meaux  is  undoubtedly  one  of the  most 
interesting episodes of the'  Jacquerie'; it is also one of best known. The 
three  principal  chroniclers  of the  time,  Froissart,  Jean  de  Venette  and 
194  Venctte, Chron., v.  2,  p. 264, trans. Birdsall, Venetie, p.  78. 
195  Luce,Jacquerie, pp. 129-147. 
85 Pierre d' Orgemont, transmitted to us with the greatest detail the memory 
of  this event.
l96 
Yet  only  FroissaIi  suggests  that  there  were  any  rustics  at  all  involved  in the 
attack on Meaux, and the entire chapter is  devoid of any other evidence.  Luce 
only cited a few remissions, and barring the remission for Tremblay which will 
be discussed later, none of them refer to rural rebels.  All his evidence came from 
documents relating to  either Parisians or men from  Meaux.  However,  Meaux 
proved an attractive centre-point for Luce's thesis that Marcel's rebellion and the 
Jacquerie were closely tied, and thus it came to fonn the crux of  his book. 
Crucially, the emphasis that Luce placed on the attack on the Marche of 
Meaux is  transferred directly into the documents that he selected for his Pieces 
Just~ficatives.  He reprints every document that mentions Meaux (of which there 
are nineteen),  which  was  unrepresentative of the nature of the  Jacques,  as  the 
men receiving these pardons were all  either from Meaux or Paris.  His selection 
of these documents conceming Meaux suggested they represented over 35% of 
all documents conceming the rebellions of 1358, but rather, amount to  less than 
7%  of the pardons for rebellions issued in  1358 and  1359 alone.  Considering 
that these remissions are for scattered individuals rather than for settlements and 
groups, in real numbers there are very few men from Meaux pardoned compared 
with other Jacques.  Yet because of the Pieces JlIstificatives'  emphasis, coupled 
with assumptions by historians  like  Cazelles  and  Bessen that  Luce's selection 
was representative of the whole body of remissions for the revolt  (which Luce 
himself made clear it was not),197  Meaux has assumed a very important role in 
discussions of the revolt.  Having accepted that Jacques were involved in Meaux, 
196  ibid, p.  129. 
19"  Luce referenced documents within his text not included in his Pieces Justificatives. 
86 Raymond  Cazelles  began  speculating  on  the  makeup  of the  Jacquerie,  based 
entirely on Luce's collection and thus also on the remissions for the attack on the 
Marche.
198  Cazelles finishes  a short discussion of the makeup of the Jacquerie 
declaring that the 'rich found themselves side by side with the poor'.  These are 
hardly 'insights into rural society': many of Cazelles's examples hail  ii-om  the 
towns of  Meaux or Paris.199  Yet this is the influence that Luce' s unexplained and 
previously unexamined sampling has had: the assumption that the Jacques fought 
at  Meaux has  in turn meant that historians assumed that those involved in the 
attack on the MarcM were representative of the Jacquerie.
200 
As  mentioned,  Jean  Froissart  is  the  only  chronicler  to  mention  the  Jacques' 
involvement in the  attack on Meaux.  Froissali was writing considerably later 
(his fIrst book has been described as  'riddled with errors"),201  and that the great 
'admirer and  chronicler of heroism'  was  writing about his  personal hero,  the 
Count of Foix.
202  His account was mostly cribbed from Jean Ie Bel.  Indeed, his 
account of  Meaux is the only area where the two chroniclers differ: 
[The  Count  of Foix  and  the  Captal  of Buch]  rode until  they  reached 
Meaux and went immediately to the duchess [ofNonnandy] and the other 
ladies, who were very happy to see them, since for days the Jacques and 
the rustics of Brie as well as those of the city had harrassed them, as had 
become appalient.  When these wicked people began to  hear that  there 
was  such  a  great  gathering  of ladies  and  maidens  with  their  young 
children, they gathered and with those from the country of Valois made 
their way to Meaux.  From the other direction, those of Paris, well aware 
of the assembly, left Paris in herds and flocks to join others.  All together 
19S Cazelles, 'The Jaequelle' pp. 76-77. 
199 ibid. 
200  For an example, see the previous chapter on Navane, and David Bessen's 'The Jaequerie' 
which assumed Cazelles's theories on the makeup of the Jacques were conect. 
201  .I.B. Henneman, 'The Age of Charles V', in Froissart: His/orian, ed ..  U.N. Palmer (1981), p. 
38. 
202 ibid.  p. 42.  According to Pierre Tueoo-Chala, 'Froissart wished to see in the Count of Foix the 
typical hero which he \vOldd follow through the years: a valiant knight, lover of  the arts, generous 
and fastious, but at the same time, cruel', in 'Froissart dans Ie Midi PyTeneen', Froissarl: 
Historian, ed.  Palmer, p.  128. 
87 at  least nine thousand were acting violent and with mischief.  All  day, 
their numbers increased with people from  various places coming along 
many roads  to  converge on Meaux,  and  they  came as  far  as  the  city's 
gates.  And the wicked people in the town did not try to  block them but 
opened their gates to  them.  They entered in a horde so great that all the 
streets were filled up to the Marche.  Now God's great grace was seen to 
be bestowed on the ladies and maidens.  They would have been violated, 
raped  and  killed  as  nobles,  which  they  were,  if these  gentlemen  and 
especially the count of Foix  and the captal of Buch had not been there. 
These two knights devised the plans to defeat the vilains.
203 
This  account is  celiainly evocative, as  the enemies  filled the city of Meaux to 
begin a devilish assault upon the fortress.  Only two brave knights, one of whom 
was Froissart's champion, and God's grace won the day.  Froissart even uses the 
word 'vilains', which implies rustic.  Yet even this account does not clearly grant 
agency to  the rural rebels: the men from Brie and Valois may have harassed the 
women, but it is the arrival of the Pmisians that leads to the gates being opened. 
In  that reading,  the  arrival  of the Jacques was ancillary to  the more important 
anival of the Pmisians.  But as  we have said,  Froissmi's second-hand account 
differs from every contemporary chronicler. 
As mentioned earlier, Froissart took his lead, and many of his tales, from 
Jean Ie Bel.  Le Bel's account of Meaux differs greatly from that of Froissart at 
this  critical  juncture,  making  no  mention  of the  involvement  of peasants. 
Instead, Ie Bel states that it was simply a joint enterprise between the townsmen 
of Paris and of Meaux: 
When news reached Pmis that these great ladies and gentlemen were at 
Meaux and did not dare to leave, people left Paris with malicious motives 
and gathered at  a certain place until  at  least  six  thousand of them had 
anived  ... The wicked  people of the  town  did  not  want  to  block the 
entrance to  those of Paris, so they opened the gates and let these wicked 
people enter freely, who like crazed men charged the March<§ to kill all in 
sight.
204 
203  Froissm1, Chrol1.,  v.  5, pp.  104-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  156-7. 
204 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p. 261. trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  154. 
88 Jean de Venette, whom Luce claims is one of the sources of his theory about the 
attack,  saw no  links whatsoever between the rustics  and the  attack on Meaux. 
Rather,  Jean  de  Venette  was  quite  clear  that  the  attack  was  triggered  by 
animosity between the inhabitants of Meaux and the Marche, then bolstered by 
the Parisian troops: 
In the same year,  1358, the duke of N0l111andy,  regent of the kingdom, 
still retained his indignation against the citizens of Paris, and the strength 
and numbers of the nobles at Meaux increased.  While the  duchess and 
the nobles were residing in the fortress of Meaux and the duke was away 
at some distance, a contlict broke out between the nobles shut up in the 
fortress and the mayor and the citizens of Meaux.  It was said at Paris that 
the  citizens  of Meaux hated the nobles  because of their exactions  and 
would gladly make war on them, if they were to  receive any substantial 
aid from Paris.  Therefore, some armed men came from Paris to  Meaux 
and, in point of fact,  the citizens attacked the nobles and the duchess in 
the  fOliress,  and there was  fighting in the gateway on the bridge.  The 
nobles,  skilled  in  arms  as  they  were,  overcame the  citizens  with their 
swords and were victorious.los 
According to  Venette,  who  was  closest  geographically to  the revolt,  the  men 
attacking  the  Marche  were  from  Paris  and  Meaux  and  nowhere  else.  The 
Chronique Nonnande agreed: 
Because the men of Meaux became frightened, they sent for help to the 
Parisians, and the provost of merchants sent them thirteen hundred anned 
men of the COlmnune of Paris, whom they received joyously.  Thus they 
went to the bridge to attack the fortress of the Marche, but the nobles put 
up a strong defence ... But the nobles steadily held on to the fortress of 
the March~  and forced the Parisians to retreat.
206 
The Clzronique  des  Quatre Premiers  Valois  concurs.  In  fact,  it  describes  the 
events  not  with the  discussion of the  Jacquerie,  but in a  separate part of the 
chronicle with the revolt in Paris: 
205  Venette, Chron., v.  2, p. 265-6, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 77-8. 
206  Chron.  norm., p.  131, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  164. 
89 After the duke had left Pmis, the provost of  the merchants and the men of 
Pmis took over the Louvre ... Then Piene Toussac, Pien'e Gilles, Pienes 
Guiffmi, Joscien de Mascon and many other anned men, all from Paris, 
left  Paris  for  Meaux  desiring to  capture the  fortress  of the  Marche of 
Meaux.
207 
The C/zronique  de regnes de Jean 11 et Charles  V also  separated the events at 
Meaux from the Jacquerie, giving it its own chapter heading, 'How those of Pmis 
and Cilly were defeated at Meaux': 
On the same, Saturday 11  June 1358, many left Paris and went to Meaux, 
about three hundred, under the cOlmnand of Piene Gilles, a grocer, and 
around  five  hundred,  who  gathered  at  Cilly-en-Meucian  under  the 
command of one named Jehan Vaillant, the provost of the royal mint  ... 
Afterwards, they went straight into battle going straight for the Marche of 
Meaux  ... And  those of Paris,  Cilly,  and many of Meaux, who fought 
alongside them, were defeated.
208 
Curiously, the least authoritative of  these nanative sources - Froissart's version 
has gained an emphasis far above that of the rest of the chronicle records.  Yet, 
the  other  clu'onicle  accounts  are  quite  clear;  the  attack  on  Meaux  was  an 
enterprise between the townsmen there and the Parisian forces,  not pmi of the 
Jacquelie. 
The  remlSSlOns  glVe  the  same  impression  as  the  chroniclers.  Despite  the 
emphasis placed  on the remissions for  Meaux by Luce,  which has  transfened 
directly into the works of Raymond Cazelles and David Bessen, none of these 
remissions show that the Jacques were linked to the attack on the Meaux:
209 
207  ChrolZ. premiers Valois, p. 72, tr. Cohn, PP, p.  158-60. 
20S  Chrol1.  des r(!gnes.  v.2, pp.  181-4, trans.  Cohn, PP, p.  166. 
209 Not included in this list are remissions issued to citizens of Meaux not involved in the attack; 
for example, Simon Rose, who was pardoned for having joined the King of Navarre, not for 
involvement with the attack on the Marche, and a party of brigands, who were involved in 
attacks on the peasantry in the months after the tumult, are not included in this table. 
90 Table vn. Names and occupations of those involved at Meaux. 
REMISSION  ISSUED TO  OCCUPATION  FROM? 
86, n.  148  Jehan de Congi  Bourgeois  Meaux 
86, n.  211  J  ehan Chandelier  Draper  Meaux 
86,11.213  J ehan Ie Ladre  Mounted Sergeant  Paris 
of  the 'Gate' 
86,n.236  Raoul d'  Aucamps  Bourgeois  Paris 
86,n.240  Parisians  NiA  Paris 
86,n.274  Guillaume de  Pliest, Canon  Meaux 
Chavenoil 
86,n.288  Meaux  N/A  Meaux 
86,n.290  Thibaud Farcault  Bourgeois  Meaux 
86,n.300  Jehan de la  Meaux 
Ramee 
86, n.  312  Jehan Rose  Maitre, conseillor  Paris 
'du roy', avocat du 
parlement 
86,n.340  J eannin des  Bourgeois  Paris 
Champs 
86,n.341  Regnault Blouart  Meaux 
There are twelve remissions issued for the attack on the Marche of Meaux, and 
as  said before, five other documents like arrets du parlement and two remissions 
to  citizens of Meaux not connected to the attack.  Considering the rest of Luce'  s 
sample (remissions and chronicle extracts about the violence in the  countryside 
91 and the peasants'  struggle against  the nobles)  it is clear they have. little to  do 
with the Jacquerie itself. 
First of all, all twelve of these remissions are issued to townsmen, rather 
than the gel7~ du plat-pais.  Secondly, the remissions clearly state that the agents 
of this attack were the citizens of Meaux and Paris.  For example, the remission 
for .Tehan de Ladre, mounted sergeant of  the gate ofParis,210 begins: 
Let it be known to  all  those present and future  that we have heard the 
supplication of our very dear and loyal cousin Jehan de Chalon,  lord of 
Arlay and Cusieaux, contending that during the time of the late Etienne 
Marcel, previously provost of  merchants of  Paris, Jean de Ladre, mounted 
sergeant of the gate of the said city of Paris, was retained with wages by 
the said city of Paris, and there certain Parisians, among them Pierre Gille 
and Piene des  Banes, had been appointed captains and instructed to go 
from the said city of Paris to to Meaux, and many of these men who were 
in  the  company of the captains  attacked the Marche and the  men who 
were in there.211 
According to  the remissions,  the insurgents were sent from  Paris  and attacked 
under the command of Piene Gilles and Piene des BalTes.  The Parisians were 
the leaders of the attack, while those of Meaux were depicted as having joined 
their enterprise.  Other remissions suggest that instead it was the men of Meaux 
who  spearheaded the  effort.  Jehan de  Congi, for  example,  was  'charged with 
being in the company of and aiding those of the city of Meaux and those of  Paris 
who came to their aid to assail the said Marche,.212  But none of the remissions 
210 This is one individual that Cazelles uses to suggest that the Jaequerie was made up of 'royal 
officials'.  Yet this individual had nothing to do with the Jacquerie, and was under the charge of 
Pierre Gilles and Etienne Marcel; this Parisian rebel was involved solely in the attack on Meaux. 
The only link he had to the commotion was the inclusion of this remission in Luce's Pieces 
.JlIstif!catil'es. 
211  'Savoir faisons a  tous presenz et a  venir que nous oye la supplicacion de nostre tres chier et 
feal cousin Jehan de Chalon, seigneur d'Arlay et Cusieaux eontenant que n'a gaires ou temps que 
Estienne Marcel m01i estoit prevost des marehanz de Paris, Jean de Ladre, sergent a  cheval de 
gait de la clicte ville de Paris, feust retenuz aus gaiges de la clicte ville cle Pmis, et lors certaines 
personnes cle la cliete ville cle Paris entre lcs quclles Pierre Gilles et Pierre des Barres furent 
establiz capitaines et orclonnez pour aler a  Meaux, dont plusiers cles clictcs genz qui estoient en ]a 
compaignie des cliz capitaines ou ordenez combatirent le Marchie et les genz qui cleclanz 
estoienf, AN, J.J86, f  69, no, 213. 
212 AN, JJ86, f  50, no,  148. 
92 transcribed or cited by Luce and used later by histolians mention peasants  as 
leaders or followers at Meaux. 
Oddly, the only indication of 'peasant support' in the attack on Meaux has passed 
unnoticed.  A  letter pardoning individuals  from  around  the  town of Tremblay 
(Seine-Saint-Denis) suggests they may have taken part in the assault: 
Let it be known to  all  those present and future  that we have heard the 
supplication of Jean de Quincy, Guillot Ie Charpentier, Beli du Four and 
Jeannin Coulon who live in Tremblay contending that they had been with 
many others of the sun'ounding lands, during the terror, commotions and 
assemblies that had recently been caused by the men of the countryside 
against the nobles of the realm, that had attacked and burnt many houses 
of gentlemen and pillaged and stole their goods and executed others of 
the said nobles  ...  and  when PielTe  Gilles  and his  accomplices  went to 
Meaux, he ordered that these said individuals should go with them when 
[he was] passing through the said Tremblay and [Gilles' men] threatened 
to  bum their town  [ville]  and houses ...  the supplicants,  ignorant of the 
wishes of the said Pierre Gilles and his accomplices, went with them to 
Meaux, and entered in the gate of  the town [ville] without any violence or 
force.
213 
This remission for the four individuals (not the settlement as  a whole)  does at 
least indicate that some of the 'genz du plat pais' may have been involved in the 
attack,  even though  these men claimed they only entered the  town,  and were 
acting  under  duress.  This  is  not,  however,  an  example  of  widespread 
patiicipation: rather, it is a specific incident where Gilles demanded support of 
four peasants on his way to Meaux.  Tremblay is not a representative settlement 
of the Jacquerie; lying on the path between the capital and Meaux, the Palisians 
213  'Savoir faisons a tous prescnz ct a venir que oyc la supplication de Jean dc Quincy, Guillot Ie 
Charpentier, Bcli du Four and Jeannin Coulon dcmouranz a Tremblay contcnu que comme il 
aient estc avec plusiers autres elu pais el'environs au etTrois commotions et assemblees qui eleux et 
n'a gaires ont este faist par les gens du plat pais contre les nobles du royaume et a ardoir et abatre 
plusiers maisons de gentils hommes et a pillier cle gaster leurs biens et aucuns cles eliz nobles mis 
a mort et avccques ce quant PielTe Gillcs et ses complices alerent a mcaulx il  commancla aus 
clessus cliz en passant par Ie clit Tremblay qu'il allassent avecqucs lui en les menassent d'ardoir 
leur ville et maisons ... Ies supplicants ignorans que Ie elit Pierre Gilles et ses eliz complices 
vouloient faire alerent avecques eulz a meaux et entrerent de dans la p0l1e de la ville sans aucune 
voulente en force.' AN, JJ86, f  96, no. 286, reprinted in Luce, Jacqucric pp. 258-9. 
93 passed it on their way to Meaux.  It is also the only settlement mentioned by the 
remissions in what seems to  be a relatively quiet area of Jacques'  activity (the 
green dots represent other settlements listed as  part of the Jacquerie, the black 
line is a potential path that Gilles might have taken): 214 
Map 1. Tremblay and the attack on Meaux. 
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Gilles's army, it appears, may have coerced local rebels as  it moved on. 
Most  importantly,  it  was  not as  Jacques that  these  men  were  involved in the 
attack  on the Marche;  rather,  their involvement was  the  product of becoming 
involved with Pierre Gilles, the Parisian insurgent.  The trip to Meaux was listed 
as  an  additional  wrongdoing  alongside  the  general  damage  done  by  these 
Jacques. The agency for the attack on the Marche of Meaux was granted to  the 
Parisians; any 'Jacques' who may have been involved were merely foot soldiers 
in a predominantly Parisian army. 
Even  considering  Tremblay,  these  remlSSlOns  are  clear  on  who  was 
involved:  the townsmen of Meaux and Paris.  The actors were not  'men of the 
countryside', but rather the heads of the Parisian rebellion, who with the people 
21 4 Although there are no remissions for Jacques in this corridor, there are remissions that attest to 
the destruction of some property in this area.  This will be discussed in Chapter 3, on 'Mapping 
the Revolt'.  The scale of  this map is 1/ 450,000. 
94 of Meaux engineered an attack on the Marche.  Only one remission for the attack 
mentioned any SOli of peasant or made any reference to the gens du plat pays the 
temps dl!  commotion or effi'ois.  If these remissions are any judge, the crown did 
not consider the peasanh'y to have been involved at all in the attack on Meaux. 
Every  single  record  the  crown  issued  concerning  the  attack  on  the  Marche 
emphasises  that  the participants  were  urban-based.  The assumption  that  this 
attack  featured  members  of the  peasanh'y  is  completely  unsupported  by  the 
remission record. 
Finally, these documents indicate how historians have been influenced by 
the  inclusion  of remissions  about  Meaux  within  the  Pieces  Justificatives  of 
Luce"s work.  As mentioned earlier, Cazelles's analysis of the occupations of  the 
Jacques is actually more a quick survey of  that said selection: 
Research into  the  occupations  of those involved in their terror springs 
other surprises  ... these are  clerks ...  even a  Canon of Meaux  ... some 
royal  officials  ... :  a  gate-keeper,  and  a  fair  number of royal  sergeants, 
mounted sergeants from the Chatelet and from the Paris watch .. ?15 
Despite a little exaggeration, the emphasis on Meaux is clear.  These people were 
not involved in the e.ffi'ois, only in the attack of the Marche.  They were not rural 
Jacques, but were rebellious townsmen.  Yet Luce's inclusion of them within a 
sample supposedly concerning the rural revolt has served to  confuse historians 
like Cazelles into thinking that Meaux was part of  the Jacques' offensive. 
The attack on the Marche was undoubtedly important, where the citizens of Paris 
and Meaux joined forces to try to undermine the crown's position.  Luce'  s theory 
that it also involved the Jacques became historical fact in almost every textbook 
215 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', pp. 76-7. 
95 on the Hundred Years' War.  While it may be that a few rustics took part in the 
attack on Meaux, there is  no  evidence to  suggest they did so  in large numbers. 
Luce's collection, and the remissions for Meaux, have become the cornerstone of 
theories about not just about the actions of the Jacques, but also the makeup of 
the insurgents and how the rebellion itself was controlled by urban countelpmis, 
despite the fact there is little evidence of Jacques' involvement in the attack on 
Meaux.  All  the  evidence,  excepting Froissmi,  points the  other way:  that  the 
attack on the Marche was an entelprise of the Parisians and those of  Meaux, with 
no substantial aid from the Jacquerie. 
96 4 - THE JACQUERIE AND THE COUNTER-
JACQUERIE 
For a  revolt  that has  attracted much recognition from  both historians and  the 
general public as  the Jacquerie, one would imagine there would be a clear and 
well-developed sense of the exact events of the uprising and its aftennath.  Yet 
many historians remain confused about the exact scale of the commociol1s.  Was 
the  violence localised  around  Paris,  or was  it  much larger?  The  repression, 
recognised to be among the most bloody and destructive retaliation against any 
medieval  revolt,  has  received  very  little  attention.
216  Historians  have  not 
attempted to  map the retaliation, create a timeline or even explain who exactly 
was  responsible for  it.  Rather,  historians have repeated generalised chronicle 
statements  about  the  Jacquerie  being  a  revolt  of the  'Beauvaisis'  and  the 
retaliation having 'destroyed all the countryside'. 
Yet the one piece of infonnation which remissions constantly provide is 
geography:  most  detail  the  location  of the  insurgents  and  in  some  cases  the 
nobility involved in the repression.  The remissions are not comprehensive; by 
their nature,  they deal  with only exceptions to  general pardons.  Yet there are 
enough of them to  map out a large number of insurgent settlements. By doing 
this,  we can see the  Jacquerie was  a  problem that  affected a  large pOliion  of 
northern  France.  We can  establish  the  Jacques'  attitude  towards  the  bonnes 
l'illes, and identify targets they selected.  By studying the repression, we can see 
two  distinct movements:  the bloody scourge of the countryside by the  nobles, 
and the more measured policy of  reconciliation emphasised by the crown. 
216  For example, see R.-H. Bautier, The Econol1lic Development of  Medieval Europe, trans. H. 
Karoly (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), p.  231. 
97 The  actions  of every rebel  within the Jacquelie of 1358  will never be 
fully  known.  The remissions  only offer snapshots of the  rebellion,  but these 
snapshots can be illustrative.  The documents may only offer a small sample of 
the villages involved, but that sample is large enough to obtain a proper sense of 
the uprising and the retaliation that followed. 
MAPPING THE JACQUERIE 
[T]he Jacquelie which broke out on  28  May 1358  in  areas  to  the nOlih 
and east of Pmis stands out as the nearest thing to  coherent social protest 
... [t]here was more or less disorganised insUlTection in other districts ... 
A host of peasant rebels  could not withstand even a small  company of 
trained  soldiers.  When the upper classes, against whom the revolt was 
directed,  had  had  time  to  gather  their  wits  and  their  troops,  popular 
protest was easily dealt with.  Peasant movements were not,  in the later 
Middle Ages, serious political things.217 
Peter  Lewis,  in  his  seminal  Later  Medieval  France,  did  not  consider  the 
Jacquerie  to  represent  a  ·serious  political'  issue.  Pmi  of his  reasoning  was 
concentrated  on the  revolt's  lack of organisation,  but  another reason was  its 
geography.  In  Lewis"s  descliption,  the Jacquerie sounds like a Parisian issue, 
which spread to a few towns or regions (Lewis mentions only Amiens).  It is not 
surprising that Lewis anived at that conclusion, considering the confusion of the 
revolt's geography in the literature.  There is a central contradiction at the hemi 
of many histOlians'  descriptions of the  violence;  they  desclibe the revolt  as  a 
Parisian phenomenon, before mentioning  attacks  in  Champagne,  near Amiens 
and  even  into  Normandy.  Philippe  Contamine  described  the  Jacquerie  as 
217  P.  Lewis, Later iVledieval France (London: MacMillan, 1968), p. 283. 
98 occumng In  'the rich  grain-growing plains  in  the  region  round Paris,;218  for 
Edouard Perroy, the rebels were the 'peasants of Beauvaisis and Soissonnais'.  219 
Mollat and Wolff described the revolt as  covering the  'lIe de  France and the 
Beauvaisis ... east and south of Paris, northward over the whole of Picardy, and 
from  there  into  Normandy  .... Champagne and Lorraine' ?20  While that area 
sounds extensive, they included a map which suggests a far smaller area (marked 
on this map by the polygon):221 
Map II. Recreation of  Popular Revolutions' map of the Jacquerie. 
This small region encircled in black has, following Mollat and Wolffs example, 
been taken to  represent the entire area covered by the revolt.  Historians have 
stressed that the area between Paris and Senlis was the heartland of the revolt. 
Mollat and Wolff selected this rather narrow passage for their map based on the 
218 P. Contamine, 'The French Nobility and War', in The Hundred Years  War, ed. K. Fowler 
(London: MacMillan, 1971), p. 154. 
219 E. Perroy, The Hundred Years  War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), p.  135. 
220 MoUat and Wolff, Popular Revolutions, p.  126.  The map was included on p.  125. 
221  The scale of  this map is  1/1,900,000. 
99 testimony  of chroniclers,  only  three  of whom  mentioned  it  spreading  much 
fmiher than the Beauvaisis.
222  Ironically, the chroniclers who claimed the rebels 
had  the  least  organisation,  Jean  Ie  Bel  and  Jean  Froissart,  also  granted  the 
rebellion the most extensive space, including the lIe de France, the area around 
Beauvais  and  Amiens,  the  territory  as  far  east  as  Soissons  and  even  to  the 
Perthois.  Yet historians seemed to  have ignored Ie  Bel  and Froissart on these 
points.  Ever since Luce's work, hist01ians have had access to a large selection of 
places where the Jacquelie occun'ed, and these were not limited to the narrow 
region suggested in Mollat and Wolffs map. 
Why is this important?  Generalisations like Lewis's rely on the fact that 
the  Jacquerie  did  not  have  an  impact  on  the  political  landscape  of France. 
However, the sheer size and scale of the Jacquerie meant that it was a  'serious 
political' event.  Foreign troops and mercenaries were drafted in to  contain the 
revo1t.
223  Potentially,  it  crossed borders  into  neighboming  countries.  More 
importantly, it  severely damaged and destroyed many key military installations 
across the region. This Sh011 section is not intended to be a definitive timeline of 
exactly  which  villages  rose  up  and  when,  because  that  data  is  simply  not 
available;  most  remissions  do  not  give  dates  or  offer  more  than  a  general 
indication of a community's actions.  Many were issued to individuals who acted 
with 'the men of the area', and give us little sense of what the others did.  The 
remissions represent only a sample of the villagers involved, and in most cases, 
to gain their pardon they claim not to be involved.  Nonetheless, it is possible to 
222  In addition to the Ie Bel and Froissart, the Chroniqlle de nignes de Jean II ef Charles V 
mentioned the regions of Morency and Mucien.  Chrol1.  des regnes, v. I. p.  180, trans. Cohn, PP, 
pp.  166-7. 
22.' Jean Ie Bel records how 'foreign troops' were important in deteating the rural rebels; Bel, 
Chron., v.2, p.  259, trans. Cohn, PP, pp,  153. In 'Retaliation', an incident involving troops paid 
to stop the rebels pillaging the countryside will be discussed. 
100 locate  at  least  some of the  rebels  who  were  involved,  establish some of their 
targets, and draw connections between urban and rural settlements. 
Insurgent action recorded in the remissions can be broadly classified into three 
'types'.  The first,  and least numerous,  of these actions  are  individual wrong-
doings  under  the  umbrella  of the  Jacquelie.  Several  individuals  committed 
transgressions loosely tied to the Jacquerie, but whose actions were not p31i of a 
general offensive by villagers.  As an example, in Doue (Seine-et-Mame), Colin 
Franyois and Nicaise Fremy the younger took advantage of the rebellion to break 
into the local nobleman's garden and steal 80 carps and chicken-heads.  Because 
they had not sold them afterwards or made any sOli of profit on their Clime, they 
were  pardoned.
224  However,  not  all  individual  acts  were  triviaL  Piene  Ie 
Macon,  in  Saint-Germain (Oise), murdered Robert L'Escrivain,215  in what the 
supplicant assured the crown was not an act of rebellion, because the people did 
not lise nor join the other men of the countryside.  Nonetheless, this action took 
place during the time of the Jacquelie, and thus in the eyes of those that issued 
the remission was part of the rebellion.  These incidents are relatively rare within 
the sample. 
The  second type  of 'action'  is  when individuals  or  communities  were 
pardoned for  acting as  p31i  of the  Jacquelie,  but their exact actions  were not 
stated,  or  they  were  accused  of having  simply joined  'the other men of the 
countryside'.  The precise groups  they joined are  most  often left  unspecified. 
Perhaps  some  joined  the  main  force  who  were  defeated  at  Clel1110nt,  but 
mAN, JJ86, f. 96, no. 291. reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 256-7. 
225 AN, JJ86, f. 218, no.  591. 
101 considering that the remissions occasionally list rebels who joined Cale and the 
main force,226  it seems unlikely this would have gone unnoticed. 
The  third,  and most useful  for  this  chapter's  purposes,  are remISSIOns 
when the insurgents acted  clearly as  pal1 of the  rebellion, and occasionally the 
narrative also detailed exactly how and 11/170  they attacked.  Several remissions 
list communities along with the properties they attacked.  These help us to create 
an accurate picture of the rebellion and the movements of  individual violence. 
For classification, the green places  on the map indicate where an entire 
community  of rebels  rose  up  according  to  the  remissions.
227  This  includes 
villages which sought remissions as a single unit, and also when a remission for 
an  individual  specifies that  'other men of the ville'  or 'surrounding area' took 
part.  The red dots specify places where the remissions identify a rebel but do 
not specify that the rest of the community took part:  for example, Jean Bruyant 
of Saint-Fargeau was involved in an attack on a castle at Villers-aux-NOlU1aines, 
but we do not know if the rest of his neighbours joined in.  Left off this map are 
instances when a rebel's hometown is not indicative of the revolt's location: for 
example,  Jehan  de  la  Basse  came  from  Marseilles  originally,  but  became 
involved in the  Jacqueriein Gerberoy (Oise).22s  Of course,  Marseilles  is  not 
k  d  1 ·  1 .  779  mar  e  as a  ocatIOn on t lIS map.--
226 See, for example, AN . .IJ86, f.  102, nos. 308. 309 and f.  136. no. 39 I; JJ90, f. 84, no. 252. 
227 Communities that appeared in remissions without the suggestion that they rebelled have not 
been included on this map.  For example, the villages around Saint-Thierry and Reims indicated 
in AN. JJ86, f.  130. no.  380 , who were targets of  the repression but were never explicitly linked 
to the revolt, have not been included. 
22S AN, JJ86, f.  175, no. 495. 
229 The place-names on this map, where unclear in the remission, have been cross-referenced with 
the Archives Naliol1ales index. which includes the 'modern' version of  place-name.  However, 
there are a few places not included on this map because they could not be located, like 'Vignoel' 
(AN, JJ86, f.  145, no. 425) or because neither the remission nor the index was clear as to the 
name of  the settlement ('Pont (or POli)-Rouy', in AN, 1186, f.  86, no. 256).  The scale of this 
map is  I / 1,900.000. 
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....; The  l11.apS  illustrate  several interesting clusters.  First,  if the  remissions  are a 
representative sample,  the  area around the lIe de France does appear to  be the 
heartland of the revolt.  Yet it  was  not simply the corridor between Paris  and 
Senlis.  Rather,  the  'heartland' extended further nOlih and east than traditional 
surveys have suggested. 
The map shows  other clusters of revolt.  First,  a large congregation of 
incidents  were recorded around  Amiens  and  Beauvais,  including villages  like 
Grandvilliers, La Warde-Mauger and Breteuil (all  Oise).  Secondly, a cluster of 
attacks were recognised to the south of Paris: the Arpajon region.  Thirdly, there 
are several attacks around Soissons.  Fourthly, a large-cluster fonned around St. 
Dizier  and  Vitry-le-Francois,  ignored  by the  chroniclers  and  later historians. 
This  area, well  over one hundred kilometres to  the east of Paris, was virtually 
across the border with Bar.  Beyond this border any attacks would have fallen 
under the jurisdiction of the Duke of  Bar, and rebels may have sought grace from 
him,  so  this cluster may have been even more extensive,  crossing into  foreign 
territory. 
There  were  several  settlements  which  recieved  pardons  but  were  not 
included on this map to the south, namely Orleans, Lon"is (Loiret), Gien (Loiret) 
and  Vel111enton  (Y onne).  Their remissions  did  not  specify  that  these  towns 
participated in the Jacquerie,  or with the  'gens  du  plat pays'.  Of these,  Gien 
seems to  have the strongest links to  the Jacquel"ie;  the remission describes the 
'time of the commotions between the non-nobles and the nobles'  although the 
pardon was issued some years later.  230  The men of Lorris and Vennenton were 
pardoned in the wake of the Jacquerie, but are described as having charged with 
230  'temps que les commocions durent entre les non nobles et nobles', AN. J1115, f.  120, no.  297. 
105 the 'enemies of the crown'. These carmot definitively be desclibed as part of the 
Jacquelie,  although  the  case  of Gien  seems  convincing:  they  were  rebellions 
against the crown by the lower sorts in the summer of 1358.231 
A few outliers were so distant they do  not fit on this map. We will later 
discuss Pierre de Montfort, who appeared in Caen trying to  stir up the peasantry 
around that area to revolt.232  Suffice it for now to say that the Jacques' influence 
could reach as far as  the NODnandy coast.  Indeed, a Jacque who had joined in 
Paillard (Oise), near Clermont, was later murdered in Plainville (close to  Caen) 
by an inhabitant of La Falaise (Somme), partly because of  his involvement in the 
.Tacquerie;  the  effects  of the  rebellion clearly stretched  deep  into  the  outlying 
regions.  111ere were other outliers too:  a man from Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais) 
was pardoned for having risen up, seemingly around that region.  According to 
the document, violence also characterised this region, and it appears to have been 
connected to  the Jacquerie:  'with many others  of the  surrounding land in  the 
terror ... [they acted] with the said men of the countryside against the nobles of 
the realm and attacked many of their fortresses and stole their goods'  .233  Other 
remissions  for  outlying  Jacque  settlements  also  imply  there  may  have  been 
clusters of violence in those regions.  For example, Montigny-Lencoup (Seine-et-
Marne), which is  around 30km east of the nearest other rebel settlement, is  not 
recorded as an exception, but rather as just another area of rebellion: 'with many 
other people of the sUD'ounding land ...  for the men of the countryside against the 
nobles of the realm,.234 
231  Lon-is and Ve1111enton will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, in  . Peasant Resistance', 
along with similar insurgencies in GiVTY, Vitteaux and Orleans. 
2.12  AN, JJ86, f.  76, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 291-2, see also the sub-section on 
'Peasant Communication' in Chapter 6. 
233  AN, 1186, f.  194, no. 534. 
234  AN, JJ86, f. 92, no. 275. 
106 Sun'ounding the major towns of the period - Senlis, Amiens, Paris and 
Meaux, for example - insurgent settlements are not so frequent.  Rather, we find 
the biggest conglomeration of  rebel settlements in the spaces between towns, like 
between Amiens and Compiegne, or between Compiegne and Senlis.  It is from 
the areas of vacuum where the towns did not have direct control that the Jacques 
rose up. 
Although based on  a small sample, an absence of insurgent settlements 
(barring Tremblay which was  involved on the  attack  on  the  Marche and  one 
individual  from  Saint-Thiebauti
35  is  notable  between  Paris  and  Meaux. 
Following  the  Marne  up  from  the  capital  to  the  fortress,  only  two  villages 
became involved in this well-populated area, and only one of them was involved 
in  the attack on the  Meaux.  Indeed,  this  relative  silence  suggests  again  that 
whatever  happened  in  this  'corridor'  came  from  the  instigation  of Etienne 
Marcel, and his lieutenant Pierre Gilles, not from the Jacquerie. 
Considering  the  data,  the  Jacquerie  was  not  simply  a  revolt  of the 
Beauvaisis;  rather,  it  affected virtually the  whole  of the  royal  domains  in the 
north-east of France.  Spreading out perhaps beyond the crown's administrativ.e 
boundaries, villages rebelled in  clusters between the bonnes villes, and although 
the exact frequency of revolt can be hard to trace, rebels could be found heading 
north almost to Flanders, east to the extreme of the realm, south towards Orleans 
and  even  west  to  Nonnandy  and  Rouen.  The  Jacquerie,  far  from  being  an 
isolated outburst to  the north of Paris, spread across all the nOlihem lands in the 
Dauphin's control. 
235  See the section on 'The Attack on the MarchC' in Chapter 3 for more discussion of this. 
107 Sadly, the remissions often do not list the exact targets of each particular group, 
but  on  occasion they  do  tell  us  something about who  the insurgents attacked. 
Overwhelmingly,  the  insurgents  focussed  upon  the  chc2 tea  u.;v:,  maisol1s  and 
sometimes  the  fortresses  of the  nobility.  While  individuals  are  pardoned 
occasionally for their parts in the murder of  a noble, rebels more often went after 
fortified locales and property, and in most cases these were burnt to  the ground 
Even when individual targets  are not listed,  often a blanket statement is  made 
716  about the 'houses and forts'-'  that the rebels destroyed. We cannot know how 
fortified  or  well-defended  these  settlements  were  (although  fortresses 
presumably were military installations), and some may have been simple fam1-
houses.  Yet this nonetheless testifies to the success of the rebels.  Much of the 
discussion,  from  Flammennont  to  Cazelles,  has  concentrated  on  peasants' 
inability to  organise successfully, and to destroy such fortified places,  without 
outside  in±1uence.
237  Yet  these  remissions  testify  to  the  ability  of individual 
villagers to unite and achieve victories over these bastions of the nobility.  They 
also indicate the boldness ofthe rebel assault.
238 
The rebel settlements we know about represent only a small propOliion of 
the Jacquerie's victims.  When a target  is  mentioned, it is  normally described 
after the general  violence habitants may have committed, with  'especially the 
chateaux'  added  afterwards.
239  Locations  specified  by  name  may  have 
represented the most impOliant attack of the group, but they were not necessarily 
the only ones.  The repetition of general phrases suggests that the destruction was 
236 'abatre, gaster et ardoir leurs maisons, fortresses etbiens'.  See for example AN, 1186, 1'.  133, 
n.  3/;7, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 276-8. 
237  See Flammcrmont 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis'; Cazelles, 'The 1acquerie', in The English 
Rising, ed. Aston and Hilton, 
23S The insurgent's targets will be discussed in 'Peasant Resistance'. 
239  For eXJ111ple, the villagers of Mennecy had noted in the remisison they had attacked many 
houses and fortresses especially 'the chaste! of Villers-aux-Nonnains',  AN, 1186, f  123, n.  363. 
108 large-scale:  a  single  peasant  unit  would  nonnally  have  attacked  numerous 
buildings, if phrases like 'leurs maiSOllS . were accurate.  The sheer scale of these 
attacks  decimated  the  property  of the  lie  de  France,  which  concurs  with  the 
accounts of the chronicles.  La Chroniqlle des  regnes des Jean II et Charles  V 
records that the Jacques "knocked down all the fOliresses of the region'  .240  Jean 
Ie  Bel gives us a numerical estimate: 'they destroyed and bumt more than sixty 
beautiful homes (bonne maisol1s) and castles (chateau!x) in the Beauvaisis', and 
another  eighty  in  NOTInandy  and  'between  Paris  and  Soissons' .241  The 
remissions even suggest this may have been a conservative estimate. 
Unfortunately, the majority of pardons do not give us such a clear idea of 
specific objectives.  Several houses mentioned cannot be found on modem maps. 
While it may be tempting to  assume  that,  for  example,  the  men of Couvrot 
attacked  the  castle  in  their  village,  or  that  the  men  of Le  Plessis-Bouchard 
assaulted  either the  small  local  fOli  or  even  the  grand  tower of Bazoges-en-
Pareds  nearby,  there  is  no  explicit  evidence  in  the  documents.
242  What  is 
specified can be divided into two  categories: first,  those rebels who attacked a 
specified target outside their village (the  target is  marked in red),  and  second, 
those rebels who  attacked a target that the crown considered to be within their 
own settlement, like the local noble's house (the settlement is marked in orange). 
The  map  below  represents  the  Jacques'  objectives  as  identified  by  the 
remlsslOns: 
240Chro17.  des regnes. v.l, p.  178, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  166. 
241  Bel, Clzroll., v.  2, p. 256, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  152. 
242  The two remissions refelTing to these settlemcnts (AN, JJ86, f.  115, no. 337 and JJ90, f  211, 
n. 419) do not specify a precise target; the fortifications nearby are mentioned in the Dictionnaire 
des c1ullcaLLI ct desj(Jrlijicalions du Moyen Age en France, ed. c.-L. Da1ch (Strasbourg: Editions 
Publitotal Strasbourg, 1979), p.  382 and p.  116 respectively. 
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These records  specify far  more  rebels  than  targets  (only forty  can  be 
identified).  Many of these targets are in fact multiple objectives - in Crevecouer 
seven houses were burned, for example
243 
- but the majority of remissions are 
vague about actual damage caused. 
Was there any programme to the attacks?  Jonathan Sumption believed he 
had found one: '[t]he reasons are obvious when one looks at a map.  These places 
were  disposed  in  a  ring around  Senlis.  In the  wrong  hands,  they were  in  a 
position to block every road leading to the city'  .244  Yet the map tells a different 
story:  virtually  all  areas  in  the  north-east  of France  were  targeted.  Senlis' 
experience  was  not  unique;  many  other  towns  witnessed  the  neighbouring 
fortifications  burnt to  the  ground.  The bottom two  towns  of the ring around 
Senlis are closer to Compiegne.  A cluster around Montdidier could be as easily 
described as  a cluster to  the south of Amiens,  or even a cluster to  the north of 
243 AN, JJ86, f.  56, no.  173. 
244 Sumption, Fire, pp. 329-30. 
110 Beauvais.  Indeed, this cluster contains the greatest conglomeration of  violence, 
along with the area between Paris and Beauvais. 
In the previous paragraphs, I discussed the seeming absence of Jacques 
between Paris and Meaux.  Included on this map were three 'targets' within this 
area, but they may not have been objectives of the 'men of the countryside'.  The 
attacks on Pomponne, Chamy and Thorigny (all Seine-et-Mame), are all detailed 
in the same donation of propelty, to Jeanne de Chamy, wife of the late Jean de 
Chamy.245  This document is at best unclear as to who attacked these properties, 
and although they were damaged during the time of the effi'ois,  it is  not clear 
whether  the  insurgents  were  peasants  or townsmen.  It  seems  a  reasonable 
supposition that it was the latter, that these attacks were committed by burghers 
on the march to  Meaux.  Given the ambiguity, once again there is  no  specific 
evidence of  Jacques activity between Pmis and Meaux.
246 
The  Jacques  were  successful  in  destroying  property  and  f0l1ified 
installations  across  the  length  and  breadth  of  n011h-eastem  France,  with 
significant victOlies  for  the Jacques.  For example,  the  'palatial  domain  ,247  of 
Robert  de  Lonis  at  Ennenonville,  worth over 25,000  livres  according  to  one 
j4~  document,  was  burnt to  the  ground by the  Jacques.-'  There were  successes 
against other military fortifications: for example, those against the castles at La-
Celle-en-Brie,249  Jouy-sous-Thelle  (Oise) 
250  and  Villers-aux-Noill1ains 
24; X 1  a 14, ff.  391, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 306-9. 
246 Also from the above register, one document (X2a, 1, fol  212) mentions an attack on a house 
on Messy, which also does falls around Meaux.  In my opinion, this document offers no data as to 
who committed the damage (the document is a donation of  property to the noble), but my belief 
is that it was more likely to be the townsmen. 
247  Sumption. Fire, p.70. 
248 AN, JJ86, f.  no. 308, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 260. 
249 AN, JJ90, f.  225, f.  102, no.  444, replinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 303-4. 
250 AN, JJIOO, f. 220, no. 478. 
III (Aisne).251  Indeed, the habitants of Crugny even destroyed the great fortress  at 
La  Fere-en-Tardenois.252  One  rebel  group  alone  was  responsible  for  the 
destruction of  four chateaux: Mesnil, Aufay, Thois and Catheux (Somme).153 
The  Jacques'  victories,  and  their  destruction  of several  key  military 
positions, emphasize that the rebellion was very much a serious political issue. 
Including reparations for the chateau at Ennenonville (Oise), Robert de  LOlTis 
claimed over 75,000 livres in damages caused by the Jacques.254  The great castle 
at  Poix  (Somme)  was  burnt  to  the  ground.  We  know  that  several  castles 
destroyed by the Jacques were rebuilt, for example at Moreuil, while others were 
left ruined,  like Verberie.255  It was  not just an  issue about recompensing the 
nobility for the loss of their propeliy, but the Jacquelie weakened the military 
in±iastructure  of the  French  crown.  That  same  fOliress  at  Poix,  no  doubt 
weakened after being looted by the Jacques, would be occupied by the English in 
September 1358.256  Lagny (Seine-et-Mame),  one of the main garrisons of the 
Dauphin's troops, was attacked by the Jacques and acted as an assembly point of 
the retaliatory force, but fell quickly to the English in 1359.257  In fact, over sixty 
fOliified  places  in  the  lIe  de  France  were  occupied  by  Anglo-NavalTese 
companies  in  the  August  and  September  1358,  just a  few  months  after  the 
Jacquerie.258  While perhap's  we cannot draw a  direct  cOlTelation  between the 
Jacques'  attacks  and  the victOlies  of the  Dauphin's  enemies  in  this  region in 
201  AN, JJI OS, f. 20, no.  60. 
202 AN, JJ86, f.  125, no. 36S. 
253  AN. J.190.  f.  98, no. 294, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllcric, pp. 296-7. 
254  AN, JJS6, f.  102, no. 30S, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllcric, p. 260. 
200 Saleh, Dictiol1l1airc, pp. SIS, 120S. 
206 Sumption. Fire, p.  372. 
257  ibid. 
25S  ibid.  For details of Lagny and the Jacques, see AN, JJ91, f.  173, no. 333. 
112 following years, the area certainly provided little resistance against enemy troops 
in the wake of the J  acquerie. 
The bulk of the Jacques were peasants or rural villagers.  Yet townsmen were 
involved, often in events ancillary to the main revolt.  The chroniclers did report 
the  involvement  of  townsmen,  but  did  not  specify  the  nature  of  their 
pmiicipation.  For example, the chronicles charge that the Jacques attacked the 
city of Senlis.  The Chronique des Regnes des Jean II et Charles V describes how 
the Jacques  'forced many of the town to ±lee  into the countryside,.259  Richard 
Lescot also describes a great antagonism towards certain towns:  'as this pack of 
rabid  dogs  went  about,  coming  and  going,  they  single-mindedly  devoted 
themselves to destroying Senlis, Ennenonville, Thierry ...  '.  260  Yet the remissions 
suggest  something else:  it  was  the  townsmen of Senlis  themselves  who  were 
complicit in removing the nobles from the city.  As reported earlier, a great C1Y 
within the city inspired the burghers to evict the lords.  This confusion continued 
in  towns  like  Beauvais,  for  which  the  C/zronique  Normande  describes  the 
following: 
The other peasants reassembled ... including even some of the [town of] 
Beauvais,  who  [also]  were  against  the  nobles.  They  sent  many  to 
Beauvais,  where  they  were  killed  with  the  consent  of  the  town's 
commune  ...  at  the  time  the  peasants  went  into  the Beauvaisis  around 
Compiegne and ordered that all nobles be sent and handed over to them, 
but the  bourgeois  refused  and gave  guarantees  to  the  noblemen,  who 
d ·  h  fC"  "61  staye  111 t  e town 0  omplegne.-
The remissions  confi1111  that Compiegne was a place that offered safety to  the 
nobles:  the  priest  and  curate  Jean  Rose  moved  his  family  there  when  the 
Jacquerie tried to use him as  a pawn in forging an alliance between the Jacques 
2S9 Chrol1.  des regnes. v.l, p.  178, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  166. 
260 Lescot, Chron., p.  126, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  170. 
261  Chroll.  norm., p.  128, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  163-4. 
113 and  the  town.
262  However,  the  above  quotation  indicates  the  confusion:  the 
townsmen of Beauvais were involved in their own attack upon their town. 
The remissions show that whenever the townsmen were involved in the 
Jacquerie, there was little clarity of purpose.  Classifying 'urban settlements' is 
also  problematic,  but several  large towns  are  mentioned in remissions  for  the 
Jacquerie.  This map indicates each urban settlement, and whether the remissions 
indicate the whole town took part (red),  one townsmen joined the  'men of the 
countryside'  (blue)  or  whether  there  was  confusion  within  the  townspeople 
d ·  . .  h  I  (  ) ?63  aroun  J  ommg t  e revo t  orange.-
Map VI. Urban centres and the Jacquerie 
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262 AN, JJ86, f.  124, no.  365, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 272-4. 
263 The scale of this map is  1/ 1,800,000. 
114 Table VIII. Urban involvement in the Jacquede 
REMISSIONS  TOWN  PARTICIPATION 
JJ86, n. 239  Amiens  Confusion;  townsmen  leave  then  are 
recalled;  some join of their  own  free 
will. 
JJ86, nos.  51O,  Senlis  Confusion;  townsmen  attacking 
511  townsmen 
JJ86, n.  584  Beauvais  One  individual  ] 0111S  'lnen  of  the 
countryside' 
JJ86, n. 297  Montlhery  One  individual  joins  'men  of  the 
countryside' 
JJ86, n.  534  . Saint-Omer  One individual joins 'men of the lands' 
JJ87, n. 231  Caen  One individual spreading propaganda 
JJ86,  nos.  437,  Montdidier  Confusion;  townsmen  revolt  while 
456  mayor disapproves 
JJ1l5, n. 297  Gien  Inhabitants attack nobles' houses 
JJ86, n. 313  Pontoise  Men  from  the  plat-pays  around  took 
part 
Of these, Montlhery, Saint Omer, Beauvais and Caen seem to have only involved 
one man from each settlement who had joined the 'men of the countryside'  .264 
This tallies with the chronicle accounts concerning Beauvais - the few townsmen 
who did join the violence were acting against public opinion in the town.  As we 
264 Those individuals are Gauchier Lore (Montlhery, AN, JJ86, n.297), Regnaut Corbel 
(Beauvais, AN, JJ86, f. 2 11, no. 584), Jean Michelet (Saint-Orner, AN, JJ86, f.  194, no. 534) and 
Pierre Montfort (eaen, AN, JJ87, [  136, no. 231). 
115 discussed  earlier  in  'Marcel',  confusion  clouds  the  involvement  of  Senlis, 
Montdidier and Amiens?65  None had much to do with the Jacquerie itself.  Even 
in the case of Pontoise, the remission specifically mentioned that peasants from 
the outskirts of the town were involved in the liot.266 
Only in Gien is it clear that the burghers were the main insurgents, rather 
than joining the men of the countryside.  A 'great party of those' from the town 
attacked  the  gardens  and  the  houses  of two  knights,  the  brothers  lehan  and 
lehannot  du  Martroy.267  Nonetheless,  these  houses  were  seven  leagues 
(somewhere in the  region  of twenty-five  to  thirty miles)  from  the  settlement. 
This seems a long way for burghers to travel - perhaps the repOlis Vv'ere inconect 
and  the  villagers  from  the  outlying  countryside  were  the  men  responsible, 
although  there  is  nothing  to  support  that  thesis.  Gien  itself  is  hardly 
representative  of the  Jacques,  situated  one  hundred  kilometres  south  of the 
nearest settlement that can be positively linked to the Jacquerie.268 
The  examples  of  urban-rural  interaction  suggest  conflict,  not  co-
operation.  Jean Rose was sent with letters proposing an alliance with the men of 
Compiegne,  which the  town rejected.269  This  animosity towards  the Jacques 
from townsmen can be found elsewhere in the sources.  In Caen, the remissions 
for  Piene  de  Monfort  shows  that  the  town  autholities  anested  suspected 
JacquesYO  The individual from  'the countryside around Pontoise' fled into the 
to>1'11  to escape the rebels, just as did Jean Rose in Compiegne.  Even beyond the 
260  See 'Marcel', in Chapter III. 
266 AN, JJ86, f.  Ill, no. 313. 
267 AN, J]115, f.  140, no. 297. 
263 It seems possible, perhaps likely, that Gien was not pali of the Jacquerie at all, and rather was 
pmi of the wave of violence that took in other southern settlements like Vitteaux and Vermenton 
which will be discussed in the chapter on 'Peasant Resistance'.  However, the remission docs 
claim the men ofGien to be involved in the revolt of  the 'gens du plat pays'. 
269 AN, JJ86, f.  124, no.  365, reprinted in Luce, Jacqucric, pp. 272-4. 
270 AN, JJ87, f. 76, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, 1717.  291-2. 
116 safety they provided and the efforts of officials to an'est Jacques, towns aided the 
nobility over their rural brethren: the remission for Corbeil shows the townsmen 
joined forces  with  the nobles  to  put down the revolt.
271  When rebel peasants 
interacted with men from the towns, the consequences were generally negative, 
not positive; they were centres of  conflict as much as co-operation. 
Do we get any indication about how the revolt ended?  The defeat of Guillaume 
Cale's  force  at  Clennont  was  certainly  a  pivotal  moment  in  the  Jacquerie 
according to the chroniclers.  For example, La Clzroniqlle Normande records: 
And at the time the King of Navane assembled a great army, consisting 
of men-at-arms from England, Nonnandy and Navane.  They marched to 
the castle of Clermont, and sent for one of the captains of rustics to talk 
with him, promising that he wanted to be on their side.  Thus, he [Cale] 
went  there,  but as  soon  as  he anived, the  King  chopped off his  head. 
Then with all his men he attacked the villains, who thought that they were 
coming to  aid them as  had been promised, but they were mistaken.  The 
King's men killed more than eight hundred ofthem.
272 
The Chronique des  Quatres Premiers  Valois  account was more detailed,273  but 
other chroniclers  remarked  that  the  Jacques  were  tticked by the Navarrese.274 
What exactly happened was unclear: was Cale really beheaded?  What is clear is 
that  the  remissions  confim1  that  Clermont  was  a  substantial  defeat  for  the 
Jacques.  As  recorded elsewhere, one remission recorded that  'Guillaume Cale, 
calling himself captain of the Beauvoisin, and many others of his adherents and 
271  AN, JJ86, f.  127, no.  372. 
272  C17ron.  norm., p.  130, trans. Cohn, PP,  p.  164. 
m  Although its account of Cale's personal demise is brief (' [Navarre  1  beheaded the captain of 
the Jacques'), the description of  the battle gives tigures for the Jacques' force (four thousand 
troops and six hundred horsemen organised in three batal1ions), lists thirty-six nobles that took 
part in the battle, and details the nobles' movements on the tield.  Yet this is the only account that 
goes into such detail, and is wlitten some f0l1y years after the event - no contemporary chronicle 
offers any corroboration.  C17rol1.  premiers Valois,  p.  73-4, t1'.  Cohn, PP, p.  160-1. 
274 See for example Venette, Chrcm.,  v.  2, p. 265, trans. Birdsal1,  Venelle, p.  77:  "the king of 
Navarre summoned some of the unsuspecting peasant captains to him with smooth words and 
s1ewthem'. 
117 accomplices  were  executed  at  Clermont  thus  putting  an  end  to  their  mad 
enterplise,.275  The reference to execution apart, the remissions do  not mention 
betrayal by Navane.  Nonetheless, the crown considered Clermont to  mark the 
end of  Cale'  s participation. 
But did the Jacquelie continue even atler Clermont?  Sadly, the majority 
of remissions only give us  a very rough impression of time.  Events are most 
often recorded as  having vaguely taken place in the  'time of cOlmnotion  and 
tenor', specific dates are very rare.  Only occasionally does a remission specify a 
date,  but even these  dates  were approximations  (such  as  'around the feast  of 
Saint-Jolm the Baptist just passed,).276  The date is used mainly as  an indication 
of the  context  of the  event,  and  that  it  took  place  within the confines of the 
Jacquerie.  Only a few remissions are more specific; on the 3 June, the men of 
Rhuis attacked the nobles at Verberie, for example.
277  There is not much specific 
evidence to suggest that the majority of the revolt did not fall within the 'blazing 
fire of fifteen days'.  278 
Yet on occasion remissions hint that the revolt actually continued for a 
period considerably after the defeat and betrayal at Clennont. For instance, the 
men  of  Louveciennes  (YveIines),  with  'many  others'  who  were  'Jacques 
Bonhommes', attacked a house at Marly-en-Roy (Yvelines) on the Feast of the 
Magdalene, on the 22  July.279  Another document, concerning a castle destroyed 
by the non-nobles at Jouy-sous-Thelle (Oise), near Beauvais, mentioned that the 
'tenor began' against them around the 'feast of Saint Christopher', on 24 July.28C1 
m  See the section on Navarre in  Chapter 3, and AN, JJ86, [  208, no.  571. 
276 AN, JJ86, f.  76, no. 231,  reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 291-2. 
277 AN, JJ86, f.  256, no. 444, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 280-1. 
278 Leguai. 'Les revo ltes rura les', p. 58. 
279 AN, JJ86, f.  130, no.  380. 
2,0 AN, JJJ 00, f. 230. n. 478. 
118 Located in the heart of the lIe de France .as much as six weeks after the alleged 
'end' of the violence, these two  remissions suggest that the Jacquerie may not 
have been crushed in the shmi amount of time previously believed.  Yet, only 
these documents suggest an alternative timeline. 
What do  the remissions tell us  then about the revolt itself?  It covered a greater 
area than the historiography now suggests.  It may have continued later into the 
summer than historians now believe and longer than the chroniclers rep01ied it. 
Urban sites were far from instrumental in the revolt; instead, they were sites of 
confusion, where participation was never clear cut.  Only on two  occasions,  in 
Gien and Montdidier, did the town populace as a whole appear to have taken pari 
in  the  rebellion.  The  bulk  of examples  suggest  that  townsmen  were  often 
opposed and antagonistic towards the peasants.  Except from  the area between 
Paris  and  Meaux  which was  considered  part  of Marcel's revolt,  viliually the 
whole of the nmih of France was covered by  the insurgency.  Finally, Jacques 
were remarkably successful  when it  came  to  destroying propeliy and  military 
installations,  even against the  considerable obstacles  of attacking nobles,  who 
certainly possesed superior arn1S and experience. 
Thus, our conclusion contradicts the traditional picture of the Jacques as 
'unimp01iant'.  How could such a large-scale revolt which caused such damage 
be anything other than catastrophic?  If nothing else,  the swift collapse of the 
realm's defences  in  this  area  to  the English and the Navanese in  the months 
following the Jacquerie indicates that the French crown's military strength in this 
central region was weakened.  What repOlis we do have suggest that the property 
damaged alone may have exceded many of the ransoms due after Poi tiers.  The 
119 Jacquelie may have been blief, but its size and scale.brought severe problems for 
the Dauphin and the defence of the realm. 
RETALIATION 
The  roughness  of  the  repression  corresponded  with  the  ease  first 
encountered by the rebels.  Case after case could be examined.  Hangings, 
spectacular  beheadings  of  the  persons  most  deeply  involved,  even 
drawing and quartering, make up a dismal story.  Sanctions were founded 
often  enough  on  the  principle  of collective  responsibility;  penalties, 
whether physical or pecuniary, affected in an arbitrary fashion a whole 
group - or some elements of a group - which was presumed guilty, if not 
of the  deeds,  at  least of not  having prevented them.  Everything took 
place as if government wished to intimidate even more than punish.:>81 
Mollat and Wolff  s charactelisation of the inevitable failure of medieval popular 
violence  and  resulting repression by vengeful  authorities  concurs  with Emile 
Zola's vision of the end ofajacquelie: 'the same exasperation bursts forth  '"  in 
which state they remain until death'  .282  Historians like Guy Fourquin presumed 
that  all  medieval  revolts  ended in  this  kind  of bloody  defeat.
2S3  As  for  the 
Jacquelie,  R.-H.  Bautier  devotes  more  sentences  to  the  "butchery'  of the 
repression than the rebellion.
284  It was also assumed that this failure came at the 
hands of an authority or 'state' which wished to  inflict terror arbitrarily on the 
lower orders, rather than resolve the situation judicially. 
Repressive measures are enacted by authOlities  for  two  reasons.  First, 
repression  perfonned  a  retaliatory  function,  enabling  the  transgressors  to  be 
punished for  their involvement.  Second,  looking forward,  repression could be 
2,1  Mollat and Wo1ft~ Popular Revollltions, p. 310. 
232  Zola, The Earth, trans. Pallnec, p.  91. 
28.1  Fourquin, Anatomy of  Popular Rebe11iol1,  p.  25, 'cven in  thesc closing ycars of the fOUlieenth 
century ... rcvolt led only to rcpression and not to rcvolution'. 
234  Bautier, The Economic Development Cif Medieval Europe, p. 231. 
120 intended  to  prevent  future  revolts,  by indicating the  kind  of response  future 
rebels might expect.  Both of these have  been traditionally considered to  be 
effective,  even in the case of medieval revolts;  for  example,  E.  Kiser and A. 
Linton suggested that the repression of English Peasants' Revolt quelled popular 
h  78'i  I' I'  .  bl  b  7R6  B  protest over t  e next century,- .  a c aIm t lat IS  questlOna  e at  est. - ecause 
repression was considered to produce positive results for central government, it 
was  presumed  that  retaliation  would  always  be  carried  out  by  the  'state'. 
However, in recent studies the power of the retaliation has been challenged, and 
with  it  the  notion  that  states  automatically  represses  their  subj ects  after  a 
disturbance?87  This is  not a modern phenomenon: in fact,  there are numerous 
examples from the medieval period.  Even in Paris, the French crown showed in 
1382  it was  willing to  forgive  its  subjects  without much bloodshed:  after the 
revolt  of the Hammer men,  the crown pardoned all  but  seven of the  citizens 
involved, but even  this proved too harsh and the agreement to  pay their taxes 
2S5  Kiser and Linton's generalisation is based on work done on popular revolt in Guyenne, which 
they conclude by saying was deeply affected by the repression of Le Fronde of 1648-53.  Yet, 
although they declare this to be a qualitative survey, their results are not backed up by an 
adequate sample.  They are only concerned with twelve rcvolts between ISIS and 1789: for 
example, statements like'  Prior to the Fronde, tax increases tended to generate revolt, after the 
Fronde, they rarely did' are based on seven revolts between ISIS and 1645 and four revolts 
between 1652 and 1789.  The ascription of whatever changes may have occurred (and within a 
sample of  only twelve it is doubtful that these can be accurately tracked) to the repression of one 
revolt alone disrcgards a ccntury-and-a-half of social change that may also have brought pressure 
on revolt.  Moreover, the concept that the repression after Le Fronde, howcver bloody, \vould 
have affected at all several generations distant to the original rebels cannot be taken for granted. 
E.  Kiser and A.  Linton, 'The Hinges of History: State-Making and Revolt in Early Modern 
France', American Sociological Review, 67, n. 6 (Dec, 2002), pp. 889-910. 
2,6 There are great rebellions after 1381, and there are minor ±1are-ups in the years after 1381; 
Thomas Walsingham reported a conspiracy in September 1382 in Norwich, and an aboliive rising 
in Kent in  1390 for example.  See The Peasants' Revolt of  1381, cd. R.B. Dobson (London, 1991) 
pp. 334-335. 
20i Repression docs not necessarily result in a reduction in the level of  popular political protest. 
Sociologists and political scicntists concur that repression of  rcvolts can lead to a variety of 
responses from participants, including an unwillingness to participate in the future, but also an 
increased belief in the necessity of violence for future rebels to achieve their goals as well as 
radicalising the populace that had previously been uninvolved.  Whatever tangible effects 
repression has. and whatever cOlTelation there might be types ofrepression and its effects on 
popular violence seems impossible to spot.  For example, Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl 
describe "disparatc effects of  repression ...  [that] sometimes deters and sometimes radicalises the 
paJiicipants of political protests.  K.-D. Opp and W.  Rochl, "Repression, micromobilization, and 
political protest', Social Forces, 69, n.  2 (Dec, 1990), p.  523. 
121 immediately broke down.
288  Indeed,  only two  years before the Jacquerie,  the 
Count of AIl11agnac  (and by extension, the French crown) discussed concessions 
with rebels, not punishing them, when the people of Toulouse rose to  dispute a 
new tax.
289  In the negotiations that followed,  in retu111  for safe passage for the 
Count, it was declared that no new tax would be levied and the inhabitants would 
not be punished for their actions. 
The conception of  repression by the 'state' in the Middle Ages is strongly 
influenced  by  an  acceptance  of the  preponderance  of violence  in  medieval 
society,  specifically Huizinga's depiction of the  'Violent Tenor of Life'  .290  In 
Pieter Spierenburg's study of the development of repression, he theorised that 
repressive forces were very rarely punished for taking action against those who 
attacked them: 
we note an acceptance of  f01111S  of private violence and the predominance 
of a  reconciliatory  stand  instead of serious  punislunent  ...  in  such  a 
climate  of acceptance  of violence  no  particular  sensitivity  prevailed 
towards the suffering of its convicts.
291 
Thus,  a  lack  of proper  social  institutions,  like  an  accepted  criminal  justice 
system, promoted vengeance and violence that was ultimately sanctioned by the 
authorities.
292  Lacking  effective  and  accepted  mechanisms  of state  control, 
medieval  society  tolerated  private  violence  by  victims  against  those  who 
2SS  Cohn, LUSI for Liber/y, p.  153. 
2SQ  ibid., p.  152. 
290  J.  Huizinga, The  Wallillg oflhe Middle Ages, trans. F.  Hopman (Hannondsw011h: Penguin, 
1972). 
291  P. Spierenburg, The Speclacle of  Suffering, ExeCliliol1s and Ihe Evolulion of  Repression: From 
A Pre-industrial lVlelropolis 10  Ihe European Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), pp. 7-8. 
292  In other cases, 8  lack of solid institutions has been linked to an increase in what we might call 
chaotic violence, particularly in the case of  the medieval Inquisition; R.  Kieckhefer argues that 
'in certain contexts complex institutions can serve as checks upon the arbitrary will of 
individuals'.  Yet Kieckhefer stresses that we should not consider medieval retaliation to be any 
more chaotic than its modern counterp81i: 'forms of  repression ... have become more common 
which are far more brutal and systematic than their medieval countei']Jarts·.  R. Kieckhefer, 
Repression ofHere.lJ' inlVJedieval Germany (LivellJool: Livel']Jool University Press, 1979). p. 
112, p. ix. 
122 committed  cnmes  against  them,  and  retaliation  went  unpunished.  In  these 
models,  the  society  of the  Middle  Ages  actively  encouraged  repression  and 
private violence. 
However,  Sam  Colm  has  shown  that  this  vision  of the  failure  of the 
medieval uprising and its inevitable bloody repression was not representative of 
the actual results  of rebellion in this  period.  Not only were revolts frequently 
successful, but even failure  did not necessarily result in bloody recriminations: 
'[i]n 70 percent of cases found in chronicles (726 of 1012), either the chronicler 
did not mention any repression or the rebels won their demands'.293 
Of course, in the case of the Jacques, the chroniclers and contemporaries 
do  mention repression.  Even Etienne Marcel noted the extreme reaction of the 
nobility, and the excessive bloodshed of the retaliation, in a letter written to  the 
towns of  Pi cardy and Flanders: 
The gentlemen of the Beauvaisis and the Vexin assembled and destroyed 
and pillaged all the country of the Beauvaisis.  Under the excuse of the 
deeds done in the Beauvaisis, the nobles in many and diverse places held 
large assemblies and raided many places in the region on this side of the 
Somme and the River Oise.  They overwhelmed those who had nothing to 
do  with these deeds in the Beauvaisis, who were guiltless and innocent, 
invading,  robbing,  sacking,  burning,  killing  and  destroying  all  the 
.  h  d'  d  f  d  "94  '  country, Just as t  eyare  omg  aya ter  ay.-
The chroniclers echoed Marcel's words, and their description of the repression is 
often  clearer than descriptions  of the  revolt  itself.  Jean  Froissmi  described a 
scene of carnage as the nobles at Meaux exacted a bloody revenge on both the 
townsmen who attacked them and the peasants in the neighbouring countryside: 
When these wicked people saw' them so well-ordered and that they were 
not such a great number to  face  them,  they were no  longer so  bold as 
before  ... Thus, those [Jacques] in front,  now feeling the blows they had 
293  Cohn, Llistfor Liherty, p.152. 
294  Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Picardy and Flanders, in Oeuvres de Froissart 
ed. de Lettenhove, (Brussells, 1868), VI, pp. 470-1, trans. Cohn, PP,  pp.  177-8. 
123 dreaded, retreated in hOlTor, all at once, one falling on top of the other ... 
Thus all sorts of men-at-anns then came out of the balTicades and quickly 
won over the square, striking down these wicked people.  And they beat 
them senseless, butchering them like animals  '"  And the gentlemen had 
killed so many they became completely exhausted and worn out.  They 
dumped the bodies in heaps into the river Marne.
295 
Froissart's expression of  joy at the destruction of the wicked Jacques was not the 
only opinion on the issue given by the chroniclers.  If  the exceptional violence of 
the Jacquerie was demonstrated by descriptions of behaviour towards  women, 
then many chroniclers  descriptions of the repression indicated that the  nobles' 
violence too was exceptional.  By highlighting these extremes, they considered it 
both unnecessary and also  dispropoliionate in its nature.  Jean de  Venette,  for 
example, records: 
OvelTunning many country villages,  they set most  of them on  fire  and 
slew miserably all the peasants, not merely those whom they believed to 
have  done  them  harm,  but all  they  found,  whether in  their houses  or 
digging in the vineyards or in the fields.  Verberie, La Croix-Saint-Ouen 
near Compiegne, Ressons, and many other country towns lying in open 
fields  which  I  have  not  seen  and  do  not  note  here,  mourned  their 
d  .  b  fi  )96  estructlOn  y  lre.-
Others conculTed. La Clzronique normande du XIVe siecle hinted that the nobles 
not  only wrought destruction but also  made a hefty profit off their retaliatory 
attacks:  'they burned everything in many places, killing and hunting down the 
people and calTying off their wealth, of which much was to be had,.:m 
Moreover,  when compared to  their often scant  coverage of the  rebels' 
actions,  the chronicles reported detailed infonnation concerning the retaliation. 
In the passage above, Jean de Venette gives a clear indication of some villages 
attacked,  while  he  only  mentions  one target  as  representative  of the  Jacques' 
295  Froissart, Clzrol1.,  v.  5, pp.  105-6, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  156-7. 
296  Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 264, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 77. 
297  Chrol7.  norm., p.  133, trans. Cohn, pp, p.  165. 
124 rampage.
298  The Chronique des  Quatre Premiers  Valois  describes the battle at 
Clennont where the Jacques were defeated, as well as the resulting retaliation by 
Charles of Navarre and  a collection of nobles from Amiens and Bray.299  The 
chronicles' sympathies naturally lay with the nobility, and the exploits of nobles 
and their retaliatory attacks would have been easier to compile than the uprising 
of faceless  peasants.  Yet  there  was  obviously  something  appealing  about 
including these tales. 
This  large  amount of detail  does  not mean that  the chronicle accounts  always 
concurred.  When looked  at  together,  the  repOlis  of the  regent's location  are 
confusing.  La  Chronique nonnande du XIVe si(xle placed him in Compiegne, 
assembling knights and nobles for the attack on Meaux, whereas La Chronique 
des  d:gnes  de  Jean 11 et Charles  V described him as  heading first for la Ferte-
Milon, then back towards Paris.
30o  Almost every chronicle suggests a different 
noble  whose  role  in  the  defeat of the  Jacques  was  paIiicularly impOliant;  for 
example,  Jean  de  Venette  mentions  the  Count  of Montdidier,  whereas  the 
Chronique des  Quatres Premiers Valois  focusses  on the Count of Roucy.  The 
only two accounts that agree are unsurprisingly Jean Ie Bel and FroissaIi, whose 
account was based on Ie Bel's chronicle.  No other source gives a prominent role 
to  the Lord of Coucy, and each chronicler details their own particular counter-
offensive,  and  it  is  \vorth  noting that  the  Count  of Foix  was  Jean Froissart's 
298 Jean de Venette mentions the castle of Enllenonvillc because it was 'then the strongest in 
France', rather than to give any sense of the geography of the revolt as he did with his description 
of  the retaliation.  Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 265, trans. Birdsall, Venetie, p.  77. 
299 ClIron premiers Valois, p.  73-4, tr.  Cohn, PP, p.  161-2. 
300  ClIron.  des regnes. v.l, p.  186, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  169. 
125 personal hero.
301  This table indicates the major acts of vengeance committed by 
nobles against the peasants as recorded by the chroniclers:
302 
Table IX. Retaliatory attacks listed by the chroniclers. 
LEADER  CHRONICLE  DEPARTED  ATTACKED  SIZE OF 
FROM  FORCE 
Lord of Couey.  Jean Ie Bel  Couey-Ie-Chateau  'all around'  'great many 
Enguerrand VI  Jean Froissart  (Aisne)  nobles' 
Count of Foix  Jean le Bel  Meaux  Area around 
Jean Froissart  Meau.x 
'Troop of  Chrol1iques des  Amiens, Bray  Poix, Roye,  1000 
gentlemen  ,3(1.'  Quatres  Gerberoy,  swordsmen. 
Premiers Valois  Gaillefontaines  90 
(Somme)  archers
304 
Robert, Count of  Chrol1iques des  Roucy (Aisne)  Brie 
Rouey  Quatres 
Premiers Valois 
Charles of  Navarre  La Chroniqlle de  Clermont?  Beauvaisis. 
regl1es de Jean II  Verberie, La 
ei Charles  V,  Croix-Saint-Ouen 
Jean de  Venette  near Compiegne, 
Ressons (Oise) 
The Regent  La Chroniqlle de  Meaux  Chateau-Thierry, 
reglles de Jean 11  la  Ferle-Millon 
et Charles V  and the 
surrounding area 
(Aisne) 
Count of Saint-Pol.  Jean de Venette  Montdidier  Verb erie, La 
Montdidier  Croix-Saint-Ouen 
near Compiegne, 
Ressons (Oise) 
Like the chronicle accounts of the initial revolt, the focus falls firmly on the lIe 
de France.  Again, this is the area that has been recognised as the heal1land of 
301  This was discussed in 'The Attack on the Marchc', 
302 This definition is not always clear-cut.  For example, Mahieu Raoul de Couey's defence of the 
castle ofle Plassie, as detailed by La Chronique Normande, is not included because it is unclear 
whether the violence continued after the end of  the battle instigated by the Jacques,  On the other 
hand, the 'troop of gentlemen' described by La Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois is 
included despite the facl they attacked a 'troop of  Jacques' for two reasons: first, this is noted as 
being after the point that 'the Jacques had been defeated', and that the spectacle of 'buming at 
least three hundred' sounds more like retaliatory violence than the result ofa military 
engagement. 
303-The chronicle lists' Le Baudrain de la Heuse, Monsignor Guillaume Martel, Monsignor Jehan 
Sonnain, Monsignore khan Ie Bigot and the chief officers of Caux',  After Poix, they were joined 
by 'the monsignor de Beausant. monsignor the castellan of  Beauvais, [and] monsignor de 
Boulainvilliers', 
304 The initial force was listed by the chronicler as 300 swordsmen, but after Poix the three 
monsignors added 700 swordsmen and 90 archers to the force, 
126 the Jacquerie by later historians.  The chroniclers were chiefly concerned with 
the violence taking place in the region around Paris.  When the chroniclers noted 
a place from which the retaliation started, it is marked in red; when they noted a 
target of the retaliation, it is marked in blue:
305 
Map VII. The repression as detailed by the chroniclers  . 
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The  repreSSIOn  took  many  forms.  For  example,  after  the  attack  on 
Meaux, if we can trust the chroniclers, two noble offensives took place. First, the 
localised and bloody burning of the region by the Count of Foix that caught the 
chroniclers' eyes.  Secondly, the regent rode out with a force fifty kilometres to 
305 This map is to a scale of I / 900,000. 
127 the East to  the area around Chateau-Thierry.  Localised repression existed, like 
that c0l1U11itted by the Count of Roucy around his lands, but so  did great armed 
campaigns across the countryside by groups of nobles.  The force that depmied 
from Amiens originally headed west to Bray, before turning back east and then 
south into the lIe de France itself: for example.  Of course, localised repression 
could have resulted in as many casualties as large movements. 
There is little doubt that the retaliation was bloody and widespread, and 
many historians have been content to record this as the complete explanation of 
the violence.  Yet these chronicle accounts do not answer all the questions.  What 
happened outside the  lle de  France?  Did the repression end tension,  or create 
more?  Social historians have challenged the assumption that retaliation quashes 
violence rather than encourages other actions.  Who actually were these nobles? 
Were they acting with the support of  the regent? 
The chronicles are not our only accounts of the retaliation.  The crown did not 
only pardon rebels, but also errant nobles for the excesses they committed in the 
wake of the initial revolt.  Moreover, some peasants were also pardoned for acts 
they committed under the pressure of assault,  and gave details  regarding their 
assailants.  The  remissions  record  previously  unknown  counter-offensives 
against  the  rural  and urban rebels.
306  The  remissions  are  a  valuable  tool  for 
tracking  the  activities  of the  forces  that  put  down  the  rebellion.  This  table 
represents the remissions that suggested large-scale chevauchees of  nobles, rather 
than instances of private violence: 
306 Charles of Navarre's offensive against the rebels was not mentioned in any remissions for the 
Navarrese, but only mentioned in the narratives of remissions for the Jacques,  The remission of 
Jehan Bernier, who later refused a commission to serve under Navarre, mentions the damage 
done by the Navarrese to the countryside, as does the remission for the people of Mello, see AN, 
.1.186, f.  133, no. 387 and JJ86, f.  102, no. 309 respectively. 
128 Table X. Retaliatory attacks listed by the remissions. 
JJ  Nobles from  ...  Description of  Attack  .... 
Assailants 
86,  142  Sa int-Dizier,  'Our good lord and  Peliois, lowlands of 
Graney  fliend', Nobles  Champagne 
86,309  Mello  Nobles, Navarre's  Mello 
troops 
86,356  Unclear  Nobles  Soissons 
86,365  Compiegne  'Nobles, Officers of  J  aux, trying to cross 
the crown and  the.1iver Oise 
citizens of 
Compiegne 
86,380  Loivre, at Reims  Nobles  Villages around Brie 
86,420  Meaux  Brigands  Montlhery 
86,421  Unclear  Nobles  Senlis
jUI 
86,578  Saint-Dizier, Saint- Nobles  Saint-Lumier 
Vrain 
90, 292  Saint-Dizier  Nobles  Favresse 
90,444  Brie  Brigands  La-Celle in Blie 
91,333  Lagny  Nobles  Bordellis, Vaires 
108,60  Beauvaisis,  Nobles, Robeli of  Herelle, Villers-aux-
Fouencamps  Rogois  Erables 
115,297  Seven leagues  Knights  Gien 
outside Gien 
The striking contrast with the chroniclers is again that of the geography: as with 
the rebellion itself, the remissions highlight a great diversity of action occuning 
outside the lIe de France.  Whereas the chronicles concentrated on the 'supposed' 
hemiland of the revolt, the remissions indicate that the repression spread across 
the  nOlih  of France.  The  heartland  is  still  well  represented,  but  there  were 
numerous  centres  that the  repression spread from,  especially to  the  south and 
east.  The map belows adds information from the remissions: when they indicate 
a centre from  which retaliation spread, the location is  marked in  green; targets 
30~  are marked orange. 
307 Several remissions mention the attack on Senlis, but only this one details the actual attack by 
the nobles. 
103  The scale of this map is 1/1,900,000. 
129 Map VIII. The repression as detailed by the chroniclers and remissions  . 
· '1  , 
• ',jI.,' 
'"':.  llf '  ,/  ,+ 
: ~' U. C rO' A ' 
/  $t  OU>.: " 
f 
i Vcl !.:-f-,c 
.....  ,1-: 
Of all the counter-insurgency movements, the most powerful originated 
from Saint-Dizier.  While the chronicles place the centre of the nobles' counter-
offensive in the ile de  France, the remissions make numerous mentions of the 
damage caused by the lord of Saint-Dizier and his push west; for this, he and the 
lord of Grancy were pardoned in early 1358: 
At the supplication of our friends and loyal knights and advisors, Eudes, 
lord of Grancy, Jean, lord of Saint Dizier and of Vignorry  ... to oppose 
and resist the disloyal and hateful companies and disorderly wishes of the 
people of the country of Perthois and the lowland parts of Champagne, 
who had imprisoned, conspired against and ordered executions of  the said 
lords  of Grancy  and  Saint-Dizier  and  those  other nobles  of the  land, 
together with  their  wives  and  children,  and  for  making false  and bad 
remarks ... [and also] had assembled with weapons with the sound of the 
bells of the  countryside ... The said supplicants and many other nobles 
and non- nobles had then assembled, both in arms and on horses as well, 
and used their royal office, setting fires in the houses and in these villages 
(villes),  communities  and  the  countryside,  and  they took,  pillaged and 
scattered many of their goods of the said communities, along with many 
goods  belonging  to  the  nobles  and  non-nobles  not  guilty  and  not 
implicated with these said communities through ignorance. They cut off 
the heads of several of those responsible, and also executed others ... In 
consideration of the said acts of  the said communities and the countryside 
and others  who had acted against the said nobles  .,'  we wish to  remit, 
130 quit and pardon the said seigneurs of Grancy and of Saint-Dizier and with 
all  the  other  nobles  and  non  nobles,  their  consOlis,  accomplices  and 
aides.
309 
According to the remissions, the Lord of Saint-Dizier appears as the main force 
in the  retaliation against the Jacques.  For example,  the men of Saint-Lumier 
(Marne) had fOlmed together to protect themselves against Saint Dizier: 
Let it be known to  all  those present and future  that we have heard the 
supplication of the inhabitants of Saint-Lumier in the Champagne ... The 
said  supplicants  had  for  many  acts  assembled,  armed  and  made 
conspiracies  together there to guard and defend against any nobles and 
any others of the land and others [as  well]  and also against the annies of 
Champagne ... especially against our loyal friend the lord of Saint Dizier 
queux of France and other nobles  of the  said land  and in  the  town of 
Saint-Verain.
3IO 
The charge by Saint-Dizier's men also could enrage passions.  The remission for 
Jean Favresse, leader of villagers around Favresse (Marne), states: 
the  lord  of Saint-Dizier with  a  great  number of soldiers  rode  towards 
Vitry in Perthois,  This greatly enraged the people of the region.  In many 
villages, they rang their bells and assembled to attack this lord of Saint-
Dizier, feming that he wished to hann them.
311 
While  these  two  extracts  do  not  mention  the  damage  done  by  the  counter 
movement,  the news of the repression travelled very fast,  and created enough 
fear that villages assembled in defence against Saint-Dizier's repression.  Saint-
Dizier was situated in the eastern extreme of the region affected by the Jacquerie, 
and  the  details  of this  push  westward  suggest  as  much  destruction  as  the 
chroniclers  desclibed  around  the  ile  de  France.  Of course,  the  number  of 
309  AN, .1J86, f.  49, no.  142, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 247-8 . 
.  '10 'Savoir faisons a  tous presenz et a  venir que nous oye la supplication des habitans de la ville 
de Saint Lumier en Ch81npaigne ....  iceulx supplicants se soient par plusiers fois assemblez 
am1ez et fair conspiracies ensemble deulx garder et deffendre contre aucuns nobles et aucuns 
autres du pais et d'ail1eurs et aussi annez aus champaigne .. , especialement contre nostre ame et 
fealle scigneur de Saint Dizier queux de France et aucuns auu'es nobles et auUTs du dit pais cn la 
ville de Saint-Verain', AN, 1J86, f  210, no. 578. 
311  AN, JJ90, f.  149, no. 292, reprinted in  Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 293-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  190-
191. 
131 remissions does not necessarily cOlTelate with the impOliance of any given event, 
but the excesses committed by St.  Dizier's forces were considered impOliant by 
the crowd, and were feared by the peasants. 
As described above, fear of  the nobles' attacks could cause peasants to act. In the 
village of Jaux (Oise), news that the nobles, officers of the crown and the people 
of Compiegne  were  coming  forced  the  habitants,  and  their  captain  Jehan  Ie 
Grant, into action: 
Since the  said commotions,  at  the  time when the nobles  raided,  along 
with our officers and many others of the town (ville) of Compiegne came 
to the bank of the river Oise at the forest of Compiegne and they wished 
to  cross over the said river to the said village (vi1le)  of J  aux on the other 
bank where this Jehan was.  He had said to  them that he would go  to 
bring the boat that was set up for crossing, (but) the said Jehan feared that 
they were accompanied by nobles and thus refused to  bring the boat, and 
then many habitants from  the  said  village  (ville)  of Jaux appeared and 
fired  (alTows)  again at those who wished to  pass,  without wounding or 
hanl1ing them in any manner ... And for  this these nobles and officers 
have had and demonstrated hate and ill feelings to the said Jehan for these 
'd  ,]7  ~  Sal  causes ...  - -
The nobles' chevauchee should not be read as the end of rebellion, but rather the 
beginning of new nalTatives.  In this example, the villagers of Jaux attacked the 
men  of Compiegne because they  thought  they were  aiding  the  nobles.  The 
retaliation marked the continuation of old battles stalied by the Jacques, as well 
as new feuds stalied during the repression. 
;12 'et depuis Jes dictes commocions ou temps qui les nobles chevauchoient et aucuns officers de 
mons seigneur de nous et pJusiers autrcs de Ja ville de Compaigne feussent a Jez sur Ja Riviere 
d'Oise du  coste divers Ja  forest de compaigne et eussent vouJu passer ouJtre Ja  dicte riviere en Ja 
dicte ville de .laux qui est de rautre coste divers dicelle ou estoit Jors le dit Jehan au qu'iJ dirent 
qu'il  leur amenost ou Feist amener Ja nacelle qui Ja estoit ordene pour passer Ie quel khan 
doubtans qu'il ne feussent accompaignez de nobles leur reffusa du toute amener Ja  dicte nacelle et 
lors plusiers habitans de Ja  dicte ville de Jaux se avanturent et retraierunt ayceuJx qui vouloient 
passer sans ce qui aucuns d'iceulx sussent bJaciez ou naures en aucune maniere du elit trait ... Et 
pour ce que les cliz nobles ou otTicers poun-oient avoir et pOlier haine et malivolence au elit khan 
pour les causes dessus dictes ... ' AN, JJ86, f.  123, no.  362. 
132 It is worth noting too that that the peasants did not passively receive their 
punishment.  While the chronicles and the  remissions agree that the bloodshed 
was mostly on the part of the nobility, these examples of  peasants taking up arms 
against  the  noble  contingent  shows  that  they  still  rose  up  even  after  the 
repressIOn.  Resistance to  the nobles'  retaliation was  not the  only example of 
peasants  organising in  defence against attack in  the  wake of the revolt in the 
region, a topic which we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 6.  For example, 
in  1359,  at  Longueil-Saint-Marie (Oise),  near Compiegne,  Guillaume l'  Aloue 
rallied 300 local peasants against the English cavalry, later in the year, the men 
of Chiitres fortified their church unsuccesfully against the same foe,  and then in 
1360, in Thouri-en-Beauce,  peasants again organised against English troops.313 
The remission that recorded the most damage caused in the retaliation was issued 
to  a number of communities pardoned for defending themselves from attack by 
the nobles in the region of Reims.  Their campaign seems to  have been a long, 
drawn-out offensive against the region's communities: 
Let  it  be known  to  all  present  and  future  that  the  inhabitants  of the 
villages  (villes)  of Marne de  Saint Thien-y,  that is  to  say Saint Thien-y, 
Thil, Merly le Grant and Ie  Petit, Pouillon, Villers-Sainte-Alme, Chenai, 
Chalon sur Veslee and of Villers-Franqueux have humbly begged us  [for 
grace]  ...  News  reached  the  said  habitants  and  many other  villages 
(villes)  that  the  said  nobles  were  trying  once  again  pillage  the  said 
countryside ... The said nobles were at Loivre near Rein1Z,  and had come 
to  assault many of the  said habitants  and were shouting  'Death to  the 
rustics!', and it was said they had executed fifty or more of them ...  [The 
nobles]  worked  and  strove  day  after  day,  raiding  these  said  villages 
(l'illes)  and  attacking  them  continually  these  said  villages  (villes), 
executing and ten-ifying men and workhorses and putting towns and men 
, 14  to ransom.' 
313  These will be discussed in more detail in  -Peasant Resistance', Chapter VI. 
314 'Savoir faisons il tous presenz et il venir que a nous ont fait humblemcnt supplier les habitants 
des villcs de la Marne dc Saint ThieITY c'est assavoient de Saint ThieITY, Thil, Merly Ie Grant et 
Ie Petit, Pouillon, Villers-Sainte-Anne, Chcnai, Chalon sur Veslee et de Villers-Franqueux ... Et 
pour ce que aus diz habit;.lns et a plusiers autres villes fut rappOlie que les dis nobles refforcerent 
133 The execution of these villagers was represented as  exceptional.  Although this 
remission  highlights  the  violence  of these  repressive  attacks,  not  least  the 
likelihood of mass executions, it also indicates several other types of oppression 
that  the  nobles  inflicted  on  the  peasantry:  destruction  and  theft  of property, 
ransoming of both towns and individuals, and arson.  Certainly in the eyes of the 
villagers making the appeal, the repression by the nobles was just as  bloody as 
anything that went before it. 
The nobles' focus  does fall mostly on the peasants, but urban dwellers were not 
safe from the counter-offensive.  According to  the chroniclers, the city of Senlis 
,vas the scene of much violence at  the end of the Jacquerie.  According to  the 
Clzronique des Quatres Premiers Valois: 
I am told that after the defeat of the Jacques, a troop of gentleman sought 
to  take the city of Senlis, took one of its  gates, and entered inside.  But 
the townsmen fought them with such force that they poured boiling water 
on top  of the  gentlemen.  The  fittest  and  best  equipped  of the  town 
courageously met them with carts, which they rolled onto the gentlemen 
with such force and power that they were chased out of town.
315 
The attack on the town, by the same forces who attacked the rebels, resulted in 
more deaths for both nobles and inhabitants.  We find a similar emphasis within 
the remissions - the assault on Senlis was the cause of  confusion and violence: 
Let  it  be  known  to  all  present  and  future  that  we  have  heard  the 
supplication of Jehan  Charnel,  which  contends  that,  on  the  day  of the 
Benediction (3  June)  that has just passed, during the time of the terror, 
commotions, rebellions and assemblies the men of the plat pays had held 
against the nobles  of the  realms,  many gentleman had made efforts  to 
de pil1ier ou dit pais ... D'iceulx nobles les quiex estoient it LoivTe devant Reimz et lors iceulx 
nobles feussent vcnuz assailir plusiers des diz habitans en crient a la mort au villains ct la en 
eussent mis a mortjusques au nombre de cinquante et plus ... [les nobles] se soient depuis 
efforeies et s' efforcent cn de jour en jour de ehevauehier et chevauchent eontinuellment es dictes 
villes de lllettre it lllOIi et peurs gens et chevaux de hurnous et autres Ii raneonncr villcs et gens.' 
AN, 1186, f.  130, no.  380. 
315  Chron. premiers Valois, pp. 76-7, tr. Cohn, PP, p.  162. 
134 enter into the town (1,ille)  of Senlis and to take it, and because. of this they 
declared  in  the  said  town  (ville)  that  all  those  gentlemen  that  [the 
townsmen] had in their houses must be sent and forced out.  Because of 
this  said declaration  someone who  lived  in  the  said  town  (ville),  who 
hosted in his house the lord of HardencoUli and two of his squires, one of 
whom was named Jehan des Prez, sent out the said knight and his squires 
from  the said house;  the said squires,  we do  not know for what cause, 
then killed the said knight, for which reason the cry  of 'Ho, murder!' was 
raised  against  these  squires.  Because  of that  and  this  cry  there  then 
assembled a great number of habitants of the said town (ville) of Senlis, 
and the said .Tehan  de  Prez was executed by this said assembly of which 
the said supplicant was  part.  We have quitted, remitted and pardoned 
[them], and especially the said habitants of the town (ville) of Senlis ...  316 
The noble  offensive against urban settlements could be just as  troublesome as 
those against the peasants.  The tale may well be fictitious:  there is  no way of 
knowing who exactly killed the master,  and whether Jehan Charue! really was 
attempting to  avenge the noble's death.  This remission,  however,  records the 
confusion  that  resulted  from  these  nobles'  revenge.  First,  the  inhabitants  of 
Senlis had lived with nobles in their midst throughout the Jacquerie, yet it is the 
the  repression  that  causes  civil  strife  between  townsman  and  their  betters. 
Second, in these towns, where the line between lord and servant were less clear, 
the  borders  became  blurFed  between  aggressor  and  defender.  The  Lord  of 
Hardencourt and his squire were not the only high profile casualties:  Henri  de 
Murat was killed in the assault, and his property was given to one of the nobles 
316 'Savoir faisons it tous presenz et a venir que, si comme avons veu par Ia supplicacion khan 
Charuel, contenant que, comme Ie jour dc Ia Bcnediction derrainement passee, pour Ie temps que 
Ies etrroiz, commocions, rebellions et assemblees estoient des genz du plat pais contre Ies nobles 
du royaume, plusieurs gentilz hommes se feussent efforciez d'entrer en Ia  ville de Senlis et 
prendre ycelle, et pour ce fu Iors crie en Ia dicte ville que tous ceuIx qui aroient gentilz hommes 
enIeurs maissons Ies meissent et boutassent 11Ors, pour Ie que! cry un hoste ou habitant de Ia dicte 
ville, qui avoit en sa maison herbergiez ou hostellez Ies seigneur de Hardencourt et deux de ses 
escuicrs, dont run estoit appellc lehan des Prez, mist et bouta hors de sa maison Ies dessus diz 
chevalier et escuiers, Ies queh escuiers, ren ne seet pour quelle cause, tuerent tantost Ies dit 
chevalier, pour la quelle cause ren cria 10rs sur yceulx escuiers 'Haro, Ie mUlire!' au quel eri et 
pour Ie quel fait s'asembIerent grant foison des habitanz de la diete ville de Senliz, par les quelx 
Ie dit lehan des Prcz fu mis a mOli, en la quelle assemblce et fait feri Ie dit suppliant.  Et eomme 
nous, depuis que nous venismes derrainement en nostre bonne ville de Paris, aiens quittc, remis et 
pardonne, et espeeialement aus habitans de Ia ville de Senlis dessuz dictes..:, AN, 1186, f.  147, 
no. 421. 
135 involved.
317  In Soissons, there were two more casualties in the nobles' counter-
offensive.
318  The attacks by the nobles upon urban areas supposedly favourable 
to  the  Jacques  were  more  problematic  for  the  crown  than  the  conflicts  with 
villages, and the blurring of lines is clear in these remissions:  the nobles killed 
other well-heeled individuals, not faceless peasants. 
There  were  other  assemblies  of nobles  from  which  the  counter-offensive 
originated.  In  the  remission  for  Jean  Bonilis,  nobles  were  reported  to  have 
gathered  together  at  Lagny  (Seine-et-Marne).  Along  with  general  misdeeds 
towards the men of the countryside, Jean's paliy were accused of three specific 
crimes:  the murder of a man in Bordeaux  (Seine-et-Marne),  the burning of a 
house in Tromi, and the rape of a woman named Tassone in Vaires near Lagny. 
The nobles were pardoned,  yet  four years  after the  fact,  specific crimes were 
mentioned.  The crown obviously considered that these four specific allegations 
required inclusion within the remission nan·ative.  The authorities did not forget 
the acts of the nobles quickly. 
Vengeance  was  not  just  carried  out  by  lords:  two  remissions  detail  how 
employees  of the crown had been involved in violent transgressions.  On two 
occasions,  it is  bligands, acting in the employ of the crown to  guard the areas 
which it could not itself guard, who brought vengeance across the countryside: 
For the paliy of Regnier de Sala,  Philip de Florencia, Nicholas Becque, 
John  de  Navare  and  many  other  brigands,  on  horse  and  on  foot, 
galTisoned  at  Cella  in  Brie,  set  forth  from  their  position,  where,  by 
themselves, from the tenth day of September in the year 1358 up until to 
the present, they were able to serve our said lord and in the present wars 
mAN, JJ86, f  56, 110.  171. 
3J8 AN, JJ86, f  120,110.352 and f.  121, no.  356. 
136 against enemies on behalf the said King, and especially in stabilizing and 
holding the said place and in the place Crecy in Brie.  In that place and 
other  said  neighbouring  places  they  patrolled,  for  protecting  and 
defending  the  said  location  and  the  inhabitants  there,  day  and  night, 
frequently  against  many  and  diverse  dangerous  opponents,  and  they 
vanquished the said hostile enemies, and killing and wounding the said 
enemies ... And dming the said time the brigands did not have sufficient 
provisions and other necessary things,  and those nearby failed to  make 
their payments, [so they took] more goods, provisions, gannents, animals, 
horses  and  captured  other  goods  of our  subjects,  and  applied  their 
propeliy to their own uses, against the will of the persons who previously 
had  the  goods  and  indeed  the  many  said  subjects.  And  they  often 
accidentally wounded or killed men, and they raped women against their 
will,  and  committed  many  other  crimes,  degradations,  bad  acts, 
oppressions,  and  burdens  ...  unduly  and  unjustly  they  increasingly 
suppressed, injured and burdened our subjects, both clergy and laity.319 
Acting  in  the  King's  serVIce,  these  soldiers  began  stealing  from  the  local 
inhabitants, which led to far more heinous activities.  In another document, some 
of the inevitable violence of the Meaux counter-offensive comes to  light.  Five 
brigands, descIibed as  archers of the garrison at  the Marche. of Meaux, headed 
south to  Montlhery (Essonne)  after the offensive,  and pillaged the countryside 
and the port, coming into contact with the knight Bensin de Menegny, guard of 
the gate: 
Let  it  be  known  to  all  present  and  future  that  we  have  heard  the 
supplication  of Bensin  de  Manesny,  esquire,  guard  of the  port  of 
Montlhery,  contending that  on Friday before the  feast  of Saint  M31iin 
last, five brigands, archers ofthe ganison of  the Marche of  Meaux as they 
claimed, had come to the said town (ville) of Montlhery and its environs 
and  committed  many  acts  of pillage  and  bad  deeds.  At around  four 
0'  clock that night  they had come to  the  said port of Montlhery where 
there was  much merchandise and  goods  belonging to  many merchants 
and other good men.  These things, merchandise and goods were under 
the guard of the said supplicant. The brigands had brought three wagons, 
all harnessed, one of which was loaded with oats and the two others were 
empty.  The cats were loaded with the said things, goods and merchandise 
that were  in the  keeping of the said  supplicant and were carted off to 
wherever they wished to take them.  The people at the mill at Lierry came 
to  tell him inmlediately, and because it  was his duty to  protect the said 
goods he went off without delay to  try and recover them,  and with him 
]19 AN, JJ90, f.  156, no. 444,  reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie. pp. 303-4. 
137 went the men of  justice of the said place and some of the merchants .... 
For having  guarded  and  defended  the  said  goods  which  were  in  his 
keeping  ... against  the  said  brigands  that  had  come  to  pillage  .....  we 
d  .  d  .  po  par  on, remIt an  qUlt.--
The gatekeeper of Montlhery, who had not been involved in the Jacquerie, was 
caught  up  in the  retaliation,  and  was  pardoned for his  aggressive methods  of 
reinstating the peace. In this case, the behaviour of the brigands made his actions 
acceptable,  while in the  fanner remission,  the brigands  themselves  needed to 
seek  grace.  Both  of these  indicate  that  forces  of the  crown  acted  in  an 
unacceptable manner.  The fanner case details rape and murder,  and the latter 
case,  theft of possessions,  indicating that the retaliatiory forces  were not only 
nobles  seeking  vengeance,  but  also  privateers  seeking  to  profit  from  their 
positions as arbitrators of  justice. 
Along  with  great  campaigns,  the  remISSIOns  indicate  repreSSIOn  on  a  much 
smaller scale.  Individual  royal  officials  often took  it into  their own hands  to 
punish rebels.3~1  Jean Rose, who carried letters to Compiegne, was executed by 
the bailli who 'with a heart full of anger' had mistaken him for one of the leaders 
320 'Savoir faisons a  tous presenz et a  venir aye sieome nous entendu par la supplicaiton de 
Bensin de Marrengy escuier garde du port de Montery contenu qui comme venredi avant la teste 
Saint Mmiin delTier passe, cinq brigands archers de la gamison du Marchie de Meaulx si commc 
ron disoit fussent venus en la dicte ville de Montery et environ Ie terroir d'icelle et la eussent 
faites plusiers pilleries et ma1efacones et environ quatre heures de nuit fussent vcnus au dit port 
de montery au qu'il avoit plusiers marchandises et biens appertenu a  plusiers marchans et autres 
bonnes gens et les quelles dannres et marchnndises et biens estoient en la garde du e1it suppliant et 
la cussent iceulx brigans amcnc trois charretes to utes attelces dont rune estoit chnrgee d'avoine 
et les deux autres vuides, les quelles ils chargerent e1es  dictres dnnrees biens et marchandises 
estands en la garde du dit suppliant comme dit cst et ycelles mistrent en voie et a  chemin pour 1es 
rober piller emporter ou emener hors ou il vouloicnt la queUe chose 1cs gens qui estoient au 
Moulin de Lierry et pour ce Ie vindrent tantost dire au dit supplicant Ie qu'il tantost er sans e1elai 
pour ce qui la garde d'ieeulx biens Ie appertenoit camille e1u est et a la tantost pour gareler 
detendre et recouvrir iceulx biens sicolllllle devoit et tenus y estoit et avecques Ii alerent la justice 
du dit leue et aucuns de Illarchans .... Pour garder et defendre les diz biens dont la garde ... 
especialment contres 1es diz brigands qui In  estoient venus pour piller ... nous avons pardonnc, 
remis et quictc' AN, JJ86, f  146, no. 420. 
m  These incidents have not been included within the table, as they do not represent organised 
attempts at repression by groups of nobles. 
138 of the  Jacques.
322  Ancella Pippe,  a  knight  from  Chalence,  who  had  seen his 
house at Dhuizy (Aisne) pillaged by the habitants of Acy near Soissons (Oise), 
responded by seizing the horses and beasts of inhabitants.
323  Most remissions 
hint  at  an  underlying mistreatment of the  peasantry by the nobles:  almost all 
remissions issued to peasants testify to the 'ill-feeling and hostility' held towards 
them  by  their noble  lords.  Whether this  hate manifested  itself physically in 
violence  against  persons  or property,  or whether  it  simply was  indicative  of 
tension that remained in the North of the France after the rebellion, it shows the 
strained relationship that the remissions were intended to heal. 
One of the crucial aspects of the Jacquerie to  commentators was the speed of its 
rise and fall.  Leguai called it a 'blazing fire of  fifteen days,.324  Yet the Jacquerie 
did not pass so  quickly.  The repression that followed continued deep into  the 
year and,  as  noted earlier,  was  not always  passively received by the peasants. 
Celiain attacks were relatively close to the end of the initial revolt. For example, 
the brigands' attack on Montlhery (Essonne) happened ten days after the assault 
on the MarcM of Meaux, on 20  June (the Wednesday before the Feast of Saint 
Martin of Tongres).325  The counter-offensive from  Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne) 
started on 24 June (the Feast of  the Nativity of St. John the Baptist).326  However, 
the brigands who had ravaged the sUlTounding countryside in Brie did not begin 
their violence until  10  September (ninety-two days  after the Jacques'  defeat at 
Clermont) and that their attacks had continued for a long time after that.
327  The 
mAN, JJ86, f  130, no. 380. 
mAN, JJ90, f  192, no. 530. 
324  Lcguai, 'Lcs revoltcs rurales' p. 58. 
325 AN, JJ86, f.  147,110.420. 
326 AN, JJ86, f  49, 110.  142, reprinted in Lucc, Jacquerie, pp. 247-8. 
327  AN, JJ90, f  156, no. 444, reprinted in  Lucc, Jacquerie, pp. 303-4. 
139 repression of the towns and the countryside lasted far longer than the initial burst 
of rebellion.  Differences  in  scale  and  speed  of responses  varied,  but  this 
repression  did  not  disappear  quickly  - it  continued  deep  into  the  year,  and 
instability was still reigning while these remissions were being issued. 
It  should  be  noted  that  we  only hear  of the  violence  that  the  crown 
granted  pardons  for,  so  this  certainly  does  not  represent  the  whole  story. 
Moreover, the crown was willing to forgive its subjects for violence in excess of 
what the peasants  committed.  Brigands  in its  own charge were  forgiven  for 
bloodying  the  countryside  for  little  reason  other  than  their  own  financial 
benefit.
32S  Nobles were forgiven for rape,  murder and arson.  By contrast, the 
peasantry were forced to justify their actions, and, most often, insist upon their 
innocence of the most heinous of charges against them.  For brigands to simply 
list  their  crimes  and  receive  a  pardon  does  suggest  that  the  context  of the 
lacquerie was enough for most sins to be forgiven. 
However,  nobles  and brigands  still  needed  to  seek grace,  and  used the 
same apparatus  as  the  peasants to  gain  forgiveness  for  their actions,  Neither 
peasant nor noble violence was sanctioned by the state,  and even the Lord of 
Saint-Dizier had to appeal for forgiveness from the Regent for his actions, which 
were at  least  ostensibly  an attempt to  stop  a  peasant  offensive  that  was  still 
ongoing in his region.  The crown certainly did not wash its hands of the deeds of 
their more senior subjects, as it could have. 
323  I have used the word in  the documents, 'brigands', even though the modern connotations may 
be misleading.  1t is unclear how these brigands were in the crown's employ, in one case 
gaITisoned at Mcaux, but it seems more likely that the usage of 'bJigand' is closer to the original 
meaning: 'the word initially indicated, until the end offourtccnth century, a foot-soldier who 
made up part of a company'.  Dictiollnaire hislorique de fa  fmzgllefrancaise, ed. A. Rey (Paris: 
Dictionnaires Ie Robert, 1998), 
140 Those issuing the remissions make two important concessions.  First, they 
recognised that in many cases villagers who had not pmiicipated in the Jacquerie 
had suffered equally with the guilty in the retaliation.  This was unacceptable; 
violence committed against innocent individuals was no better than the actions of 
the Jacques.  Secondly,  they conceded that  even  when the peasants had been 
involved  in  the  uprising,  celiain  levels  of  violence  were  unacceptable. 
Retaliation  could be  understandable,  but  perpetrators  had to  seek  legal  grace 
from the crown on account of their actions. 
Moreover, the crown could administer punishment, even within the act of 
granting  grace.  Conditions  could  be  added  to  remissions;  for  example, 
specifying a pilgrimage that had to be undeliaken before grace would be granted. 
Havet de Hangest had demanded repayment from a celia  in Jean de Blagny, from 
Cachi,  who  was  known  for  having  attacked the  house  of his  cousin  and  her 
husband.  The argument resulted in Havet killing Jean with his lance.  For this 
crime,  and taking into consideration Havet's previous  good service against the 
crown's enemies at the battle of Poitiers and Malconseil, Havet received a letter 
of remission,  on  the  condition  that  he  go  on  pilgrimage  to  Notre-Dame  de 
Boulogne-sur-Mer  (Nord),329  roughly  90km  to  the  north.
330  For  Thomas 
Cousterel, a similar punishment was issued: 
On behalf of the present friends of Thomas Cousterel who at the time of 
ten'or and commotion recently past between the nobles and the men of the 
plat pays the said Thomas who at the time was 'familier' and guard of the 
house of Messire Walle de Montingy, knight, and who went with others 
329 It was not only I-Iavet de I-Iangest who had to go to Boulogne-sur-Mer.  One of  the Jacques, 
Jean Bignet, 'electus capitainus' of Remy, was ordered to complete a pilgrimage there as well for 
his part in the uprising.  AN, JJ89, f.  281, no. 609. 
!!O According to Gerard Jugnot, Notre-Dame de Boulogne-sur-Mer was the most common 
pilgrimage site in letters of remission issued betwcen 1352 and  1363. G. Jugnot, . Le pelerinagc ct 
le droit penal d'apres les lettrcs de remission accordecs par Ie Roi de France', in Le pelerinage, 
CaMel'S de Fanjellx 15 (Toulouse: E.  Privat, 1980), pp.  191-206. 
141 of the said nobles to .  attack the men of the countryside and took, defiled 
and scattered their goods and also executed some of them.  The baillif of 
our said cousin (the Bishop of Beauvais) had then placed him for a long 
time in prison of our said cousin and had him tortured most cruelly ... He 
confessed to the crimes mentioned above ... in particular that, at the time 
of the  said telTor,  he had executed Soybeli Ponquet who had .... stolen 
and calTied off the goods of the house of the said knight, his master, and 
had started the fire  ... Before the next Feast of Saint Jehan the Baptist 
the  said  Thomas  [must  make]  a  pilgrimage  to  N otre-Dame  of Roc-
amadour and  on the  completion (pelfectiol1)  of the  said pilgrimage he 
must  bring  back  trustworthy  letters  (lettres  creables)  of proof to  the 
baillif of Senlis.  331 
Pilgrimage  as  punishment  drew  some  criticism  from  Simeon  Luce,  who 
considered this  'illusory punishment' to  be representative of a 'prince who had 
been inclined never to appear to have the strength at heart to  enforce' the law. 
When considered from a modern viewpoint, pilgrimage could sound like a soft 
option.  However, pilgrimages were still relatively common as punishments laid 
down by both ecclesiastical and civil courtS.
332  They were often added to letters 
of remission as conditional clauses.
333  Gerard Jugnot records ninety instances of 
pilgrimages  added  to  remissions  between  1354  and  1368.  That  these  two 
individuals only needed to  complete pilgrimages to  relatively local sites is not 
surprising either; after 1328, the vast majority of  pilgrimages ordered by the king 
331  'Comme les amis charnelz de Thomas Cousterel ou temps de effrois et commocion, qui deux 
et n'a gaires ont est contre les nobles et les gens du dit plat pais icelui Thomas qui pour Ie temps 
estent familier de messier Walle de Montigny chevalier et garde de son hostel it este avecque 
plusiers es diz nobles contre les dictes gens du dit plat pais it prendre gaster dissiper leurs biens a 
aucune mis it mort.  Le baillif de nostre dit cousin la tait prendre it tenu longuement en prison de 
nostre dit cousin et fait gehenne tres cruellement.  ... il  a confess les choscs dessus dictes ... 
especial a temps des diz effrois avoir mis a mort Soybert Ponquet qui avoit pille et en porte les 
biens de hotel du dit chevalier son maistre et y mis Ie feu  .... icelui Thomas dedans la Feste de ]a 
Nativitie de Saint lehan Baptiste prochain (unreadable word) en pelegrinage a  Nostre-Dame du 
Rocamadour et de la perfection du dit pelegrinage appOlie letters creables au bailli de Senlis·. 
AN, 1J86. f.  146. no. 419. 
332 For example, the Inquisitor Bernard Gui categorised sites as 'major' or 'minor' pilgrimages 
for punishing heretics.  Flemish cities drew up a list of  pilgrimages to shrines which related them 
to the crime that had been committed,  D.  Webb, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage ill/ize :i1edieval West 
(London: .l.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 51-63. 
m  Oddly, there is no mention of pilgrimage in remission letters in Diana Webb's two survey 
works, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage and Medieval European Pilgrimage, c.  700-/500 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002).  1. Sumption does mention them very briefly in his section of'  Penitential 
Pilgrimages, Pilgrimage: an Jmage ojMediaeva/ Religion (London: Faber. 1975), pp. 98-113. 
142 3'4  335  were  restricted  to  the  north.  ~  For nobles,  pilgrimage still had resonance. 
These pardons were conditional on the supplicant completing this task and was 
perhaps indicative of the seriousness with which the crown considered the crimes 
they had committed.  The whole process  of the pilgrimage was  similar to  the 
grace that these same nobles were forced to seek from the crown itself, based on 
restoring the reputation of the individuaL 
Moreover,  pilgrimage was  not  the  only  form  of punishment.  Prior to 
receiving  his  remission  and  presumably  completing  his  pilgrimage,  Thomas 
Cousterel  was  imprisoned  before  the  remission  had  been  granted,  and  was 
tOliured  into  confessing.
336  While it was in Cousterel's interests to  exaggerate 
the  hardships  he  had  suffered,  this  is  clear  evidence  that  the  justices  were 
interested in finding and prosecuting errant nobles, even if their methods crossed 
the line into 'great cruelty'. 
So  if the  crown did  not  approve  of the  methods  of the nobility,  at  least  not 
beyond a celiain point, and punished errant nobles, how did the crown believe 
the rising should have been policed?  The crown had its  own punishments to 
mete out to  the peasants, but did not involve the same level of bloodshed. Many 
)34 Jugnot, 'Le pelerinage', p.  199. 
m  Geoffrey de Charny (whose property is destroyed during 1358, perhaps by Picrre Gille's mcn 
on the way to Meaux) mentions pilgrimages as a way of improving one's wOlih as a knight, 
although he is specifically talking about foreign pilgrimages, in The Buok of  Chivairy, trans. R. 
Kaeuper and E.  Kcnnedy (University of Pennsylvania, 1996), pp. 91-3.  Webb stresses that even 
a local pilgrimage issued as punishment could have serious social implications: 'a shOli local 
pilgrimage was a form of public penance which exposed the offender to the scrutiny of people 
that mentioned them'.  Webb, Medieval E1Iropeall Piigrimage, p.  90. 
336 As an aside, this is the only remission describing the Jacquerie that I have found which 
mentions torture.  In this case, the choice of  the word 'confessu' maybe important; the cOllli may 
have recognised that a confession under torture was unreliable.  That said, it is wOlih noting that 
the remission does not dispute the cenu'al fact ofthe case, that Cousterel murdered Soybert 
Ponquet, but only gives an explanation of  why Cousterel killed him.  The evidence presumably 
gi\'en through confession (pertaining to Cousterers responsibility) is still recorded as fact in the 
remission narrative. 
143 of the villages were levied with what seems to be a standard fine of 1,000 ecuz 
each for their involvement: 
...  our friend,  loyal counsellor and lieutenant in these parts the Count of 
Vaudemont summoned [the  villagers of Betancom1 and Vroil (Marne)] 
before  him  at  a  ce11ain  time  and  place.  On  the  day and  place these 
inhabitants did not dare appear in person out of fear of the great and cruel 
executions  that  our lieutenant had carried  out  and  was  continuing day 
after day  against  the  people of the  country.  Instead they  sent  certain 
procurellrs on their behalf to  our lieutenant.  Without knowing any more 
about these inhabitants, he condemned them to pay a fine of  two thousand 
',7  ecuz [between them].  0_ 
The villagers would appear before the King's lieutenant, who would then issue a 
fine,  in this  case without hearing their case.  Even amidst the 'great and cruel 
executions'  being  committed  throughout  the  countryside,  the  crown  was 
simultaneously exacting its  own punishment on the villages that rebelled.  Two 
thousand ecuz was  a huge sum - for example, this  would be equivalent to the 
yearly wages of ten well-off ploughmen, if we were to  generously estimate that 
they would make 20 ecuz a year each.33s  Six penalties of this sum would have 
paid the ransom required for the Earl of Warwick to vacate the nine fortresses he 
had occupied after Poitiers.
339  This  was not the  only example of fines  being 
issued.  Villages that assembled in Champagne were issued with similar fines.34o 
The village of Bucy-le-Repost (Marne) paid a sum of 200 florins d'or, and the 
village of Chavanges (Aube) was forced to  pay a fine of five hundred escuz d'or 
337 AN . .JJ86. f.  117. no.  346, reprinted in  Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 266-8, trans. Cohn. PP, p.  187. 
m  These numbers are suggested by K.  Fowler, The Age of  Plantagenet and Valois (London: 
Ferndale Editions, 1980), p.ll.  Fowler estimates that a 'ploughman doing weII' would make 
between 40-60 shiIIings a year (although the Statute of Labourers of 1351  supposedly limited the 
amount to only 10 shillings per year), wOl1h approximately between 14 and 20 eell::; Spufford 
suggests by this period the eell:: was worth about 23 sous, or just more than 3 shillings, in P. 
Spufford, Handbook ofMediem! Eyc1/aJ1ge (London: Offices of  the Royal Historical Society, 
1986), pp.  189-203.  I have attempted to select the most appropriate exchange rates dependent on 
when the remission was issued, but it is worth nothing that coinage in this period was 
exceptionally unstable; Spufford reports that 'between 1 February 1337 and 5 December 1360. 
there were no les than 85  changes in the coinage', and describes 'wild oscillations in the silver 
content of  the tournois', ibid., p.  176  . 
.  '.'9 On 13 May 1360, the Earl of  Warwick was paid twelve thousandji-anes.  The eCII:: (23 sous) 
was worth a little more than thejl-allc (20 sous) at that time.  Sputlord, Handbook, pp.  189-I 93. 
340 AN, JJ86, f.  121-122, nos. 356,358,359,360. 
144 in  two  instalments:  three hundred before the feast of Saint .Andre,  and another 
two hundred before Christmas of that year.
34
!  These villages appealed for grace 
specifically  to  avoid  these  fines,  and  were  considered  worthy  by  the  crown. 
Considering that presumably many were not pardoned, and that the fine was the 
stimulus  for  the villagers  to  seek grace,  it is  clear that  these must have been 
issued widely to numerous settlements.  We have no evidence of how these fines 
were administered, but their existence indicates that the  crown,  apart from  the 
pardoning process,  did  take  a proactive role in  punishing the peasants.
342  By 
demanding financial  reparations,  the  crown  could  bolster its  cotTers,  but  also 
could  reward  loyal subjects  and pay reparations to  those whose propeliies had 
been destroyed.
343  For example, later documents specify that Robert de  Lorris 
needed  25,000  livres  in  compensation  for  the  destruction  of the  chateau  at 
Ermenonville  (Oise),  amongst other  expenses,  or  around  140,000  escuz:  the 
crown would have needed to  succesfully collect the fines of 140 villages to have 
paid for the reconstruction of the chateau. 
Of course, by specifying a particular manner in which the rebels should 
be  treated,  they  set  a  precedent  for  punishment  that  was  financial  but  also 
peaceful.  The violent transgressions of the nobles had to  be punished because 
they clashed with the measured approach of the crown. 
The  example  of the  J acquerie  shows  us  something  very  different  to 
Spierenburg's  model  mentioned  earlier,  where  the  crown  sanctioned  private 
vengeance because it could not effectively punish insurgents: in 1358, nobles had 
341  AN, JJ86, f.  91, no.  271  and JJ86, [217, no. 596. 
342  Charles Y, in both his regency and as king, punished noble rebels by stripping them of their 
land and wealth: 'one cannot help but notice that in the years of crisis - 1358-9, 1364, 1369-72, 
1378 - he made the widest use of forfeitures as an instrument of  policy, as a means of 
punishment, reward and incentive'.  Cuttler, The Laws o(Treasol1, p.  180. 
343  For examples, see AN, JJ90, f.  139, n.271  and  JJl02, [40, no.96. 
145 to  seek forgiveness from the crown for the damage they had done to the rebels 
and  their propeliy.  The  state  did  act  as  a  reconciliatory  power,  but  not  by 
accepting private  violence  without  question.  Nobles  were  not  immune from 
prosecution,  but  rather reconciliation  was  achieved through  exactly  the  same 
system which the peasants used for their appeals. 
Of course,  most  generalised  models  on  the  effects  of retaliation  have 
necessarily assumed that the  'state' was the organ of repression, and legitimate 
violence in quelling revolt becomes 'domestic state violence' once it crosses an 
acceptable threshold.
344  Yet again, the J acquelie represents something different: 
there were two  distinct responses  to  the revolt.  The first  was  initiated by the 
crown - fines,  confiscations  of property and implisomnent of individuals;  the 
second by the  enraged  nobility - violent  executions,  destruction and  theft  of 
property and ransoming.  This violence took a variety of forms,  fro111  drawn-out 
ransacking of the countryside to quick pillages of certain sites.
345 
This could be the reason for the different tenor of retaliation from other 
medieval revolts,  where the participants are treated with leniency.  In  the vast 
majOlity of revolts of the fourteenth century, where repression was rare and often 
non-existent,  the  insurgents  fell  under  the  jurisdiction of a  central  authOlity 
344  Howard Brown discusses the distinction between appropriate, legitimate violence in ending a 
revolt and 'domestic' state violence, which is generally considered to be excessive.  In many 
cases, this distinction seems artiticial: violence, when it begins, is always judged to be 
appropriate, and the degeneration into illegitimacy may be unconnected to the state, but rather 
through inappropriate behaivour of its agents.  Moreover, in this period, the links between 
repressive violence and the 'state' are far from clear.  The crown does not, in the case of  the 
.Iacquerie, orchestrate the repression, but guidance is coming from several different individuals, 
like Charles of Navarre and the lord of Saint-Dizier.  Yet Brown's distinction can be considcred 
important: there is a point whereby repressive violence outstrips its utility and is viewed by many 
to be cxcessive. H.  Brown, . Repression from the Croquants to the Commune', The Historical 
JOllnzal 42 (Sept,  1999), pp. 597-622. 
34> Two different responses tl'om the 'state' and the nobility have also been noted in reference to 
the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381, although in that case the reactions arc reversed: "[the 
nobles'] reaction seems to have been considerably cooler than that of  the Commons',  See lA, 
Tuck, 'Nobles, Commons and the Great Revolt of 1381', in  The English Rising, ed Aston and 
Hilton, p. 212, 
146 equipped to  deal with them, such as the local civic oligarchy.  The revolt of the 
Jacquerie was too big, too  great a social phenomenon, for the central powers of 
lordship to  contain it.  This is  evident in the way in which the revolt is  finally 
quelled: it was an outside force, Charles ofNavalTe's anny, which eventually put 
down one large Jacques' force,  and at  Meaux the nobles were assisted by men 
from  outside the borders of France.  The crown needed to  employ brigands at 
Montlhery and at  Meaux; both these groups  later turned on the  peasantry and 
their excesses were mentioned in remissions issued by the crown.  Remissions 
were  intended  to  paper over  the  cracks  in  the  fractious  relationship  between 
nobles and peasant and to  re-establish the 'good peace' across  the countryside. 
They could also be used to  excuse nobles who had acted improperly, but more 
than  that,  the  very fact  that  these nobles had to  seek pardons for their actions 
shows that the crown considered them to have acted wrongfully.  In some cases, 
nobles were imprisoned.  Pilgrimages were issued to rehabilitate knights who had 
strayed from their moral duties. The remissions give the clear impression that the 
crown did not approve of the ransacking of the countryside after the Jacquerie; 
by that token, the remissions also imply that the crown had little control over the 
retaliation. 
147 5. IDENTIFYING THE JACQUES 
In  any protest, the identity of its paIiicipants shapes the ideology of the crowd. 
The 'social category'  that the insurgents define themselves as,  be that peasant, 
worker or something else,  defines  the  very nature of the rebellion:  the  crowd 
does not act as a collection of individuals, rather, 'the beliefs that guide them are 
the  collective beliefs of the associated groups'  to  which they belong.  Indeed, 
perceptions of identity are the basis on which revolts work:  '[l]arge numbers of 
people can act together in the crowd ...  to  the extent that they share a common 
sense of identi ty'.  Thus, the 'identity' of the Jacques is the key to understanding 
the revolt itself346 
When attempting to  identify the Jacques, remissions provide impOliant 
infonnation  about  the  recipients,  including  occupations.  Remissions  were 
expensive,  and issued on the renown or status  of the  supplicant,  and thus  we 
should  expect  that  only  Jacques  with  substantial  reserves  of money,  land  or 
prestige would have been able to  obtain one.  Yet if this bias is  accounted for, 
some assessment of the social character of the insurgent rank-and-file might be 
possible. 
A  systematic  study  of  these  rem1SSIOns  can  counter  many  of  the 
arguments  made  about  the  Jacques  in  the  historiography.  When  Raymond 
Cazelles  described  the  Jacquerie  as  a  mixture  of royal  officials,  clergy  and 
artisans, and featured as many burghers as peasants, he based his theory paIily on 
a few  scattered examples from the remissions.  The overriding in±1uence on his 
judgement  must  have  been  the  historiography,  which  emphasised  elite 
participation in revolts.  Cazelles specifically acknowledges Yves-Marie Berce's 
346  S.  Reicher, Socialldentiy and Leadership Dynamics (forthcoming). 
148 work, which suggested that early modem revolts relied upon the participation of 
women and on the instigation of the clergy.  By studying the remissions, even 
with  their  bias  towards  the  wealthy  and  privileged,  can  we  confinn  that  the 
Jacques were townsmen, artisans or elites, mainly women or led by churchmen'? 
Were  the  Jacques  really  not  the  'men  of the  countryside'  the  chroniclers 
described? 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE JACQUERIE 
It was at this time that the nobles in derision called peasants and simple 
folk Jacques Bonhommes.  That year men sent to the wars who bore anns 
in rustic fashion of peasants were given the name Jacques Bonhommes by 
those who mocked and despised them, and thus lost the name of  peasant. 
Both French and English called peasants this for a long time afterward. 
But woe is me!  Many who then derided peasants with this  name were 
347  later made mortal spoli of  by them. 
As Jean de Venette indicates, the tenn Jacques Bonhommes had become such a 
common description for rural folk that the word 'peasant' was almost redundant. 
When Jean Ie Bel and the Anonimalle Chronicle both created a leader supposedly 
representative  of  the  1358  revolt  of  these  rebels,  they  named  him  'Jak 
Bonhomme'  ,348  and when choosing a title for the rebellion, the contemporaries 
drew  directly  from  the  name  given  to  the  'rustics'.  Since  then,  the  tenn 
'jacquerie'  has  become  synonymous  with  the  rural  rampage  of  desperate 
peasants.
349  NonnaUy  triggered  by  the  onset  of famine  or  bad  crop  yields, 
villagers rose up in a seasonal madness. 
3~7 Venette, Chrol1., v.  1, p. 240, trans. Birdsall, Venette,  p.63  . 
.  '43 Bel, Clzroll .•  v.2, p.  261, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  153; The Anonil71a/le Chronicle, ed. V.H. 
Galbraith (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1927), pp. 42-3, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 172-3. 
349 Zola, The Earlh, trans. D.  PaTIllee, p. 91. 
149 Even when the  chroniclers used more specific identifiers for the rebels 
than just the 'Jacques", they are identifiably rural.  For Ie Bel, they were 'gens de 
villes  champestres,;35o  for  the  Clzroniqlle  des  Quatres  Premiers  Valois, 
Clzronique Nonnande and Jean de Venette,  they were 'paysans' or 'paisans,.351 
For the continuator of Richard Lescot, they were 'rusticos.352 and the Chronique 
des  regnes  de  Jean  11  et  Charles  V considered them  to  be  'menu  gens'  and 
'communes".353  Even though this chronicler conceded that 'rich men, bourgeois 
and  others  filled  their ranks',  he  insisted  that  the  Jacques  were  largely  rural 
peasants:  'assemblies  were  compromised  mostly  of  gens  de  labour 
(labourers354),.355 
Yet in recent years, the notion that the peasantry was at the heart of the 
Jacquerie  has  progressively  come  under  attack.  The  social  and  economic 
historians of the 1960s stressed that the ile de France was the lichest region in 
France  for  the  rural  worker in  the  1350s,  and  they  were  far  from  the  most 
desperate peasants in the country.356  The idea that revolts are made up of the 
most desperate peasants is  demonstrably false.  Social scientists and historians 
have thoroughly rejected the notion that people rebel only at their lowest ebb;357 
Cohn has shown from a sample of 1,112 revolts that bread riots and other form of 
350 Bel, Chron .. v.2, p.  261. 
351  Chron. premiers Valois, p. 71; Chroll.  110rm., p.  127; Venette, Chrol1.,  v.  2, p.  263, trans. 
Birdsall, Venelle, p. 71. 
352 Lescot, Chron., p.  126. 
353  Chron.  des regnes. v.l, p.  188. 
1)4 The term 'gens de labour' will be discussed in detail later, as it appears with regularity in the 
remissions for the Jacques, but it is intrinsically linked to the notion of the rurallandworker. 
355 ibid., trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  166-7. 
356 See R.  Fossier, HislOire sociale de l'occidelllmr!xlieval (Paris: Al1l1and Colin, 1970), G. 
Fourquin, Les campagnes de fa region parisienl1e a lafill dll Moyen Age (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1964) and G. Duby, Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval 
Wesr,  trans. C.  Postan (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), p.  309. 
357 Mollat and Wolff recognised that revolts could only happen 'when a calamity has not become 
a total scourge', Popular RevolwiolZs, p.  93. 
150 revolts involving the most desperate elements of society were extremely rare.358 
Nonetheless, Raymond Cazelles has claimed that the Jacques was not made up of 
peasants at al1.
359  Suggesting that 'cultivators' would never revolt at the end of 
Mayor the  beginning of June,  because it would damage their crops,  Cazelles 
insisted that peasant revolts would only take place in the autumn.  But this makes 
little sense: first,  we have historical examples of peasant revolts at this time of 
year.  In France, there were other peasant revolts during May and June, even in 
the Beauvaisis: in May  1338, for example,  the villagers of Brissy and  Remies 
rebelled against the bishop of Laon and the crown's troopS.360  Indeed, the most 
famous  rising of all,  the English Peasants' Revolt,  took place in June  1381.361 
Second, at this  time,  agricultural workers have little to  do  but watch the crops 
grow, while in late SUlmner, harvest-time, they are at their busiest.  The peasants 
preserved their crops, specifically targeting houses, castles and goods belonging 
to  the  nobility.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  they  targeted  the  fields  or the 
countryside  around  these  properties,  or  did  anything  that  might  have  been 
counter-productive  towards  their  own  goods;  remissions  even  discussed  the 
participants' wishes to  secure their crop yields:  '[the supplicant]  will reap and 
send to safety his goods which are of the fields, work and cultivate his lands and 
.  d  '  ,6
0  vmeyar  s :  - Instead,  the  nobility  chose  to  destroy  their  fields  during  the 
30S Cohn, L{{st/or Liberty, pp. 70-75. 
309 Cazelles, 'The Jacquelie', pp. 75-6. 
360 See Cohn, LlIstfbr Liberty, p.  31.  The rest of the chapter on 'Peasant Revolts', p. 25-52, 
details several peasant revolts that oecuned in Mayor June, for example, two revolts in  1355 
involving the peasantry of Lucca and Rimini.  In  1422, a rebellion in Forez (perhaps closer to 
rural brigandage than a true revolt) broke out in May, as did most famously the Peasants Revolt 
of 1381. 
161  Indeed, both rebellions covered roughly the same period, with Guillaume Cale and Wat Tyler 
being executed on 10 June and  IS June respectively.  The feast of Corpus Christi fell between 
both revolts; for discussion of its relevance to the Great Rising, see M.  Aston, 'Corpus Christi 
and Corpus Regni: heresy and the Peasants' Revolt', Past and Present, v.  143 (1994), pp. 3-47. 
162 This phrase appears in sixty remissions.  It will be discussed later in this chapter in more 
depth. 
151 retaliation;  as  the  Clzronique  de regnes des  Jean II et Charles  V recorded,  the 
nobles 'bumt and destroyed all the countryside between the Seine and the Marne 
rivers,.363 
Nonetheless, Cazelles went back to the remissions (at least Luce's sample 
of them),  and  proclaimed  that  the  Jacques  were  'more  rural  artisans  than 
peasants,.364  In  his  analysis,  the  revolt  crossed  social  barriers  and  included 
officers  of the  crown,  churchmen,  peasants  and  burghers;  'the  rich  found 
themselves  side  by  side  with  the  poor,  the  royal  official  with  the  lord's 
subject'.365  Although the numbers were not tallied, Cazelles gave the impression 
that  Luce's  sample  strongly  suggested  this  to  be the  case.  But  as  discussed 
above, Luce's sample does not represent the full range of remissions concerning 
the  Jacquerie.  By  retuming  to  the  documents,  the  range  of the  Jacques' 
occupations can be compiled, even if focus on these occupations recorded in the 
remissions may be misleading, because these letters were not available to alL 
Three factors may cause us to question the representativeness of a sample 
compiled from  the remissions.  First, remissions were expensive.  As  discussed 
in Chapter 2,  the  charge was  at least 3 livres,  but potentially much more with 
additional taxes and surcharges.  Sixteenth-century costings suggest two  months 
wages  for  a waged labourer.  366  Apart from  communities who  appealed for  a 
pardon  together  to  avoid  a  fine,  there  was  little  financial  imperative  for  an 
363  Chron.  des regnes, v.l, p.  188.  Crops could not only bc dcstroycd, but also stolen.  Phillipc dc 
Baucncourt stoIc horscs and 'goods ofthc ficld' from thc villagers of Sompuis to compcnsatc him 
for damagc caused by the Jacques.  AN, JJ86, f  87, no.  258. 
364 Cazelles, 'Thc Jacqucric', p.  76 . 
.  '65 ibid.  Going cvcn further, in the cntry on the Jacquerie in the Dictionary of/he Middle Ages, 
Henneman states that 'contcmporary sourccs do not offer much evidence that the Jacquerie of 
1358 was an  uprising of pc  as ants', and argues the remissions 'identify most ofthc participants as 
3!1isans, stonccuttcrs, pctty functionaries, and even clergy, but rarely as cultivators of thc soil', p. 
36.  As this chapter will demonstrate, that assertion is simply wrong  . 
.  '66 For a discussion ofrcmissions and thcir cost, see 'Rcmissions: Form and Function'.  Also see 
Gcrcmck, The Margins o.{Society il1  Late Medieval Paris and Davis, Fiction in the Archives, p. 
154. 
152 individual  to  seek  grace.  The  remISSIOns  do  not  record. fines  for  individual 
rebels; therefore, we can assume that the cost of obtaining a remission was not 
balanced with the reduction of a levy.  The remissions for the Jacquerie were 
even more exclusive than the conUllon pardon; recorded in the royal chancery, 
these  remissions  were  intended  to  be  kept  permanently  in  the  crown's  own 
records, and subsequently cost more for that privilege.  Individuals needed to  be 
willing, not only to  spend significant sums of money on a remission, but also to 
pay more to have it included pel111anently in the chancery. 
Secondly, as  we have said, remissions were as much a judgement on a 
supplicant's past as the crime itself.  The crucial clause turned on the pal1icipants 
'good  name  and  renown',  his  loyal  service  to  the  crown,  and  how  he  was 
perceived in his community.  In this manner, supplicants who had proven loyalty 
in the past, often tlu'ough military service, had the best claim to grace,  and those 
who had high-standing in the conmmnity had the best testimonies on their behalf. 
These individuals would also be most concel11ed to  regain their good standing 
within the community; the consequences of having a stained character in the eyes 
of the  law would be more important  for  a  citizen of some  status  than  for  a 
peasant of low-standing. 
Thirdly,  the  supplicants  who  received  individual  remissions  were 
exceptions from those who received the general pardon.  Neither were these men 
receiving pardons as  part of the community - these supplicants received grace 
without the company of neighbours or villagers.  In many cases, they were only 
interested in their own culpability, not their communities.  For example, Jehan 
Fillon's remission was  only concel11ed  with proving he had not been involved 
with the murder of a man-at-al111S  in Conches (Seine-et-Mal11e), not that the rest 
153 of the inhabitants were innocent.  367  It is understandable that a royal s.ergeant of 
Paris, for  example, would not expect the grace received for the village of Jaux 
(consciously refened to as 'gens de labour') to cover him.
368 
Any  sample  of occupations  based  on  remissions  thus  covers  only the 
Jacques  who  possessed  the  social  standing  to  obtain  a  remission,  and  who 
considered their reputation impOliant enough to  petition the cOUli  to  have it re-
instated.  These  rebels  were  also  the  only Jacques  who  could  afford  it,  and 
celiainly  the  only  ones  who  wished  it  recorded  in  the  royal  chancery.  Any 
sample  suggesting  a  strong  influence  of elites  within  the  Jacquerie  could 
therefore be attributed to the nature of  the sources. 
Nonetheless,  the  sample  suggests  that  the  Jacques  consisted  more  of 
agricultural  workers  than  townsmen,  royal  officials  or even  rural  aliisans,  as 
Cazelles asselied without supplying any quantitative evidence: 
Table XI. Occupations ofthe Jacques. 
OCCUPATION  NUMBER 
'Sergeant  a  Cheval'  or  3 
'Royal Sergeant' 
Curates or Priests  4 




Carpenter  1 
Draper  1 
Mason  1 
Carpenter  1 
Fish Merchant  1 
Impoverished  8 
'Labourer'  2 
'Homme de labour'  9 
Communities  described  as  8 
'gens de labour' 
367 AN, JJ86, f  81, no.  244. 
368 khan Leber, 'mounted sergeant of Paris' , received a remission in AN, ]]86, f  73, no. 223; the 
participants of  Jaux and their two capitaincs received remissions in AN, J.l86, f  123, nos. 361 
and 362. 
154 Below  the  data  is  organised  into  the  subgroups  (excluding  the  communities 
described as 'gens du labour'): 
Table XII. Occupations ofthe Jacques organised into sub-groups. 
Sub-group 
Royal officials 
,.,  (1.8%)  .) 
Religious figures  4  (2.4%) 
Rural artisans  8 (4.8%) 
Rural Labollreur  11  (8.6%) 
Impoverished  4 (2.4%) /10 (7.2%) 
No occupation given  132 (82.5%) 
Of the first of these occupational groups, only three royal officials were involved 
in the Jacquerie.
369  One of the three hailed who from Montdidier, a town which 
had links with the Jacquerie - although the inhabitants' opinions were divided  -
and was  one of the  exceptions  to  the  rule,  a  townsman  who joined the rural 
rebels.
370  The second was  a  'mounted sergeant of the Chatelet of Paris', who 
found himself in Jaux (Oise), near Compiegne, where he joined the rebellion.
371 
His  role  in  Jaux  was  unclear,  considering  there  were  two  captains  of Jaux 
mentioned  in  other  remissions;  he  seems  to  have  been  just  a  rank-and-file 
member of the rebellion.
372  The last royal  official is  a sergeant from Noailles 
369 A founh royal sergeant is involved in the uprising in town of Lorris against the local fOliress 
in  1358, which is never explicitly linked to the Jacquerie; AN, ]]90, f.  24, no. 48. 
)70 AN, ]]86, f.  161, no. 456. 
m  Jehan Leber. 'mounted sergeant of Paris', received a remission in AN, JJ86, f. 73, n. 223. 
372  The inhabitants of Jaux and their two capitailles received remissions in AN, JJ86, f.  123, 110S. 
361  and 362. 
155 who became leader of four villages in the region.
373  Thus, all.tlu·ee rebels were 
townsmen who became involved with the peasants in their struggles.  These men 
were very different from the standard Jacque Bonhomme who rose up with his 
village. 
Tuming to  the aliisans, we fail to see the large proportions of craftsmen 
that  Cazelles  suggested  filled  the  Jacques'  rank  and  file.  The  above  table 
includes only those who had their occupation specifically listed, not individuals 
with sumames which hints at an occupation.  In one instance, for example, Raoul 
Ie Boucher is described as a 'homme de labour'; this document does not indicate 
he was a butcher as well.
374  This has meant the exclusion of tlu'ee 'Ie Bouchers', 
one 'Ie Macon', one 'Ie Cordier', and one 'Ie Pontonnier'.  Although the number 
of alii  sans would have increased by another six, the sample still does  not lend 
credence to Cazelles' claims.  Because of the nature of the remissions, we would 
expect  rural  alii  sans  to  receive  a  dispropOliionately  large  percentage  of 
remissions,  yet  less  than 5% of the individuals could be so  identified,  and  no 
other evidence from chronicles or other sources suggests any large contingent of 
rural aliisans within the revolt. 
We cannot  be sure  what  being a  'rural artisan'  actually meant  in  this 
period, at least in comparison with the urban artisan.  Georges Duby reports that 
these professions  'gave many a man frustrated by his insufficient resources  ... 
the  means  of existence',  rather than  prestigious  occupations  in themselves.
375 
Rural alii  sans were not an emergent middle-class; their skills were often learnt to 
mAN, JJ90, f. 81, no.  148. 
3;~ AN, JJ86, [  88, no.  262. 
375  Duby, Rural Economy alld COllntry Life, p.  154. 
156 compensate small land holdings that were insufficient to  provide sustenance376. 
Nor were these individuals comparable with their urban counterparis: they tended 
to  be  entirely  dependent  on  their  landlords,  and  the  local  economy  was  not 
subject to  the same freedom as  a Parisian artisan.  111ere is no suggestion in the 
limited  literature  that  these  individuals  possessed  greater  wealth  or  social 
standing  than  the  average  land-holding  peasanen .  Moreover,  were  the 
comparative roles of a rural  ariisan similar to  that of an  urban  ariisan:  was  a 
village mason as  skilled as a guild member from Paris?  Was a village butcher 
anymore than a slaughtennan? 
The third group - those involved in labour - provides another interesting 
case.  There are two types of 'labourer' included within the group.37S  The first 
are  those  described  as  agricultural  labourers  within  the  early  pari  of  the 
remissions, such as labourer de  bras.  The second is  slightly more complicated: 
individuals  (and  connnunities)  who  were  described  as  'homme  (or gens)  de 
labour' immediately before or after the section of the remission that dealt with 
their good name and reputation.  This tenn  /zolJ1l71e  de laboltr - has been the 
subject  of  some  debate.  Raymond  Cazelles  declares  that  this  does  not 
}76 To look at the English example, according to A.  Everitt, in the sixteenth century the majority 
of  rural artisans were labourers who 'naturally took up these employments' during the 'slack 
months': A.  Evelitt, 'Fann Labourers', The Agrarian HistOf), of  England and Wales, Vol. 4, 
ISOO-1640, ed . .r.  Thirsk (Cambridge: CUP, 1967), p. 429.  Even those who have disputed this 
characterisation agree that unskilled labourers readily practised trades and that their 'standard of 
life was little removed £i'om labourers', B. Sharp, In  Contempt of  All Authoritv: Rural Artisans 
and Riot ill the  IYest 0/  England 1586-1660 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 
174. 
m  It is worth noting that the Statute 0/  Labollrers issued in England in  13S1  limited the wages of 
a mower to Sd a day and a reaper to 3d a day, while limiting the wages of  a standard mason to 3d 
and a standard carpenter to 2d.  For discussion of wages, see D. Farmer, 'Prices and Wages 13S0-
1400', The Agrarian HislOf), of  England and Wales.  vol. 8,  1348-1S00, eel.  E.  Miller (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1991), pp. 431-9S.  Duby uses the example of a thatcher in Winchester, who at the end of 
the thirteenth could expect to earn three times as much as a reaper, but by the first half of  the 
fifteenth century only earned a third more.  Of  course, the French experience may have been 
different, although Duby demonstrates that rura11abourers' wages doubled betwcen 1349 and 
1370 around St. Denis.  Duby, RlIral Economy and COlln!ry Life, pp. 304-S. 
378  For discussion of  rural labour in medieval France, see G.  Small, Later Medieval France 
(  feJI1hcoming). 
157 necessarily mean an agricultural worker:  'they could well be labourers using the 
hoe,  or the  spade - working the  land - but they could  also  be carters  ... or 
labourers unloading wine  ... or workers on the riverside'  .379  However, labour 
most  definitely  means  agricultural  work.  Robert's  Dictionaire  Historique 
describes labour as  'agricultaral', the 'way in which one loosens and tums land', 
and  the  verb  labourer  meant  'to  loosen  and  tum  over  (the  ground)  with  a 
ploughing implement, or with a tool by hand (shovel, spade, hoe)'.  380  Gauvard 
believed them to represent the 'superior level of the rural world' (as compared to 
the  inferior  labourer de  bras),  yet  accepted  that  the  technical  definition  was 
simply a man with the means to own his plough.381  Despite confusion about the 
status of an  !zo111me  de labour,  there was  very little doubt that these men were 
involved in agriculture.  Perhaps they were more representative of the middling-
SOli  of petty  landowner  than  the  traditional  peasant  fanner,  yet  they  are 
undisputedly men of the countryside.  While Cazelles is light to say that the tenn 
is  not  ubiquitous,  18.6%  (eight  of fOUliy-three)  of all  communities  pardoned 
were  desclibed  as  .  hommes  de  labour',  communities  of  small-scale  rural 
workers.  Of those individual rebels or groups of rebels asclibed an occupation, 
58.4% of  them was described as rural labourer, or homme du labour. 
The final group is the impoverished, and I have recorded two categmies 
for  this  category.  The  first  proportion  is  individuals  where  the  remission 
exclusiveZv refers  to  the  individual as  poor (pauvre),  miserable  (miserable)  or 
begging (mendiant).  Not included in this group are those who also have other 
379 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', p. 76. 
380 Dicliol1l1aire historique de la langueji-al7caise, ed.  Rey.  See also Cohn, PP,  p.  149, where he 
finds that 'specialists in agricultural history and the historical dictionaries define the term as a 
substantial peasant who possessed a plough and might have had enough property to supplement 
his labour by employing others'. 
3S1  Gauvard, De grace especial, vol.  I, pp. 402-6. 
158 professions  specified.  The second figure  were individuals  described  as  poor, 
even if the remissions also specified an occupation.  For example, Gillebmi Colas 
of Acy (Oise)  is  described as a  'small-scale and poor seller of eggs,  fish  and 
cheese'  ,3~2 and thus included in the figure in parentheses, as  is  Jean Chacon of 
Montataire (Oise), a 'poor labourer,.383  This number is presented separately so 
that  proportions  can be tallied  to  100%,  but also  to  indicate the regularity of 
rebel's  low-standing.  The  remissions  described  more  supplicants  as 
impoverished than  identifIed  as  rural  miisans,  which is  remarkable  giving the 
cost of obtaining a remissions. 
Remissions that ascribe no occupation whatsoever to supplicants were the 
most common.  Normally, a supplicant, ifhe had an occupation worthy oflisting, 
would probably have wished to include it for his good name and reputation. Thus 
the relative rarity of Jacques with occupations listed was probably indicative that 
they  had  no  'trade'  worth recording,  and  therefore  were  common Jacques  or 
peasants.  The remissions, biased heavily in favour of the upper classes or skilled 
artisans, indicate strongly that even the better-off rebels were still, at their heart, 
connected to  the  rural world.  Of course,  the  Jacques  may not have been the 
lowest of peasants.  Claims of poverty are relative,  and  that  individuals were 
destitute yet still able to pay for the remission appears contradictory.  But even 
where occupations were indicated, pardoned rebels were in fact listed as  'most 
often gens du labour', as the chroniclers would have us believe. 
But we can go  beyond specified occupations in the  remission to  perceive the 
rural origins of the revolt. In addition to the remissions constantly using the tenn 
302 AN, JJ86, f.  166, no.  470, 'petit et pouvre marchant de poulaille, de fourmage, oeux et autres 
petites marchandises·. 
3S3  AN, JJIOO, f. 220, no. 643. 
159 'genz du plat-pais' to describe the rebels, the crown's scribes used another phrase 
regularly (especially in JJ86  and in the immediate aftel111ath  of the Jacquerie). 
Sixty  remissions  have  the  following  phrase  near  the  end  of  the  pardon, 
concerning the supplicant's intentions after receiving his pardon: 
He might reap his goods which are in  the fields and send them to  safety, 
and will work and cultivate his lands and vineyards.
384 
To be sure, this was not just a stock phrase: it does not appear in any remissions 
for urban rebels.  Nor does the second clause appear for the 'artisans' within the 
sample.  It is fair to  assume that this phrase indicates that the supplicant worked 
or owned land.  There is  no  infol111ation  to  help us  estimate how much land ~ 
these men may be have been working their own field  or rural  landlords  who 
possesed many fields.  Although not all rural remissions have this phrase (in later 
years,  the  emphasis  of the  latter lines  of the  document  are  on preserving the 
supplicant'S 'body and goods' from further attack), the relative frequency of this 
line along with the ubiquitous 'genz du plat pays' indicates the rural roots of the 
rebellion. 
Claude  Gauvard's  De  Grace  Especial  tallied  occupations  of supplicants  in 
remission letters overall from  1380 to  1422.385  The proportions and percentages 
that go into the calculations are not always transparent.  She does not indicate the 
numbers,  only the percentages,  so  it is  difficult to  get a sense of sample size. 
Supplicants often were specified by 'more than one occupation'; it is, however, 
unclear whether these occupations were  double-counted in the  original survey. 
384  '11  soit cuiller et mettre a sauvete ses biens qui sont aus champs, labourer d  cultiver ses terres 
et vignes·. 
185 Gauvard, De grace especial, v.I. p. 403. 
160 Moreover, individuals without occupations were not listed  .. Nor has she included 
poverty or begging as an occupation in her tallies. 
Table  XIII.  Frequency  of  occupations  in  Gauvard's  sample  and  the 
Jacquerie. 
GAUVARD'S SAMPLE  JACQUES 
Royal Officials  5.4%  2.4% 
Clergy  0.4%  2.4% 
Aliisans  15%  4.8% 
Labourers  19%  8.6% 
Others  3.2%  2.4% 
Unknown  57%  82.5% 
Other  factors  make  such  compansons  somewhat  questionable.  Gauvard's 
remissions were issued in the reign of Charles VI,  and the full sample includes 
such matters as  boundary disputes, tax evasion, theft, pillaging and blasphemy. 
Her sample covers between 1380 and  1422, incorporating areas the size of the 
Languedoc and regions as distant as Toulouse and La Rochelle.  There are more 
remissions in Gauvard's sample from Macon or the Cotentin than there is  from 
Vitry  or  Melun,  two  regions  important  in  the  Jacquelie.  As  mentioned,  the 
sample  includes  records  not  kept  in  the  chancery,  like  the  registers  of the 
Parlement, but it is unclear whether these are included in all tables. 
A comparison does highlight a few key points:  first,  rural labourers,  or 
land  workers  as  we might  call  them,  appear  frequently  (the  vast  majority of 
potential  supplicants  lived in  the countryside,  after all);  in fact,  if we remove 
161 those who specify no  occupation, the propOliions of laboureurs within the two 
samples  are  relatively  close  (41.19%  in  Gauvard's  sample  compared  with 
49.14% of the Jacques).  However, in Gauvard's general sample the proportion 
of alii sans is three times higher. Only 17.5% of Jacques specify an occupation, 
compared with 43% of Gauvard's sample.
386  From this comparison, the Jacques 
appear exceptional compared to the standard recipients of the remission. 
A better comparison can be made if we look at other revolts from this area, and 
this period; for example, here is the tallied occupations of the Parisian revolt and 
the attack on the MarcM of  Meaux in 1358: 
Table XIV. Occupations of the Parisians and the men of Meaux. 
REMISSIONS  SUPPLICANT  OCCUPATION 
86,206  Pierre de Lagny 
86,209  Nicolas Ie Flamenc  Draper 
86,214  Guillaume Ie Fevre  Fish-merchant 
86,216  Jacques du Chastel 
86,220  Nicolas de la COUli-Demie 
86,230  Jean Hersent 
86,233  Laurens de Veullettes  Lillgier 
86,238  Jehan de Monteux  Knight 
86,248  Henry de Chastillon  Knight 
86,252  Guillot Bonnachet  Man at arms 
86,253  .Tehan Fagnet  Merchant 
386  Although the sample would probably be large enough, as Gauvard does not give us integers, it 
is impossible to run t-tests or other tests for statistical significance. 
162 86,271  Gie±fron Ie Flamenc 
86,272  Thomas Gascogne 
86,278  Etienne de la Fontaine  Argentier  du  roy  (Royal 
Master of the Robes) 
86,282  Etielme de Resnie  Captain of  many soldiers 
86,285  PhiIIipe de Jeurre  Espieier 
86,289  J  ehan Pardoe 
86,292  Maron Pardoe  Youngman 
86,371  Jehan de Lyon  Sergeant of  Anns 
86,390  GuiIIaume d'Augueil 
86,519  Salemon de la Tour  poor archer and miserable 
person 
86, 527  Jehan de Saint-Leu  cure of Ste Genevieue 
90,078  Nicolas de la COUli Nemie 
86,n.148  J  ehan de Congi 
86, n. 211  .Tehan Chandelier  Draper. 
86,n.213  lehan Ie Ladre  Mounted  Sergeant  of the 
'Gate' 
86,n.236  Raoul d'  Aucamps 
86,11.274  GuiIIaume de Chavenoil  Priest, Canon 
86,n.290  Thibaud Farcault 
86,n.300  J  ehan de la Ramee 
86,n.312  .Tehan Rose  Maitre,  eonseillor  'du 
roy', avoeat du parlement 
163 86,n.340  J  eannin des Champs 
86,n.341  Regnault Blouart 
Of the  thirty-three  remISSIOns  for  individuals  who  were  pardoned  for  their 
paliicipation in either the Pmisian rebellion or the attack on Meaux, eighteen of 
these individuals had occupations identified; of these, two were churchmen, five 
were 'artisans' (a draper and two merchants), while the other eleven were royal 
officials or soldiers (of various ranks).  Although one of these was listed as poor, 
the  other  eight  were  probably  important  members  of  the  local  political 
conmmnity. 
Below these numbers are broken up into the categories we used earlier: 
Table XV. Occupations of Parisi.ans and men of Meaux, in subgroups. 
Group  Number (Percentage) 
Royal Officials / Military men  11  (32.4%) 
Churchmen  2 (5.9%) 
Aliisans  5 (14.7%) 
Rural Laboureurs  0(0%) 
Poor or Impoverished  1 (2.9%) 
No Occupation given  15 (44.1 %) 
Here the social configuration is radically different from the remissions granted to 
the Jacques.  There are no laboureurs within this urban sample. 
Before we compare the rebellions, there is  another point of comparison 
available  for  how insurgents  were represented in  the  remissions.  Leon  Mirot 
collected the remissions of the  Revolt of the Hammennen and  the Harelle  in 
164 1382,387  when the  "[cJraftsmen came forth from all  parts, raising a standard of 
white  cloth',  according  to  Cousinot  Ie  Chancelier.
388  Miroes  sampling  was 
problematic.  For  example,  in  one  section  Mirot  offered  a  short  list  of 
supplicants' occupations, but a few pages later, he detailed some additional rebel 
craftsmen.  With  this  in  mind,  it  is  possible  that  Mirot  does  not  record 
everything.  Yet only fourteen of the sixty-four individuals named within the text 
have no  occupation directly attributable to  them, implying that professions was 
something that Mirot did note when relevant: 
Table XVI.  Occupations of Maillotins and those of the Harelle. 
Group  Number (percentage) 
Royal  Officialsj~~  4 (6.3%) 
Religious Officials-,)I)  1 (1.6%) 
Artisans or middling sorr;~  I  43  (67%) 
Laboureur  0 
Poor or impoverished"')- 3 (4.8%) 
No occupation'ij  14 (21.9%) 
337 L. Mirot, Les insurrections IIrbaines au debut dll rcgne de Charles VI (I  380-J  383) (Paris: 
Fontemoing, 1905), particularly p.  114, but also pp.  114-140. 
333 Guillaume Cousinot I,  Gcsle de l1oblcs, ed. Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1859), ed. and trans. 
Cohn, PP, p.  300. 
339 There are two royal valets, one marescf1a/ and one maire. 
39(J  There is one cleric in the sample. 
391  Included in this category are bankers (1), leathermakers (2), pioncers (1), marc/zands (1), 
drapers (3), shoemakers (3), potmakers (2), innkeepers (1), winesellers (I), notaries (1), ollvrier 
d 'images (1), goldsmiths (3), bee1111akers (1), drapes-sellers (3), bakers (I), knifemakers (3), 
skinners (1), balTel-makers (1), vinegar-vendors (1), money-changers (1), hoodmakers (2), 
hOl71l11es de Illestiers (I), candlemakers (1), engravers of  seals (I), minstrels (I ),formiers (1), 
embroiderers (I) and doubleticrs (1). 
392  Included in the 'poor and impoverished' are two individuals described as 'pauvre et miserable 
personnes' and one as a 'manservant'.  Rather than leave the latter out of  the sample, he has been 
included in this column. although one could argue he should have his own category  . 
.  '93 Not included in the "no occupations' is one individual described as a 'young man', who has no 
occupation described for him but may not have been old enough to have developed a trade.  This 
is why the proportions do not add up to 100%. 
165 In the case of 1382, remissions are plimarily issued to. the urban artisan.  There 
are no labourers or menial workers within this sample, although two are issued to 
'poor' supplicants and one for a young man.  These three examples confirm that 
while remissions were issued to insolvent supplicants, they were very much the 
exceptions.  This  sample  also  shows  us  what an  artisan revolt (how  Cazelles 
described the J  acquelie) would appear in the remission record: almost two-thirds 
of the  individuals  in  1382  were  aliisans,  and  a  wide  range  of trades  were 
represented,  ranging  from  shoemakers  and  drapers  to  money-changers  and 
g?ldsmiths. 
Comparing the  Jacquerie  with the two  Parisian revolts,  then  we see  a 
definitive difference between the rural rising and its urban countel"paris: 
XVII. Comparison of occupations. 
Jacquerie  Paris 1358  Paris 1382 
Royal Officials  2.4%  32.4%  6.3% 
Clergymen  2.4%  5.9%  1.6% 
AIiisans/Middling  4.8%  14.7%  67% 
SOli 
Labourer  8.6%  0%  0 
Impoverished  7.2%  2.9%  4.8% 
No  occupation  80.1%  44.1%  21.9% 
gIVen 
Compared to  Etienne Marcel's rebellion, only a very small percentage of royal 
officials appear in the Jacquerie; Marcel and his troops were clearly the political 
166 and military elite of Paris.  Noticeably fewer artisans  and more impoverished 
supplicants  staffed the Jacquerie  than appear in either of the  Parisian revolts; 
again, the Jacques were undoubtedly of lower status than the Parisian rebels. The 
two most significant differences, however, were first that fewer rebels among the 
Jacquerie possessed an occupation listed at all, and second that men who worked 
or  owned  land  compose  the  bulk  of Jacques  (lzomme  de  labourer).  Such 
identification does  not  appear once  within the two  Parisian revolts.  The first 
observation indicates that the Jacques were poorer than urban rebels; the latter 
shows the Jacquerie to  be what the chroniclers said:  it  was a rural rebellion by 
the men of the countryside.  Where occupations were listed, which was rare, the 
insurgents  were  most  often  rural  figures  who  wished  to  be  allowed  back  to 
'cultivate their lands'.  Sadly, we cannot glean any information as  to how well-
off (or otherwise) these individuals were. What we can say is that even within a 
dataset  that  heavily  favoured  the  richest  of urban  society,  the  evidence  is 
overwhelming  that  the  rebels  were  agricultural  toilers.  When  they  had  no 
occupation specified,  which was  most often,  we  can hardly presume that they 
were higher up  the  village hierarchy than the lzomme  de  labour.  The Jacques 
were notably different from  those of the Parisian rebellions of 1358  and 1382, 
and from the general population who received pardons for common crimes and 
reasons other than popular protest. 
THE CLERGY AND THE JACQUERIE 
The ascendancy of the parish priest over his parishioners often had  the 
effect of  placing him at the head of a revolt, either as its instigator or even 
as its leader.. .  They were tailor-made spokesmen for their parishioners 
167 who could articulate their local grievances  ... Knowing the misery. and 
the hopes of his parishioners better than anyone else, he could establish 
himself as the defender ~  both tactical and passionate ~  of the interests of 
1 .  .  394 
lIS commumty. 
Yves-Marie Berce's model of early modem revolt placed the rural clergy at the 
centre of rural protest.  The quote above indicates the two-fold importance that 
Berce considered the clergy to  possess in uprisings.  First, their position in the 
heart of village society and their understanding of peasant concems placed them 
at the centre of any uprising.  Secondly, the clergy's role at the head of village 
society translated directly into a leadership role within the rebellion.
395  These 
twin roles supposedly enabled the clergy to assume leadership roles in the 'pre-
industrial riot'. 
The little that has been written on the Jacques has stressed the surprising 
silence of the clergy in the records of the  crown and the clu'oniclers.  Michel 
Dommanget made the point that 'if the clergy had taken part [in the revolt], the 
Church  is  not  once blamed'  .396  The  chroniclers  were  not  hesitant  to  blame 
churchmen for their part in other revolts, most famously Robert Ie Coq, bishop of 
Laon,  whom Jean Ie  Bel described as  'spiteful' for his  part  in the uprising in 
Paris of 1358.
397  Yet there is  nothing recorded in the chronicle accounts that 
would  imply  other  churchmen  were  involved  in  the  Jacquerie  of  1358. 
Systematic study of the chronicles in this period suggests the same is  true for 
many medieval revolts; Cohn argues that 'civil revolts that were led by clerics or 
that even mentioned them were extremely rare'  .398 
394  Beree, Revolt and revolution in early modem Europe, tr. Bergin, pp. 67-70. 
395 'The clergy of the parish, being themselves ofloeal origin, took part in local life and could 
easily come to hold a decisive position in their village', Berce, Revolt and revolution, p.  70. 
396 M.  Dommanget, La Jacquerie (Paris: F. Maspero, 1971), p.85. 
397 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p.  264, trans. Cohn, pp, pp.  154 
398 Cohn, Lustfor Liberty, p.  112. 
168 Yet  others  have  emphasised that  Berce's vision  can be applied  to  the 
Jacques.  Raymond Cazelles declares that '[t]here are clerks, priests, incumbents 
of rural parishes and even a canon from Meaux,.399  As the chronicle accounts 
make no mention of the clergy (barring Robert Ie  Coq's involvement with the 
rebellion in Paris),  Cazelles's only source of reference for this statement is  the 
remissions  catalogued  by  Luce.  Once  again,  however,  Cazelles  at  best  has 
allowed Luce's skewed sample to mislead him, but even here, he does not supply 
numbers or even examples, other than the urban canon of Meaux, who was not 
involved in the rural Jacquelie.  If we tum to the whole population of  remissions, 
only four churchmen appear: 
Table -"-rvUI.  The clergy and the Jacquerie. 
REMISSION  NAME  LOCATION  TITLE 
JJ86,265  Jean Morel  Blacy (Marne)  'prestre, cure' 
JJ86, 365  Jean Rose  Angicourt  'clerc, tonsuree' 
(Oise) 
JJ86,386  J ehan N erenget  GilocoUli  'prestre, cure' 
(Oise) 
JJ86,465  Colin Ie Barbier  Ballilleo (Oise)  'clelici tonsUli' 
The rarity of the clergy is stliking.  The remissions count as many rural butchers 
recorded as  rural clelics.  Cazelles' assertion that clelics composed a substantial 
part of the revolt is sheer conjecture.  Even the four exceptions do  not clearly fit 
Berce's vision of the rural clergyman involved in the pre-industrial riot.  While 
the curates were obviously important figures in their rural palishes, the roles of 
199 Cazclles, 'The Jacquerie', p. 75. 
169 the clerics, Jean Rose and Colin Ie Barbier, within their village is  unclear (Rose 
in  particular  becomes  involved  through  his  links  to  the  bonne  ville  of 
Compiegne). 
To be more generous, Cazelles's claim may derive directly from Luce's 
Pieces Justfficatives, where tlu'ee of these four were recorded.  As Luce reprints 
only thiliy-three remissions issued to individuals, it may give the impression that 
religious  men make up  a  more  sizeable  number than the  whole  collection  of 
remissions  attest to  (still,  it  would  only be around  9%).  Yet,  only  one  other 
remission outside Luce's collection is issued to  a clergyman, and they make up 
just 2.4% of the individual Jacques pardoned.
40o  Considering clerics are one of 
the groups whom would be expected to  apply for remissions, both in tenns of 
ability  to  afford  them  and  also  necessity of preserving their  'good name  and 
reputation',  this  seems  surprisingly  low,  and  contradicts  traditional 
understandings  of  pre-modem  revolts,  in  particular  Berce's  emphasis  on 
transferral of the priest's central role in rural life directly into rural rebellion. 
Some may have suspected the clergy of playing a role within a rebellion, 
but not the crown.  Jean Morel's remission starts with this interesting statement: 
It is  said, and we believe, that the curates of the villages of these plains 
[around  Blacy] ,  and  especially  the  said  supplicant,  were  favourably 
disposed and obedient to these lords in the region.  [Yet] they [the nobles] 
considered them all traitors, and especially the said curate ... as  a result 
of which many of the  said curates  ... were several  times  put in great 
401  danger. 
400  See the previous section on  'The Composition of  the Jacquerie' for the calculation of  this 
percentage. 
401  AN, JJ86, n. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  188. 
170 The  nobles  around  Blacy jumped  to  the  same  conclusion as  Berce:  that  the 
curates must be involved in their parishioners' rebellion.
402  With there being a 
definite benefit to  playing down one's involvement in any given remission, no 
doubt the curates would claim their innocence anyway.  Yet the acceptance of  the 
crown of the innocence of the local curates, not just the petitioner, indicates that 
the crown did consider the rural clergy to  be blameless in this incident, and the 
comparative absence  of other churchmen in  the  remissions  suggests  the  same 
across the north of  France. 
This  is  supported  when  we  consider  the  individual  stories  contained 
within the remissions.  Jean Rose came from Angicourt, but sent his family to 
safety in Compiegne because he feared the rebels.  When he did join the Jacques, 
he did so under constraint, and was sent to Compiegne by Guillame Cale himself, 
holding  letters  intended  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  townsmen.  Rose's 
relationship to his home village had no impact on his role within the rebellion.
403 
Jean Morel  was  suspected of having supplied the  commoners  with grain,  but 
claimed that the rebels had actually stolen it.  Worse, they 'ordered him to dance, 
keeping him in line with his stick'  .404  This priest was a focus for bullying, not a 
catalyst to  rebellion.  These individuals were not  empowered by their links  to 
their  villages:  Jean  Rose  acted  outside  his  own  parish,  and  Jean  Morel  was 
treated as an outsider (and as an enemy) by his own parishioners. 
These men were not leaders: Jean Morel was subordinated and humiliated 
by his parishioners.  Jean Rose may have been a more ambiguous case.  He was 
402 Interestingly, later monarchs like Charles VII did use mendicant friars as spies within 
communities, but never curates or village clergy.  See M. Vale, Charles V!! (New Jersey: 
University of Califomia Press, 1974), pp.  121-3. 
403  AN, JJ86, n.  365, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 272-4. 
404 Of course, it would have been in Morel's interests to downplay links between himself and the 
rebellion, but there is no particular reason to believe that Morel fabricated this anecdote.  AN, 
JJ86, n. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP. p.  188 
171 executed by the baillif whose 'hemi was full of anger', and believed him to have 
been the leader of the Jacques.  The remission then notes that this was despite the 
fact he was  'tonsured and in habit'; the implication being that Rose's habit and 
tonsure  made  it  unlikely  that  he  was  the  leader,  the  opposite  of Berce's 
contention that clerics were the natural leaders of  pre-industrial popular protest. 
Only  the  remission  for  Colin  Ie  Barbier  suggests  an  active  role  that 
churchmen may have played within the revolt.  Wonied about a potential attack 
on  his  village  of BallilIeo,  Colin  rang  the  village's  two  bells  to  summon 
defenders  to  defend  the parish  against enemies.41J5  The rural  clergy could  be 
impOliant  in the assemblage  and  beginnings  of the  revolt,  because  they  held 
within their jurisdiction a powerful tool for summoning and organising potential 
rebels:  church bells.  Jean Morel was  even suspected by the nobles  as  having 
'sold the bells', which was one of the reasons that the nobles distrusted him.406 
As  Corbin writes,  'in this domain, a decisive mission was devolved to  the bell-
linger,.407  The functions  that church bells could have in the community - the 
impetus  to  assemble,  to  celebrate,  and  to  arm  - were  in  the  hands  of the 
clergyman.  Yet announcing assemblies was not a crime in itself, nor were bells 
required to assemble.  Colin rang the bells only when his parish was threatened, 
not when they were seeking to join the Jacques' pillaging.  As Natalie Davis has 
stressed, peasants often assumed the position of preacher408  (in the example of 
~05 AN, JJ86, f.  164, no. 465, 'nisi cum sola campana pulsare presumeret, nisi propter timorem et 
strepitul11 inimicorul11 regni, in quo cavere Iiceret cuicumque, ad pmTochie tuiccioncm ct 
dcfcncionem ac inimicorum reistanciam, cum duabus pulsare campanis, ad finem quod gentes 
annorum, secundum cujuslibet facultatcm, ad villam ubi son us seu pulsacio dictarum 
campanarum inciperet, mitterentur, ad resistendu111 inimicis et ad eorum potenciam 
cleprimendam' . 
"06 AN, JJ86, f.  89, n. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  189. 
"07 A.  Corbin, Les cloches de la terre, paysage son are et cultllre sensible dans les call1pagnes au 
XIXe siecle (Paris: A. Michel, 1994).p. 155. 
408  In  'Religious Riof, Davis argues that although 'clerics and political otTicers were activc 
membcrs of  the crowd, though not precisely in thcir official capacity'(p. 66), 'not all religious 
172 Ballilleo,  another individual  wams  the  villagers  with his  'loud voice,409),  and 
peasants could also assume control of the bells.  Bell-ringing was not solely the 
preserve of the rural clergy, and only this remission shows a churchmen acting in 
this manner.410 
Cazelles is  right that there were churchmen in the revolt,  but they were 
rare and played only minor roles, if indeed they played them at all,  within the 
rebellion.  Just as the chronicles do  not see the clergy as complicit in the revolt, 
three of our clergymen were pardoned for acting under constraint or for having 
only  acted  in  self-defence.  Moreover,  none  was  considered  to  have  had  a 
prominent role in the rebellion, none were leaders, and all were ancillary to  the 
main criminal acts specified in the remissions.  Colin Ie Barbier summoned the 
villagers but could not be blamed for their actions afterwards.  Jean Rose was 
wrongly  executed,  and  was  only  the  unwilling  messenger in  the  negotiations 
between Cale and  Compiegne.  Worst of all,  Jean  Morel  was humiliated and 
literally  whipped into  action by the villagers that Berce's model  suggested he 
should lead.  The clergy within the Jacques were notable because their position in 
rural society did not translate to an equal standing within the revolt. 
If this revolt cannot be characterised by the involvement of clergy then neither 
can  it  be  characterised  by  violence  against  clergymen.  Even  Ie  Bel,  who 
describes the Jacques as Saracens and defines them by their ungodliness, makes 
riots could boast of officers or clergy in the crowd' (p.  67).  Moreover, often the crowd would 
often assume the clergy's function during religious riots: 'we have seen crowds taking on the role 
of priest, pastor or magistrate to defend doctrine or purify the religious community" (p. 90). 
~09 AN, JJ86, f.  164, n. 465, 'et special iter per unum hominem alta voce ad ara se prompcius 
preparent clamantem'. 
410  E.  Cockayne, 'Cacophony, or vile scrapers on vile instruments: bad music in early modern 
English towns, Urban Hist01J!, 29, n.1  (2002), pp. 35-47. 
173 no  mention of any specific acts against the Church.41
1  We have only one set of 
remissions  that  suggests  any  anti-clerical  violence  at  the  time.  These  four 
remissions, issued to five villages that sent men to  an assembly in Champagne, 
alleged the following: 
they set many conspiracies, alliances and monopolies against the nobles 
and the clergy for their destruction and executions.412 
This  phrasing  is  exceptional,  and  appears  nowhere  else  111  the  sources; 
presumably  it  refers  to  specific  acts  of anti-clerical  violence.  However,  its 
existence both highlights the rarity of anti-clelical violence, while indicating that 
the  crown  was  interested  in  punishing  it  when  they  could  establish  that  it 
happened.
413 
The clergy did not play the role in the Jacquerie that Berce imagined, nor do  the 
Jacques  'envelop the priests and nobles in  a common hatred,.414  Models  that 
emphasise  the  importance  of churchmen  as  both  instigators  and  targets  of 
popular violence do not fit the Jacquerie.  Rather, the peasants were empowered 
to  reject  traditional  'leaders'  who  the  social  hierarchy provided,  and  instead 
selected their own champions and find  their own impetus to  revolt.  Moreover, 
the rebels' lack of interest in attacking the  church emphasises again that  these 
411  Ie Bel does state that 'had God not remedied matters by His grace, the commoners would have 
destroyed all the nobility, the Holy Church, and all the rich throughout the country', but he makes 
no mention of  any violence committed against the property or persons of the Church. Bel, 
Chrol1., v.2, p.  257, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  152. 
412 AN, JJ86, f.  125, no.  367, and f.  122, nos. 358, 359, 360. 
413 Dommanget argues that this indicates that in the region around Pelihois, Chaumont and Vitry 
thc peasants 'envelopperent dans une haine commune les prctres ct les nobles', mentioning that 
the remissions use the above quote. Yet there are many remissions from that area that do not 
mention the clergy (for example, the much quoted remission for Bettancourt and Vroil, AN, JJ86, 
f.  117, no. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 266-9, reprinted in Cohn, PP,  pp.  187-8). Only 
thc four remissions issucd in connection to this grand assembly in Champagne usc this form of 
phrase.  With that in mind, it seems likely that this was one specific ineidcnt of  anti-clerical 
violence, rather than indicative of  the character of violence in the whole region.  Dommanget, La 
Jacqllerie, p.85. 
414 ibid. 
174 rebels were not simply striking out .at  authority, but rather were. focussing upon 
the property of nobility. 
WOMEN AND THE JACQUES 
The involvement of women was also traditional.  They were to be found 
first of all in the grain disturbances, where they often formed the maj ority 
of the crowds.  In other types of disturbance, they might also appear in 
the  front  ranks,  where their presence was  a  more eloquent  sign of the 
misery and determination of  the community.-m 
For Yves-Marie Berce and others, the pre-industrial revolt was characterised by 
an  emphasis  on  food  riots,  and  therefore  by  the  involvement  of women.
416 
Women,  whose  responsibilities  extended  over  the  hearth  and  were  chiefly 
affected by domestic clisis, were the first to mobilise in these stlUggles.
417  This 
argument  is  central  to  the  image  of the  'pre-industrial  revolt',  although  its 
relevance to  the medieval period has recently been called into question.
418  Yet 
while many other generalisations of Berce, such as  the impOliance of the lUral 
clergy, have been enthusiastically applied to  the Jacquerie by historians such as 
Raymond Cazelles, there has been no  mention of women in any of the studies 
.  1  J  419  concernmg t le  acques. 
415 Berce, Revolt alld revolution in early modern Europe (Manchester, 1987), tr.  Bergin, pp.  107-
8. 
~16  Also see Rude, Paris and London in the Eighteenth Ceil/lilY for the impOliance of  the food riot 
in the so-called pre-industrial riot. 
417 Of  course, the Jacquerie was no food riot, and it has been categorically shown by Cohn that 
the food riot itself was far from prevalent in the medieval world (Cohn, Lust/or Liberty,p. 70-
75).  Nonetheless, Beree's theories have been widely accepted by scholars like Raymond 
Cazelles, as suggested earlier. 
41S  'To conclude that women were the traditional participants or the leading force behind 
medieval revolts, however, would be to disregard the sources entirely'. Cohn, LliST /01' Liberty, p. 
135. 
419 Cazel1es, 'The Jacquerie', in  The English Rising, ed. Aston and Hilton. 
175 The involvement of women in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, most studied 
of all the great uprisings of the fourteenth century, had been largely ignored in 
recent years until Sylvia Federico's recent article on the subject.
42o  This is all the 
more  surprising  considering  that  there  is  documentary  evidence  of women's 
impOliance within the English rising.
421  Pardon rolls for 1381, very different to 
letters of remission but serving the same general function, contained the names 
of women:  Fedelico records one roll as listing thirty female names.
422  Federico 
unfOliunately does not give us the relative proportion of female to male names; 
nonetheless, the fact that it contained women's names at all illustrates that 'royal 
officials  could  imagine women acting as  perpetrators  in  [the  revolt].  ...  That 
these women sought pardon in the first  place suggests  ... that they,  too,  could 
.  .  1 If"  47,  Imagme  t 1emse ves  as  perpetrators  0  cnme.-'  While  the  Peasants'  Revolt 
celiainly  could  not  be  characterised  as  predominantly  'female'  ,424  there  is 
documentary evidence that women were part of  the rising, even acting as leaders, 
like the remarkable Johanna Fenour.
425 
420 S.  Federico, 'The Imaginary Society: Women in  1381', The Journal of  British Studies, 40, No. 
2 (April, 2001), pp.  159-183.  Before that, discussion of women in the Peasants Revolt can be 
found in A.  Reville, Le soufeFement des rravailleurs d Angfeterre ell  1381 (Pmis,  1898). 
421  Federico starts her aJiiclc off with the example of Margery Stane, \vho is said to have bumt 
clerical records.  Moreover, Henry Knighton believed that the improper treatment of  women by 
the crown's officers instigated the revolt, and there are numerous legal cases in which rebels are 
charged with crimes of  rape or abduction of women.  S.  Federico, 'The Imaginary Society', pp. 
159, 178. 
422 ibid., p.  163. 
423  ibid., p.  164.  Federico uses the telln 'horizon of plausibility' to describe women's 
involvement: thnt it was considered plausible by contemporaries that women had been involved 
in the rising. 
424 Chroniclcrs like Knighton and Walsingham almost exclusively use 'men' to describe the 
insurgents.  For example, tIle Chrollica kJaiora describes the peasants from Essex as 'weary of 
their prolonged exertions, and were to some extent desirious of seeing their homes, wives and 
children again' (p.433), and that the rebels were 'abandoning ... their wives' (p. 413).  The 
Chronica Maiora o{Thol7las Wafsingham,  1376-1422 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005), trans. 
D. Preest, ed.  J. Clark. 
42:'  'Johanna ... went as the chief perpetrator and leader of a grent society of  evildoers fj'om  Kent', 
KB 27/842 rex. m 3.d, translated by Federico, 'The Imaginery Society', p.  168.  The full 
documcnt is transcribed in Reville, Le sOlifeFemenl (Paris, 1898), pp.  199-200. 
176 As  regards  the Jacquerie,  the chronicles of 1358  make .no  mention of women 
acting as  insurgents.  In this respect, the Jacquerie appears similar to  the third 
great revolt of the later Middle Ages,  the revolt  of the Ciompi.  The general 
tenns  for  the  insurgents  may  not  always  be  gender  specific  - commoners, 
'peuple',  rustics  - but  the  implication  is  that  these  offenders  were  male.
426 
Women do  get the occasional mention, however, even if they remain largely in 
the background.  The Chronique des  Quatre Premiers  Valois  mentions that the 
countess of Valois gave the Jacques provisions outside Gaillefontaines and also 
suggests that rural women may have had a logistical role in the revolt: 
For they [the Jacques] had become accustomed in the villages and places 
they passed through to  have the people, men and women, put tables out 
into the streets.
427 
This is not repeated by any other chronicler, but it seems plausible that villagers 
supported and supplied the Jacques  with food,  while not joining the rebellion 
themselves.  Even in stocking the rebels, men were still involved; even this was 
not a specifically 'female' role. 
Alongside  this  single  chronicle  account,  we have  only  one  remISSIOn 
connected to  the rebellion of l358 that mentions women taking an active role. 
The account however has little to do with the Jacquerie itself, but is illustrative of 
one potential function of women within the revolt: their ability to start violence. 
In this case, the parliament sent Hue de Saint-Amle, a baillif and sergeant of the 
parlement, to arrest one man, Jean Sirejean, who with another male Jean Daulle 
had been fined 1,300 livres toumais for their pali in the commotion: 
426 The name'  J  aequerie' of course originates fi'om the slang name used condescendingly by the 
nobility.  Better evidence, perhaps, is the insistence by the remissions that the culprits were the 
gelZz du plat-pays. 
427 Chrol7.  premiers Valois, p.  72, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  160. 
177 That bailliff (Izuissier),  went with  Jehan  of AlTaz,  our sergeant  of the 
provoste  of Montdidier,  to  the  said  town  (ville)  of Hangest  (SOlllille) 
where they found the said Jehan Sire in his  hostel and they placed him 
under alTest  in our name, and they wished to  take him prisonner.  Then 
the valet of the said baillif picked up his sword drawn and ran to the the 
church of the said town (ville).  As  soon as the women who were there 
who  saw the  said valet with the  said sword unsheathed,  they uttered  a 
great cry.  At that great cry, Nicaise Sire Jehan, PielTe Patin, PielTe Sire 
Jehan, Jehan du  Lot and Martin Troquet mshed out there,  each with an 
.  .  d I  .  l' 1  d  4
08  1ron-t1ppe  ance or axe m  l1S  lan  s.  -
The  incident  diffused  without  fuliher  violence  but  shows  women  instigating 
popular action.  The 'great cry' came close to creating a mini-riot, as it did in the 
beginning of several  other late medieval revolts,  like  the  Maillotins.
429  This 
incident, however, was not pari of the Jacquerie, but rather the alTest  of rebels 
several  years  after the  initial  revolt.  If anything,  it highlights  the absence of 
women  from  the remissions  associated with the Jacquelie.  Although women 
could instigate popular violence in late medieval revolts and their actions could 
be recorded in pardon-tales (as N.Z. Davis has shown), such incidents were not 
recorded during the rebellion of 1358.
430 
The remissions concerning the Jacques only record the names of women 
when they are making claims on behalf of their husbands  .  .!3]  For example, the 
remission for her husband Jean Rose, who had carried letters to  Compiegne for 
the  Jacques  but  been  executed  when  mistaken  for  a  leader,  was  sought  by 
428 'LequeI hussier, avec lui lehan d'AITaz notre sergent la provoste de Montdidier, allerent en 
ladite ville de Hangest en laquelle iI  trouverent Jehan Sire en son hostel, auquel il mirent la main 
dc par nous, et Ie vouldrent amener prisonnier.  Et lors Ie varlet dudit hussier print son espee et 
COUITU devant Ie moustier de laditte ville, et tantost 1cs fcmmes d'icelle qui virent !edit varlet avec 
Indite espee tout nue, firent et getterent un grant cry.  Pour lequc1 frant cry, Nicaise Sire lehan, 
PieITe Potin, PieITe Sire lehan, lehan Du Lot et Martin Troquet, saillircnt suz, chascun un baston 
feITe ou haches en leurs mains'.  AN, 11107, no. 186.  This remission is transcribed by Gauvard, 
De grace especial, v.l, pp. 342-3. 
429  For some examples ofrcvolts triggered by women's cries, see Cohn, LlIsl/or Liberty (2006), 
pp.  132-3. 
·130  Sec, for example, 'Women on Top', in Davis, Society and CIIIIlIre in Early Modern France, 
pp.124-152. 
4,1  Therc are many examples of this.  See AN, JJ86, f  120, no. 352, where Isabelle, wife of PicITe 
de Soissons, appeals for grace on behalf of  her late husband, murdered in the nobles' retaliation. 
178 'Jehanne, wife of the late .Tehan Rose ofla Pirelle near AngicoUli,.432  Not only 
did Jehanne claim that .Tehan had committed crimes only under duress, but also 
she required a posthumous pardon for her husband to  'feed three children'.  This 
remission is  also  indicative of the passive role  that  the pardon-letters  suggest 
women played in the revolt: her husband sent Jehanne and her children to safety 
in Compiegne by the husband when violence broke out. 
Chronicle and remission evidence suggest that women were connected to 
the Jacquerie in  only two ways.  First,  they appear in  the chronicle record as 
having  supported  the  effolis  of the  Jacques  by providing food  and  supplies. 
Second,  and most commonly,  they appeared in their role as  wives;  submitting 
claims for grace to re-establish their property, good name and renown.  All these 
examples place women as secondary to the active agents of  the rebellion, defined 
by the  crown as  exclusively male,  Women were.  only recorded as  aides to  an 
entirely male insurgency, 
It  should be noted that women were not  as  numerous  in the  registers  of the 
chancery as the men.  Bourin and Chevalier estimate that 6,5% of remissions in 
.c  I  L  '  .  d  4i3  lourteent l-century  Olre  were  Issue  to  women, - This  number  falls  even 
fUl1her as the period continues: in the reign of Charles VI,  only 4% were issued 
to women, and by the reign of Charles VIII, it was lower than 2.5%.434  This is 
432 AN, JJ86, f  124, no.  365, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, p. 272-4  This remission has been 
transcribcd by Luce, and has been detailed elsewhere. 
·m M.  Bourin and B.  Chevalier, 'Le COl11portelnent Criminel dans Ie pays de la Loire l110yenne 
d'apres les lettres de remission (vers 1380-1450)', Anl1ales de Bretagne et de pays de I'ouest, 88 
(1981), p. 251. 
434 Gauvard, De grace especial, pp. 300-30 I.  Gauvard believes this is due to the increase in types 
of  homicide pardonable by remission that, as most homicides are committed by mcn, causes a 
greater imbalance bctween the sexes: '[pJlus qu'iJ une evolution de la eriminalite feminine, eet 
affaiblissment est du a revolution de la source considcree qui, au cours du xv siecle, filtre de 
plus en plus Ie, types de Climes rel11is pour reduires pratiquel11ent a  l'hol11icide des la XVIe 
siecle'. 
179 considerably  less  than  we might  expect,  considering what  little  we  know  of 
female  criminality.  10%  of those  recorded  within  the  Registre  Criminel  elu 
Chatelet were women;"35  Nicole Gonthier estimates for Montpellier that women 
committed almost  20%  of all  crimes  in the  area.
436  This  difference may be 
explained by the tJ:equency of homicide within the chancery: homicide was the 
most common crime recorded, and almost all murderers pardoned by the crown 
were  male.
437  There  would  have  undoubtedly  been  practical  problems  for 
women receiving remissions: they would need high standing in the community 
and willing character witnesses or supplicants who would make their case to  the 
crown.  They also required the financial capability to afford a remission, which 
as demonstrated was outside the reach of the vast majority of individuals.  Yet it 
is  important  to  stress  that  women  did  receive  remissions  for  crimes  they 
conU11itted. 
The chronicles of the Jacquerie do mention women, but only as victims of male 
violence.  All of the chronicles indicate that the brutality of the Jacques was not 
just targeted against noble men: 
And when the Jacques saw what a great crowd they were, they charged 
against the nobility,  killing many.  Worse,  they became deranged, mad 
people of little sense, often putting to death noble women and children.
438 
The  implication  here  by  the  otherwise  sympathetic  Chronique  des  Quatres 
Premiers Valois was that the targeting of women was something extraordinarily 
immoral, even compared with the murder of the men. The sign that the crowd has 
435 Gauvard, De grace especial, p.301. 
436 Quoted in Gauvard, ibid., p. 30  I.  For recent work on crime in the medieval period, see N. 
Gonthier, Ie chfilill1ent dll crime au Moyen Age (XIf-XVI siecles) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires 
de Rennes, 1998). 
437  For example. Gauvard records that over 99% of  all homicides in her sample were committed 
by men, p. 307. 
438 Chroll. premiers Valois, p. 71-2, trans. Coiln, PP, p.  160. 
180 become deranged and lost its  senses is  not their attack against the nobility but 
rather when they turned their attention to women and children.  Violence against 
women  is  repeatedly  used  by  chroniclers  to  indicate  how  the  Jacquerie  was 
exceptionalZv savage: 
The traces of their wickedness swelled: they put to  death any noblemen 
they found,  even  noble  children  ...  [a]nd  even many noble ladies  and 
maidens were rounded up to be inhumanely murdered.439 
For  Richard  Lescot,  the  treatment  of women  was  the  worst  wickedness  the 
insurgents committed. Jean de Venette, one of the more sympathetic chroniclers 
of the  Jacquerie,  sounds  the  same  note:  that  while  the  destruction  of noble 
property  was  unacceptable,  the  execution  of 'noble  ladies'  was  'still  more 
lamentable,.440 
Rape  and  sexual  violence  represent  the  worst  excesses  of  peasant 
violence and the best indication of the inhumanity of the mob.  For Froissart, the 
attack on the Marche of  Meaux was specifically an attack upon 'a great gathering 
of ladies  and  maidens with their young children';  their intentions  were not to 
have  overthrown  the  fortress  but  to  have  'violated,  raped  and  killed'  these 
441  "maidens'.  Jean Ie  Bel declares the  Jacques were boastful about the sexual 
violence they committed: 
There were even those who confessed to have helped in raping the ladies; 
some claiming six ladies; others, seven; still others, eight, nine, ten, and 
twelve, and they killed them as well, even if  they were pregnant.442 
In  his most famous  example,  Ie  Bel records in detail a women who was  gang-
raped then  force-fed  the  roasted  flesh  of her husband before being executed. 
This kind of horrific, misogynistic violence was used regularly by the chroniclers 
m  Lescot, Chrol1., p.  126, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  170. 
44f) Venette, Chrol1., v. 2, p. 264. trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 77. 
441  Froissart, Chrol1.,  v.  5, pp. 104, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  156. 
442 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p.  259. trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  151-2. 
181 to  illustrate the exceptional brutality of the revolt - le Bel states that he 'would 
not  dare write or tell of ... the indecorous things  they did  to  ladies,.443  This 
rhetoric  undoubtedly  impressed  on  readers  the  atrocious  behaviour  of  the 
peasantry. 
It is  then  surpnsmg  to  find  no  remISSIOns  whatsoever  that  mention 
women as  victims of the Jacquerie.444  No single individual or group is  accused 
of attacking a woman, and neither are any communities implicated in any such 
violence.445  General remissions do not mention women either.  In contrast to the 
chronicles,  the common phrase that appears in the bulk of remissions does not 
mention  rape;  rather,  the  Jacques  'assaulted  their  fortresses,  distributed  their 
goods and executed them', and  'they' represents the male nobility.446  In many 
cases, their targets are specified as the gentillzoml71es. 
There is only one remission  that  specifies any acts  of violence against 
women cOlmected  to  the Jacquerie, but it was not issued to  the Jacques.  The 
remission was  for Johanis de Bonolis, an esquire (annigerus l1obilis)  who  had 
assembled (congregatis) with several nobles of the realm in Lagny to  retaliate 
against the peasantry, which resulted in a murder, an arson attack and the rape of 
a  woman  named  Tassone  at  Vaires  near  Lagny  (Seine-et-Mame).447  This 
443  ibid., pp.  151-2. 
444 Remissions were issued only when the crown considered the applicant wOlihy of  being 
pardoned; it could bc that attacks on noble women within the .Iacquerie were considered 
unpardonable offences.  However, under normal circumstances men were regularly granted 
remissions for both rape and murder where the victim was female, so this seems unlikely. 
44:' One should note that women were less likely to be the victim in a recorded remission in the 
Regislres des Td;sor des Chartes than men.  Only 9% of Gauvard's sample of  remissions record 
violence against women, so evcn in this regard the sources mostly concern males.  Yet 9% still 
represents several thousands of  remissions; and we would surely expect at least one incident in 
the remissions that exist for the rebellions of 1358 that featured some mention of sexual violence. 
446  In the original, this appears as 'abatre plusiers Iieux fortresses et dissiper leurs biens et aucuns 
d'iceulx mis a mort", with variations.  AN, JJ86, f  123, no. 363. 
447 The reproduction of  this remission is ditlicult to read, and cuts offsevcral sentences.  The 
surnamc of Tassonc and the namc of  her husband is obscured, with the line reading 'raptu 
Tassone quondam uxorum Mas[xJ', with [xl marking the point where the illegibility begins.  The 
next line resumcs 'Vares prope Luaginicum'.  The name of the individual murdered is unclear, 
182 remission, written in Latin and issued to a noble, is certainly exceptional, and the 
immoral violence against a helpless woman was not the chivalric ideal presented 
by  Jean  Ie  Bel,  Froissart  or other  noble  chroniclers  where  violence  towards 
women is mentioned. 
For the chroniclers,  violence towards  women was  not only part  of the 
general  violence  of the  revolt  but  also  what  distinguished  the  Jacquerie  as 
exceptionally brutal.  In  comparison with what chroniclers  like Jean Froissart 
might  have  considered  the  typical  conduct  of war  (even if that  conflict  was 
between peasants and knights),  the targeting of children and especially women 
was focussed upon to  mark out this  revolt as  something particularly abhOlTent. 
Again, it is surPlising that this emphasis was not transfened into the issuing of 
pardons and remissions.  Of course, the stOlies of violence that caught the eye of 
the chroniclers may not have been representative of the behaviour of the whole 
of the peasant force, or may have been simple rhetorical devices.  Perhaps in the 
process of re-establishing the peace the crown intentionally focussed on disputes 
concerning men and propeliy.  Nonetheless, the issue of the action of the Jacques 
towards women is one area where the chronicles and the records of the chancery 
do not concur. 
The phrase used in remissions to  describe the rebels - the gem: dll plat-pais -
seems to be an accurate image of how the sources gender the revol t.  It could be 
that women were simply hidden within pardons issued to  village communities, 
but  the  absence  of specific  remissions  of individuals  seems  more  than  a 
coincidence.  When women do appear, they provide backup to men by providing 
'Guilli [xl hominibus en villa de boneullis', where [xl is unclear.  The individual whose house 
was bumt down is  'Johanis Cousselli ad sancti Tromi de Bonuellis'. AN, JJ91, f.  173, no. 333. 
183 assistance  or  seeking grace  for  them.  More  surpnsmg  IS  the  silence  of the 
remISSIOns  concerning violence done to  women:  the only example is  violence 
done  to  a  peasant,  not  a  noblewoman.  While  other  revolts  and  scholarship 
suggest that it is very unlikely that the Jacquerie was solely a male enterprise, the 
chroniclers'  eyes and the crown's grace fell  solely upon men, and the  pardon-
tales tell us only of crimes committed by and to them. 
184 6 - DISCOVERING THE JACQUERIE 
Much of what has been wlitten up to this point has been about establishing what 
the Jacquerie was not.  The rebellion was not co-opted by elites like Charles of 
Navarre or Etienne Marcel.  Neither was it a brief spark centred on a small area 
around  P31is;  it  spread  across  the  whole  of the  nOlih-east  of France.  The 
repression  was  bloody,  but  not  spearheaded  by  the  crown,  who  instead 
concentrated on re-establishing peace in their realm.  The insurgents were not 
townsmen,  artisans  or royal  sergeants, but rather the 'men of the  countryside'. 
Nor does the revolt follow the model  suggested by Berce for the early modem 
peliod and supposedly pre-industrial revolts writ larger; it was not dominated by 
women nor instigated by the clergy. 
If  it was not any of these things, what was it?  How could a revolt as large 
as  the Jacquerie work?  What instigated it?  The remissions  are  not  silent on 
these  issues.  Rather,  they  establish  the  foundations  for  a  new model  of how 
large-scale rural  revolts might work,  one that perhaps can be applied to  other 
such risings.  Born of a peasantry already actively engaged in resisting the forces 
of both  the  French,  English  and  Navarrese  crowns,  villages  rose  up  against 
individual  fortifications.  Before rising,  they appointed leaders from  the  local 
community, met in assemblies to  discuss  action and select objectives, and sent 
emissaries  backwards  and  forwards  along trade  routes.  The linging of bells, 
audible cal1s-to-anns and even letters could be used to  pass messages back and 
forth between insurgent groups.  Individual local cells assembled against nearby 
nobles;  rather than joining grand annies, they remained in small collections of 
villages  and  concentrated  on  their  surrounding  areas  - recognised  as  p31i  of 
185 something bigger  ('the Jacquerie'),  these  rural  settlements  pursued  their  own 
"micro-insurgencies' against the local nobility. 
This  section  will  first  establish the  culture  of resistance  in the  ile  de 
France, before indicating just how these rebels did conduct themselves. We will 
explore the peasant community - the village  and how it represented the base 
unit  of rebellion,  and  how  these  micro-insurgencies  on  a  local  level  came 
together under the  umbrella of the Jacquerie.  The issue of leadership will  be 
addressed:  who led these peasants, and how were leaders chosen?  Finally, we 
will  look  at  communication:  how  these  communities  organised  and  kept  in 
contact, and what linked these local rebellions  micro-insurgencies - together. 
PEASANT RESISTANCE 
The  idea  that  a  peasant  without  a  lord  was  like  a  sheep  without  a 
shepherd, easy prey to any passing predator, was popular with preachers 
but not much supported by the evidence.  The arrival of  the soldiers in the 
localities did not, usually, result in the scattering of a community but a 
drawing together of that community around the political organisation of 
the village which had served it so well in previous crises.  ·448 
Using chronicle accounts, vernacular literature and letters of remission, Nicholas 
Wright's Knights  and Peasants makes clear that  'social  contlict was  part and 
parcel  of the  Hundred Years'  War in the  French  countryside,.449  Where the 
soldiers  of  the  contlict  went,  violence  followed;  military  historians  have 
established that 'the direct intlicting of misery and harm on the enemy population 
was one of the three main tools in the hands of the medieval commander, along 
44, N. Wright, Knights and Peasants. the Hundred Years  War in  [he French Countryside 
(Woodbridge,: Boydell, 1998). p.  115. 
449 ibid. 
186 with battle and siege'  .450  The ferocity of al111ed  assaults on non-combatants was 
on a new scale in the nOlih:  the  1346  chevauclu!:e,  for  example,  had  stretched 
from Caen to Boulogne and Pontoise.
451  Instead of arguing that peasants were 
'helpless before the power of the soldier', Wright showed that they actively dealt 
with  the  increased  threat  from  the  military,  brigands  and  even  the  nobles.
452 
Evidence from chroniclers and remissions show that the lacquerie was the most 
widespread and violent outbreak in a period of sustained social conflict between 
the peasants and the nobility. 
This wave of resistance was  not  simply restricted to  France but  spread 
across Europe in the wake of the Black Death of 1348.  The most recent addition 
to  the historiography of medieval peasant revolts, Lust for Liberty, argues that 
something changed in the psyche of the medieval peasant (and townsman), not 
immediately following the  first  strike of the plague,  but by the  middle of the 
1350s: 
Postplague  popular  revolt  reflects  an  analogous  about-face  from  utter 
despondency  and  fear  to  a  new  confidence  on  the  part  of peasants, 
aIiisans and workers.
453 
Uprisings like the Peasant's Revolt in 1381  and the Ciompi of 1378 are the best 
studied examples of this trend;454  but in excess of one thousand smaller revolts 
were recorded across the continent by contemporary chroniclers.  In the wake of 
the  plague,  ordinary  inhabitants  of medieval  Europe  shifted  from  passive 
4,0 C.  Rogers, 'The Age of the Hundred Years War', in lvledieval Warfare.  A HislOlY (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,  1999) ed.  M.  Keen, p.  133. 
4,1  ibid., p.  151, and also C.  Rogers,  War.  Cruel alld Sharp, English Strategy Under Erhvard III, 
1327-1360 (Boydell: Woodbridge, 2000), especially 'To Make an End to the War by Battle: The 
Crecy CheW/Lichee,  1346', pp. 238-272. 
4,2 C.  Allmand, 'War and the Non-Combatant', in Medieval Wwfare. A History, ed.  M.  Keen, p. 
205. 
453  Cohn, LlIstfor Liberty, p. 237. 
454  Indeed, Dyer describes the English Peasants' Revolt as coming out of 'well-informed self· 
confidence rather than a blind search for vengeance' in the original proceedings of the Past and 
Present Society Conference, The English Rising of  1381 (The Past And Present Society, 1981), p. 
31. 
187 responses  to  direct  action  when  dealing  with  social  problems,  particularly 
through protest and social revolt.  In the late 1350s, the French peasantry took 
anns to defend their settlements against opposing annies and the nobility. 
However, when historians have attempted to  explain the reason for the 
Jacquerie,  their focus  has  fallen  on so-called economic  factors:  the  Jacquel-ie 
was, according to  Fourquin, a 'revolte de  misere,.455  Mollat and Wolff claimed 
that 'fiscal problems were again a source of discontent', and included the revolt 
within  their  chapter  'Revolts  Against  Poverty'  .456  There  have  been  several 
suggestions  as  to  what these problems were,457  including the  first  attempts  to 
raise ransom due for King Jean II,  who  was  held under captivity in England, 
although the sum would not be fonnalised until the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360.458 
That said, more than one qumier of the noble contingent of the French mmy had 
been  captured  at  Poitiers  in  1356,  including  1400  belted  knights,  fourteen 
different counts and twenty-one barons.459  If  the ransoms for these lesser figures, 
not dealt with by the Bretigny settlement, had been paid before 1360, they would 
weighed heavily upon their subjects.46o  Mollat and W olff suggest that the Black 
Death of 1348 had a catalysing effect on social tensions by creating a greater gap 
455 Fourquin, Les call1pagnes de la region parisienne, p. 233. 
N  Mollat and Wolff, Papillar Rel'olutions, p.  127. 
457 For example, Richard Kaeuper argued that virtually every potential trigger of the Jacquerie 
was essentially financial: 'peasants ...  found themselves expected to pay not only taxation for 
what seemed a war rapidly being lost, but also money to ward off deprivations of English, 
Navarrese or even royal solidcrs, and ... fines ... at the same time, their lords seemed to have 
increased their demands'.  R.W. Kaeuper, War,  Justice and Public Order,  England and France ill 
[he Laler Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p.  353. 
N  Sumption, Fire,  p. 447. 
m  ibid, p. 247. 
460 Accurate amounts for these ransoms is difficult to obtain, even for the high nobility; Given-
Wilson and Seriac argue that it is 'no easy task to discover the amounts for which Edward III 
e\'entually ransomed the prisonners - or, indeed, how many of them were asked to pay ransoms 
at all' (p. 817).  Moreover, 'non-payment of ransoms was, in  tact, extremely common in the 
Hundred Years' War (p. 829).  The exact financial implication for the subjects is unclear.  For 
these quotes, see C. Given-Wilson and F. Seriac, 'EdwardllI's Prisoners of War: The Sattle of 
Poitiers and its context', English Historical Review, 468 (2001), pp. 802-33.  For wider 
discussion of the ransoms and Poitiers, see C. Given-Wilson and F.  Seriac, Les prisonniers de la 
bataille de Poiliers (Paris: H.  Champion, 2002), especially p.  167-195. 
188 between  rich  and  poor,461  although  this  case  has  never  been  properly 
demonstrated.462  Fourquin blamed the so-called price-scissors effect, when the 
price  of agricultaral  produce  falls  but the  price of 'industrial'  goods  remains 
stable, which began as  early as the grain crisis of 1315.463  Yet Fourquin and 
others,  as  mentioned earlier,  have also  shown that  the  lIe  de  France  and  the 
sun-ounding regions  were comparatively well-off in comparison to  the average 
medieval  French  peasant,  even  the  wealthiest  rural  regions  of France  in  the 
fOUlieenth  century.464  Did this  grain clisis persist for so  long?  Even if it did, 
why did  peasants wait  over fifty  years  to  revolt?  Why economic motivations 
caused these seemingly solvent peasants to rebel, and why these tensions erupted 
in 1358 and not earlier, has gone unexplained. 
On the other hand, the chroniclers do not mention destitution, starvation 
or even financial impositions as the cause of  the Jacquelie.  Nor do  they list any 
such demands against  taxes  or dues.  Rather,  they highlight the  failure of the 
nobility  to  hold  up  their  end  of the  social  contract  as  the  social  scientist 
Banington Moore suggested: in general, the peasants provided for the lords, but 
the lords could not in tum protect them from ham1.
465  As Peter Lewis wrote, the 
J  acquelie was the result of 'hatred engendered by the failure of the nobility to do 
its social duty and protect the people from the miseries of warfare'  .466  Jean de 
Venette indicated that the peasants had a 'zeal for justice': 'since their lords were 
461  Mollat and Wolff, Popular Revolurions, pp.  110-115. 
462 For example, Colin Platt argued that the Black Death actually calmed social tcnsions, through 
increasing the value of  the peasants' labour.  C. Platt, King Death. the Black Dealh and its 
aftermatlz in Late Medieval El1gland (London: UCL Press,  1996). 
463  Fourquin, Les campagnes de la region parisiellne, p. 233. 
464 For example, see Fossier, Hisloire sociale de I 'occident 1I11idieval.  This issue was mentioned 
in note 344. 
465 'Therc is considcrable evidence to support the thesis that, where the links out of  this 
relationship between ovcrlord and peasant communities are strong, the tendency toward peasant 
rebelIion (and later revolution) is feeble', B. Moore, Social Origins a/Dictatorship and 
Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press 1961), p. 469. 
466 Lewis, Larer A1edieF{l1 Fral1ce, p. 284. 
189 not defending them but oppressing them,  [they]  turned themselves to base and 
execrable  deeds,.467  Jean Ie  Bel  described the peasants'  motivation  as  anger 
against the 'nobles, knights  and squires [who]  were ruining and disgracing the 
kingdom'  .468  The Chronique NormLlnde made quite clear that revolt was caused 
by the French army's looting: 
Then the regent was advised to  order those of his knights  in  the lIe de 
France  and  the  Beauvaisis  who  had  fortresses  to  stock  their  garrison 
quickly with plenty of provisions .... some did not have means to  supply 
the  provisions  for  their  castles  ...  so  they  were  advised  to  take  the 
provisions from their own people ... these peasants were mortified that 
the  knights  who  were  supposed  to  protect  them  had  seized  there 
property.469 
Not only did the nobility fail to protect the peasants from the ravages of  war, they 
were in tum responsible for those ravages.  Suffering from a lack of supplies, the 
crown's own troops resorted to  pillaging the countryside.  The continuator of 
Richard  Lescot's  chronicle  records  that  by the  summer of 1358,  '[s]ince  the 
plundering was everywhere and no-one was around to oppose the brigands and 
enemy  troops,  the  fields  now  lay  barren'  .470  The  first  time  the  chroniclers 
mentioned  this  plundering concerning the  lIe  de  France  was  in  1358,  as  the 
precursor to  the Jacquerie; the clu'oniclers believed these recent activities were 
the trigger of  the revolt. 
It was not only the French troops gan-isoned in the Beauvaisis who were 
responsible.  Charles of Navane's initial push east into the tIe de France can be 
seen as  one of the main catalysts for the rebellion.  On 12 March 1358 the great 
French  strongholds  of Arpajon  and  Montlhery  (Essonne)  were  taken  by  the 
467 Venette, Chron., v.  2, p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Venetie, p. 77. 
468  Bel, Chron., v.2, p.  256, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 151. 
469 Chroll.  norm., p.  127-8, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  163. 
m  Lescot. Chroll., p.  126, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  170. 
190 Navarrese;  both  of these  two  areas  would  become  targets  of the  Jacques.·m 
Robert  of Clennont  attacked  Corbeil  (Essonne),  effectively bringing the  war 
directly into the healiland of the Jacquerie.
472  By 25 March, the Dauphin had to 
flee  Paris.  Through April,  the Anglo-NavalTese  forces  had Sens  (Yonne)  and 
Chateau-Landon (Seine-et-Mame).  In May, it is safe to presume that their troops 
were pushing even further into the I1e de France.  Connected to this military push 
was  an  increase in brigandage:  historians have extensively covered the trouble 
that the infantry - the Great Companies - caused in the lIe de France.·m  During 
this period, the peasantry faced numerous threats - from the crown's troops, the 
Anglo-Navarrese troops and unaffiliated brigands ravaging the countryside - but 
all were connected to the Hundred Years' War.  The nobles both failed to protect 
the peasantry, and were responsible for the conflict that threatened the peasants. 
To  understand  a  revolt,  we  must  'consider  it  from  [the  rebels'] 
perspective,  using  their  categories  of understanding',  and  the  best  way  to 
understand  their perspective is  to  examine their actions,  and paliicularly their 
objectives.  As William Reddy wrote, speaking of a riot in Rouen in 1752,  'the 
targets of  these crowds thus glitter in the eye of history as signs of the labourers' 
.  f  1  f"  474  conceptIOn  0  t le nature  0  socIety.  The Jacques  expressed their ideology 
through the murder of nobles,  the destruction of their propeIiy,  and assaulting 
military fOliifications.  This  revolt  of the  'non-nobles against the  nobles'  was 
clearly marked by the division between these two 'orders'; those were the terms 
471  Sumption, Fire, p.  315. 
412 ibid., p. 316. 
473  For examples, see Fowler, A1cdicl'al Mercellaries, Volllme  I:  The Great Companies; Allmand, 
'War and the Non-Combatant' in ivfedieval Warfare, ed.  Keen; Wright, Knights and Peasants, 
pp.  89-95. 
474 W.  Reddy, 'The Textile Trade and the language of  the crowd at Roucn, 1752-1871', Past and 
Present 74 (1972), pp. 62-89.  This quote was used in Reicher, The P,ycho!ogy a/Crowd 
Dynamics. 
191 by which rebels and victims alike viewed the. conflict.  The nobles' property was 
a natural objective to aim for.  However, important military locations, like castles 
and  fortresses  were  destroyed  as  well:  many remissions  attest  that  the  rebels 
'attacked, pillaged and burnt their fortresses', along with their 'houses and their 
goods,.475  How many of these fortresses  were  currently in use by an  army? 
There  is  little  information  on  the  exact  details  of the  targets.  Yet  other 
remissions  point  to  the  rebels  selecting  and  attacking  buildings  that  were 
undoubtedly manned by  soldiers  (for example,  the attack on castle of Villers-
N  ..  A'  ) 476  aux- onnms  111  Isne.  Individual  knights  were  assaulted,477  and  more 
imp 0l1antl y,  so were garrisoned troopS.478  The initial incident which spurred the 
whole  movement,  the  attack  on  Saint-Leu  d'Esserent  (Oise)  was  desclibed 
primarily as  an attack upon the milites; according to  Luce, the f0l1ifications had 
been occupied by two men in the  service of the  Dauphin,  one of them. being 
Robel1  of Clermont, Marshal of Normandy.479  As the Chronique de  ni:gnes  de 
Jean  II  et  Charles  V  reported,  the  peasants  then  'charged  against  many 
gentlemen  who  were  in  Saint-Leu,  killing  nine  - four  knights  and  five 
,  480  grooms. 
If we accept the premise that  the Jacquerie was prompted by increased 
military  activity in the  region  and  anger towards  the  local  nobility,  then  the 
Jacquerie was part of widespread peasant resistance towards nobles and armies in 
this  period,  not  least  dming the  summer of 1358  itself.  Five remissions  for 
m  'abatre, gaster et ardoir leurs fortresses, maisons et leurs biens' AN, .lJ86, f  77, no. 237. 
Variations of this phrase often include c/zaslcls, hOlcls or chdlCazcr. 
476 AN, J.J86, f  132. no.  383. 
477  For cxample Jehan OUl'ccl  was pardoned for his pati in the murder of three knights near Port-
Saint-Maxence. See AN, JJ94, f  2, no. 4, replinted in Luce, Jacqllcric, pp. 328-30. 
m  The men of Bruyeres, for example, attacked a local 'garrison' (JJ86, f.  204, no.  556). 
479 Luce, Jacqllcric, p.  276. 
4S0  Clzrol1.  dcsregncs. v.l, p.  177, trans. Cohn,PP, p.  166. 
192 rebellion were issued to settlements south of the Paris that historians traditionally 
considered pati of the Jacquerie: Orleans (Loiret), Givry (Aisne), Lorris (Loiret), 
Vitteaux  (Cote-d'Or)  and  Vermenton  (Yonne).  However,  nothing  in  the 
remissions  shows  that  these  rebellions  were  a  pati  of the  Jacquelie:  none 
mentioned the  'gens du plat-pais'; only Orleans mentioned the conflict between 
'nobles and non-nobles' and the latter three described themselves as  'enemies of 
the  crown',  a  term  never used  to  describe  the  Jacques.  Luce  included these 
revolts  because of the  coincidence of these communities lising up,  within  100 
miles of the fIe  de France and at the same time as the Jacquerie.  However, they 
share not just chronology, but also  the same objectives:  all  five were focussed 
against military installations or soldiers.  These five rebellions were not pati of 
the  Jacquerie,  but  rather  the  Jacquerie  itself was  part  of the  bigger wave  of 
rebellions  against  the  nobility  and  the  annies.  For  example,  below  is  the 
remission for Orleans: 
And of these said men, after many liots and dissensions with some of the 
knights  who  lived  in  the  town of Orleans,  these habitants  has  become 
deadly enemies of the said soldiers. And at the time of the commotions of 
the non-nobles against the  nobles,  they had wished  to  destroy the said 
castle  of Aula  (chateau-la-Cour),  and  then  certain  parties  knocked  it 
down.
481 
Just like the Jacquerie, tensions between combatants and non-combatants erupted 
into violence.  This also happened in Vitteaux (Cote-d'Or), as far south as Dijon, 
where the townsmen rose up against the garrisoned troops: 
Some of the inhabitants of the town [ville] of Vitteaux, among those this 
said Johannes called Turelin, of Salvoloco, came to  the castle of Dracy, 
where  the  knights  were,  catTying  sticks  and  swords,  and  they  angrily 
entered castle,  in which were swords, wines  and other mobile goods of 
~Sl 'quin imo diete gentes, post plures rixas et dissensiones quas cum aliquibus habitatoribus ville 
Orleans habuerunt, eo quod ipsi habitatores qui dicto militi fuerant inimici capita1es et qui 
tempore commocionis innobilium contra nobi1es dictum castrum de Aula destruere voluerant et 
iam qU3mcJam partem prostraverunt', AN, JJ91, f.  74, no. 227, reprinted in Luee, Jacqllerie, pp. 
324-7. 
193 the said knights were held, and then with strength and violence certain 
..  ~, 
partIes knocked thIS castle to the ground....  -
The above attack draws a perfect parallel with the initial attack of the Jacques at 
Saint-Leu  d'Esserent:  the  gens  d 'armes  and  the  eCl/yers,  who  looted  their 
supplies  from  the peasantry, became a focus  for  the villagers'  frustI'ations.  At 
Lorris  (Loiret)  there was  a  struggle with  the inhabitants of the  fortress  at  the 
Chateauneuf-sur-Loire.
483  In  Vermenton  (Yonne),  near  Auxerre,  the  gens 
d'armes  got involved in  a violent dispute  with the  people of the  surrounding 
484  area. 
These incidents  demonstrate a culture of resistance against the  nobility 
and the armies in France during 1358.  The Jacquerie was not the only expression 
of this feeling; it was part of a wider social movement across the nOlih of  France 
and beyond.  Within the previous twelve months, royal officers were attacked in 
Forez and there were attacks on tax collectors in the south of France, including a 
revolt  in  Toulouse.
485  Similarly,  Jean  de  Venette  recognised  that  peasant 
resistance had begun in the  ile de  France and  elsewhere.  The peasantry had 
stmied  taking  matters  into  their  own  hands,  and  were  organising  resistance 
against the military and the brigands in the region: 
In  the  same  year,  in  the  ile  de  France  and  elsewhere,  the  peasants 
dwelling  in  open  villages  with  no  fortifications  of their  own  made 
fortresses  oj"  their  churches  by  surrounding  them  with  good  ditches, 
4~2 ',igentibus commocionibus nequissimis que inter nonnullos populares regni nostri a ribus 
annis citra viguemnt, nonnulli habitatores ville de Vitteaux, inter quos erat Johannes dictus 
Turelin, de Salvoloco, ad castru111 de Draceyo nuncupatu11l, quod est dicti 111ilitis, cum fustibus et 
gladiis acccsserunt, ct illud castru11l, in quo bladorU111, vinoru11l ct alioru11l bonoml11 mobiliull1 
dicti militis copia maxica existebat, hostiliter invasemnt, ac eciall1 vi et violencia quandall1 
pmtell1 dicti castri ad tcrra11l prostraverunt ... ', AN, JJ91, f. 20, no. 71, reprinted in Luce, 
Jacquerie, pp. 322-3. 
4S3  AN, JJ90. f.  24, no. 48. 
4S4  'ceulx qui en rannee dcrnierc passe vindrent et encores sont et dCl11eurant en la fortresse de 
Ligny-Ie-Chastel et es pmties d'environ, Icsquelx a  grant nOl11bre et force de gens d'all11es sont 
plusiers foiz venuz en la dicte ville de Vell11enton et es parties d'cnviron' AN, J.l90, f.  61, no. 
110. 
4S5 Cohn, Lust/or Liberty, p. 221. 
194 protecting the  towers  and  belfries  with planks as  one does  castles,  and 
stocking  them  with  stones  and  crossbows.  Thus  they  could  defend 
themselves  if perchance  enemies  should  attack them,  as  I have heard, 
they  did  fairly  frequently  ...  By day they  kept lookouts  on top  of the 
church towers ... When they saw the enemy coming in the distance, they 
blew a horn or rang bells.  Then the peasants who  ,vere at work in  the 
fields or busy with other tasks in their houses ran with all  speed to their 
churches which they had fortified and took refuge in them,.4s6 (emphasis 
mine) 
Peasants actively resisted the military; rather than an initiative by royal sergeants 
or landlords,  the rural labourers themselves  stood up  to  the  annies of France, 
England  and  Burgundy.  The  construction  of new fOliified  places  within  the 
villages  across  France had become widespread:  in  1371,  royal  commissioners 
found over 111  fOliified places in the bailliage of Caen.,m  The creation of these 
fOliifications  was  noticed  as  early  as  February  1358  by  the  Estates-General, 
which  demanded  that  all  the  petites  fortresses  be  destroyed  for  security 
reasons.
488 
Jean de Venette showed a shift in philosophy towards villagers taking an 
active role in defending their locales  against invaders before the Jacquerie;  he 
also  recorded  that  resistance  canied on  after the  Jacquerie  of the  summer of 
1358.  The most famous story concerned Guillaume L'Alou who was, according 
to  Luce,  'the  obscure  peasant  of Longueil-Sainte-Marie  [who]  deserves  to 
occupy  a  place  of honour  in  our  annals'  .489  The  story  of Grandfene  and 
Guillaume L 'Alou is  reported by several chroniclers, all of whom gave slightly 
different versions of  the story.490  In 1359, the peasants of Longueil-Sainte-Marie 
486 Venette, CllrOIl., v.  2, p. 268, trans.  BirdsalL  Venetie, p.  85. 
4S7  Sumption, Fire, p.  386. 
4SS  ibid.  What exactly constituted petite fortresses was not specified, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that the fOliified churches that Jean de Vcnette described could be classed as such. 
4S0  S.  Luce, 'l'\otice Sur Guillaume L'Aloue" Anl111aire-Bu!!elin de fa societe de! 'izisloire de 
France (Paris, 1875) p,  150. 
490 These include The Chronicle of  Jean de  Venelle, and the Chrolliqlle Normande.  The major 
difference is that the former considers GrandfeITe and Guillaume I' Aloue to be two different men, 
195 (Oise),  near Compiegne in the he31iland of what was  the Jacquelie, rose up in 
rebellion,  this  time  against  the  English  troops.  The  leader,  a  rustic  named 
Guillaume l'  Alou,  repulsed  one  attack from  the  English  troops,  and then  his 
right-hand  man,  a  peasant  known  as  Grandfene,  repulsed  another.
491  A 
remission issued some years after the event confirms l'Alou's role as a leader of 
peasant resistance in the lIe de France: 
Charles,  by the  grace  of God  King of France,  let  it  be  known  to  all 
present  and  in  the  future  future  that  we  have  received  the  humble 
supplication of Hemy Staidue of WaugicoUli, contending how, at the time 
of the great wars,  discord and dissension that was in the countryside of 
the Beauvaisis and thereabouts, the said supplicant, wishing to serving us, 
put himself under the  governance of Guillame I' Alou who  was  at  war 
helping the good men of the countryside against the enemies of the said 
countryside for the honour and profit of us, then regent of the realm, and 
inflicted with his companion great damage on these enemies at Longueil 
Saint Marie and elsewhere ..... However, in the time he was with the said 
Guillaume l'  Alou, around sixteen or seventeen years ago now  ... he and 
another companion that had served the said Guillaume found a valet or 
boy on foot between Senlis and Saint-Clu'istopher, and they beat him and 
wounded him until he was dead,  and they stole his gold and the money 
that  he had,  so  that  the  said  supplicant  no  longer  dares  to  go  to  that 
.  492  regIOn ... 
This movement, in the area where the Jacquerie was bloodily put down just one 
year before,  is  a  good example of continued peasant resistance  after the great 
revolt  of 1358.  Each  chronicler  characterised  the  rebels  as  being rural;  for 
example, the English chronicler Sir Thomas Gray described that 'the people of 
while the latter believes them to be the same individual.  Also see Cohn, L1(st/or Liberty, pp. 37-
8. 
491  Venette, Chron., v.  2, p. 286, trans. Birdsall, VenetIe, p. 90-2. 
492  'Charles, par le grace de  Dieu roy de france, sa voir faisons a  tous presenz ct a  venir nous 
l'humble supplication de Henry Stadieu de WaugicoUli avoir receue, contenant que comme jiJ. 
pieca, au temps de grans guC1Tes,  descors et discensions qui estoient ou pais de Bauvoisin et 
environ, ]edit suppliant se feust mis pour nous service soulz le gouvernant de Guillaume I' Alou 
faisant gueITe  iJ. raide des bonnes genz du pais aus ennemis estanz out dit pais pour i'onneur et 
profit de nous, lors regent Ie royaume, ausquelx ennemis par lui et les siens fut porte tres grant 
clommage en plusiers lieux, tant iJ.  Longueil Saint Marie comme ailleurs ... toutefoiz, pour ce que, 
ou temps qu'il cstoit avec Ie dit Guillaume rAlou, seize 01.1  dix-sept ans a ou environ ... et que il 
ct un autre compaignon qui estoit soubz le dit Guillaume trouvcrent un varlet ou garcon a  pie 
entre Sen liz et Saint-Christophe, lequel il batirent ou navrerent tant que il moru, et lui osterent 
ror et rargent qu'il avo  it, ucellui suplliant ne se ose comparoit au pais', AN, J]]08, no. 350, ed. 
Luce, 'Notice Sur Guillaume L'Aloue', pp.  153-4. 
196 the fOliress were saved, being for the most being only brigawltz and common 
folk  of the  band  of the  Jacques  Bonhommes,.493  Moreover,  Jean  de  Noyal 
emphasised that far from a flash in the pan, these peasants remained a constant 
threat in this  period:  'they sustained many strong attacks  on the paIi of their 
enemies and held their place throughout the whole course of the war'  .494 
The men of Longueil-Sainte-Marie (Oise) was not  the only example of 
resistance  Jean  de  Venette  provided.  Townsmen  were  particularly  active, 
resisting  the  English troops  in  Soissons  and Troyes.  At Compiegne,  'several 
townsmen  had  bravely  issued  fOlih  to  conquer  the  English  in  the  woods', 
although they were eventually destroyed.
495  However, it was not only the bOl1l1es 
villes that resisted attacks: numerous 'little towns' offered 'such a brave defence 
and a stout resistance that the English could not take it by stOll11' .496  Little towns 
and villages regularly took up arms.  Although they were unsuccessful, Jean de 
Venette used Orly (Seine-et-Mame) as an example: 
Among [the fOliified  country villages]  was a church and  its  tower in a 
village near Paris called Orly, which had been fOliified by the men of  the 
village.  They had fitted it for a strong defence as well as possible and had 
stocked it with crossbows and other means of defence and with food in 
abundance.  About two hundred men from the village occupied it.  But 
those  who  trusted  their  strength  and  their  fOliresses  in  the  end  were 
I .  1  d  .  d 497  U  tlmate y  ecelve  . 
Jean de Venette is not the only source in which we find continued rebellions by 
peasants  and  townsmen  towards  the  military  forces  (and  the  nobility  who 
sanctioned them) marauding around the countryside.  The remissions offer other 
~93 In the original French, thesc individuals were described as 'lez plusours fors brigauntz et gentz 
du comune et du couyn lakes Bonhom'. The 'fortress' was 'a fortress in an abbey which the 
French had fortified between Creil and Compiegne', according to the chronicle, Sir Thomas 
Gray. Scalacrollica. 1272-1363 ed. and trans. A.  King (SUliees Society: London, 2007), pp. 164-
5. 
49~ 'Fragment de la chronique inedite lean de Noyal', ed.  Luce, rcprinted and trans. Birdsall, 
Venelle, p .258. 
495 Venette, Chron., v.  2, p.  302-3, trans. Birdsall, Venelte, p.  102. 
496 ibid. 
497 ibid.,  p. 99. 
197 examples of settlements rising up even after the Jacquerie of 1358.  In May 1359, 
for example, the townsmen and peasants from Nevers (Ni€we)  attacked the royal 
lieutenant  and  the  troops  he had brought with  him  to  the  area.
498  In Troyes 
(Aube)),  1360, a noble and his accomplices were murdered because they were 
considered  to  have  been  involved  in  brigandage.
499  These  attacks  were  not 
simply restricted to  the towns. Fronville (Haute-Marne) is a village a few miles 
south of Joinville, close to  Saint-Dizier, one of the centres of the Jacquerie and 
also the nobles' retaliation.  Yet even these inhabitants were not cowed.  In 1360, 
the villagers attacked troops ganisoned at the local castle, during which Henri de 
Somerville killed a man.soo  Villages to the west of Rouen, specifically Hauville, 
Le Landin, Ie Haye-de-Routot and Guenouville (Eure), attacked the men-at-arms 
and  the  soldiers of Pont Audemer and killed four.
50l  The villagers  of Saint-
James  (Manche),  south  of Rouen,  along  with  their  local  capitaine,  a  knight, 
evicted their bailiff Thomas Pinchon and his men that were occupying the local 
castle, because they were alleged to have treasonous links to Navan-e.
502  There 
was  a  riot  between  'celiain  chanoiners'  and  the  habitants  of the  town  of 
Grenoble  (Isere),503  and  a  fight  in  Lyon  between  royal  sergeants  and  the 
townsmen in 1360, but this could simply have been a braw1.
504  Peasants made 
several attempts to resist the Navan-ese forces. 505  Whether these were true social 
movements, or simply everyday struggles between the populace and authOlities, 
is  sometimes  unclear,  but  they  once  agam  emphasise  how  the  presence  of 
mAN, .lJ90, f.  136, nos. 258, 259, 260, 261. 
mAN, .lJ89, f.  181, no. 413. 
500  AN, .lJ88, f. 82, no. 27. 
501  AN, JJ87, f  21, no.  34. 
502 AN, JJ87, f.  72, no.  61. 
50) AN, .JJ87, f.  54, no. 73. 
504  AN, JJ89, f.  123, no. 290. 
505  Sec section on 'Navarre', in particular AN, JJ90, f. 62, no.  113; fo1.  81. no.  149 and to1. 97. 
no.  177. 
198 soldiers  could spark  popular violence;  suggesting that,  as  Peter Lewis  stated, 
'peasant disorder was  endemic  wherever there  was  military disorder'.  506  The 
same  issues  that  were  at  stake  during  the  Jacquerie  continued to  kindle later 
peasant uprisings. 
Some have viewed peasant resistance as  doomed to  failure,  or as  token 
effolis unrepresentative of the peasant masses,  who  presumably accepted their 
enemies'  impositions  with  fatalism.  507  Yet  resistance  could  be  found  in 
numerous  villages across  the countryside, and there were probably even more: 
for the most part, the remissions only tell us about resistance towards the men of 
the French crown, but not to the English troops.  Was it likely a peasant church 
could hold out against an  am1Y?  Such a result would have been rare.  Perhaps 
resistance represented only a pynhic victory rather than an actual one, perhaps it 
had real benefits in terms of negotiating tenns from the enemies, or it may have 
provided time for the peasantry to  'send their goods to safety'  .508  Wright argues 
that 'for everyone disastrous encounter between a large company of soldiers and 
a  pathetically  vulnerable  parish  garrison,  there  would  have  been  a  hundred 
encounters between parishoners and very small companies of pillagers'  .509  What 
is  indisputable is  that peasants continued to  resist,  even after so-called failures, 
like the bloody end to the Jacquelie. 
506 Lewis, Larer Medieval France, p. 286. 
507 Sumption states that the 'great majority were militarily useless',  but only offers two examples 
offailure, one being Orly (Sumption, Fire, p.  386).  Allmand argues that 'since these eannot have 
presented mueh of  an obstacle, they were little or no use against large and detennine forces 
against whom walled towns and castles constitued reasonably sure plaees of safety', yet offers no 
examples of combat between armed forces and peasant fortifications, or suggests why the 
peasants may have continued building such obstacles.  C.  Allmand, The Hundred Years War 
(Camridge: Camblidge University Press, 1998), pp. 76-87. 
50S The phrase 'cuiller et mettre a sauvete ses biens qui sont aus champs' appears rcgularly in the 
remissions. For example, AN, JJ90, nos.  162, 288, 356, 413, 419, 635. 
509 Wlight, Knights and PeasaF1ls, p.  113. 
199 The chroniclers and remissions identify that not only was  the Jacquerie 
instigated  by  ill-feeling  towards  the  nobility  and  the  annies  of the  Hundred 
Years' War, but so were many other smaller rebellions.  Did the Jacquerie trigger 
this  wave  of anti-military behaviour?  More likely,  it  was  simply the  biggest 
expression of the  wave of anti-military,  anti-noble  feeling  that was  sweeping 
across  France.  Local expressions of frustration  against the  troops  of both the 
crown and the English continued throughout the years following the Jacquerie, 
even in the ile de France, the area supposedly cowed by repression in the wake of 
the  Jacquerie.  The  Jacquerie  was  not  an  expression  of desperation  by  the 
peasantry of one region, or a revolt that spread for violence's sake alone.  Rather, 
the same common cause could be seen to  unite disparate peasant groups across 
the length and breadth of the country, as  part of a large-scale expression of the 
violence and resistance towards nobles and annies that was occurring in the north 
between 1357 and 1360. 
PEASANT COMlVlUNITIES 
To realise the causes of the success of the revolutionary armies we must 
remember the prodigious enthusiasm, endurance, and abnegation of these 
ragged  and  often barefoot troops  ...  The history of the  annies  of the 
Revolution  recalls  that  of  the  nomads  of  Arabia,  who,  excited  to 
fanaticism by the ideals of  Mohammed, were transfonned into fonnidable 
armies which rapidly conquered a portion of the old Roman world.
510 
When historians describe popular movements, they often compare the insurgents 
to  the  usual  unit  of violent  struggle:  the  traditional  anny.  In  this  extract, 
Gustave LeBon described the  French peasants  as  forming  'formidable annies' 
510 O.  LeBon, The French Revolution and the Pcl)'ch%gy of  Revolution (London: Transaction, 
1980), pp. 217-8.  See the chapter 'The Annies of  the Revolution', pp. 223-231. 
200 during  the  Revolution  of 1789,  caught  in  the  contagion  of fanaticism.  An 
analogy between a revolutionary force and an anny can often be misleading.  It 
implies that agency in the rebellion was the preserve of one unified force,  that 
rebels were subject to a military hierarchy and that they were bound together into 
a homogenous unit that could be deployed at the will of  its commanders. 
The scholarship sunounding the Jacquerie has also made extensive use of 
this metaphor.  The insurgents are often described in militaristic terms.  Mollat 
and  Wolff,  still  unchallenged  on  many  of their  descriptions  of the  peasant 
rebellions  of the  late Middle Ages,  describes the  nature of the rebellion thus: 
'Carle selected the castles and strong places which would furnish support ... [h]is 
,511  h'  .  ful  troops  were  never  very  numerous .  Sumption,  whose  ot  erWlse  insIght 
account mentions a plurality of groups,  local leaders and different targets,  still 
relies  on  inappropliate terminology to  describe  the rebels,  describing them as 
'annies' and Cale's collective as a 'grand force,.512  Dommanget's description is 
even more explicit: 
This  primitive  and  essentially anarchic  and  spontaneous  tenor  ...  was 
succeeded by an ordered phase.  They established some progress towards 
a military point of view.  There was  a certain discipline:  there was the 
1  .  f  1  h'  f'in  se ectlOn 0  troops, t 1ere was a supreme c  le .' -
This  terminology  is  imbedded  in  the  description  of histOlical  revolts,  and  is 
revealing  about  the  assumptions  sunounding  how  peasant  revolts  actually 
happened:  the repeated comparison with an 'anny' implies that this main force 
was representative of the .lacquerie.  This supposed anny was responsible for the 
51 I  Mollat and Wolff, Popular Revolutions, pp. 124-5.  Mollat and WoHT use the [0011 'Carle' for 
Cule throughout their book, which is only used by Jean de Venette does use 'Karle', Chronique 
laline de Guillallllle de IVangis (ed. H.  Geraud, Paris, 1847). 
512 Sumption, Fire, pp. 331-3. 
)1) Dommanget, La Jacquerie, p.  58. 
201 attacks of the movement, and therefore the heads of the am1Y  were respoI\sible 
for orchestrating the revolt. 
A  similar set of assumptions has govemed study of another great rural 
revolt,  the  English  Peasant's  Revolt  of 1381  but  for  it,  there  has been  some 
debate.  Nicholas Brooks, for example, believes that this emphasis on the great 
military might of the peasants is  because of the inability of historians to  accept 
that planning and local knowledge were the reasons for its relative success: 
It is not medieval chroniclers (who are entirely silent on the matter) but 
modern historians who have repeatedly refened to the 'march', the 'long 
walk'  or 'the wonderfully quick march' on London of the commons of 
Kent and Essex.  It is a revealing assumption which re±1ects  the lack of 
attention to  the inception of the revolt and an unwillingness to  suppose 
that  fourteenth-century  peasants  were  capable  of  organizing  a  co-
ordinated rising with military precision.  No one would pretend that every 
recorded action of the insurgents of Kent and Essex fits into a neat and 
readily comprehended master-plan.  But if we allow that the insurgents 
raised a mounted force in each shire and struck with devastating speed ... 
we shall be less surprised at their success in ovemmning the capital and 
at the discipline and selectivity of  their targets there.
Sl4 
Brooks is right to take to  task those who believed in one solid force of peasants 
traversing the countryside and cOlmnitting crimes  at random,  and to  focus  on 
individual forces  fi:om  different shires, rather than one grand army of peasants. 
However,  his  view  still  assumes  that there must have been  a  central place of 
plmming and cOlmnand: 
The synchronised assembly and movement of the insurgent forces in the 
two counties did not fit by chance into so neat a pattem.  Decisions had to 
be taken  and orders  sent  about meeting places,  about dates  and about 
targets; these decisions had to take account of the distances to be covered 
by each band on each day and of the time that would be needed to open 
gaols  and to  break into propeliies and destroy records.  Every vill  that 
sent men to the assembly points had to be contacted in advance.
51S 
514 N.  Brooks 'The Organisation and Achievements of  the Peasants of Kent and Essex in  1381', 
in Stlldies in Medieval History Presented to R.H. C.  Davis, ed. H. Meyr-Hm1ing and R.I. Moore 
(London: Hamb1edon Press, 2003), p. 240. 
<15  ibid., p.240. 
202 Brooks rails against those who believe one military unit was behind the entire 
campaign, but clings to  the belief that one organisational unit,  a peasant high-
command,  lay  behind  the  entire  revolt.  Both  of these  models  rely  upon 
manipulation from  a peasant  'centre'  and demand exceptional  levels of cross-
border organisation. 
These models  represent  two  Images  of medieval  popular movements. 
The first,  more generalised,  is  that  of a  peasant  anl1Y,  a  single unified  troop 
marauding around the landscape creating havoc, moving from  target to  target. 
The second,  more nuanced, has an organisational high command, often with a 
chmismatic  leader  at  its  head,  orchestrating  and  micromanaging  numerous 
attacks.  In  the case of the Jacques, the instrument of revolt is  either a  'grand 
force' of peasant 'troops', or a high-command of chief capitaincs like Guillame 
Cale. 
There  is  a  simpler  explanation  for  the  events  of an  upnsmg like  the 
Jacquerie, where large areas were covered, local objectives selected and castles 
overtIu·own.  It relies neither on a grand army nor military precision in planning. 
Rather than one central core specifying the movements of every peasant, local 
peasant groups were acting independently.  Individual villages took actions into 
their  own  hands.  How  did  the  peasants  know  where  the  tax  collectors  and 
sheliffs were on a pmiicular day?  Rather than  conspiracy between the distant 
chiefs who had calculated itineraries, the local peasants, aware of the actions of 
their fellow  peasants across the countryside,  caught the contagion of rebellion 
and  struck  out  against  enemy propeliies  independently.516  If the  villagers 
"16 It has been argued that the defining characteristics ofthe violence committed by peasants in 
1381  was 'a combination of neighborly vendetta, family group activity .... the strategic 
confiscation of  objectionable documents'.  Federico describes numerous instances of  familial 
groups plundering records concerning them from the local nobility, like Matilda and Robeli 
203 wished to  attack a noble homestead or fOliification,  then  their local knowledge 
would have been paramount; they may even have been the defence force that the 
lord  would  have  normally  relied  upon.  This  model  has  recently  become 
popularised in the media.517  Today, visions of Al-Qaida, a fonnless ideological 
'leadership'  floating  above  specific  cells  each  of which independently  selects 
their  own  local  targets,  dominate  popular  conceptions  of  how  ten'orist 
movements operate.
518 
In  the  case of peasant revolts,  these smaller cells were tied together by 
something more tangible  than  class  consciousness,  and  less  susceptible to  the 
variations in status of its members. The impOliance of community bonds within 
revolt  was  paramount.  Berce  writes  that  '[t]he  local  community  was  the 
fundamental bond, the first resort in cases of confrontation, and the most potent 
source  of outbursts  of collective  violence'.  519  For  urban  uprisings,  this  is 
certainly demonstrable.  Richard Trexler went to  great lengths to  show how the 
Revolt of the Ciompi was  infonned by neighbourhood loyalties and geographic 
ties  between  different  insurgent  groups,  and  Sam  Cohn  showed  these  bonds 
through man-iage records.
52o  Historians of the later period such as Roger Gould 
emphasises communal bonds in  the  1871  Pm-is  Commune.  He concludes  'the 
Aleyn who stole a chest of documents trom the London house of Hugh Ware.  Moreover, there 
are instances oflocals encouraging their neighbours to rise up (Margaret Stafford, for example, 
'encouraged the people to rise' in  Larktleld). See Federico, The imaginary Society, pp.  159-83 
017  In the case of  revolts, however, others are still tempted to assume some f01111  of guiding 
organisation behind it.  During the Ban lieu Riots of  autumn 2005, French interior minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy declared 'We were struck to see in the deparments - notably Seine-Saint Denis-
a largc organisation', implying that the riots had been encouraged by Islamic insurgent groups. 
This was despite assurances trom the Chief of Police that this was not the case.  Notably, when 
BSC reporter David Chazan asked if  anyone was organising the violence, a 19-year old youth 
replied 'We are' ("Bravado and anger in riot suburb', Wednesday 23  November 2005, 
http://news.b bc. co. uk! I  /hi/wor  I!  europe/  4463862. stm). 
518 For a description of  the scale-tree network that supP0l1s terrorist movements, and can be 
applied to peasant insurgencies, see A.-L  Barabasi, Linked (New York: Plume, 2003), 
pm1icularly 'Web Without A Spider', pp. 249-254. 
519 BerCt\ Revolt and revolution in early modern Europe, p. viii. 
520 Trexler, 'Neighbours and Comrades'; Cohn, The Labouring Classes, pp. 171-5. 
204 reasons  for  taking pali in  the fighting  for most of the  rank and  file  involved 
membership in an urban community understood plincipally in spatial terms', and 
that  'the urban community defined in spatial tenns was the fundamental unit of 
political action'.  For Gould, 'insunection on a citywide scale, ultimately framed 
in  terms  of a  cit}'\vide  collective  identity,  required  the  interplay  of local 
neighbourhood solidarity with extralocal organizational networks forged by the 
mobilisation period itself.  521 
Even tighter than bonds linking neighbourhoods or city quarters were the 
bonds linking the inhabitants of the village.  Peasant communities in the Middle 
Ages were sources of independence and power.  While the  village boundaries 
might contain varied individuals with different status  and personal wealth,  the 
village  itself  represented  an  impOliant  administrative  unit  involving  all 
inhabitants.
522  Village units. were responsible for keeping the peace.  Leopold 
Genicot speculates that the village could make community wealth from rents on 
the leasing of COlmnons,  fines  for unrest within the village, and proceeds from 
local taxes.
523  The village was then able, with the money locked in the common 
safe,  to  buy landed properties  and  to  construct  common buildings.
524  In  the 
mountains  around  Florence,  collective  action  controlled  the  'settlement  of 
disputes  with  other  parishes,  revision  of village  statutes,  discussion  of civic 
issues and the initiation of litigation, the appointment of advisors to the parish or 
5:1  R.  V.  Gould, 1l1sllI'gcl1tldcntities, Class COlJ1munity and Protest in Paris Fom 1848 to thc 
Communc (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).  See pp.  154-194, 'Neighbourhood, 
Class and the Commune of 1871', for a full explanation of  how these solidarities work.  The 
quoted passages come from pp.  154-155.  For a medieval example, see Trexler, 'Neighbours and 
Comrades'. 
522  Leopold Genicot describes them thus: '[rJural communities may well be notable for the variety 
contained within them, but they all exhibit a level of  coherence and unity.'  L  Genicot, Rural 
COll1munities il1  thc Mcdicval West (Baltimore: 10hns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 57. 
523  For an example, see SJ. Payling. 'Law and Arbitration in Nottinghamshire 1399-1461'. in 
People, Politics and Community in the Later Middle Ages, ed. J.  Rosenthal and C.  Richmond 
(Gloucester: A. Sutton. 1987)  pp.141-160. 
524 Genicot, Rllral COllJmunities in the Medieval West. p. 57. 
205 commune,  and most frequently  the election of their own lay syndics  who  ... 
negotiated  with  the  city  of  Florence  on  mattters  such  as  tax  relief  and 
indebtedness  and  ...  decided  how  taxes  were  to  be  aportioned  within  the 
community'  .525  The village was also an important legal unit in England: Hilton 
offers examples of villages in which inhabitants \vould make legal presentments 
on  their  communities'  behalf.
526  Moreover,  these  communities  had  strong 
conceptions  about  what  constituted  an  outsider  within  their  community, 
regulating and selecting new tenants.
527  This  strong sense of responsibilities, 
boundaries and outsiders indicates a belief in the cOlllinunity as  individual and 
distinct from those around it. 
Village communities made these decisions collectively, through meetings 
or councils.  Little is  known about the  practical  application of these,  but from 
regulating defence to  the appointment of local officials and the upgrading of the 
local infrastructure (with approval of their lord), these decisions were made as a 
unit, and for that to be the case, it indicates the existence of a process by which 
these decisions could be made.
528  The community was not only used to acting 
together,  but  had  appropriate  methods  for  making  collective  decisions,  an 
025  S. Cohn, Creating [he  Florentil1e State.  Peasants and Rebellion 1348-1434 (Cambridge: CUP, 
1999), pp. 52-3. 
526 R.H. Hilton, A Medieval Society,  The  West Midlands at the end (jfthe Thirteenth Centlll:v 
(London: Weiclenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p.  150. 
027  Hilton offers an example where a sale cannot be sanctioned until the tenants approved the new 
o\vners.  ibid., p.  151. 
028 For example, mountain villages around Florence required all adult men of the parish to be 
present when electing the village priest. Cohn, Creating the Florentine State (1999), pp. 50-1. 
206 assembly.529  These assemblies, whose heritage stretches back to the Carolingian 
era, were central to the democratic core of the village.53o 
These communities were the units  of mobilisation of the Jacquerie and 
answer  the  dilemma  Brooks  posed  in  his  discussion  of the  events  of 1381. 
Rather than a single military movement rampaging across the landscape, or one 
organisational high command co-ordinating and micro-managing rebel  groups, 
individual villages under the umbrella of the Jacquerie were selecting their own 
objectives across the countryside.  This  allowed targets over a wide area to  be 
struck simultaneously,  explains  why organised  assaults  on fortresses  occurred 
alongside  small-scale  cnmes  like  the  looting  of  gardens,  and  allowed 
communities scattered from  the lIe de France as  far as Bar, or from London to 
Norfolk, to join under the same banner in their attack on the nobles. 
There is no doubt that the Jacques exhibited a degree of 'negative class 
consciousness,.531  However,  while  the  distinction  between  the  victims  and 
perpetrators was couched by the courts in almost proto-class tel111S  - the nobles 
and the non-nobles532 - this does not mean that the rebels mobilised under these 
auspices,  and  were  organised  in  these  ranks.  The  peasants'  attack  was  not 
organised  into  one  army  of non-nobles.  Rather,  the  base  unit  of peasant 
mobilisation was  their own local communities.  The remissions are quite clear 
that the village, settlement or town provided the organisational backbone to  each 
individual action of  revolt. 
)29 For a discussion of the functions of the village, and the mechanisms that must have existed to 
facilitate them, see Z.  Razi, 'Family, Land and the Village Community in Later Medieval 
England', Past and Presellt, 93 (Nov., 1981), pp. 3-36, especially pp.  13-16. 
530 See S.  Reynolds, Kingdoms and Commullities in Western Europe,  900-1300 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.  138-152, for a description of the 'rural community' as it developed 
into the later Middle Ages. 
m  For a discussion oftl1is concept of 'negative class consciousness', see R.H. Hilton, Bond Men 
Made Free (London: Temple Smith, 1973),  pp.  119-134. 
532 'les non-nobles contre les nobles', as it appears in the remissions. 
207 Luce's Pieces Justicatives  (on which some historians may have relied) 
strongly suggests that the majority of rebels who received pardons did so  in the 
form  of a personal remission issued to  an individual appellant.  Not including 
ones for Meaux, or that focussed upon Paris, thirty-nine remissions were issued 
for Jacques.  Of these, thirty-three (85%) were issued to  one or two individuals, 
while six  (15%) were issued to  small towns or settlements.  The impression is 
clear: remissions were individual. 
With  the  larger  set  of  remissions  within  the  Archives  Natimzales, 
individuals also receive pardons more often than conununities, but a substantial 
number  of peasants  (and  almost  definitely  the  vast  majority  of them)  were 
pardoned in  groups  alongside their communities.  Of the  146  remissions from 
JJ86  and JJ90  (between 1358  and  1360 in the wake of the revolt)  that can be 
classified  as  instances  of the  Jacques  revolting,  107  (73%)  were  issued  to 
individuals or a handful connected to  this particular uprising.  However, thiliy-
nine (27%)  were issued to  a community (sometimes combing as  many as  four 
different  villages  or parishes).  Considering that these villes  included perhaps 
hundreds  of rebels,  the  greatest  number  of Jacques  received  grace  in  these 
community pardons.  Even if we assused only thirty inhabitants were involved in 
each ville, then the number of Jacques pardoned with their conununity would be 
ten times that of those who received individual personalised remissions. 
These  communities  often  came  together in assemblies.  Of the  sample of 144 
mentioned  above,  twenty-seven  made  some  reference  to  'assemblies'  or the 
rebels having  'assembled".  That the  phrase reoccured with such regulmity in 
what  could  often  be  a  standardised  remission  indicates  the  impOliance  the 
208 authOlities  placed  on  this  practice.  Rural  assemblies  are  paramount  in  the 
transmission of non-official  news  and  rumours  to  the  masses,  and  thus  in  the 
"  fl'  I 533  transmISSIOn  0  revo utlOnary zea .  It was in an assembly that the villagers 
around Favresse  (Marne)  elected Jean Flageolot their leader.  Assemblies  were 
forums  for  fonning  village  decisions  on  action:  the  village  of Grandvilliers 
(Oise), under the captaincy of Simon Doublet, held 'assemblies in the fields  to 
take anns'  .534 For neither was rebellion a foregone conclusion: in the case of the 
villagers  of Bettancourt  and  Vroil  (Marne),  the  inhabitants  assembled  before 
deciding not to take part.  535  Assembling, of course, aroused the suspicion of the 
authOlities; while it was not always illegal (villes often received pardons because 
presumably this was all they had done), it meant that the local nobility assumed 
they were rebels.  In  this  latter case,  the villages were fined  the large sum of 
2,000  eeltz based on assembling alone.  These assemblies could also be cross 
parish  bound31ies.  For  example,  five  villages  were  indicted  for  their 
paIiicipation in a grand assembly somewhere in Champagne: 
'Charles, let  it be known to  all present and future  .... the  habitants  of 
Heis-le-Marru (Marne) in the prevote of Vitry went in person or had sent 
certain representatives with the habitants of many other villages (villes) of 
the land of Champagne to many assemblies .... and at these assemblies it 
is  charged  that  there  were  set  many  conspiracies,  alliances  and  plots 
against  the  nobles  and  the  clergy  for  their destruction  and  executions 
....  for this also these said nobles had pillaged and marched through the 
said village,536 
5.13  See C.  Gauvard, 'Rumeur ct Stereotypes a  la fin du Moyen Age', in La circulation des 
nouvelles au Moyen Age. XXIVe cOlZgres de la s.H.M.E.s. (Paris: Publications de 1a Sorbonne, 
1994),  pp. 157-177. 
5.14  AN, 1J86, f.  136, no.  392. 
535  AN, JJ86, f.  117, n. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 266-9, trans. Cohn, PP,  pp.  187-8. 
536 'Charles, savoir faisons a  tous presenz et a  venir ... oye comme les habitans de la ville de 
Heis-Ie-Marru en la provoste de Vitry aient este ou envoie certain personncs avec les habitans de 
plusiers autres villes du pais de Champaigne en plusiers assemblecs ... en quelles assemblees 
aient este faictes sicome en leur impose plusiers conspiracions alliences et monopoles encontre 
Ies nobles ct c1ergie du pais pour les dcstruere et mcttent a  mort ... pour ce aucuns des diz nobles 
aicnt pille et couru la dicte ville', AN, JJ86, f. 125, n.  367. 
209 Identical  renllSSlOns  are  issued  for  four  other villages:  Etrepy,  Vi try-l a-Ville, 
BignicoUli-sur-Salle  and Drouilly (Marne).537  According to  the  pardon,  these 
villagers  had only sent their delegates  to  this  grand assembly,  but along with 
being ravaged by the nobles' counter-offensive they had already been fined 1,000 
ecus  for  their  peaceful  participation.  These  five,  however,  represented 
exceptions:  the  documents  suggest  that  many more  settlements  sent  villagers 
there, some of  whom went beyond discussion to direct action against the nobility. 
Nor  was  the  assembly  in  Champagne  the  only  large-scale  meeting:  the 
remissions  list  others,  such  as  a  grand  assembly  at  Saint  Vrain  (Marne),  for 
which five villages received pardons for attending.
53s 
The  villages  were  not  deciding  whether  join  one  big  organization, 
Guillaume Cale'  s anl1y.  Rather, they were deciding whether to rebel in clusters 
that  extend  beyond  their  home  parishes,  and  on  which  properties  to  attack. 
Villagers  focussed  on  local  objectives,  rather than  on fulfilling  a  grand plan 
coordinated by Cale and his  accomplices.  Our map in Chapter 2 indicated the 
targets  of the rebellion.  When a village attacked a target within its immediate 
vicinity (for example, when the men of Fransures (Somme) attacked the noble's 
house  in  the  village)  it  was  marked  orange;  targets  beyond  the  settlement 
pardoned are marked red.  The following map contains the same data with the 
insurgent  groups  added  in  blue,  when  they  attacked  sites  not  within  their 
immediate proximity.  Not included on this map are individuals, for whom it is 
m  The last two viIIages named are pardoned in the same remission.  AN, ]]86, f  122, nos. 358. 
359,360. 
538 The assembly at Saint-Vrain is mentioned in AN, JJ86, f.  103, no. 3 I I, f  124, no. 365 and f. 
133, no.  386. 
210 not specified they were acting with their fellow villagers, were involved in the 
attacks on specific property.  These examples are instructive:539 
Map IX. Villagers and their targets. 
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Village  communites  attacked  nearby  nobles'  property.  The  longest 
journey the  rebels  took was  when the men of Chavanges  (Aube)  crossed the 
Marne to  attack Saint-Vrain,54o  or when the men of Crugny (Marne) and Cuiry-
Rousse  (Aisne)  joined  forces  to  attack  a  castle  in  La  Fere-en-Tardenois 
(Aisne),541  but even these were no  more than five kilometres from the rebels' 
homes.  This shows a familiarity with the apparatus of power:  the locals knew 
potential  objectives  within  reach.  Secondly,  it  undermines  the  idea  that  the 
participants required massive military organisation to overthrow a castle.  These 
villagers were well outside the traditional heartland of the rebellion.  There is no 
evidence of any assistance from the 'military expertise' of Guillaume Cale, and 
539 The scale of  this map is  1/ 2,000,000. 
540 AN, 1186, f.  217, no.  596, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 283-5. 
541 AN, 1186, f.  133, no.  386. 
211 no  reinforcements.  Without any safety-net of.a rebel army nearby, villagers on 
the  border with  Bar,  like  many  others,  took  rebellion  into  their  own  hands. 
Moreover, these rebels were not being drawn inwards towards the ile de France 
or to  a central force organised by Guillaume Cale or anyone else.  The men of 
Crugny (Marne) headed south and the men of Chavanges (Aube) headed north, 
not west; the men of Melmecy and Ballancourt (Essonne) headed south to  find 
their target, and the men of Lignieres, Grandvilliers and Poix (Somme) headed 
north, all away from the so-called epicentre of the violence.  Cale's force, near 
Clennont, was not a whirlpool drawing rebels in; rather, rebels selected their own 
particular aims independently of events elsewhere. 
These villages also combined together with other communities to  attack 
local targets.  Pardoned in three separate remissions, the villagers of  BallancoUli, 
Mem1ency  and  Saint-Fargue  attacked  a  castle  at  Villiers-aux-NOlmains,  just 
outside La Ferte-Alais:
542 
Many of the habitants of the village (ville) and parish of Menency '"  who 
with  many others  of the  surrounding  countryside  who  had  previously 
been involved with the men of the countryside against the nobles of the 
said realm, attacked many of their fOliresses,  dissipated their goods  and 
also executed them.  They especially attacked the castle of Villers near La 
-43  Ferte-a-Alays.) 
The  same  remission is  repeated for  the  villagers  of Balancourt  and  a  certain 
Jehan Bruyent (with an addendum indicating that the supplicant was imprisoned 
542 Cazelles, in 'The Jacquerie', claims that the Parisians and Marcel's troops to have been behind 
an attack on La  Ferte-Alais, but there is no evidence to support this claim.  Presuming CazeIIes is 
discussing the attack on the castle nearby which these documents mention, then the remissions 
explicity state that the castle was taken by 'the men of the plat-pais', not the Parisians. 
Moreover. CazeIIes' assertion implies that Parisian troops made a 100km round trip to complete 
this attack, \vhich in turn suggests that Marcel's forces was far bigger and more mobile than 
Cazelles can prove.  What the remissions indicate was that nearby villagers came together to 
make an attack on this local target. 
543  'Oye comme plusiers des habitants de la ville et paroisse de Mencncy  ... este avec plusiers 
autres de pais d 'environ au efn:ois qui  deux et n 'a gaires ont este fais par les gens du plat pais 
contre Ie nobles du dit royaul11e Ii abatre plusiers lieux fortresses et dissiper leurs biens et aucuns 
d'iceuIx mis a 1110rt ct cspecialement Ii abatrc Ie chaste de villers empeschent  Ia fcrte a aIays 
AN, JJ86, f.  123, no. 363. 
212 by the capitaine of Corbeil for his participation in the attack). The villages were 
all less than a couple of kilometres apart, and all  within six kilometres of their 
selected focus.  This attack, south of  Paris, was outside the traditional boundaries 
of the Jacques'  heartland, and was not mentioned in the chronicle accounts  or 
within any of the remissions that mentioned Cale.  Nor was this organised, co-
ordinated  effort part  of the  main  offensive;  instead,  the  villagers  identified  a 
target in their locale and joined together to  mount their own assault.  This co-
operation can be seen regularly.  This map records villages that joined together to 
assault a noble fortification (colours included just to indicate separate groupS):544 
Map X. Village co-operation. 
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The villages are all local to each other.  When communities came together, it was 
always with their immediate neighbours.  Nearby villages like Egly, Boissy-sous-
Saint-Yon and Marolles-en-Hurepoix  (Essonne) joined forces.  Notably,  there 
could often be different groups of rebels  operating together in  the  same area. 
Rather than forming into one large force, they remained in small collectives even 
544 This map is to a I / 1,800,000 scale. 
213 when they were close to other groups .. The villagers of Poix, Grandvilliers and 
Lignieres (Somme) did not feel the need to join those around Montdidier in their 
attack. 
Village movements  show  the  rebels'  powers  of organisation.  Here  a 
collection of  three villages came together to assault fortified property.  The rebels 
also displayed a familiarity with the possessions of the nobility.  Most striking, 
however, is the sheer daring of  many of  these assaults.  The typical paradigms of 
medieval  revolt  give  us  three  pillars  to  base  our studies  upon:  that  peasants 
cluster into marauding bands, that the violence is  spontaneous and contagious, 
and that the rebellion is unavoidably a desperate failure.  Yet the J acquelie shows 
individual cells, well organised with specifically selected propeliies.  Moreover, 
they  were  remarkably  successful  - far  from  being  desperate  failures,  the 
documents  attest  to  the  ability  of communities  to  cause  real  damage  to  the 
fortified settlements of their local lords: rebel communities managed to  'assault 
and attack' or even 'bum many fortresses and houses' of the nobility.  Villages, 
like Vitteaux, or the combined force from the villages of BallancoUli, Mennency 
and  Saint-Fargue,  perpetrated raids  that were  organised  and  effective.  These 
stories  can  be  found  tlu'oughout  the  documentation:  cOlmlmnities  such  as 
Fontaine-sous-Montdidier (Somme) joined neighbouring villagers  to  attack the 
house of a local noble before moving on to the local castle at COUliemanche;545 
the men of Buchy (Seine-Maritime) and their neighbours brought telTor  to  the 
B  11  R  546  1  f  C  (M)  d  ray  va  ey  near  ouen;  t 10se  0  rugny  arne  concentrate  on  two 
h'  .  h  h 547  C  ateaux Just to t  e nort  . 
545 AN, JJ92, f.  125, no. 227. 
546 AN, 1187, f.  81, no.  117. 
547 AN, JJ86, f.  133, no. 386. 
214 There  remam  some  Issues  about  the  ascription  of  'communities'  to  the 
settlements listed in the remissions.  While in some cases, they are established 
villages (and even small towns), in others, they were too small to  be found on 
maps.  Only one remission within  the  chancery records  gives  us  a  numerical 
estimate  for  the  size  of an  insurgent  group.  This  remission  issued  for  the 
habitants of the parishes of Belleau and Givry (both Aisne) pardoned the thirty 
individuals  from  these  two  communities.
548  That  indicates  that  these  groups 
could be small, but there is no evidence to indicate whether this is representative. 
Moreover,  this  document does  not use  the  conm10n  term ville to  describe  the 
cOllli11unity, implying that this was not as identifiable a settlement as most of the 
other cases.  At the execution of lehan Bernier, there was 'two or three hundred' 
villagers  present  from  Montataire  (Oise),  but  many  more  may  have  been 
involved in the revolt.
549  In  another remission, the nobles allied to  the lord of 
Saint-Dizier executed  fifty  rebels  from  a  collection of settlements;  how many 
rebels escaped execution is, of course, unknown.  Two documents not held in the 
JJ  series but included in Luce's Pieces Just(fzcatives also mention numbers: one 
records  that  34  people  were  involved  in  the  murder of a  spy  in  Pont-Point 
(Oise),550  while an  arret dll  Parliament was  issued against  46  individuals  for 
having pillaged a house in Choisy (Oise).55!  Again, however, we have no real 
frame of reference as to what constitued a ville. 
While  they  must  have  been  relatively  substantial  to  have  inhabitants 
wOlihy of the pardon, the word ville can describe anything between a collection 
of settlements to a fully-fledged town, or even a city like Paris.  Moreover, these 
5~, AN, JJ86, f.  109, no. 326. 
549  AN, JJ86, f.  102, no. 309, reprinted in  Luce, Jacqlterie, pp. 261-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  191-2. 
550 X 1a 17, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 320-2. 
551  Reprinted in Luce. Jacqlterie, pp. 331-2. 
215 remissions sound holistic in the pardoning of a settlement, but no notice is  given 
as  to  what proportion of the population involved in the violence.  That in itself 
indicates the crown considered the  village rather than an amorphous group  of 
people to be the unit that required pardons, but it does leave us unsure of the size 
of each unit.  Yet even with this in mind, we must find that the village unit was 
at  the heart of this revolt.  Regardless of the size of the settlement,  the  court 
pardoned rebels  in the name of their ville,  and  that  was  the  unit  beyond the 
individual who the crown heard supplications from and granted pardons to.  But 
we  also  see  that  the  rebels  were  able  to  organise  themselves  beyond  their 
traditional units of religious and secular adminstration, framed for centuries by 
lay or religious authorities. 
Why  is  recogmsmg  this  model  of action  conU11Unities  acting  together  -
important to understanding the Jacquerie?  First, it establishes the only realistic 
model  under which this  revolt  could have  functioned.  By understanding the 
Jacquerie to be individual conU11Unities who could join with its neighbours acting 
against local targets, a new image of localised peasant action can explain both the 
scale and speed of the revolt.  No longer do  the Jacques have to  have covered 
large  distances  in  impossibly  short  amounts  of time  with  massive  logistical 
demands,  and neither would they  have required military  organisation to  have 
operated successfully. 
Secondly,  stressing  'community  action'  takes  agency  away  from  the 
image of the grand force that still dominates writings on the Jacquerie, whether 
that  force  be led by Guillaume Cale or more usually Etienne Marcel  or even 
Charles  of Navan"e.  This  deals  with  many  of the  practical  problems  that 
216 traditional understanding of the revolt has caused.  It also deals with many of the 
assumptions sunounding this topic - that the leaders of the grand force also had 
control over the individual actions.  It changes the nature of the revolt from one 
that  could  be  controlled  and manipulated  from  the  centre  into  one  that  was 
essentially expanding distinctly not only from the core but it-om  the geographic 
margins  as  well:  each  node  that  exploded  into  rebellion  was  acting  largely 
independently of  what was going on in the Beauvoisin. 
Thirdly, it deals with one of the difficulties in assessing why 'peasants', 
with a wide dispaIity between wealth, status and lifestyle, would bind together 
against a common enemy.  The defining issue is not one of  monetary wealth, but 
rather it is  one of community bonds that already existed.  These men were not 
choosing sides  dependent  on their social  status,  but rather were reacting to  a 
perceived threat towards  their community,  and lising together with those they 
had joined for years in legal, judicial and social matters.  To paraphrase Gould, 
the  pan-regional  insunection  (and  what  would  later  be  defined  by  its  rural 
collective  identity)  was  dependent  on  local  village  communities  in  the  first 
.  5"'1  mstance. --
LEADERSHIP 
The issue of the leadership of the Jacquelie was  confused even in the eyes  of 
contemporaries.  In Jean Ie  Bel's chapter 'How ce11ain  people without leaders 
rose Up,,553  he goes on to contradict himself, saying that the 'meschans gens had 
a  captain  called  J aque  Bonhomme,  who  was  the  complete  rustic  (pm/air 
552 The original passage fr0111  Gould, Insurgent Identies (p.  154) is included earlier. 
553  Bel, Chroi1_,  v_2,  p_  255. 'Comment aueunes gens sans chiefs se leverenC_ 
217 vilain/.
554  This conf1ict.in the sources, between Ie Bel's assertion of  the uprising 
being leaderless,  other chroniclers pointing to  a captain, most often Guillaume 
Cale,  and  the  remissions  pointing to  a  myriad of local village leadership,  has 
never been  satisfactorily  resolved.  Generally,  studies  of pre-industiial  revolt 
have  tended  to  hinge  their  analysis  on  individual  leaders.
555  With so  many 
uprisings  memorialised  by  association  with  a  single  leader  (like  Cade's 
Rebellion),  the  Jacques  might  be  called  Cale's  Rebellion  gIven  the  current 
histOliography. 
The predominance of leaders within a revolt was one of the main points 
under which Gustave Ie Bon proposed his model of crowd action.  For Le Bon, 
'[a]s soon as  a celiain number of living beings are gathered together,  whether 
they be animals or men, they place themselves instinctively under the authority 
of a  chief  .556  Following in Ie  Bon's footsteps,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the 
'leader' (or at least an individual who has orchestrated the revolt) holds the key 
to discovering the ideology and the aims of the Jacques themselves.  It is on this 
premise that Cazelles and Bessen's theOlies of co-opted rebellion are based; by 
selecting an influential figure  who shapes the will of the crowd, be it Etienne 
Marcel or Charles of Navarre, it is assumed that their ideology was  transferred 
onto the rebels.
557 
:':'4 fhid., 'et avoient ces meschans gens ung chappitaine qu'on appelloit Jaque Bonhomme, qui 
estoit un parfait vilain'. 
555  For the Peasant's Revolt, Dobson states that '[v]irtually every aspect ofWat Tyler's career is 
controversial', yet histOlians like Alistair Dunn have been quick to ascribe aspects of  the rising to 
the 'personal nature of his leadership'. B.  Dobson, The Peasants' Revolt of  1381 (London: 
Macmillan, 1970), p. 24 ; A.  Dunn, The great rising of  1381 (Stroud: Tempus, 2002), p.  119. 
:':'6 Later psychologists, notably Allport and Freud, while taking issue with many other of Le 
Bon's arguments, continued to stress the importance of  the leader.  Their theories suggested that 
the crowd automatically revelis to the ideology of  the leader at times of  disorder.  It was not until 
the 1950s that these ideas were systematically challenged. 
557  Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie' and Bessell, 'The Jacquelie: Class War or Co-Opted Rebellion'?'. 
218 Most works  on medieval revolts  have devoted substantial  space to  the 
discussion of who exactly was in charge of the uprisings.
558  While this was no 
doubt worthwhile for establishing the identity of the key actors in a movement, it 
is questionable what light this has actually shed on the mechanisms of any given 
revolt.
559  Even in cases where a rebellion survives in popular memory as being 
connected to  one individual, like Cade's Rebellion of 1450 in the south-east of 
England, not much has been done to establish what it was that the leader actually 
did  within the crowd.  We know virtually nothing about Jack Cade,  and what 
sources we have are contradictory.  The crown seems to believe he may have had 
ties to  the House of York, but other clu'onicle accounts paint him as a physician, 
notary or even a sorcerer.
560  He is by different accounts a devil, a peasant and a 
nobleman.
561  Even less is recorded of his actions - while the rebellion has come 
to  be identified with Cade,  Cade himself is  curiously absent from  the  action, 
apmi from when his head is placed upon a spike in London.
562 
Those historians  who  have  searched  for  a  leader in the  Jacquerie,  and 
found Guillaume Cale, have reinvented him to  fit  their thesis.  Rodney Hilton, 
who theorised that the Jacquerie was orchestrated by well-to-do peasants, comes 
to  the  conclusion that  Cale must have been a  'well-to-do peasant' himself.  563 
There  is  no  specific  evidence  for  either  asseliion,  but  in  the  models  that 
)58 In the case of  the Peasants' Revolt, see the substantial literature spent discussing Wat Tyler. 
559 Ryan, in her work on  19
th  century Irish suffi'age movements, describes the problems of 
historical research into the leaders of  crmvds thus: . In our search for neat, complete and 
comprehensible histories, 'the cult of personality' focuses our attention on the 'leading lights' of 
specific organisations and masks the wider complexities of leadership in the movement as a 
whole', in L.  Ryan, 'The Cult of Personality: reassessing leadership and suffrage movements in 
Britain and Ireland', in C.  Barker, A. 10hnson and M.  Lavalette (eds.), Leadership alld Social 
Movements (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) , p.  21  I. 
560  For a short sun'ey of  what is (and is not) known about Cade, see I.M.W Harvey, Jack Cade 's 
Rebellion of  1450 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 78-79. 
)61  ibid., pp. 78-9. 
562  ibid.,  p.  100.  Although throughout the text the insurgents are referred to as 'Cade's men', it is 
unclear when Cade is with them. 
563  Hilton, BOlld Men Made Free, p.  123. 
219 historians have created,  Cale becomes a representation of the top-level  of the 
hierarchy.  Of all  the  recent historiography,  the  passage  that  most  explicitly 
grants attributes to Cale is from MoUat and Wolff: 
He possessed a certain gift for organisation, appointed a  chancery,  and 
divided his followers into troops, each subdivided into groups of ten.  He 
had a feeling for tactics.  Left to  themselves the Jacques had pillaged at 
random.  Guillaume  Cafe  selected the castles  and strong places vvhich 
would jill"l1islz  support at key points.  and he was  not vFit/lOlit political 
,564 (  .  l'  )  sense.  my Ita lCS 
There are no footnotes in Mollat and Wolffs work, but if there were references, 
they would  point  directly  to  the  Chronique  des  Quatres  Premiers  Valois,  the 
most  sympathetic  account  of Cale.  Yet  nothing  within  even  that  Chronicle 
suggests that Cale 'selected the castles and strong places'; rather, this is  Mollat 
and Wolff  s speculation, putting the entire campaign waged by the Jacques as the 
enterprise of its heroic leader.  Implicit is the understanding that the crowd was a 
rabble, similar to Ie Bel's 'animals' or Flanul1ennont's depiction of the 'uncouth 
peasants', until Cale instilled order in the masses. For these historians, only Cale 
could have organised them, and his authOlity extended over the entire group of 
rebels from Rouen to Bar. 
This  is  a  direct  result  of the confusion  that  exists  between historians' 
definitions  of a leader,  and historians'  definition of leadership.  The two have 
been welded together in such a way that a 'leader' must have performed all tasks 
associated with leadership - mobilised the army, shepherded the troops towards 
their objectives, controlled the programme of the revolt.  This approach not only 
minimises the insurgents, but also over-simplifies the role of the leader.  The idea 
one heroic  individual  controlled  the  masses,  forcing  the  peasants  to  act  in  a 
manner different to that which suited them, is typical of the Le Bonian model of 
564  MoJ1at and  Wo1ff~ Popular Revolutions, p.  124. 
220 crowd leadership described by social psychologists as  'zero-sum games,;565  an 
understanding  of the  crowd  where  'leader agency  is  achieved  at  expense  of 
follower agency'  .566  A leader forces the crowd to act in accordance with his own 
aims, and the crowd relinquishes its power over its  actions to the leader; as  Le 
Bon  wrote,  the  crowd  places  itself entirely  under  the  control  of the  heroic 
individual. 
This view has been systematically refuted by recent scholarship.  Within 
a revolt,  it has been shown that the construction of an  ideology is  a  two-way 
process  between  leaders  and  followers.  Studies  like  Adas'  survey,  work  on 
Indian peasant revolts and others all stress that during a peasant revolt leadership 
comes from within the crowd, not outside it.567  Leaders cannot simply substitute 
their agenda  for that of the crowd's, because the  crowd does  not accept it.
568 
Rather,  direction comes from  the crowd.  The submissi.on of the crowd to  the 
power and control of  one individual is rejected. 
Yet  at  first  glance,  the  chronicles  may  seem  to  suppOli  the  'heroic 
individual'  theory.  Of  these  accounts,  four  chroniclers  specify  the  same 
565 In a zero-sum game, anything 'added' must be balanced by the same amount 'subtracted'.  In 
this case, there is only so much leadership to go around: any input by the leader neeessmily takes 
away from the input of the crowd.  S.  Reicher, S. Haslam, and N.  Hopkins, 'Social identity and 
the dynamics ofleadership: Leaders and followers as collaborative agents in the transfonnation 
of social reality, Leadership Quaterly (2005, in press), p.  2. 
566  ibid. 
567 M.  Adas, Prophets of  Rebellion: millenarian protest movements against the European 
colonial order (Cambridge: CUP, 1987) and M.l. Akbar,  . Riot Ajier Riot' - Reporting on Caste 
and Communal Violence in India (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1988). 
568 For a contemporary example, see BlIl"I1,  Baby,  Bum,  The Los Angeles Race Riot (London: 
Gollancz, 1966); J.  Cohen's and W.S.  Murphy's account of the Watts Riots of 1965.  The Los 
Angeles Police Department produced several individuals (like civil-rights activist and comedian 
Dick Gregory) who were supposed to then assume control of the crowd.  The crowd rejected 
these individuals on the grounds they did not share an ideology, with one individual responding 
to the activist's pleas with 'Baby, if you're going to be one of  us, here's a bottle - throw it'.  For 
an example closer to the Jacques, the crowds rejection of  the \vords of Lord Jean des Mares, and 
his attempts to appease the rioters, in the tax revolt in Paris of 1382: in the Chroniqlle du 
Religew; de Saint-Denys, YIIJ, Book 3: Chapter I, trans. Cohn, PP pp. 275-280. 
221 individual to have led the peasants: Guillaume Cale.
569  Three of them describe 
Cale  as  being  elected  or  chosen  by  the  Jacques  to  lead  them.  For  most, 
descriptions of Cale's actions are vague and unspecific, as with the Clzronique 
des regnes de Jean II et Charles  V: 
They elected a captain called Guillaume Cale and  went to  Compiegne, 
but the townsmen would not let them enter.  Then they went to Senlis and 
forced  many of the  town  to  flee  into  the  countryside.  They knocked 
down all the fortresses of  the region  ...  570 
Only the Chronique des  Quatres Premiers Valois  attributed any specific actions 
to  Cale, and it gave him the role of chief negotiator, trying to temper the violent 
rage of the Jacques. 
Cale is  not just memorable for his  actions;  for each of the chroniclers, 
Cale  becomes  a  representation  of how  they  understood  the  Jacquerie.  For 
Richard  Lescot,  who  saw  the  Jacques  as  rabid  dogs,  Cale  was  simply  a 
'rustico,.571  For Jean de Venette, who saw them as acting with some misplaced 
sense of  justice, the leader is an 'astute peasant'  .572  Furthelmore, the Chronique 
des  Quatres Premiers  Valois,  who disapproved of the Jacques but saw them as 
well organised and effective,  the leader is  a  stabilising force:  'a knowlegeable 
man  ... many times Guillaume Cale told  them  they had gone way too  1'ar,.573 
This chronicle even offers an entirely different explanation to  anything recorded 
elsewhere  - Cale  was  seized  and  forced  to  lead  the  Jacques.  This  account 
foreshadows  the repeated defence used in the remissions that individuals were 
569  Guillaume Cale is referred to as 'Guillaume Cale' in Clzroll.  des reglles, v.l, p.  177, 
'Guillaume Charles' in  Chron. premiers Va/Dis,  p.  72,  'Guillelmus Calle' in  Lescot, Chrol1., p. 
126, and 'Guillelmum Karle' in Venette, Chron., v.2, p.  263 . 
.  '70 Chroll. des regnes. v.l, p.  178, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  166. 
5/1  Lescot, Chrol1., p.  126, 'quodam rustico qui Guillelmus Calle vocabatur'. 
572 Venette, Chron., v.  2, p.  263, trans. Birdsall, Venelle, p.  71.  In the original Latin, Calc is 
described as a 'rusticum magis astutum'. 
573  Chron. premiers Va/Dis,  p.  71, t1'ans. Cohn, PP, p.  158-62. He was also described as a 'ung 
homme bien sachant et bien parI ant, de belle figure et forme'. 
222 coerced into leading troops.574  These last two sympathetic pictures of Cale are 
what shaped the visions of  Hilton, Cazelles, Mollat and Wolff. 
However, Cale does not appear in all chronicle accounts; JeanIe Bel and 
others depicted a very different individual.  The cannibalistic Jak Bonhomme is 
clearly a dramatic invention, a personification of the worst excesses of peasant 
violence.  The  Anonimalle  Chronicle  sees  him  as  akin  to  the  Devil:  'Jak 
Bonehonune ripped  babies from  their mothers'  wombs and with these babies' 
blood quenched their thirst and anointed their bodies in contempt of God and his 
saints  ... a haughty and anogant man with the hemi of Lucifer in executing his 
deeds,.575  Jak Bonhomme is  not a real  individual, but beneath the hyperbole 
there lies an important point.  The chroniclers made the same connection as their 
contemporaries and the modern reader: they intended the allusion to the'  Jacques 
Bonhommes', the slang term for the peasantry.576 Rather than a case of  mistaken 
identity,  these  chroniclers  prefen'ed  to  leave  an  image  of peasant  bmtality 
antlu'opomorphised into an individual.  For several chroniclers, no single leader 
led the Jacques but rather the bloodlust of the peasantry itself:  'he who  dared 
commit the greatest evil and the vilest deeds was deemed the greatest master'  .577 
Not only was  Cale's leadership  undercut by those  who  considered the 
movement spasmodic,  violent  and  leaderless,  it was  also  questioned by  those 
who forfwlrd Cale as  the leader.  There are contradictory notes as to  how much 
574 ibid., 'dont Guillaume Charles leur dist souventeifoiz qu'ilz excedoient trop grandement, maiz 
onc pour ce rien n'  en lasserent'. 
575  Anollimaiie Chronic/e, p. 42, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  172-3. 
576 The exact date of the tenn's origin is clouded ~  the continuateur of the Chronicle of Guillaume 
de Nangis mentions it appearil1g as a tenn of derision used by the nobility to describe the entire 
peasant class in 1356.  For discussion of the tenns rise to prominence, see Luce, Jacq1/erie, pp.4-
6, and Medeiros, Jacq1/es c{ Chroniquers, p.  184.  For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that 
the tenn was certainly well-known and widespread by the time chroniclers like Ie Bel created the 
character of 'Jak Bonhomme·.  1t was also used in the remissions as early as November 1359 
(AN, JJ90, t  182, no. 354). 
577  Bel, Cflron., v.2, p.  257, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  151. 
223 control Cale held over the Jacques.  The Clzrol1ique Normal1de suggests that Cale 
was not even in charge of the greatest portion of the Jacques: whilst Cale'  s force 
at Clermont of around eight hundred was slaughtered by Charles of Navan'e's 
army,  over  two  thousand  Jacques  were  slaughtered  by the  nobles'  counter-
offensive in the north of the Paris basin.57S  The Clzronique des regl1es de Jean II 
et Clzarles V places Cale similarly, beheaded at Clermont after individual groups 
of Jacques  were defeated in the repression originating in Meaux,  as  does  the 
Chroniqlle  Quatres  Premiers  Valois. 579  Given  the  many kilometres  between 
Clennont, where  Cale  was  beheaded, and the  thousands  of peasants  executed 
around the countryside, Cale could not have effectively controlled all the rebels. 
This distance from the the mass of rebels, scattered across much of the n01ih of 
France, indicates the problems with assuming Cale's position to be analogous to 
that of the typical military commander. There are other suggestions that Cale was 
not in complete autonomous command. When Cale tried to preserve the revolt in 
face of an oncoming defeat by the opposing annies,  he met resistance from his 
charges: 
Guillame Charles said to  them  'We will go towards Paris and take up a 
position there,  since we will have support and aid of those of the city'. 
Then the Jacques cried out they would never flee.sso 
Even in the account that credits Cale with the most direct action, his control of 
his men is  described as  tenuous.  The  Chronique des  Quatres Premiers Valois 
also  names  a  hospitaller  who  seems  to  have  been  on  an  equal  footing  with 
578 Chrol1.  110rm., p.  130-1, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  164. 
579  Chrol1.  des regnes. v.l, p.  184, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  167, Clzroll. premiers Valois, p. 73-4, trans. 
Cohn, PP, p.  158-61. 
580 Chroll. premiers Valois, p.  73-4, trans. Cohn, pp, p.  158-62. 
224 Cale;5S1  the  Clzrollique Normande alone mentioned that Cale was just. 'one of a 
number of  captains'  .582 
Yet  despite  this  inconsistency  between  his  position  and  his  power, 
Guillaume  Cale,  unlike  Jak  Bonhomme,  IS  a  verifiably  real  figure,  and  was 
recognised by the crown and the individual Jacques as  a leader.  The letters of 
remIssIOn  give  some  evidence  that  Cale  was  an  important  leader  within· the 
rebellion.  Twice they refer to him by name, and on five other occasions, they 
make  reference  to  a  ruling  capitaille  (or  capitaines)  of  the  countryside. 
Considering that Cale is referred to  as  the ruling capitaine in the same body of 
sources, it is a fair assumption that it might be Cale: 
Table XIX.  Mentions on general capitaine. 
JJ  Place  Terminology 
JJS630S  Mello (Oise)  'by constraint of the said people and their 
.  .  ,';S,  capztame - -
]]S6309  Mello,  Pont- 'by constraint of the said people and their 
Saint-Maxence  capitaille',  'in the  absence  of the  general 
and Montataire  .  .  '584  capztame 
(Oise) 
JJS6344  Conty  'capitaine  subj ect  to  the  ruling  capitaines 
(Somme)  of  the countryside,585 
JJS6345  Courtes  'by  the  constraint  and  entreaties  of the 
(Oise)  capitaines of  the countryside,586 
JJS6391  Catenoy  'by  the  force  and  constraint  of the  late 
(Oise)  Guillaume Calle previously made capitaine 
of  the  people  and  communities  of  the 
beauvaisis' ,  'in  the  said  company  of 
581  ibid.  The original states: . Maiz cle fait les Jacques Ie prindrent et en tirent leur gouverneur 
avecques ung home qui estoit hospitalier, qui avoit veu des guerres·. 
,82 Chrol1.  110rm., p.  129-30, trans. Cohn, PP, p.  164. 
583  'par contrainte dudit peuple et de leur capitaine', AN, JJ86, f.  102, no.  308, reprinted in Luce, 
Jacquerie, p.  260. 
'S~ 'par contrainte dud it peuple et de leur capitainc', 'en I'absence de leur capitaine general', AN, 
JJ86, f. 102, no. 309, reprinted in  Luce, Jacijllerie, pp. 261-2. 
,85 'capitaine subjct des souverains capitaincs du plat pais', AN, JJ86, f.  116, no. 344. 
586  'par la contrainte et entretment des capitaines du dit plat pays', AN, JJ86, f  121, no. 355, 
reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie. pp. 268-70. 
5S7  'par la force and contrainte de feu Guillaume Calle n'a gaircs estoit capitaine du pcuple et 
communes de beauvaisis' ; 'en la dicte compangie of Guillaume Calle', AN, JJ86, f.  136, no.  391. 
225 Guillaume Calle')~/ 
JJ86437  Montdidier  'With other capitaines of the plat pays')O~ 
(Somme) 
JJ98252  Montataire  'Guillaume Cale, the capitaine of the said 
(Oise)  men of the countryside'  589 
The most famous  of these  remISSIOns  is  the  last  one,  used by Simeon Luce, 
Raymond Cazelles, Leon Mirot and Sam Cohn to  illustrate a variety of different 
points  regarding  the  Jacquerie.  The remission broadly  agrees  with the  more 
sympathetic picture painted by the Clzronique des Quatres Premiers Valois.  Far 
from  being  a  monster,  or  a  token  'captain'  of a  spasmodic  movement,  Cale 
exercised control  of his  charges.  Indicative  of this  is  the remission  issued to 
Mahieu de Leurel, who had assisted in the murder of Jean Bernier, a member of 
the Jacques accused of treasonous complicity with Charles of  Navarre: 
Around  the  time  of the  feast  day,  Jehan  Bernier,  a  non-noble,  was 
allegedly accused of treason,  because letters  from  the King of Navane 
were found on him, and he was commonly known for such deeds in this 
region.  From  this,  he was  led  to  Guillaume Cale,  then  captain of the 
people of the countryside, to  be tried and punished.  Guillaume handed 
him over to  Etienne du Wes, then captain of the village of Montataire, to 
be put to  death, if he (Etienne), the villagers and those of the sunounding 
countryside judged that he deserved it.  590 
After  being brought  initially  to  face  the  'captain  of the  people',  Bernier is 
handed  over by Cale to  a  local  captain to  receive his  punishment.  If we  do 
assume  Cale to  be nominally 'in charge'  of the Jacquerie,  then  this  remission 
suggests a pyramid of organisation below him. 
This remission is not without its problems: it was issued in March 1364, 
almost  six  years  after  the  insunection.  Bearing  in  mind  that  the  name  of 
5S, 'avec autrcs capitaines des plat-pays', AN, J./86, f.  154, no. 437. 
589  'Guillaume Cale, lars capitaine dez dictes gens du dit plat pays', AN, JJ98, f.  120, no.  252 
590  AN, JJ98, f.  120, no.  252; reprinted in Luce,Jacqllerie, pp. 333-5, tr. Cohn, PP, pp.  191-2. 
226 Guillaume Cale was known by chroniclers as  far north as Flanders and as  far 
west as  the  Rouen,  it  can be assumed that  Cale's reputation  was  well  known 
within the lIe de France as well.  In the document, Cale is a shadowy figure who 
Mahieu himself does not interact with.  This suggests there is  symbolic value to 
mentioning Cale - the name is  recognisable enough to  wan-ant inclusion within 
the remission.  Moreover, it increases the power of the plea for clemency - for 
Mahieu,  claiming reduced culpability for the homicide,  who  better to  mention 
than Guillaume Cale himself,  whose name was still memorable years after the 
event?  More than just confirming his position as  the head of an organisational 
structure, they confirm Cale's position as  the symbolic head of the movement. 
His name was important in both the histories and the legal documents, either for 
retelling the story of the Jacquerie or for explaining the individual stories of the 
Jacques. 
However, another remission gives us a better sense of Cale having led his 
men.  Issued in the aftennath of the revolt - August 1358 - the remission details 
the involvement of Arneul Guenelon, an individual who rose to prominence Cby 
force and constraint', as the remission maintains) as leader of the rebels from the 
village (ville) ofCatenoy (Oise).  According to the pardon, he was forced to take 
charge of this settlement by Guillaume Cale, here described as the 'capitaine du 
peuple et communes de  beawnonsis'.  However, more interesting than this plea 
for clemency, Cale is then described as issuing an order to Guenelon's troops: 
under force and constraint of the late Guille Calle, previously capitaine of 
the  people  and  community  of  the  Beaumonsis,  his  adherents  and 
companions of the region assembled for knocking doV'm,  destroyed and 
bumed  the  houses,  mansions  and  fOliresses  of the  nobles  ....  [Cale] 
ordered  the  said  company  to  execute  several  persons,  make  several 
227 pillages  .and  bum  houses  and  several  others  went  to  the  castle  of 
Em1enonville ... their company was sent to the town of Senlis.
591 
The men from Catenoy attacked the castle at Ennenonville, and then moved on 
to  Senlis.  This  action  was  confinned  by  another  remission:  Germain  de 
Reveillon is said to take control of the attack on the castle at Ennenonville when 
he  became capitaine  "in  the  absence  of their  general  captain'.  592  These  two 
remISSIOns  together  show  Cale  taking  direct  action  - sending  groups  of 
individuals  to  Ennenonville,  south of where  Cale  would  eventually meet  his 
death at Clennont. 
Even  within  these  descriptions,  we  see  that  whatever  hierarchical 
organisation the Jacques had was dynamic.  Guenelon has control of his men in 
Catenoy, but sUITendered authority to Cale, while his men are subsumed into the 
bigger group of  rebels.  He had control of them again on the trip to Em1enonville, 
but  when  they  aITive  it  was  Germain  de  Reveillon who  was  their capitaine. 
Cale's  absence  from  such  an  important  (and  well-reported)  moment  in  the 
uprising as  when Senlis refused to  allow the Jacques within the walls indicates 
that much of the action happened without their general captain. 
Three of the five remissions that mention a top-rung of leadership in the 
Jacques  also  indicate  a  plurality  of leadership  at  the  top  of the  upnsmg. 
ConculTing  with  the  Clzronique  Normande,  and  the  Clzronique  des  Premiers 
Quatres Valois, they suggest that Cale was not the only important leader.  These 
three, all  issued in August of 1358, mentioned multiple capitaines, in one case 
091  'par la force et contrainte de feu Guille Calle n'a gaires esleu capitaine du peuple et commune 
de Beaumonsis de ses adherens et complices assembles au  dit pais pour aler abatre et destruire 
ardoir  et  abatre  les  chiiteaux  mansones  lieux  et  for(Tesses  des  nobles  ...  ordenes  de  la  dicte 
compaigne  furent  plusiers  personnes  mises a mort,  plusiers  pillages  arsures  de  maisions  et 
plusiers aucunes gu'il firent du  chastel d'ennenonville ... leur compagnie mettent en la vile de 
Senlis' AN, JJ86, f.  136. no. 391. 
on 'en l'absence de leur capitaine general', AN, JJ86, [  102, no. 309, reprinted in Luce, 
Jacquerie, pp. 261-2. 
228 describing  a  local  capitaine  as  'subject  to  the  sovereign  captains  of  the 
countryside'.  This direct recognition that leadership was not solely the preserve 
of one individual indicates the complexity of  this crowd. 
Cale is referred to  as  the capitaine of the  'men from the Beauvaisis' in 
one remission.  All five of the remissions that mention Cale or a singular ruling 
capitaine  come  from  the  same  general  area,  the  area  between Clermont  and 
Senlis - near the heartland of the Jacquerie, or at least one of its most important 
nodes, but only a small fraction of the area that the rebellion encompassed:
593 
Map XI. Guillaume Cale's involvement. 
Clermont 
• 
• Catenoy  •  La  Presl  • 
• Milo Pont-Saint 
• .  Maxence 
Manta  Ire  .SENLIS 
Green places  on this  map indicate where  Cale was  mentioned.  The 
actions he directs - the murder of Jehan Bernier and the deployment of Arnuel 
Guenelon's men - take place within the same belt (Ermenonville is just a little 
south of Senlis).  This  area is  little more than 30km from  point to  point,  and 
concurs with the chronicle accounts: Cale was murdered by Charles of  Navarre at 
593 The scale of this map is  1/ 850,000. 
229 Clennont, and hailed from  the village of Mello.  We have no  evidence of Cale 
operating outside this region (small in ten11S  of the range of the Jacquerie, which 
spread past Amiens to  the nOlih and as  far east as  Bar and west to Rouen). It is 
hard  to  make  the  case for  him  exhibiting  control  in  the  majority of villages 
outside this central pocket. 
These remissions, like the chroniclers, offer us a double vision of Cale's 
role within the Jacques.  They confinn that Cale was viewed as  the symbolic 
head of the uprising, but was only a regional  leader.  Cale did exercise power 
over  his  charges:  not  only  did  he  pass  Jehan  Bernier  to  the  villagers  of 
Montataire for  execution,  but he deployed the men of Catenoy towards  Senlis 
and Ermenonville.  Simultaneously however, like the chroniclers, the remissions 
undercut the notion that Cale was  in complete control of what was  a complex 
movement.  Cale only has control in the area he came from,  around Clermont. 
According to the remissions, there were many ruling capitaines of the Jacques. 
In  addition, these ruling capitaines were not  always the driving force;  instead, 
local capitanes controlled their men, like Etienne du Wes and Arneul Guenelon. 
These individuals may have occasionally received orders and directions from the 
top, but they also operated independently: it was up to  the villagers of Montataire 
and their elected capitaine to decide the fate of  Jehan Bernier. 
Peasant  communities  largely  operated  independently with  their  own  separate 
capitaines, providing the organisational thrust to  the Jacquerie, rather than one 
symbolic  leader or a small group  of centralised chiefs.  While chroniclers and 
historians  have  focussed  on  the  prominent  individual,  the  remissions  provide 
another layer of leadership,  a myriad of intluential figures  within a myriad of 
230 communities.  In  comparative  studies  of peasant  revolt,  the  phenomenon  of 
primary and  secondary leaders  has  been recognised  the  fonner providing a 
focal  point  or  figurehead  (often  prophetic),  with  the  latter  providing  the 
organisational dynamism (and aggression) to  the revolt.
s94  While painting Cale 
as  a  prophetic  leader  would  be  misleading,  his  representation  has  served  to 
obscure the real thrust of leadership that according to  the remissions came not 
from the top of any hierarchy of the Jacques, but rather from the bottom, within 
the individual villages communties that rose up. 
Within  the  remissions,  seventeen  documents  mention  a  local  leader, 
whether it  is  an  individual receiving the remission or within another's pardon 
nan-ative.
595  They are identified by the single reoccun-ing word, capitaine, which 
appeared from  the earliest remissions just months  after the Jacquerie, until  the 
last mention in  the middle of the 1360s.
596  These local captains provide the real 
driving force behind groups of Jacques acting against local targets: 
094 The terms 'primary' and 'secondary' should not be seen as declaring one type ofleadership 
subservient to the other.  Adas does partly intend to illustrate how a revolt can deviate from its 
original intentions, but as regards the Jacquerie, this is not the case.  See Adas, Prophels of 
Rebe/1iol7, pp.  130-7. 
090 In several occasions, such as in the remission of Mahieu de  LeureI, the capitail1e is mentioned 
in the narrative of the remission, rather than the capitail1e being the individual who is receiving 
the remission. 
096 All twenty-one remissions use the telln capitail1e to describe leaders. 
231 Table XX. Mentions of local capitaines. 
NAME  REMISSION  PLACE  Occupation? 
Jacques  de  JJ86207  Montmorency  None 
Chennevieres  (Val d'Oise) 
Guillame  JJ86221  Deuil  None 
Lanyeux  (Val d'Oise) 
Jean Hullot  JJ86298  Etavigny  None 
(Oise) 
Germain  de  JJ86309  Ermenonville  Familier  de 
Reveillon  (Oise)  Comte  de 
Montfort 
Colart  Ie  JJ86344  Conty  None 
Maunier  (Somme) 
Estienne Nolon  JJ86361  Jaux (Oise)  None 
Jean Ie Grant  JJ86362  Jaux (Oise)  None 
Arnoul Guenelon  JJ86391  Catenoy (Oise)  None 
Simon Doublet  JJ86392  Grand vill iers  None 
(Oise) 
Jean des Hayes  JJ86444  Rhuis (Oise)  None 
Jean Bignet  JJ89609  Remy (Oise)  None 
Philippe  JJ90148  Ponchon  Royal sergeant 
Poignant  (Oise) 
Jean Flageolot  JJ90292  Favresse  None 
(Marne) 
Hue  de  JJ90298  Angicourt  None 
Sailleville  (Oise) 
Michel Marin  JJ90234  Saint-Amand  None 
Gilles Ie Haguez  JJ90354  Chambly  None 
(Oise) 
Pierre Paingnant  JJ90364  Neuilly  None 
(Aisne) 
<unnamed  JJ94004  Oize  None 
capitain> 
Etienne du Wes  JJ98252  Montataire  None 
We are told virtually nothing about these individuals, their status or their position 
in society, except in the case of Philippe Poignant. Many of the remissions give 
us  little  idea  of what  these  capitaines  may  have  done.  The  most  extreme 
example of this is the fragment of the remission for Michel Martin, which simply 
states 'Item - another similar and in the fonn of the previous one ... for Michel 
232 Martin of Saint-Am  and made capitaine  by the  habitants  of the  said  town  of 
S ·  A  d' '197 HId  a111t- man.- owever,  t 1ese  ocuments  can shed  light  on the nature of 
leadership in the J  acquerie. 
In  almost  every  case,  the  inhabitants  of these  communities  select  and 
promote  individuals  to  be capitaines.  They  are  not  appointed  from  Cale  or 
another ruling  captain  but rather by their neighbours.  These  individuals  are 
'made capitaine'  by the  villagers,  often  after they  have  'assembled'; indeed, 
Jehan Bignet was 'electus capitainus,.598  This people power extended to the top 
level; according to Jean de Venette, the peasants 'combined in great numbers and 
appointed Guillame Cale ...  their capitaine', although there is no specific evidence 
about how this election might have taken place.599 
In several  of these cases,  the  elected capitaine seemed to  renounce his 
role in the remission, or claimed to have been forced to act.  This could be seen 
to reaffinn the power of the crowd: the rebels may elect representatives, but they 
may also discard them.  And of course, there may be confusion: historians may 
use different categories  to  ascribe  leadership to  individuals  than  a  fourteenth-
century  court.  Although  these  rioters  may  well  have  been  described  as 
capitaines, that does not necessarily mean that they led the revolt in the way we 
might  assume.  More  likely,  this  is  an  embodiment  of why  Davis  describes 
remissions as  'fiction in the archives,.6oo  These individuals have a vested interest 
in proving themselves im10cent of any crimes they are accused of.  The majority 
597  'Item  .. autre semblable et en  121  foullne de ceste dessus passee et signee comme dessus pour 
Michel Martin de Saint-Amand esleu capitaine par les habitans de la dicte ville de Saint-Amand', 
AN. JJ90, f.  150, no. 293. 
598 AN, JJ89, f. 218, no.  609. 
<99  Venette, Chron., v.  2,  p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p.  7l. 
600  Davis, Fiction in the Archives. 
233 wished to portray themselves as individuals 'under the constraint,601 of either the 
community that they served:  'Estienne Nolon was made lieutenant and capitaine 
against his will and wishes by the habitants of the said village (vi1le),,602  while 
Amuel  Guenelon  acted  'by the  force  and  constraint  of their  lord  Guillaume 
Calle,.603  As  with all  remissions, we must remain vigilant - appellants had to 
mll1Ull1se  their  role  within  the  movement  to  be  granted  a  pardon.  Pierre 
Paignant, for example, who became capitaine of the prevatt of Neuilly (Aisne), 
sought his remission after being 'sent to  prison in the belfry at Soissons'  for a 
year,  and would not have been wanting to  linger too  long upon his  crimes.604 
Despite  the  denials  of individual  involvement,  leadership  within  the  riot  did 
exist: village assemblies regularly fonned and elected them.  The revolt was not a 
spasmodic rising.  Its  programme was not selected randomly, nor handed down 
from above by an overarching authority beyond the boundaries of  the ville. 
When Cazelles and Hilton considered Cale,  they both placed him at the 
top of the highest social group that fits their model of  the Jacques.  This implies a 
reliance on a kind of natural order to the crowd - that they select leaders from 
whom  they  were  naturally  led  by.  However,  certainly  in  the  experience  of 
peasants in other contexts,  this is relatively rare.  Many examples indicated that 
the crowd 1110st often subverted the natural (or imposed) hierarchy of the village. 
In  early  modem  Japan,  for  example,  peasant  revolts  and  petitions  regularly 
601  Of our sample of 20 leaders, 6 mcntion that they may be acting under constraint.  Terms used 
include 'contrc son gre et valente' (AN, JJ86, f  123, no.  361), 'par contrainte' (AN, JJ86, f  123, 
no.  362) and 'par la force ct contrainte de feu Guille Cale' (AN, ]]86, f.  136, no. 391). 
602  'Estienl1c Nolan eust este csleu contre son gre et volente par les habitans dc 1a dicte ville 
lieutenant du capitaine d'icelle' AN, JJ86, f  136, no. 391. 
603  'par la force ct contrainte de seignuer Guille Calle'. 
604 AN, JJ90, f.  124, no.  364, Phi1lipe Paingnant was 'mettent en prison au belfroy au Soissons'. 
234 bypassed the authority of the village 'headman'.  605  Remissions for the J  acquerie 
emphasise a similar lack of reliance on the old order.  Had they held to it, the 
clergy would have been prominent as leaders and,  as  we have seen, they were 
not.  In most cases, communities of Jacques have selected leaders who were not 
prominent even within their own community.  Only two give any sign of their 
employment.  One of  those is a royal sergeant, and ifhis role as a capitaine could 
be multiplied many times over this may lend truth to Cazelles' ascriptions,606 the 
other is afamilier of the count of MontfOli, and leads the rebels from the town of 
Ermenoville.  Yet,  these  are the  only cases  of such individuals.  Instead,  the 
silence concerning the occupations of the other individuals is telling.  There is no 
mention even of the better-off peasantry or rural landowners (nonnally signified 
by the phrase lzommc de labolll)'  If the insurgents did contain several members 
of the military,  then  we would expect to  see them prominently at the  £i'ont  of 
these crowd movements, as in the cities, especially Paris.  We might also expect 
to see evidence of local officials orchestrating their charges' actions.  In a village 
society that had a  perceptible hierarchy to  it,  one  would think  this  would be 
visible in the organisation of the  peasant clusters,  but it  is  not.  In Jaux,  for 
example, where a Parisian sergeant is pardoned for joining the revolt, there is no 
implication that he was in charge of the groUp.607  Rather, two individuals from 
the village who had no occupation wOlih recording both assumed the mantle of 
60; See l.W. White, lkki: Social COllflict alld Politica! Protest ill Early Modern Japall (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995).  For other examples of  crowds selecting individuals other than 
an existing hierarchy might suggest, see Cohen and Murphy, BlIrn, Baby.Bum: in both instance 
no community leaders featured within the crowd, and leadership was instead provided by 
individual instigators identifying new targets.  Barker et a1.  in their discussion ofleadership find 
that in many movement contexts "[c]onventional cultural capital can be a positive hindrance', C. 
Barker et ai, "Introduction', Leadership and Social Movemellts, p. 8. 
606  AN, JJ90, [  81, no.  148: Poignant is described as being "sergcnt du  nostre dit seigneur'. 
G07  AN, JJ86, [  76, no. 233. 
235 leading this community at different times.
608  That insurgents certainly ignored 
their  traditional  representatives  like  mayors  and  clerics  is  indicative  of their 
power: the Jacques themselves held ultimate control of  their actions. 
In modern models  of crowd  action,  the  leaders'  responsibilities  are  to 
help groups achieve their goal or to interpret their agenda into direct action.
609  It 
falls  to  the  leader  to  channel  the  crowd's  emotions,  and  to  tum the  crowd's 
wishes into action.  Although the matter is dealt with in two separate remissions, 
Simon Doublet led the villagers of Grandvilliers, Poix and Lignieres (all Somme) 
to  destroy the castle at Poix,6]O and may also have played a part in the murder of 
the knight Guillaume de Picquigny by a group of 'murderers and rebels' midway 
between the latter two  settlements.
6
]]  Jacquin de  Chennevieres led the men of 
Montmorency (Val d'Oise) against local targets, specifically the chateau there.612 
It was not only on the offensive that local leaders made their presence felt.  Two 
leaders,  Jean  Flageolot  and  Jean  Ie  Grant,  came  to  prominence  in  their 
settlements after the initial burst of violence, as they reorganised their followers 
to  resist the attacks of nobles.  When the nobles in their counter-offensive were 
attempting to gain control of the forests around Compiegne, Jean Ie Grant and the 
men of Jaux  refused  to  send  the  felTyboat  to  them.
613  Flageolot  (appointed 
through the absence of their original leader) brought together several villages that 
assembled  to  protect  themselves  from  the  lord  of  Saint-Dizier's  counter-
60S  AN, JJ86, f.  123, nos. 361  and  362.  Remissions are issued for two capitailZcs, Estienne No10n 
and Jean Ie Grant. 
609  Reichereral., 'Socialldentity', p.17. 
610  AN, .IJ86, f.  136, no.  392; ]]87, f.  1, no.  1. 
611  AN, JJ86, f.  54, no.  165; reprinted ill  Luce, Jacqllcric, pp. 245-7 'rebelles et murtiers'. 
612 AN, JJ86, f. 67,  no.  207. 
613  AN, JJ86, f.  123, no. 362. 
236 offensive against the men  of the  countryside.
614  These individuals  turned the 
anger  of the  non-nobles  under  their  command  into  direct  action  against  the 
nobility, either through resistance or attacks on their property and persons.  There 
is no trace here of any direction from Guillaume Cale, or anyone else at the top 
of some regional or pan-regional heirarchy. 
The remissions show that any hierarchy within the Jacques was not static. What 
these  remissions  indicate,  like  the  Chroniqlle  Normande  and  Chronique  des 
Quatres  Premiers  Valois,  is  that  leadership  was  not  a  strict  hierarchy  like 
Cazelles  proposed.
615  What  did  exist  was  informal.  In  some  cases,  leaders 
seemed to be serving other leaders; the episode concerning Etienne du Wes is the 
best example.  This was not the only example, however:  'Colart Ie Maunier who 
lived in  Conti  in the  county of Clern10nt  was made a capitaine subject to  the 
1·  ..  f  h  'd  '  (PI  . ) 616  ru mg  capztaznes  0  t  e  countrysl  e  at pazs .  In  other  cases,  different 
leaders could work alongside each other: two separate individuals led the village 
of Jaux.  The inhabitants needed Estienne Nolon to  organise their attacks on the 
nobles, and Jean Ie  Grant to  organise their defence.
617  The .Tacquerie  provides 
another  example  of "the  complex  and messy  dynamics  of a  historical  social 
618  movement' . 
The role of capitaine was  not fixed:  as mentioned earlier,  Gern1ain  de 
Reveillon  originally acted under constraint of Cale,  and  then  became captain 
614 AN, J190, f  97, no. 292, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 293-4, 'acceptant Ie dit oftice de 
capitcnarie pour ce que Ie Seigneur dc Saint-Dizier accompaignez de grant nombre dez gens 
da1111es  chevauchee jusques les gens clu pais'. 
615 Ryan, 'The Cult of Personality', p. 211, as 'images of activisits ancl leaders have become 
mediated through layers of  representation ...  [ilt is all too easy for movements to become reified, 
their internal dynamics and collective identity processes no longer visible to the modern 
researcher'. 
616 AN, JJ86, f  116, no. 344. 
617 AN, JJ86, f.  123, nos. 361 and 362. 
61S  Ryan, 'The Cult of Personality', p. 211. 
237 himself (although,  he  claimed,  only  for  one  day  and  one  night)  in  Ca1e's 
absence.
619  Presumably another capitainc, Arnuel Guenelon of Catenoy, came 
under Reveillon' s charge there. 610 
This  flexible  chain of command,  with power being held by individual 
collectives  of villages,  towns  and  peasants,  not by a  think-tank powering the 
whole  movement,  represents  the  only  manner  wherby  a  movement  like  the 
Jacquerie  could function.  Philippe Poignant  was  leading his  troop  apparently 
under  duress,  but  then  brought  them  into  the  main  force  for  a  great 
'chevaucMe,.621 Groups, like that of  Poignant's, could act as independent entities 
before joining the main force and falling under the control of (presumably) Cale 
or his  counterparts,  if they  ever did.  These men and their followers  were not 
controlled from  above by their superiors.  There  is  no  other evidence of any 
orders  or objectives  being specified from  above  than  the  two  remissions  that 
mention  Cale.  Any  hierarchy may  well  have  been symbolic,  known  to  the 
insurgents  in  concept  rather  than  through  direct  contact  with  the  ruling 
capitaincs. This fluid organisation would fit a movement like the Jacques, which 
covered a massive area, especially considering that Cale's name appears nowhere 
outside the immediate sunoundings of the fIe de France. 
In  contrast,  these  local  leaders are  scattered  across  the  whole  north of 
France.  These individuals who came from these groups can be found across in 
the area where Jacques rose up (which was larger than Mollat and Wolff would 
1  b  1·  ) 6"0  lave us  e leve : --
610 AN, .1186,  f.  102,110.309, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 261-2. 
620  ibid.,  and AN, JJ86. f.  136, no. 391. 
621  AN, JJ90, f.  81, no.  148. 
622 The scale of this map is  1/1,500.000. 
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Green  place-names  indicate  mentions  of Guillaume  Cale,  blue  place-names 
indicate  local  capitaines  specified  by  the  remISSIOns.  The  change  in  the 
respective  area  covered is  remarkable.  Not included on this  map,  there  is  a 
fragment of a remission which mentions Michel Martin to have been the leader 
of a force at Saint-Amand, which is almost as far north as Tournai.
623  There are 
two  leaders found  within a couple of miles of each other, south of Amiens.
624 
Jean  Flageolot  is  said to  have  led  several  villages  around  Favresse  (Marne), 
which is right on the borders of Bar, level in longitude with Verdun.
625  These are 
what we might consider the furthest reaches of  the Jacquerie, yet local leaders are 
by no means only found on the periphery.  The majority come from the heartland 
of the Jacques, between Paris and Beauvais, with men like Gilles Ie Haguez in 
Chambll
26 (Oise) and Pierre Paignant in Neuilly (Aisne).627  This heartland also 
spreads to Compiegne, with villages such as Jaux (Oise).  We also see individual 
623  AN, JJ90, f.  125, no. 234. 
624 AN, 1186, f.  116, no. 344 (Conty) ; JJ86, f. 136, no. 392 (Poix). 
625 AN, JJ90, f.  149, no. 292; reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 293-4. 
626 AN, JJ90, f.  182, no. 354; reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 297-9. 
627 AN, 1190, f.  186, no. 364. 
239 leaders  hailing from  the  same part  of the  country that  Cale  came  from:  those 
already mentioned like Gen11ain de Reveillon and Arneul Guenelon and others, 
none of whom make any mention of Guillaume Cale or any other regional leader. 
Moreover, the leaders were not outsiders.  They led communities they were very 
much familiar with, if not born in: 
Table XXI. Mentions of the local capitaines. 
LEADER  REMISSION  HAILS FROM  LEADS  Distance  AGAINST 
between? 
Jacques  de  JJ86207  Taverney  Montmorency  Around  10 
Chennevieres  km 
Guillame  JJ86221  Deuil  Deuil 
Lanyeux 
Jean Hullot  J.l86298  Etavigny  Etavigny 
Gennain  de  .lJ86309  Ern1enonville  Ennenonville 
Reveil10n 
Col art  Ie  JJ86344  Conty  Conty 
Maunier 
Estienne Nolon  JJ86 361  Jaux  Jaux 
Jean Ie Grant  ]]86362  Jaux  Jaux  Those 
attacking 
Jaux 
Arnoul  .JJ86 391  Catenoy  Catenoy  Clennont 
Guenelon  and  then  to 
Ennenonville 
Simon Doublet  1.186392  Grandvilliers  Grandvi  11 i  ers,  Villages  all 
Poix  and  within 
Lignieres  10km 
Jean Signet  ]]89609  Remy  Remy 
Philippe  JJ90 148  Ponchon  4 towns  Oize  and 
Poignant  Therain 
region 
Jean Flageolot  J.J90 292  Favresse  Several  villages  Organsied 
around Favresse  defences  in 
same villages 
Hue  de  .JJ90 298  Angicourt  Angicourt 
Sail1eville 
Michel Marin  JJ90234  Saint-Amand  Saint-Amand 
Gilles  Ie  JJ90354  Chambly  Chambly 
Haguez 
PieHe  JJ90364  Neuilly  Neuilly 
Paingnant 
<unnamed  JJ94004  Oize 
capitain> 
Etienne du Wes  ]]98252  Montataire  Montataire 
240 All these individuals are identified as from within or nearby the communities that 
they lead.  Leaders for whom names and places of  residence are listed came from 
the  community that  they rose to  lead  or from  a  neighbouring one.  The most 
distant,  Jacques  de  Chennevieres,  hailed  from  Taverney (Val  d'Oise),  around 
eight  kilometres  outside  Montmorency  where  he  was  their  elected  leader.
628 
Even then, Taverney and  Montmorency are both intimately linked - bordering 
the same forest and connected by road.  In the remissions where the crimes of 
these  companies of Jacques  are  listed,  all  of these  groups  acted against  local 
targets: the furthest from their home that these rebels fought was Guenelon's men 
from  Catenoy,  who  ended up  ten kilometres  to  the  south in  Senlis  on Cale's 
instruction, but this is only after causing devastation within their own region. 
These leaders were not in charge of large regional forces:  some of these 
leaders  operated  very  close  to  another capitaine.  Jacques  de  Chemlevieres's 
force from Taverney, on the outskirts of what we would consider modern Paris, 
was just ten kilometres away from  Guillaume Lanyeux  and the inhabitants of 
Deui1.
629  Simon  Doublet may have  led  the  villages  of Poix,  Lingnieres  and 
Grandvilliers  (all  SOllline,  south  of Amiens)  in  rebellion,  but  again  just  ten 
kilometres  away  (the  same  distance  that  separated  the  villages  under  his 
command), Conty's force was following Colart de Maunier.
63o 
This is  one of the reasons  that we can be confident in  saying that  the 
surviving  records  represent  only  the  tip  of the  iceberg,  and  that  leadership 
permeated every single group  of villagers who  rose  up.  Of one hundred  and 
seventy four individual references, only twenty make any mention of leadership 
within the Jacques.  Can we really talk of a leadership hierarchy on a scattering 
628 AN, JJ86, f. 67, n. 207; reprinted in Luce. Jacquerie. pp. 254-6. 
629 AN, JJ86, f. 72, n. 221. 
630  AN, JJ86, f.  116, n.  344. 
241 of names?  Is  there anything to  suggest that this group made up anything more 
than just the second rung of Cale's hierarchy? 
Although we have  only dealt  so  far with the  remissions  that have specified a 
capitaine, there is reason to believe that they represent just a small sample of the 
many leaders  who  were working within the Jacques.  For example,  numerous 
remissions described actions as being done in conceli with 'several others of the 
said town', which implies that the individual is either receiving the remission for 
the community as a whole (as a representative), or he is somehow considered to 
be more guilty than the other inhabitants.  Jean Bouquel of Pont-Point (Oise), for 
example,  was  granted a remission for his part in the murder of the  noble spy, 
conU11itted  with  thiliy-four  habitants  of  the  village  and  the  adjoining 
settlement.  631  The implication is  that  Bouquel  is seeking grace  on  behalf of 
himself and  the  villagers,  and  therefore  may have  been  the  'leader'  of that 
paliicular attack. 
Even without adding to  the number of remissions that may well indicate 
leadership to have been present, we can still consider it likely that the majority of 
settlements  had  someone  who  fitted  the  tenn  capitaine.  Above  all,  the 
remissions  indicate  the  necessity  of even  some  of the  smallest  conununities 
needing  a  leader.  Moreover,  the  contrast  between  the  force  marshalled  by 
Philippe Poignant, who was at the head of four villages who then joined the main 
force  with Cale,  compared with those like Michel Martin who seemed to  have 
held sway over only one village,  indicates how levels of leadership varied and 
631  AN, JJ96, f. 220, no. 425, reprinted in  Luce, Jacqllcrie, pp. 311-2. 
242 thatall sizes of settlements generated leaders.
632  These leaders each perfonned 
acts  of violence  during  the  insurgency  on  radically  different  scales,  whether 
within the  confines of the main force,  as  with Poignant,  or Jean Ie  Grant,  the 
second leader of Jaux (Oise), who organised the villagers to  bar entry to  nobles 
and foreign mercenaries.  Again, remissions only concern the exceptions to  the 
justice administered by the crown to  the people of the plat-pays, and we should 
consider these leaders either exceptionally f0l1unate to have escaped death at the 
hands of the enraged nobles, or exceptionally unfOl1unate to have been identified 
as a capitaine in the first place. 
The  story  that  these  remissions  tell  is  ce11ainly  suggestive  of a  large 
number  of micro-insurgencies,  all  of which  could  have  identified  a  leader 
amongst  their midst.  Certainly,  these  individuals  do  not represent some  elite 
circle  of leadership,  or even  the  chief ringleaders,  amongst  the  Jacques.  If 
leaders were vital to such small cOlllil1Unities,  then nearly every cOlllil1Unity and 
each individual attack, of which the remissions recount many, must have had at 
least some form of  capitaine. 
To understand exactly the imp0l1ance of the leaders of the Jacques (and indeed 
any crowd)  we must understand what it means to  be  a leader within a crowd. 
Trying  to  fit  Cale,  and  the  leadership  of the  Jacques,  into  the  mould  of a 
commander-in-chiet~ leads  to  misconceptions  about  his  role.  Hilton  grapples 
with  the  concept  of Cale  as  a  military  leader,  deciding  that  the  Jacques' 
shambolic  defeat  indicates  that  he  had  no  preparation,  yet  the  organisational 
abilities  convince  Cazelles  that  they  must  have  been well-versed  in  warfare, 
632  AN, JJ90, f  81, no.  148 and f.  125, no. 234. 
243 especially considering the speed at which towns and chateaux were taken.
633  No 
remission, and only one chronicle, gives us any sense that Cale was involved in 
any SOli of military plaIlliing. 
Similarly,  attempts  to  force  a  top-down  hierarchy  on  the  Jacques  are 
misplaced.  While  it  is  obvious  that  Cale  was  viewed  as  the  leader  of the 
movement of the Jacquerie, and the remissions suggest that Cale may have held 
b  f  b 1·  634  h'  1  1"  power  over  anum er  0  su  - leutenants,'  t  ere  IS  no  sense  t 1at  t 11S  IS 
necessarily  a  military hierarchy,  with  Cale  specifying targets  that  sub-groups 
would focus upon.635  Rather, these rebel 'cells' were operating independently of 
the "ruling captain'.  Very few of the remissions conceming 'leaders' mentioned 
any  link  with  the  hierarchy.636  There  was  no  suggestion  that  Cale  was  an 
exceptional individual within the crowd, apart from those few that describe him 
as the most impOliant of them all. 
So if leadership was provided on a smaller scale, by men elected by their 
own communities, what did these leaders actually do?  In the most basic sense, 
they represented the crowd, and were perceived by both crown and compatriots 
as  being  responsible  for  their  charges'  actions.  More  than  that,  their  very 
existence  provided  a  structure  under  which  the  movement  could  exist.  By 
selecting objectives, casting the first stone or even just spearheading an attack, 
the  leaders  transfonned  the  ideological  base  of the  revolt,  the  anger  at  the 
633  Hilton, Bond Men i,dade Free, pp. 119-122 and R, Cazelles, "The Jacquerie'. p.  79  While 
CazelIes emphasises the tactical value of their targets, Hilton calls the rebels' [mJilitarily 
inexperienced'  . 
604 Again, the remission for Mahieu de Leurel is the best example of this.  AN, JJ98, f.  120, no. 
252, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 333-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  161-2. 
635 Media eoverage focuses on the 'leaders' often'OJist organisations, but ten'orist cells operate 
independently ofthe 'leader' with whom they share only an over-arching ideology.  This is an 
accurate comparison with the Jacquerie: the emphasis placed by historians upon Guillaume Cale 
obscures the independent aetions ofthe localised 'cells' acting against the crown, who were 
linked ideologically to Cale, but not practically. 
636 Fifteen make no reference to any form ofleaders, or group, operating 'above' the 10cal1eader. 
244 nobility,  into  action.  While the  precise nature  of these attacks  varied,  all  the 
crowds interpreted them in a broadly similar manner, targeting in particular the 
homes and property of local nobles.  There was undoubtedly a sense of purpose 
to  those being led: it is mostly those Jacques outside the leadership structure (the 
two young men who stole the chickens and carps, for example) that behaved in a 
different manner.  637 
We  can  assume  that  most  Jacques,  with  their  neighbours  and  fellow 
habitants of the villages who assembled and bonded together, had some sort of 
capitaine within their association who directed their action.  We can also assume 
that  these  men,  rather  than  being  manipulative  outsiders,  resembled  their 
followers.  Cale, and those other capitaines in charge of the main force, were 
impOliant,  and their legend has  been preserved for  us  when we consider the 
Jacques.  But the important part of the revolt, the genesis of the programme of 
destruction, lies with the local leaders, not in the hands of the main force.  Rather 
than memorialisinga heroic individual who marshalled the eventual defeat of the 
Jacques, credit should lie at  the feet of Michel Mmiin and Guillaume Lanyeux, 
who, with their followers'  blessing, led the groups to  destroy numerous targets. 
The Jacques appeared to  be a leaderless people, because active leadership was 
being provided by names that the chroniclers never knew. 
COMMUNICATION 
The unit of rebellion was the village community, and leadership was provided by 
local men within those conm1Unities, but when we think of the bigger picture, it 
637  AN, JJ86, f. 97, no. 291. rcplinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 256-7. 
245 is necessary to understand how and why these communities felt they were pmi of 
the same wider rebellion.  While each village did act separately, they also were 
considered  (and  considered  themselves)  to  be  part  of something  larger:  the 
remissions described all actions as  committed in conjunction with 'other men of 
the plat-pays', and in the remissions insurgents refer to themselves as  Jacques or 
as motivated by the 'time of conunotions'.  As illustrated, several knew the name 
of Guillaume Cale,  and remissions  make reference to  assemblies,  conspiracies 
and joint action: how could these messages be passed between separate insurgent 
')  groups; 
In the models of pre-industrial revolt, popular preaching was one way in 
which  rebellious  communities  can  share  and  communicate  ideas  between 
themselves,  and  can foster  the  imagined  bonds  between  them.
638  When we 
searched for the influence of the  clergy in  the Jacquelie, however, the sources 
were very quiet.  Not only is church propeliy relatively undamaged in the revolt, 
very few mentions of preachers exist, and fewer still take a leading role in the 
campmgn.  Moreover,  we have  no  record  of any  preaching  of revolutionary 
ideology  from  the  pulpit,  nor  any  popular religious  fever  like  the  kind  that 
inspired the Flagellants to spread tlu'ough Gem1any and across the French border 
in the wake of the Black Death, or that can be seen in other late medieval revolts 
such as in Flanders in 1327 or more prominently in revolts ofheretics.
639 
If the  message was  not  coming from  the pulpit,  then,  how were  these 
village communities hearing the word,  and spreading it onwards?  How  could 
63& The most commonly cited model is that ofY.-M. Berce, Revolt and revo/llfiol1.  For a fullcr 
analysis, see Davis, 'Religious Riot'. 
639  See Cohn, LlIst  for Liberty, pp.  100-104 for discussion of religious riots in the late medieval 
period. 
246 news of the rebellion pass quickly enough that the peasantry as distant as on the 
borders with Flanders join the rebellion'? 
Recent scholarship has shown that the infrastructure of rural life in the Middle 
Ages  was  stronger  than  had  previously  been  assumed.  Most  bridges  were 
constructed at high-expense, built from stone, and lasted deep into the modem 
era.  640  In  medieval England,  for  example, the price of transporting crops  was 
relatively  low;  it  was  40%  less  in the  fourteenth  century  than  it  was  in  the 
.  I  1  641  elg1teent1 century.  The  affordable  cost  of transport  implies  other  things 
about medieval trade links: the proliferation of markets, the quality of  roads and 
speed at which goods could be moved.  Medieval infrastructure was good enough 
to  foster links between cOlmnunities, and these links extended further and wider 
than previously assumed. 
Everything  from  the  transfer  of political  rumours  to  religious  heresy 
quickly disseminated throughout rural communities.  Moreover, the transport of 
news  could result in popular action.
642  In  1377,  Berkshire villages came to  a 
standstill on account of 'the great rumour among various other tenants', in this 
case an uprising of some forty villages in  Wiltshire, Hampshire and SUlTey.643 
Letters of remission also testify to the swift passage of rumours from settlement 
to settlement.  Many individuals mention continued 'ill wishes and hostility' long 
640 See D.F. HalTison. 'Blidges and Economic Development, 1300-1800', Economic History 
Review, 45 (1992), pp. 240-261. 
641  1.  Masschacle, 'Transport Costs in Medieval England', Economic History ReFiew, 46 (1993), 
p.276. 
642 The importance of  rum our in revolt has not diminished over the centuries.  In the aftennath of 
the 1919 race riot in Chicago, the RepOli of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations featured 
a whole section on rumour, and concluded that '[rjumor, fennenting in mobs, prepares the mob 
mind for the direct suggcstion impelling otherwise law-abiding citizens to atrocities'.  In  The 
Negro in Chicago: A Studv o/Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1922), p. 35. 
643  R.J. Faith, 'The 'Great Rumour' of 1377 and Peasant Ideology', in The English Rising, ed. 
Aston and Hilton, pp. 43-70. 
247 after the event from the local nobility:  their reputations were known across the 
local  area.  6.+4  Official  pardons  were  about  bringing  an  end  to  the  rumours 
conceming these individuals' participation in the violence. 
So  how did rebellion spread?  The message could be transfened by individuals. 
When  considering  how  revolutionary  ideals  spread  to  epidemic  propoliions, 
Malcolm  Gladwell  used  the  example  of  Paul  Revere  and  the  spread  of 
revolutionary  fervour  at  the  start  of  the  American  Revolution  of  1779.
645 
Revere's ride through the north-eastern towns spreading the word of  rebellion is 
one famous  example of how an individual can pass the message of revolt and 
rebellion onwards.  This journey, encompassing several different conununities, 
provided a means to  transmit this message to  communities who wished to  take 
part.  According to  Gladwell, word-of-mouth epidemics, like rebellions, require 
'connectors':  individuals  with  links  in  several  communities  who  can  quickly 
disseminate ideas through their links.
646  Thus, when considering the spread of 
revolt,  it  is  wOlih  considering  the  possibility  of certain  individuals  having  a 
particular importance in the spread of  revolutionary ideas. 
We  can  find  individuals  like  this,  interacting with  other communities, 
spreading the word of the Jacquerie, even in the letters of  remission; for example, 
Jacques  de  Chennievieres  travelled  the  few  kilometres  to  the  neighboUling 
6H 'malivolence et hayne', as it appears in the majority of  remissions. 
645  M.  Gladwell, The  Tipping Point (London: Little, Brown, 2002). 
646 Recent studies into networks support this. In any given network, most nodes have relatively 
few connections, but a minority of  key nodes have numerous connections which keep the 
network expanding.  Sce Barabasi, Linked.  For the application of scale-free networks to 
medieval rural society, see P.  Ormerod and A.P. Roach, 'The Medieval inquisiton: scale free 
networks and the suppression of  heresy' , Physica A, 339 (2004), pp. 645-52.  With regard to 
insurgent movements, see pp. 219-225, and also M. S.-Y.  Chwe, 'Structure and Strategy in 
Collective Action', The American Journal ojSociology, 105, n.1  (Jul., 1990), pp. 128-156. 
248 village to lead them into revolt.
647  Jean Flageolot helped some villagers around 
Favresse (Marne) to  organise defenses.
648  Piene de MontfOli,  citizen of Caen, 
was seen to be 'giving speeches of evil and disorder' to the people of  the city and 
those around (even in Picardy), while also  declaring loyalty to  the men of the 
plat pais  in  their  struggle.  649  An  outsider,  Jehan  Charoit  of Marioles,  was 
pardoned with the habitants of Egly (Essonne).650  Individuals from the outside 
could convince new communities to rebel. 
We  cannot,  however,  consider  the  individual  to  be  paramount  in  the 
spread  of the  insurgency.  As  Gladwell  stresses,  the  power  lies  within  the 
message the men canied.  Like any epidemic, rebellions require the agent to be 
contagious and adaptable enough to  stick on when it is exposed to  new groups. 
The agent could be transmitted in many f0TI11s.  Most notably, rebels were often 
orators,  and used words to  convince others  of their cause.  The Parisians,  for 
example had  'been won over by many false  words,  deceptions,  proclamations 
and  by  other malicious  and  deceptive  means,.6SI  Etienne  Marcel's  greatest 
weapons were his words ; the  standard start of the remissions for  the Parisian 
rebels was  ' ...  at  the instigation, prompting and encouragement of the deceased 
Etienne Marcel'.  652  In Amiens, as well, it was the spoken word that provoked 
the  most action:  'many of Amiens  said  and spread astonishing and injurious 
words against our state and persons'.  653  As discussed in Chapter II, Marcel even 
sent lieutenants, like Jean Hersent, to  villages dependent on Paris (like Chatres-
6H AN, .IJ86, f. 67. no. 207. 
6~S AN, JJ90, f  149, no. 292, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp.293-4. 
649 AN, JJS7, f.  136, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 291-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  189-
91. 
650 AN, .l.J86, f  70, no. 215. 
651  AN, JJ86, f. 79. no. 240, reprinted in Secousse, Ordonnances, pp. 346-7, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 
179-180. 
652  For example, see AN, JJ86, f.  68, no. 209. 
653  AN, JJ86, f  79, no. 239, reprinted in Secousse, Orilol1lwnces, pp.  97-9, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 
197-8. 
249 sous-Montlhery) to  convince the inhabitants to join the Parisian rebellion under 
the command of several "commissaries', even if  this mission failed.
654 
This  emphasis could be found  in  the countryside as  well.  As we  have 
seen, Pierre de Montfort in Caen transmitted the message of  rebellion through his 
'speeches of evil and disorder'.  655  In the village of Ballieo (Oise), an individual 
wamed 'in a loud voice'  that the  enemy intended to destroy their land,  causing 
the men to assemble in Saint-Vrain with the intention of resisting the nobility.656 
Yet  there  is  reason to  believe that  others  perfom1ed  a  similar role.  We have 
already discussed the capitaines, who were clearly involved in spearheading and 
organising their villages.  Presumably, when Gennain de Reveillon took on the 
duties of the general capitaine it was his job to spread the message. 
The chroniclers also suggest the importance of oratory.  Even Jean Ie Bel 
suggests a group was responsible for spreading the message: 
At first there were not a hundred of them, saying that the nobles, knights 
and  squires were ruining and  disgracing the kingdom,  and it  would be 
good if they all were destroyed.  Each [rebel]  said:  'He speaks the truth; 
he speaks the truth.  Shame on him who allows them to live.657 
The  agency for  the  spread of the  rebellion  is  not placed in  the  hands  of the 
peasants who  attacked the battalion at Saint-Leu; rather, it was a group of less 
than one hundred rabble-rousers who convinced others of the 'truth' with whom 
the responsibility lies.  Of course, there is  no  evidence that even one rebel said 
this line.  This may have been chanted on the fields of the Beauvaisis, but was it 
chanted in Champagne or Picardy? However, it gives us  an understanding how 
important the spoken word can be in h'ansmitting the message between a group 
654 AN, .IJ86, f.  76. no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 263-4. 
655 AN, JJ87, f.  136, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 291-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  189-
91. 
656 AN, JJ86, f.  164, no. 465, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 281-2. 
657  Bel, Chrol1.,  v.2, p.  256, trans. Cohn, pp, pp. 152. 
250 as  large as  the Jacques.  Phrases and war cries can give us  some sense of the 
appeal of the message, and how it applies to  these individuals.  The Chronique 
des Quatres Premiers Valois puts another phrase into the mouths of the rebels: 
All these nobles and many others whose names are not recorded here, at 
least a thousand men-at-anus, joined the King of NavalTe's company to 
face the Jacques, who with a fierce demeanour held their ranks,  tooting 
their horns  and  trumpets  and  crying  haughtily  'Mont joye', and  they 
carTied many insignia painted with the Fleur-de-lis.
65s 
'Mont joye' was of course the traditional battle-cry of the king of France.  What 
that  actually  meant  in  a  time  of unceliain kingship  is  unclear:  King  Jean  of 
course is held captive because of the perceived failure of  the nobility; perhaps, as 
in the Peasant's Revolt of 1381,  the rebels believed the  dauphin to  have been 
misled by his  advisors.  Even as  short  a  chant  as  'Mont joye' has  important 
symbolic value.  S.  Reicher, discussing the work ofN.Z. Davis on religious riot, 
describes four functions that oratory and speeches perfonu: 
First  they  constitute  the  rival  group  as  a  threat  which  needed  to  be 
defended against.  Second,  they urge violent attack as  the best fonu of 
defence.  Third,  they point to  the particular fon1lS  the violence should 
take.  FOUlih,  they legitimate and indeed sanctify such violence as doing 
the Lord's work.
659 
Under this critelia,  'Mont joye' is a potent chant indeed: the noble enemies are 
defined as being in opposition to  the rightful king, the order is  given in the fOlm 
of a  war-cry  which  in  tum  infonued  (or  perhaps  represented  )  the  force's 
decision to fight a pitched battle, and finally, it legitimises the revolt in the name 
of the lord, in this case secular rather than religious.
66o  The Chrolliqlle' s repOli 
65S  Cfzroll. premiers Valois, p. 74, trans. Cohn, pp, p.  162. 
6:'9 Reicher, 'The Challenge of  the Crowd' (in press). 
660  An accurate assesment of what an average medieval peasant might have considered utopian is 
impossible to attain; however. the importance of the King in the Jacques' chants is similar to 
Hilton's characterisation of peasants' political vision in the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381: 'a 
popular monarchy. a state without nobles, perhaps without churchmen, in which the peasants and 
251 of Clermont is problematic: it goes into great detail surrounding the battle, but no 
other  account  corroborates  any of its  details  (or  mentions  similar  sentiments 
towards the crown),661  and it was written some forty years after the violence. It is 
possible  that  the  CJzronique  des  Quatres  Premiers  Valois  may  have  been 
mocking the rebels - it seems unlikely that the peasants actually had horns and 
trumpeters alongside them.  Nonetheless, the Clzronique did see fit  to  credit the 
peasants with a chant; the spoken word  was  one way in which peasants could 
show solidarity, redefine their identity, and convey their message to others. 
Recent  scholarship  has  stressed that large-scale medieval peasant revolts  were 
held together by a surprising emphasis on written messages.  In Cade's Rebellion 
of 1450, there seems to have been an intricate web of communication amongst 
notaries and  scribes - nearly every rebel leader had a scribe or messenger.  For 
example, Thomas Cheyne,  'leader' of the rising in eastern Kent in  1450, had a 
scrivener who sent messages about the country.662  The English Peasants' Revolt 
displays similar links.  In Wa1singham's record of the events of 1381  in England, 
he records that John Ball sent a letter to Essex exhorting them to  continue their 
riot, which seems to have been reproduced and found on the body of  an insurgent 
(Wa1singham  uses  'these',  implying  he  was  carrying  propaganda).  Steven 
Justice makes the case that several of the rebels' speeches that Knighton records 
may actually have been letters produced to suppOli the case.  Justice also argued 
their king are the only social forces'.  Hilton, The Eng/ish Peasantl]! in the Later Middle Ages, 
p.14. 
661  Some chroniclers of the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381  suggested the peasantry held loyalty 
towards their monarch.  For example, the AI/onima/le Chronicle, p.  148 reports the peasants 
kneeling down in front of the King and declaring 'Welcome our Lord King Richard, if  it pleases 
you, and we will not have any other king but you', trans. W.  Oman, reprinted in in The Peasants 
Revolt of  1381, ed. B.  Dobson, p. 181. 
662  Harvey. Jack Cade's Rebe//iOiI Cif 1450, p. 75.  That rebellion also produced a series of well-
infonned petitions, ibid., p.  105. 
252 that differences in the dialect of these letters indicate. that these documents were 
copied and recopied.
663 
Scattered references suggest letters may have been just as  impOliant to 
the Jacques as they were to  the English peasants some twenty years later.  For 
example, in Etienne Marcel's communications with the bonnes villes, he claimed 
he  had  sent  'confidential  letters  to  [the  Jacques]  to  stop  the  great  evil,.664 
Moreover,  the  remission  issued  to  Jehanne  Rose  on  behalf of her  executed 
husband, the cleric Jean Rose,  tells how Guillaume Cale sent Jean and another 
'constrained man' to negotiate a truce with the men of Compiegne.  Jean, fearing 
for his o\vn life (and having sent his  family to Compiegne for their own safety) 
agreed to carried the message to the townsmen: 
the said general capitain of the countryside sent the said Jehan and one 
other constrained man to  carry letters  to  the bourgeois and habitants of 
the said town (ville) of Compiegne to ask them if they wished to become 
allies of the men of the countryside and sustain comfOli and aid them .... 
to  these said letters the said bourgeois and habitants made responses to 
the said capitaine and his allies and adherents.
665 
Letters were clearly important to  the Jacquerie.  In forming important alliances 
the written word, just like the channs of an orator or the words of a delegate, 
could be  vital for  the rebels.  More importantly, Cale, his allies  and  adherents 
expected a written response.  These rebels were communicating through writing 
with other communities in the realm:  letters were important in convincing new 
allies to join the uprising. 
663  S. Justice, Writing and Rebellion, England in  1381 (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 
1993).  See 'Insurgent Literacy', pp. 1  3-66. 
664  Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Picardy and Flanders, trans. Cohn, pp, p.  177. 
665  'lc dit general capitaine du dit plat pais envoya icelui 1ehan et un autre homme contraintes 
porter lettres aus bourgeois et habitans d'ieelle ville de eompiegne a fin qu'il voussisent etre aliez 
avee les gens du dit plat pais et eulx soustenir conforter et aider en  ..... des quelles lcttres les dis 
bourgeois et habitans firent response au dit capitiane et a ses allies et adherens ...  ·.  AN, 1J86, f. 
124,110. 365, replintcd in Luee, Jacquerie, pp. 272-4. 
253 · Letters were not only useful in forging new alliances, but they could also 
be used to  consolidate old ones.  We have already drawn heavily on one letter 
concerning the Jacques, the pardon issued for the mason Mathieu de Leurel for 
his part in the murder of one Jean Bernier.
666  This same Jean Bernier, who was 
suspected of treason with Navarre and was  'commonly known for such deeds in 
the region', was executed when 'letters from the King of  NavalTe were found on 
him'.  Obviously, this anecdote indicates the level of antagonism against NavalTe 
by the  Jacques,  but  it  also  suggests  of the  importance  of the  written  word. 
Whether  Bernier  held  the  letters,  or  was  simply  accused  of holding  letters, 
allegiance  was  indicated  by  documents  rather  than  rumour.  Writing  was 
impol1ant both in communicating old loyalties and forging new ones.
667 
Another  signal  that  seems  to  be pat1icularly  imp0l1ant  for  the  Jacques,  and 
intimately cOlmected to parish and community life, was the ringing of the church 
bells.  For example: 
the  lord  of Saint  Dizier with a  great number of soldiers  rode  towards 
Vitry in Perthois.  This greatly enraged the people of this region.  In many 
villages, they rang their bells and assembled against this Lord of Saint-
Dizier, fearing he wished to hann them.
668 
Church  bells  held  an  exceptionally  important  role  in  pre-modem  society, 
especially in rural societies: 'church bells ... might well be compared to the role 
of the telephone, radio, newpapers, clock, calendars and telegrams in our day ... 
they measured the time in daily practices and served as  a channel to transmit the 
666  AN, JJ9S, f.  84, no.  252, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 333-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  191-L 
667  Etienne Marcel himself scnt "letters' to the bOllnes villes to communicate his views on the 
Jacquerie.  See "Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Pieardy and Flanders', trans. Cohn, 
PP, pp.  177-S. 
663  AN, JJ90, f  97, no. 292, reprinted ill  Luce, JacqueJ'ie, pp. 293-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  190-1 
254 most important messages,.669  Bells were a 'sacred object, symbol of the identity 
d  1 ·  f  .  ,670 A  d'  f  .,  d  an  co 1eSlOn 0  a commul11ty  .  s a me  lUm  0  commul11catmg messages, an 
a call to  assembly for the public, bells obviously had significance in the genesis 
of popular movements.67l  Jelle Haemers, refelTing to  fifteenth-century Flemish 
revolts,  desclibes bells as  'the voice of power,  a vital medium to  mobilize the 
masses,.672  Improper ringing  of these  bells  could  result  in  the  culprit being 
executed.  The bells themselves could be the targets of retaliation; following the 
Harelle  of 1382  in  Rouen,  the  King  'dismantled the bell  that  had  called  the 
commune to action'.673 
In the case of the Jacquerie it was clear that the authorities construed the 
ringing  of bells  to  be  a  call  to  arms  for  the  peasantry.  In  the  case  of Jean 
Flageolot and his charges, the crown had originally considered the ringing of the 
bells to have been evidence in itself of  the villagers' intent. 674  Although they had 
not attacked any local  settlements,  nor needed to  defend themselves from  the 
Lord  of Saint-Dizier,  the ringing of the bells  was  enough to  suggest that they 
might have.  In the same region, Jean Ie Jacqueminart's remission indicates that 
669  S.  Menache, The  Vox Dei: Communication in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,  1992), p.  9  The definitive work on the importance and symbolism of  bells in rural life is 
Alain Corbin's Les Cloches de la  Terre.  Paysage sonore et cultllre sensible dalls les campagnes 
all XIXe siecle (Paris: Albin Miche'l,  1994), although it concentrates only on the 19
th  century.  For 
works 011  sound in earlier periods, see Cockayne, 'Cacophony, or vile scrapers on vile 
instruments', pp. 35-47, and D.  GaITioch,  'Sounds of the city: the soundscape of early modern 
European towns', Urhan HistofT 30, n.l (2003), pp. 5-25. 
670 Corbin, Les Cloches de la  Terre.  p.267.  Bells were a crucial factor in a village community's 
own identity.  Miguel Angel Marin suggested that because bell-ringing was 'probably a local 
feature that only natives would be able to understand', they 'helped to create a sense of spatial 
awareness and oflocal identity'.  M.A. Marin, 'Sound and urban life in a small Spanish town 
during the ancien regime', Urban History, 29, n.l (2002), pp. 58-9. 
671  Berce describes the ringing of bells as one of  the characteristics of the 'pre-modern' revolt: 
'Ringing ceaselessly, the alann bell summoned the inhabitants of the neighbourhood who flocked 
to join the pillage, of which they would have their share if  the rioters left the town gates open'. 
Berce, Rel'O/l and revollliion, p.  liS. 
672 J.  Haemers, 'A Moody Community?  Emotion and Ritual in Late Medieval Urban Revolts', in 
Emotions in  {he Hearl oIthe City (Fourteenth 10 Sixteenth Centuries); Studies in  Urban Historv, 
ed.  E.  Lecupprc-Desjardin and A.L. Van Bruaenl (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 41-62. 
673  Chronique dll Religiellx de Saint-Denys, vol. 6, pp.  144-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 281. 
674 AN, JJ90, f. 97, no.  292, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 293-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  190-1. 
255 the villagers of Thiebelemont (Marne) were sunmloned .at  the sound of bells.675 
The impOliance is underlined in another remission, where the priest Jean Morel 
was accused of having "sold the bells to  the nobles,.676  Bells (and bellmakers) 
were important to the village, the community and their lords.  Who had control of 
these 'sacred objects;, and what they did with them, was instrumental in bringing 
the villagers into revolt.  Most explicit was a remission that details exactly how 
the  bells  could  be  used in  case  of danger.  The  ringing  of the  bells  alerted 
villagers to  danger,  'where anyone who was able was sent to  the village (vme) 
where sounds  or the striking of the said bells statied, to  resist enemies and to 
suppress their force'.  677  The ringing of two bells in Ballieo (Oise) also allowed 
the assembly to  hear the words  of one individual who  warned them that when 
'enemy parties  an-ived,  the  whole parish would be devastated,.678  Bells  both 
warned the villagers and sUlllilloned them together to hear the common message. 
The role of visual imagery within popular revolts has been much discussed,  as 
has  the  importance  of symbols  and  signs  within  uprisings.  Symbols  offer 
legitimacy to  the crowd's actions.  They also  offer means of binding together 
individuals  within  the  crowd  to  act  in  unison.679  Trexler  and  Cohn  have 
demonstrated the power of flags  within the Ciompi,68o  and while that patiicular 
practice was not common in the nOlihern Europe, other symbols took their place 
6
7
5 AN, JJ86, f  121, no.  355, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie,  pp.  268-70. 
676 AN, JJ86, f  89, no. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  188-9. 
677 AN, JJ86, f  164, no. 465, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 281-2. 
678 ibid. 
679  Ralph H.  Turner and Samuel 1.  Surace write about the importance of the symbol, and how it 
can bind a disparate crowd if  they know what it 'means, in their 1956 essay 'Zoot-Suiters and 
Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behaviour', in Collective Behaviour, ed. Ralph. H. Turncr and 
Lewis M. Killian (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957): 'To the degree, then,  to which any 
symbol evokes only one consistent set of connotations throughtout the community, only one 
general course of action with respect to that object will be indicated, and the union of diverse 
members of  the community into an acting crowd will be facilitated', p.  19. 
680 Trexler, 'Follow the Flag', Cohn, Lustfor Liherty, pp. 177-92. 
256 especially in the cities.
681  If we consider Marcel's revolt  in Paris,  chronicle 
accounts  and also  remissions indicate the importance of costume and image in 
the  uprising.  This  is  made  clear by  the  remissions,  like  this  one  issued  to 
Guillaume Ie Fevre: 
They wore a silver buckle enamelled half in vermilion, half in blue, with 
'to a  good  end'  written  underneath  it.  And they wore  parti-coloured 
hoods as a sign to live or die with this provost, against all others.
682 
This  symbol was clearly known in Paris, and the crown mentions it in several 
remissions.  It is also  clear that a substantial number of these individuals were 
specifically indicted for  wearing this  costume.  Not only was  it known to  the 
French  crown  and  the  Parisian  people,  but  other  rebels  in  the  north.  For 
example, in Amiens,  'they put on the hoods, part blue and red, as  a sign of their 
unity and alliance with the city of Paris,.683  Symbolism was not trapped solely 
within the crowd that was rioting, but it could spread beyond the boundaries to 
other crowds and other rebels - it could mean as much to outsiders as it did to the 
rebels themselves. 
We see nothing that matches the complexity of the urban examples, but 
there is  scattered evidence of symbolism connected with the rising.  Pierre de 
Montfort, for example, while attempting to  convince the people of Caen to join 
the revolt, showed unity with the Jacques by replacing the feather in his hat with 
a model plough.
684  If this symbol was understandable to  the townsmen, as the 
document states,  then the men of Caen were both aware of the Jacquerie,  and 
considered it to  be of a rural origin. Other than that,  we have the account of the 
Chroniqllc des  QlIatres  Valois,  which describes the rebels as  draped in banners 
6,1  Cohn, LlIst/or Liberty, pp.  183-188. 
682 AN, JJ86, f.  85, no.  255, reprinted in Secousse, vol  I, pp.  83-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  192-3. 
683  AN, 1186, f.  78, no.  239, reprinted in Secousse, pp. 97-9, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  197-8. 
684 AN, JJ87, f.  136, n. 23 L reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie. pp. 291-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp.  189-91. 
257 emblazoned with the fleur-de-lis.  The 'fleur-de-lis', especially in the context of 
the  Hundred Years War,  is  powerfully symbolic:  the  symbol had been burned 
into  popular consciousnesses  as  a  stereotype  for  'peace and justice,.685  This 
account  only  applies  to  Cale's  force,  and  as  established  earlier,  this  did  not 
represent the whole rebellion.  As we mentioned, the clu'onicler may not be the 
most  reliable  source  on  the  revolt.  However,  if either  this  account  or  the 
remission is  accurate, the acceptance of some form  of insignia was  a sign that 
symbolism could be impOliant for these rebels, even if not to  the same extent as 
for their urban counterparts. 
Communities may have acted independently in selecting their own targets,  but 
they could and  did communicate ideas tlu'ough  a variety of means.  Not only 
were letters transfen'ed between rebel groups, but non-verbal signs and signals 
could both bring together conu11Unities as well as spread the message to those yet 
to  rise.  Moreover,  the  infrastructure and  social  organisation meant that rural 
villages (villes) could pass these messages along established routes.  As we have 
seen, individuals with links to  other villages or towns could bring the message to 
new settlements, like Pierre de MontfOli in Caen, or could organise the peasants 
together,  like  Jean  Favresse  who  brought  together  several  small  villages  to 
defend  against  the  possibility  of a  noble  attack.  Jacques  Chennievieres,  of 
Taverney (Val d'Oise), could lead the neighbouring settlement of Montmorency 
in violence. 
The  real  success  of the  Jacquerieis  apparent  in  the  speed  at  which 
peasantry outside the Beauvaisis, upon the first outbreak of  rebellion, themselves 
685  Menache, The  Vox Dei, p. 201. 
258 took up anns.  That message could be transmitted in a variety of fonns but the 
power of the message is what seemed important: speeches, phrases and letters all 
seemed to have a lasting legacy that could easily be recalled by the courts and the 
appellants months and years later when remissions were issued.  The citizens of 
Caen may have seen the plough on  Pierre de  Montfort's cap, and knew that it 
symbolised the  rising  of the  peasants;  the  authorities  considered the message 
powerful enough for Pierre to be anested, over 100 miles nOlih of the supposed 
heartland of the revolt. 
259 7 - CONCLUSION 
At the end of October and November 2005, the disaffected youth of the housing 
projects around the major French cities, stmiing in Paris, rose up into large-scale 
social  protest.  Although  only  one person  was  killed,  thousands  of cars  were 
burnt, numerous buildings were destroyed and public services disrupted in  the 
ensuing violence.  The incidents caused political tunnoil throughout France, and 
led to  the opening of political discussions  on  subjects ranging from  inner-city 
poverty  to  the  uniculturalist  attitude  that  supposedly  defined  French  cultural 
policies up until that point.  686 
The riots lasted roughly until  18 November, or twenty-two days.  In the 
intemational press, they were often described as a purely Parisian problem - for 
example, ABC News ran a 'special report' on the 'Paris Riots in Perspective,.687 
Any true perspective on the rioting would have identified that  a national (and 
international,  in the  case of some  'sympathy riots'  in neighbouring countries) 
problem,  affecting  274  towns  over  departements  as  far  from  Paris  as  Ille-et-
Vilaine and Bas-Rhin in the north and west, and Alpes-Maritimes and Pyrenees-
Atlantiques in the south.
688 
While many intemational commentators ignored the scope and scale of 
the uprising, their focus naturally fell on the damage and disruption caused.  The 
686 For example, see A.  Duval Smith, 'The Week Paris Burned', The Observer, 6 November 
2006, available at http://observcL£U3rdian.co.uk/focus/storv/0.6903,1635373,00.html; ], 
Baudrillard,  'The Pyres of Autumn; NeH' Left Review 37 (2006), pp. 5-7; a series of  papers 
available at htm://riotstrance.ssrc.or£ ascribe the root causc ofthc violence to (amongst other 
factors) sociology, economics or post-colonial apmiheid. 
687  'Paris Riots in Pcrspective', ABC News Special Report, 4 November 2005, accessed 31 March 
2006 http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id= 1280843. 
638  'Linkcd' attacks were reported in Spain, Berlin, Switzerland, Belgium. the Netherlands, 
Greece and Denmark.  Many of these attacks demonstrated similar methods (the burning of cars 
and trashcans) and professed sympathy with the bal1lieue inhabitants.  For example, on  II 
November 2005 a crowd of 80 youths attacked the French Institute in Thessalonika, Greece.  In 
the French Caribbean colony of Guadeloupe, there were also riots. 
260 violence caught the eye of many journalists and academics, who emphasised the. 
seemingly unorganised rampages of the disaffected urban youth in a style that 
encouraged  compmison  with  the  Jacquerie  of 1358.  For  example,  Bernard 
Henri-Levy wrote in Le Point that the riots were: 
A  sinister  energy  of pure  hatred.  A  nihilistic  whirlwind  of violence 
without  idea  or  plan  which  intoxicates  itself:  town  by  town,  in  the 
reflection of its own spectacle in the TV images,  which is itself just as 
fixated [with the violence].689 
This idea of  nihilistic violence was furthered by Swiss journalist Martin Meyer: 
They  may be increasingly  'nihilist',  and  armed  with  a  willingness  to 
COlllillit  a violence honed by thousands of computer games.  The events 
satisfy their desire  for  action,  and are  steered  by the  vague  'idea'  that 
'this'll show the people in power'. But this mentality, far from theory and 
doctrine,  makes  it  extremely difficult  for the  public  secmity forces  to 
respond efficiently. The more a spontaneous terror movement sees itself 
as 'playful', the more difficult it is to tackle.690 
Despite this  emphasis  on  a  meaningless  'whirlwind'  of destruction,  Levy did 
note,  however,  that  there  was  organisation  ('the  group  joined,  with  mobiles, 
exchanging text messages), the groups were effective (,mobile units') and there 
was  some  sort  of programme  (the movement  would not  stop  'until they had 
burned or tried to bum every last representative building of France and the State 
of Law,).691  Indeed, a riot reported to have started when teenagers died hiding 
from the police in an electricity installation ended in the destruction of several 
power stations  in  Amiens.  It was  even  suggested  by some  that  there  were 
shadowy organisations operating behind the rebels: In The Spectator, Rod Liddle 
commentated that'  [i]t may well be that the motive for the rioting was nothing 
more than an inchoate grievance allied to youthful exuberance and a penchant for 
6~9 B.-H.  Levy, 'Sur l'explosion des banlieucs', Le Point,  10 November 2005. 
690  M.  Meyer, . Frankreich brennt', Nelle Ziircher Zeitlll1g, 7 November 2005, h·ans. 
www.signandsight.com. 
691  Levy, 'Sur l'explosin des banlieues', Le Point,  10 November 2005. 
261 bad  behaviour,  but  it  was  Islam  which  gave  it  an  identity  and  also  its 
retrospective  raison  d'etre.,692  Interior  Minister Nicolas  Sarkozy  hinted  at  a 
'1  .  .  , b  h'  d  h  1  693  NIl  1  d  fi  .  arge orgal11SatlOn  e  m  t  e revo t.  onet 1e ess, t 1e  e mmg comment on 
the banlieue rioting was that it was a revolt without a message or progr31mne. 
The links between this reportage and the chroniclers' depictions of the Jacquerie 
are  obvious.  A  French phenomenon  reported  as  a  Parisian  problem,  in  the 
fom1er case; in the latter, a revolt covering virtually the whole of the north, but 
repOlied as only taking place in the lIe de France.  Both were described as revolts 
seemingly  without  'meaning'.  The  chroniclers,  like  today's  cOlmnentators, 
repOlied  a  certain  organisation  within  the  revolt,  but  these  accounts  were 
discarded in favour of tales of extreme violence (on the part of both the peasantry 
and the  nobility).  As  later commentators will be influenced by the images of 
buming vehicles in Seine-Saint-Denis, modem historians have been influenced 
by the accounts  of violence recorded by the chroniclers.  The  'blazing fire  of 
fifteen days' ,694 which could not have been organised because 'the peasants were 
too brutish',  695  is a product of the most salacious reportage by contemporaries. 
Yet as  early as  the  nineteenth century,  Simeon Luce had uncovered a 
source that allowed historians to understand mechanisms of this 'rampage'.  The 
letters of remission, recorded in the Royal Chancery records, offered insight into 
individual rebels and rebel communities.  Although they have since been used by 
a variety of historians, the Pieces Justificatives  compiled by Simeon Luce has 
692 R.  Liddle. The Spec/aror,  11  November 2005. 
69.'  C.  Salhani, 'Bedlam to Ballot: More to French Riots than meets the eye', II Nowmber 2005, 
htip:llwww.khalecjtimcs.com/Displavmiicle.asp?section=opinion&xfilc=data/opinion!2005!nove 
mbcr/opinion  novcmber79.xml. 
694 Leguai:Les revoltes ruralcs', p. 58. 
695  Flammermont, 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis',  p.  12. 
262 ever since been assumed to represent the fun extent of the surviving sources.  In 
truth, Luce's collection was only a small proportion of them, and concentrated on 
the  attack  on  Meaux  rather  than  the  Jacquerie  itself,  and  curiously,  his  own 
analysis  drew  more  upon  the  chroniclers  than  the  remissions  he  skilfully 
transcribed.  He barely scratched the surface of  these sources' potential. 
Letters of remission offer those interested in the rebellions of 1358 access 
to  over two  hundred individual testimonies about the  events  of that rebellious 
summer.  They  offer  vital  crucial  information  about  individual  rebels  and 
communities,  including  geographical  data,  names  and  dates.  Moreover,  the 
nanatives themselves contain a variety of  data that can, when compiled, give us a 
real sense of the character of the Jacquerie. 
Of course,  remissions  were  not  available  to  all  rebels.  They  were 
intended for exceptions:  for those who missed the general amnesty, those who 
felt  they were harshly treated or those  who  could afford an advocate on their 
behalf.  We have no sense of  the total proportion of  rebels this sample represents, 
and the circumstances sunounding the production of remissions suggest that the 
sample is  weighted towards the better-off Jacques.  Neither should we  always 
take their narratives at face value;  these documents were primarily intended to 
put  the  supplicant's  case  in  as  positive  a  fashion  as  possible,  and  utilised 
formulae  that  were  familiar  to  the  crown - tenns like gens  du  plat-pays - to 
appeal in a context most likely to bring them forgiveness. 
Yet even  within  the rigid formulae,  we  can discem infonnation of the 
nature of the revolt.  Although recent scholarship has emphasised links between 
the Jacquerie and the rebellions of Marcel and Charles ofNavane, the remissions 
suggest  that  the  each  individual  movement was  almost entirely  distinct.  The 
263 Jacque1ie  was  not  a co-opted rebellion as  Cazelles and Bessen concluded;  the 
crown of France certainly makes clear that each revolt was unconnected.  Even 
the example of Jacques and Parisian cooperation at Meaux is unsupPOlied; apmi 
from  Jean  Froissart's  second-hand  account,  no  other  evidence  points  to  the 
Jacques playing a large part in the attack on the Marche. 
Studying the Jacquerie through the remissions highlights that many of the 
old models concerning medieval revolt  are  simply inadequate.  The Jacquerie 
was certainly not a food  riot,  which historians such as  Rude claimed to  be the 
most  common  form  of the  so-called  'pre-industrial 1iot,.696  Neither were  its 
participants  primarily women.  Neither  could  the  revolt  be  marked  as  being 
dominated by the clergy, as  Berce and other emphasised for the whole of 'pre-
industrial  Europe'.  697  These  Jacques  were  peasants,  agricultural  labourers  or 
semi-skilled workers who lived and worked in the rural economy. 
But  there  is  more  to  the  remissions  than  simply  negating  CUlTent 
scholarship.  They indicate exactly how a large-scale revolt  like  the  Jacquerie 
could function.  Rather than one grand 'army' led by a general, the Jacques were 
hundreds of individual units attacking their own targets.  The unit tended to be 
the  most natural  bond in  rural  society - the  village.  The  community where 
peasants controlled common places and local customs was the same community 
in  which they rose up  as  rebels.  These villages selected local objectives,  and 
waged often successful campaigns to destroy their local nobles' property. 
Villages did not need to remain independent, although they often did.  On 
occasion, they joined together with other local groups to fOTIn  substantial forces, 
696  G.  Rude, 'The London Mob of  the eighteenth century', The Historical JOllrnal,  v.  2 (1959), 
pp.I-18. 
697 Y.-M. Berce, Revolt and Revollition in eadv modem Europe, an esssay Oil the histolY oI 
political violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), trans. J.  Bergin, pp. 67-9. 
264 able to  destroy local fortifications and houses.  To do  so,  they used a variety of 
methods  of conU11Unication,  including  the  written  word;  they  also  organised 
regional  assemblies and  congregations where they could decide on a course of 
action,  even if they eventually chose to  return to  their pastures without further 
action.  Even when these assemblies were large, however, the focus  remained 
localised:  assemblies  near  Saint-Dizier  or  south  of Paris  did  not  look  to  the 
supposed heartland of the ile de France, but concentrated on nearby installations 
and fortifications. 
Moreover, the villages were led by local people, not outside agitators or 
lieutenants  sent  out by Etienne  Marcel,  although  they all  perfonned different 
actions like ananging offensives or defensive fOliifications, These leaders came 
from peasant backgrounds and the villages themselves, or from nearby parishes, 
and were promoted from  within the ranks of rebels,  rather than from outside. 
Tactics were detennined by the peasants and landworkers, not elites or ariisans; 
from top to bottom, the Jacquerie was a peasants' revolt. 
While  this  image  of the  Jacquerie  may contrast with  older  Images  of 
revolt,  it  minors  the  cunent  emphasis  from  social  psychologists,  who  have 
sought to  explain the complexity of  popular movements and return the emphasis 
onto the insurgents themselves, rather than outside forces like the nobility.698  It 
also min'ors  the work of recent scholarship into the popular movements of the 
Middle Ages.  Systematic study of hundreds of medieval revolts has shown that 
'not  even  class-prejudiced  chroniclers  suggested  that  the  subaltern  classes 
depend on outside social superiors to lead them'.  699  They were often large-scale, 
69S  Reicher, The Psychology of  Crowd Dynamics (in press). 
699 Cohn, Lustfal" Liberty, p.  129. 
265 well-organised, had lofty ideals (although on  this we have little evidence from 
the Jacquerie) and created bold plans of  attack. 
The Jacquerie was undoubtedly different to the majority of revolts of the 
Middle  Ages.  That  the  chroniclers  treated  the  revolt  and  the  retaliation  as 
exceptional, plus the sudden weight put on the legal infrastructure with the mass 
issuing of remissions designed to  restore the peace in the countryside, indicates 
something entirely new in the crown's experience.  Yet much of this can be 
accounted for by the scale of the uprising,  stretching as  it  did across much of 
northern France.  Naturally, such a large revolt had a bigger emotional impact for 
the  chroniclers and the crown than  did  the more regular urban uprising,  often 
confined within city walls.  There was more violence, but possibly proportionate 
to  the increased scale of the rebellion.  The nobles' retaliation was bloodier, but 
the  crown sought to  temper it  by sounding a  conciliatory tone in its  issues of 
pardons and fines for the damage. 
In these new models, the Jacques were rebels who fought with a purpose, 
were often successful  (at least in  their short-term, accomplishing their tactical 
missions)  and  were  capable  of organising themselves  without  the  help  of the 
nobility.  Rather than a post-traumatic psychological reaction to  the coming of 
the Black Death, or an explosion of exasperation from the destitute peasantry, the 
peasants  in  this  area  acted  to  protect  their  communities  against  the  military 
nobility who they saw as responsible for the bligandage then sweeping across the 
countryside.  Many  similar peasant  communities  in this  period  echoed these 
actions, some of  which were also mistaken for taking part in the Jacquerie, like at 
Vitteaux  near Dijon.7oo  Nor did  this  movement  die  with  the  Jacques;  rather 
700 See'  Peasant Resistance'. p.  182-196. 
266 resistance  to  anned  individuals  marked  the  relationship. between  crown  and 
peasants for at least the next several years. 
The tendency to  describe the Jacquerie of 1358  as akin to  the mindless 
displays  of violence  in  the  wake  of the  Black  Death,  like  the  Flagellant 
movement, is incorrect; rather, it is far closer to what has been described the so-
called cluster of 'complex revolts' between 1378 and 1382.  The Jacquerie was 
not  'incoherent'  nor  'spontaneous',  the  adjectives  Mollat  and  Wolff used  to 
describe  it.
701  Rather,  it  was  organised  and  directed  with  clear  targets  and 
identifiable chiefs,  Using the remissions, we have come a long way from Jean Ie 
Bel descriptions of the leaderless rebels' 'mindless rampage'  .702  The rediscovery 
of the Jacquerie as  a dynamic movement of related peasant settlements renders 
d  ..  l'k'  ,  ff  h  k 7()i  escnptlOns  1  e  'unllnportant  as  0  t  e  mar r.  •  The  Jacquerie  needs  to 
reassume its rightful place as the most impol1ant social movement in the history 
of  medieval France, as the chroniclers knew, and the remissions prove. 
701  MoJlat and Woltl, Popular Revollltions, p.  128. 
~02 BcI, Chrol1., v.2, p.  256, trans. Cohn, PP. p.  151. 
703  Lcguai:Lcs revoltes rurales', p. 58. 
267 Appendix I: Letters of remission connected to the Jacquerie 
Remissions issued to suspected Jacques 
This  table  includes  all  remissions  issued to  supplicants  (either  individuals  or 
communities)  that  were  suspected  of being  part  of the  Jacquerie.  When 
'individuals'  is  used,  it  indicates that a  number of persons  were  identified by 
name;  when  'inhabitants'  is  used,  the  remission  is  issued  to  the  entire 
community.  Note in  some cases remissions refer to  a  specific individual and 
'others  of the  said  ville':  in  this  table,  only  the  name  of the  supplicant  is 
recorded. 
SERIES  ITEM  ISSUED TO  ... 
(JJ) 
86  203  Oudal1 Rouy and Colet Yon 
86  205  Jacquin de Chennievieres 
86  207  Inhabitants ofBoissy-sous-Yon and Egly 
86  208  Several individuals from St. Martin (near Paris) 
86  215  Inhabitants of  Boissy 
86  221  Guillaume Lanyeux 
86  222  Jean Boulaille 
86  223  Jean Leber 
86  224  Jean Ourcel 
86  ?,.,') 
_J~  Vincent de la Vallee 
86 
'),., - _J)  Thomas Couereusse 
86  239  Inhabitants of Amiens 
86  244  Jehan Fillon 
86  246  Inhabitants of  Precy-sur-Oise 
86  247  Jehan de Four and Jacquet de Saux 
86  249  Guillaume Ie Charron 
86  250  Enguerran and Guillaume de la Mare 
86  254  Colin du Bruille 
86  256  Oudart Ie Colet 
86  262  Raoul Ie Bouchier 
86  265  Jean Morel 
86  267  Robert des Jardins 
86  268  Simon Ie Cordier 
86  269  8 individuals from Lucy-Ie-Bocage 
86  275  Thiebaut Ie Maire 
86  280  Inhabitants of  Vemars-sur-Oise 
86  286  Four individuals from Tremblay 
86  291  Colin Francoise and Nicolas Ie Fremy 
86  297  Gauchier Lore 
86  298  Jean Huillot 
86  299  Pierre Hardi 
86  304  Six individuals from Loncjumeau 
86  305  .Tehan Ie Bouchier 
86  306  Tassin de Lannoy 
268 86  308  Colmi du Four 
86  309  Germain de Reveillon 
86  310  Phillipe Ie Bouquillon 
86  311  Inhabitants of Saint-Vrain 
86  313  Roulant Ma1etrache 
86  314  Jean Gore 
86  320  Simon Ie Choine 
86  "')') 
.)-~  Inhabitants ofNeuilly-Ste-Fronte 
86  326  30 individuals from Belleau 
86  329  Inhabitants ofFontenay-les-Briis 
86  338  Pierre Benart and others from Liancourt 
86  342  J ehan Renmi 
86  344  Co1mi Ie Maunier 
86  345  Estienne Ie Champion 
86  346  Inhabitants of  BetiancoUli and Vroi1 
86  352  Wife of Penot de Soissons 
86  353  Estienne Asse and others of  Montmorency 
86  355  Jean Ie J  acquirunmi 
86  356  Jacquet Diane 
86  357  Inhabitants of  Heiltz-Ie-Maurupt 
86  358  Inhabi tants of  Etrepy 
86  359  Inhabitants of Vitry-Ia-Ville 
86  360  Inhabitants ofBignicourt and Drouilly 
86  361  Etienne No1on 
86  362  Jean Ie Grant 
86  363  Inhabitants of  Mennency 
86  364  Jean Bruyant 
86  365  Jean Rose 
86  366  Guillaume Brnyant 
86  368  Badouin Ie Charon 
86  369  Badouin Ie Paris 
86  370  Henri di Vi1ain 
86  377  Inhabitants of villages around Heiltz-Ie-Hutier 
86  378  Inhabitants of Songy 
86  379  Inhabitants of  La Chapelle-sur-Colle 
86  380  Inhabitants of villages around Reims 
86  383  Jean Ie Gentil 
86  384  Lambert d'Autrefontaine 
86  385  Denisot Rebours 
86  386  .Tehan Nerenget 
86  387  .Tehan Bernie 
86  388  Inhabitants of Maisons 
86  391  Arnoul Guenelon 
86  393  Inhabitants of  Balan  court 
86  395  Denisot Rebours 
86  396  Baudin Ie Chanon 
86  397  Guillaume de Trie 
86  421  J  ehan Charnel 
269 86  422  Simon Ie Cordier 
86  424  Inhabitants of  Cravant 
86 
4')~  _J  Jean du Bois 
86  430  Gillebari Colas 
86  437  Inhabitants of Montdidier 
86  444  Jean des Hayes 
86  456  Adam Ie Coq 
86  465  Colin Ie Barbier 
86  477  Warnier Ie Pontonnier 
86  480  Inhabitants ofBeaumont-sur-Oise 
86  484  Inhabitants ofXanteuiI and Abliages 
485  Inhabitants of Sagi-Ia-Ville, Courtemanche, Prusieux 
86  and other villages around Pontoise 
486  Inhabitants  of  Orgenay  and  other  villages  near 
86  Meulan 
86  495  Mahieu and Perrin Cordelle 
86  496  Inhabitants ofBoran-sur-Oise 
86  496.5  Inhabitants of  Herennoville near Pontoise 
86  498  Pierre Ie Bouchier 
86  510  Iehan de Relenguet 
86  511  Gieffroy de Chennevieres, Henry Ie Pennetier, Raoul 
de Meulis. 
86  524  Inhabitants of  Loissy-sur-Marne 
86  5""  .).)  Inhabitants of  Pethes 
86  534  Guy Michelet 
86  571  Pierre Ie Macon 
86  578  Inhabitants of Saint-Lumier 
86  584  Regnaut Corbel 
86  596  Inhabitants ofChavanges 
86  597  I ehan de la Basse 
87  46  Thomas de la Franc 
87  117  Garnot Bellehere 
87  118  J ehan de BruneI 
87  231  PielTe de MontfOli 
88  2  Radolpho Ie Fevre 
88  9  Nicolas Ie Mane 
88  31  Guerart de l'Esglantier 
88  43  J ehan Heudemare 
88  89  Inhabitants of GouyencoUli 
88  213  Rauol de Fevre 
90  48  Inhabitants of  Lorris 
90  76  Inhabitants of  Ferrieres 
90  82  Colin Fabri 
90  110  Inhabi  tants of  Vennenton 
90  III  Inhabitants of  Cerny 
90  161  Jacquet Bedin 
90  162  Francisco de Berne 
90  174  Johannes de Prunot 
270 90  235  Phillipe Barnet 
90  243  Pierrot de la Sene 
90  244  Jehan HUliout 
90  271  Inhabitants ofBouchy-Ie-Repos 
90  288  Hue de Sailleville 
90  292  Jean FlageoIot 
90  293  Michel Matiin 
90  294  Jean Ie Fieron 
90  354  Gilles Ie Haguez 
90  356  Jean Lespert 
90  364  Pierre Paignant 
90  387  J ehan Hequet 
90  413  Pierre TrousseI 
90  419  Individual Ie Plessis-Bouchard 
90  423  Roger Rogier and others 
90  424  Pierre de Colebart and Pierre Rogier 
90  425  Pierre Ia Barreur 
90  446  Jehan Bonte 
90  476  Fremy Houdier 
90  488  Inhabitants of  Marly-le-Roi 
90  496  Thomas Suavale 
90  556  Guillame de la Sengle and Jean Guillaume 
90  564  Inhabitants of  Beauvais 
90  629  Henry Ravet 
90  635  Guillaume Porel 
91  71  Inhabitants of  Dracy 
92  237  Inhabi tants of  Courtemanche 
92  277  Inhabitants of Fontaine-sous-Montdidier 
94  4  J  ehan Ourcel 
94  26  Jean and Robert Arnoul 
96  179  Perrin de Verberie 
96  393  Baudouin Ie Vasseur 
96  425  Jean Bouquet 
97  358  Individuals from Cachy 
98  252  Mahieu de Leurel 
99  480  Martin Ie Tanneur 
100  643  J  ehan Chacon 
100  683  Jean de Dore 
101  55  J  ehan Ourcel 
102  9  Jean Macreux 
102  96  Gilot and Jehan Dudelonge 
102  272  Sicart Ie Barbier 
106  393  Gille de Roy 
109  173  Guillaume Ie Penettier and Jean Cochonet 
271 Remissions issued to non-Jacques that concem the Jacguelie 
The  remissions  tabulated  below  were  issued  to  supplicants  that  were  not 
considered to be Jacques, but the remission nalTatives detail either the Jacque6e 
itself or the retaliation that followed.  Sometimes they do both - for example, the 
remission  for  Ancel  la  Pippe  justifies  his  involvement  in  the  retaliation  by 
detailing the climes of the men of Acy against him. 
SERIES  ITEM  ISSUED TO  ... 
(JJ) 
86  130  Jean de Donnans 
86  131  Mathiu de Roucy 
86  142  Seigneur of Saint-Dizier 
86  153  Jean de Chap  on oval 
86  171  Jacques des Essarts 
86  173  Jean de Crevecoeuer 
86  258  Phillipe de Baucencourt 
86  352  PelTot des Soissons 
86  356  Jacquet Diacre 
86  372  Gui de la Conte 
86  373  Renier la Pippe 
86  395  Robin Charettier 
86  396  Raoul and Guillaume Ie  Mabot,  Guiot  de  Tremibiit, 
Jean de Hauchies and Jean Gobart 
86  402  Nobles of  Trezan 
86  406  Maraguos Behosque 
86  419  Thomas Cousterel 
86  420  Bligands ofMontlhery 
86  421  Jean Charuel 
86  429  PielTe Langlois 
86  436  Count of Vaudemont 
86  456  Adam la C  oq 
86  578  Seigneur of Saint-Dizier 
88  31  Guerart de I  'Esglantier 
90  151  PielTe d'Escart 
90  444  Brigands ofLa-Celle-en-Brie 
90  519  Nobles involved with the ganison at Meaux 
90  530  Ancel la Pippe 
91  3""  .:U  Jean de Bonneuil 
96  179  Nobles at Pont-Saint-Maxence 
96  393  Badouin Ie Vasseur 
96  425  Nobles at Pont-Saint-Maxence 
97  358  Nobles at Cachy 
100  478  Jacquet de Bamain 
100  683  Gilot Dudelonge 
102  96  Sicmi Ie Barbier 
102  276  Gilot and Jean Dudelonge 
107  186  Squire of I--Iangest 
108  80  Robert Rogois 
115  297  Knights of Gien 
145  498  Nobles at Plainville 
272 Appendix II: Letters of remission concerning the revolt in Paris 1358 
Series (JJ)  Item  Issued to ... 
86  185  Jean Morelet 
86  206  Pierre de Lagny 
86  209  Nicolas Ie Flament 
86  211  Jean Chandelier 
86  213  Jean Ie Ladre 
86  214  Guillaume Ie Fevre 
86  216  Jacques du Chatel 
86  220  Nicolas de la COUli Nemie 
86  230  Jean Hersent 
86  233  Laurens de Veullettes 
86  236  Rauol d'Aucamps 
86  238  Jehan de Monteux 
86  240  Men of Paris 
86  248  Hemy de Chastillon 
86  252  Guillot Bonnachet 
86  253  Jehan Fagnet 
86  255  Guillaume Ie Fevre * 
86  271  Gieffron Ie Flament 
86  272  Thomas Gascogne 
86  274  Guillaume Chavenoil 
86  278  Etienne de la Fontaine 
86  282  Etienne de Resnie 
86  285  Phillipe de J eurre 
86  288  Men of  Meaux 
86  289  Jehan Pisdoe 
86  290  Thibaud Farcault 
86  292  Maron Pisdcie 
86  300  J  ehan de la Ramee 
86  312  Iehan Rose 
86  340  J  eannin des Champs 
86  341  Regnault Blouart 
86  371  Jehan de Lyon 
86  390  Guillaume d'  Augeuil 
86  519  Salemon de la Tour 
86  527  Jehan de Saint-Leu 
90  66  Men of Amiens 
90  78  Nicolas de la COUli-Nemie * 
* This remission is a duplicate of a previous document 
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